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

The Oxford Handbook *of* POLITICS IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

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Edited by

MELANI CAMMETT

and

PAULINE JONES

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THE inspiration for this book came from a coauthored piece in the *Annual Review of Political Science* that we published in 2014 titled “Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?” The prevailing assumption that we questioned in that article is very much linked to the presumptions about the role of religion in Muslim societies that we interrogate in this volume. Yet, because the scope here is much broader, we decided to bring together a diverse group of outstanding social scientists with area expertise in various parts of the Islamic world. We are grateful to these scholars for accepting our invitation to contribute to this volume and for embracing our goal to investigate rather than presume both whether and how religion influences social, political, and economic outcomes in Muslim societies.

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CHAPTER 1

POLITICS IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

What's Religion Got to Do with It?

MELANI CAMMETT AND PAULINE JONES

In Western scholarship, depictions of social and political life in the Muslim world oscillate between emphasizing the importance of religion and rejecting its relevance altogether. Based on an essentialist definition of religion, an earlier generation of scholars claimed that Islam plays an outsize role (Huntington 1996, Kedourie 1994;, Lewis 1995; Patai 1973). Others contend that religion has a minimal influence at best, especially when religion is defined as doctrine (Anderson 2001; Lust 2011; Tibi 2012). Although social scientists with area expertise have long cautioned against a reductionist understanding of Islam and politics, at least until very recently, Western scholarship has regarded Muslim-majority states[1] as places where religion dominates social and political life, requiring distinct analytical approaches (Cammett and Kendall 2021; Mitchell 2004; Said 1981; Tessler et al. 1999). The question thus remains: *What's religion got to do with it*? *How—if at all—does religion influence social, political, and economic outcomes in the Muslim world*? In this chapter, we explore this question based on a definition of religion that moves beyond doctrine. Importantly, our definition—and many of the core claims we make based on this definition—is not unique to Muslim-majority states and societies, but can apply more generally to Western and non-Western contexts with distinct dominant religious traditions.

Our broader aim in this volume is to integrate the study of politics in Muslim societies into mainstream comparative analytical frameworks. Toward this goal, we focus on some of the most salient outcomes of interest in the social sciences, including regime type, political behavior, social mobilization, economic development, and governance. We take seriously the relevance of religion in Muslim societies, while seeking both to clarify its role and probe its limitations in explaining these social, political, and economic outcomes. Collectively, the chapters in this volume provide a partial but robust illustration of emerging Western scholarship that takes this approach.[2] They provide insight not only into whether religion shapes these outcomes, but also under what conditions and through which mechanisms it does so. The broad geographical scope of the contributions to this volume, moreover, enables us to both situate and evaluate these claims in diverse contexts across the Muslim world.

Within much of the scholarly community, the claim that religion is not the root cause of various social, political, and economic outcomes in the Muslim world has become the conventional wisdom. While we share this assessment, we contend that it is based on a narrow definition of religion as doctrine—that is, the set of beliefs and practices that delimit a particular faith. Indeed, perhaps the most common finding across the chapters in this volume is that Islamic doctrine has little or no impact on a wide array of outcomes, including political attitudes toward democracy, governance and economic development, political participation, voting behavior, and even support for Islamist parties. This is not to say that doctrine is unimportant, but rather that that there is no singular interpretation of Islamic doctrine (hence, the small d) and that its agency depends on other aspects of religion that are often overlooked. We define religion as both the beliefs and practices that constitute doctrine and the infrastructure that sustains these beliefs and practices. As we argue in this chapter, doctrine is critical to understanding religion's potential force, whereas infrastructure—specifically, social organization (i.e., institutions and actors) and social identity—is the key to understanding why, when, and where religion has agency to enact that force.

Based on this definition of religion, we can offer general insights about how religion influences a variety of important social, political, and economic outcomes (see Figure 1.1). Our goal is not to make universal claims, but rather to understand the effects of religious institutions, actors, and identities in a given context. As the contributions in this volume illustrate, by this definition, the influence of religion can operate through multiple mechanisms and is elevated under a diverse set of conditions. It thus can also have distinct effects, depending on the particular context. At the same time, given their cross-regional breath, the chapters point to some common mechanisms, conditions, and effects across Muslim-majority societies, despite their immense diversity.

First, religion as social organization can provide a technology of mobilization, particularly under conditions of state repression. Religious institutions, such as mosques


Facilitating Conditions
- State repression
- Religious actors empowered
- Violent conflict/civil war
RELIGION =
Social organization
doctrine
Social identity
Mechanisms
- Coordinates & sanctions behavior
- Shapes attitudes
- Creates social bonds
- Collective action
- Political preferences
- Economic opportunities
(Selected) Outcomes
- Social & political mobilization
- Voting behavior
- Regime legitimacy
- Support for democracy
- Attitudes toward violence
- Governance
- Economic development

FIGURE 1.1 How religion influences social and political outcomes.

or affiliated agencies, as well as religious elites with standing in their communities, can coordinate and sanction individuals, helping to overcome barriers to collective action needed for social and political change. Likewise, social networks, which are often fostered or reinforced by religious institutions and actors and may be rooted in shared religious identity, can facilitate mobilization around social and political ends. Social networks can also contribute to individual decisions to participate in collective action, for example by propagating specific interpretations of doctrine that can be used to justify certain social and political goals.

Second, religion as social identity can impact social and political outcomes through the communal bonds it fosters among religious adherents or members of the same religion. Consistent with psychological theories of identity and intergroup relations, religion as social identity can play a powerful role in shaping individual and collective attitudes and behavior and transforming them into action. This is particularly the case under conditions of conflict or instability. For example, threats against members of a religious group make individuals identify more strongly with the group in question (Huddy et al. 2007), and religion can address a vital need for security and community (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The power of religion as social identity is in fact what makes it so attractive to nonreligious actors, such as political and communal elites, who deliberately deploy this identity in public pronouncements to shore up support. The sectarianization of social identities during conflicts waged in the name of religion also lends support to these psychological theories.

Finally, religion is best situated to influence social and political outcomes when religious institutions and actors are empowered—for example, via state institutions that elevate their status or via access to scarce resources. Across the Muslim world, historical and more contemporary developments have endowed religious elites with political authority and control over economic resources, giving them an advantaged position to influence not only popular attitudes and political behavior but also access to social and economic opportunities. This edge may arise because religious elites utilize their control over formal state institutions to constrain attitudes and behavior or to undermine the development of new institutions that might rival their own. It can also arise because religious elites utilize the promise of access to scarce resources to incentivize popular compliance with directives. These resources enhance the psychological appeal of religion as a social identity, which can bolster the ability of religious institutions and actors to influence social and political attitudes and behavior.

In the remainder of this chapter, we illustrate these arguments in more detail with specific references to the chapters in this volume. We begin by developing our conceptualization of religion, which builds on a sociological approach, and by justifying our emphasis on religion as infrastructure—that is, social organization and identity. The subsequent three sections focus on how religion as social organization and religion as social identity shape these outcomes, and then point to the areas in which even a multifaceted understanding of religion appears not to illuminate the outcomes in question. We conclude by summarizing our main analytical points.

DEFINING RELIGION

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community, called a church, all those who adhere to them.
>
> —Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, 1982, 129

> [I]t is intellectually imprudent and historically misguided to discuss the relationships between Islam and politics as if there were one Islam, timeless and eternal.
>
> —Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 1996, v.

Defining religion is an excursion into well-traveled intellectual and spiritual territory. Admittedly, there are many competing yet equally valid understandings of what religion is. Our aim is not to review or critique the rich and expansive literature across disciplines that seeks to conceptualize either religion in general or Islam in particular. Nor is it to provide a definition of religion that is appropriate for all times, places, and questions. Rather, our intent is to offer a definition that serves the two-fold purpose of this volume: (1) to explore the role that religion plays in shaping contemporary social, political, and economic outcomes in Muslim-majority countries while probing its limitations as an explanation; and (2) to do so in a way that integrates the study of Muslim societies into mainstream comparative analytical frameworks in the social sciences in the West. We seek to define religion, therefore, in a way that is analytically clear, empirically verifiable, and broadly applicable as well as contextually appropriate.

In sum, building on a sociological approach (particularly that of Durkheim), we conceptualize religion as multidimensional. It consists not only of doctrine—that is, "a unified system of beliefs and practices"—but also the infrastructure that sustains these beliefs and practices. Renewed emphasis on how doctrine can help to explain social and political outcomes is a welcome development. However, we place greater emphasis on infrastructure, which consists of both social organization and social identity. Doctrine is critical to understanding religion's potential force. Social organization and social identity are the key to understanding why, when, and where religion has agency to enact that force. Combined, doctrine, social organization, and social identity underscore why religion should not be viewed as merely a "moral community."

Religious Doctrine and Its Limits

About a decade ago, political scientists across subfields drew attention to the neglect of religion in social scientific inquiry and called for greater emphasis on understanding the various ways in which religion influences politics (Bellin 2008; Wald and Wilcox

2006). Some scholars also called for renewed attention to the importance of doctrine (Grzymala-Busse 2012; Philpott 2009), which had been overshadowed by the dominance of the political economy approach to the study of religion and politics (see Gill 2001 for an overview). This increased attention to religion and doctrine coincided with a proliferation of work on the Muslim world that questioned the prevalence of both religion and doctrine in explanations for social, political, and economic outcomes in Muslim states and societies. Although these seem to be contradictory trends, they are compatible in that they both acknowledge, implicitly or explicitly, the simple fact that "[d]octrine is critical, but it does not act alone" (Grzymala-Busse 2012, 126).

The recognition that doctrine lacks independent agency does not diminish its importance. We share the view with other scholars that doctrine is a core dimension of religion. It is not only what enables us to distinguish one religion from another, but also to understand religion's potential force. Defined as a unified set of beliefs and practices, doctrine is essential to understanding why an appeal to religion might resonate at the individual level and how it can be used to shape political attitudes and behavior. At the same time, focusing solely—or even primarily—on doctrine limits our understanding of both whether religion influences the outcomes we care about and how it exerts this influence, for three main reasons.

First, treating religion as doctrine alone risks mistakenly attributing a causal role to religion. Although doctrine is critical to understanding religion's potential force, it does not have the agency to enact that force. Assigning agency to doctrine is particularly problematic when it comes to Islam, given the widely held presumption that Islamic doctrine is unique because it permeates every aspect of Muslims' lives, and thus is the primary driver of their political attitudes and behavior (Cammett and Jones 2014). Moreover, the "current obsessions with Islamic texts" in the case of Islam has contributed to this misperception by serving to obscure the diversity within and across Muslim societies (Aydin 2017, 231).

Second, and related, doctrine does not speak with one voice. As others have recognized, across time and space, all the major world religions have expressed multiple iterations of doctrine (Black and Patton 2015; Stepan 2000). A large part of the reason for the "multivocal" nature of doctrine (Stepan 2000, 44) is that it is subject to interpretation. This is particularly the case for Islam, which does not vest authority in any one source for interpreting the Quran and includes multiple schools of thought. Yet it is also because doctrine is embedded in particular social and historical contexts that both gives it meaning and affirms this meaning among a particular community of adherents (Gerrish 1988, 91), making it impossible to identify a singular interpretation. This is especially relevant for Muslim communities, where "religion as a set of rules" is only intelligible "in the social context of practices" (Ismail 2004, 618; see also Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, chapter 1). Thus, doctrine is an important source for distinguishing among different faiths, but it should not be considered consistent across adherents within the same faith.

Third, doctrine is also not uniformly observed. Just as doctrine is multivocal, it is also multi-praxis. Individuals do not necessarily conform to all the beliefs and practices espoused by their religion. Nor do they do so to the same degree. Thus, we cannot assume that individuals who are members of the same religion understand or adhere to doctrine in the same way. Definitions of "religiosity" try to take this into account by conceptualizing and measuring religiosity as beliefs, behavior, and belonging (Smidt 2019), and differentiating among types of beliefs as well as individual versus communal practices (Beatty and Walter 1984; Layman 1997). Although this approach was developed to study the relationship between religion and politics in predominately Christian contexts, it has gained traction in the study of Muslim-majority countries as well (Livny 2020; Pepinskly et al. 2018). The increasing attention to not only disaggregating but also depoliticizing piety is a welcome development in light of the prevailing tendencies to reify Muslim piety and to presume that it is consistent with a singular social, political, and economic agenda.

Religion as Multidimensional

By now it is clear that we conceptualize religion as multidimensional. Drawing on Durkheim's well-known definition, we argue that religion consists not only of doctrine, but also includes the infrastructure that sustains the beliefs and practices that make up doctrine.[3] Infrastructure consists of two separate but integrally related parts: social organization and social identity. Social organization includes both institutions and actors. Combined with doctrine, it forms the third core element of religion, which we argue is not merely a "moral community" but actually a social identity. Given the aforementioned limitations of doctrine, we emphasize the role of infrastructure as the levers of religion's influence on a variety of social, political, and economic outcomes. Whereas doctrine is critical to understanding religion's potential force, infrastructure is the key to understanding why, when, and where religion has agency to enact that force.

In conceptualizing religion as social organization, we include both the institutions and actors that separate religion from other aspects of social and political life. This, of course, applies only to religion in its modern form, which makes "institutional differentiation" possible and distinguishes modern religion, for example, from folk religion (Yang 2011, 34). The institutions that comprise religion include formal and informal rules and physical structures, whereas actors operate both because of and within these institutions. Infrastructure, therefore, may be extensive. But it is not ubiquitous. Rather, it consists of specific and mutually acknowledged institutions (e.g., churches or mosques) and actors (e.g., priests or imams) within a moral community. Identifying the relevant institutions and actors for any given religion is essential for two reasons. First, like doctrine, infrastructure must be contextualized if we are to understand the role of religion across and within denominations. Second, being precise enables us to ascertain what religious infrastructure is doing and what it is not doing—that is, whether religion per se is the driver of the social, political, and economic outcomes we care about. This is particularly important in the case of Islam because it eschews the widely held presumption that Islam has a holistic influence on Muslims' lives, and thus that Islam itself has agency over their political attitudes and behavior.

Religion as social identity emerges from the combination of doctrine and social organization. Albeit discrete concepts, there has been a tendency in the context of Muslim societies to conflate religion as social identity with religion as a culture and with religiosity. On the one hand, social identity is distinct from cultural definitions of religion in that it is not all-encompassing such that it "formulat[es] conceptions of a general order of existence" (Geertz 1966, 4). On the other hand, religion as social identity is distinct from religiosity in two main ways. First, although related to doctrine, it does not depend on uniformity of interpretation or commitment. Social identity goes beyond Durkheim's notion of "a moral community" in that it recognizes there can be diversity within a community concerning adherence to doctrine, and yet the community can still be unified by religion.[4] In other words, social identity is not based solely on the degree to which each individual member of the group is committed to doctrine.[5] Second, whereas religiosity concerns individual level piety, social identity can be manifested at both the individual and group level, whether this corresponds to a village or the nation (or even the global). Personal religiosity can thus only shed light on individual attitudes and behaviors, whereas social identity can improve our understanding of individual and collective attitudes and behaviors, including local and national (and even international) forms of mobilization.

What Religion Is Not

Providing a clear definition of what religion is—and thus whether it affects social and political outcomes—also means clarifying what it is not. First and foremost, we do not share the view that religion in general, and Islam in particular, is all-encompassing, and thus influences every aspect of an individual's life. Contra recent work by Shahab Ahmed (2015, 259), the "mere fact of [Islam's] massiveness" does not mean that it always "exercises agency and power." Second, religion is not an ideology in the sense that it corresponds to a particular set of beliefs or preferences about how the political and economic system should operate. Our understanding of the influence of religion on politics in Muslim societies has been hindered by the tendency to treat Islam itself as a program for social and political change rather than as a religion. Religion can certainly become the basis for an ideology, but it is not in and of itself a call for action.

Third, and directly related, religion is not the same as the movements and parties that appeal to religion in order to mobilize supporters. Although these actors deploy religion to construct an ideology, they are not religious actors because they are not part of religious infrastructure. This is an important point of departure, because Islamists are sometimes considered to be major religious agents in the Muslim world. If we define Islamists as actors who seek to make Islamic principles the basis for public and private life and aim to use state powers of legislation and enforcement to do so, then this characterization may seem apt (see, for example, Brooke's chapter in this volume). However, we view Islamist parties and politicians not as religious actors per se, but rather as actors deploying religion toward political ends. Some of their policy preferences and goals may be rooted in interpretations of Islamic doctrine, such as proposed legislation around the role of religion in the constitution or family law, but in almost all Muslim-majority countries they vie for influence in political systems that are not theocratic or controlled by religious authorities. Finally, we do not define religion as the obverse of "secular"—a concept that is too often presumed to be transparent in its meaning and limited in its scope when in fact it is neither (Asad 2003).

Religion as Social Organization

Rather than doctrine, most contemporary scholarship on politics in Muslim societies focuses on the social organization of religion, as manifested in institutions and actors. In studying how religion shapes social and political outcomes, religious institutions and actors are central because they adopt and advocate particular interpretations of Islam with respect to questions of governance, frame the choices facing elites and non-elites according to these interpretations, and incite and facilitate collective action. When religion is defined in terms of these subdimensions of social organization, a strong case can be made that religion "matters" in Muslim-majority countries—and in non-Muslim-majority contexts as well, albeit via distinct types of institutions and actors.

Religious Institutions

Religious institutions can take varied forms, including formal and informal rules, and in some instances are rooted in physical infrastructure. In social science research on Muslim-majority societies, all of these types of institutions have been shown to affect key outcomes of interest such as political regime transitions, socioeconomic development, political behavior, and social mobilization. Relevant formal institutions might include Islamic laws such as those related to finance or capital accumulation, informal institutions such as uncodified norms, and brick and mortar institutions such as mosques or community centers. To the extent that doctrine shapes social and political outcomes, it is funneled through these channels. Formal and informal institutions can privilege particular interpretations of doctrine, thereby setting the parameters for the attitudes and behaviors of community leaders as well as individuals within the community, but doctrine alone is not the catalyst for mobilization.

The impact of Islamic financial institutions on investment and growth illustrates how formal institutions associated with Islam affect development, an important outcome in social science research in general, and a central focus of the growing literature on the "great divergence" between the West and Muslim societies. Timur Kuran's (2011) account of how Islamic law "held back" the Middle East is illustrative. In his framework, aspects of Islamic law related to inheritance, business partnerships, and waqfs or charities deterred capital accumulation as well as the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, hindering economic growth and development. In this volume, Fulya Apaydin also points to the role of formal institutions in her analysis of the effects of Islamic banking on capital accumulation and productive growth. The case of Malaysia, where Islamic banks have grown rapidly since the early 1980s, seems to be a "most likely" success case in light of recent research on the conditions under which shariʿa-compliant banks foster growth, because Malaysian Islamic financial institutions operate alongside the regular banking sector. Furthermore, Islamic banks have integrated previously unbanked populations into the financial system. Yet even in this context, the Malaysian experience shows that Islamic banks have not produced sustainable growth but rather have extended loans to finance real estate and consumer durables purchases to the detriment of productive investment, benefiting large corporations and governments instead of small and medium enterprises. In line with Kuran (2011), Apaydin therefore indicates that a key set of formal institutions in Muslim societies are not conducive to growth and development.

In his chapter, Mohamed Saleh identifies taxation as a distinct formal institutional feature of Islamic law that can explain the relative underdevelopment of Muslim populations—in this case, the inferior socioeconomic status of Muslims in comparison with Copts in Egypt. Saleh shows how the imposition of a regressive poll tax on non-Muslims, in effect from the mid-seventh through the mid-nineteenth centuries, incentivized poorer Egyptians (who were all Copts, initially) to convert to Islam, leading nonconvert Copts to shrink into a better-off minority. Group-based restrictions into certain occupations reinforced these divisions over time. In this way, Islamic taxation acted as a screening mechanism of who stayed Copt and who became Muslim, rather than a cause of the underdevelopment of Muslims once they converted.

Informal institutions, or unwritten rules that are generated, disseminated, and enforced outside of official or written channels (North 1990), also shape political and social behavior, and often explain how formal institutions actually operate in distinct contexts (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 726). In this volume, several chapters touch on the ways in which informal institutions, notably norms, shape political attitudes and behaviors. Based on a survey of Iraqi and Iranian Shiʿa on the pilgrimage to Karbala, Fotini Christia, Elizabeth Dekeyser, and Dean Knox argue that communal practice, which transmits norms through religious socialization, affects attitudes about the role of religion in politics, perceptions of regime legitimacy, and support for democracy. Among other findings, however, they show that religious Iraqis and Iranians, who are more likely to engage in communal practices such as the pilgrimage, harbor distinct views about the appropriate relationship between the state and religion. This suggests that different norms emerged among Shiʿa in these two different national contexts, resulting in distinct political attitudes. More generally, if informal institutions condition the effects of formal institutions, then ongoing research should investigate how the same Islamic institutions have affected long-term trajectories of political and economic development in varied ways across time and space.

Tangible brick and mortar institutions associated with Islam, most notably mosques, can facilitate various forms of political mobilization by serving as sites for coordinating mass protests or by facilitating electoral turnout. In her analysis of the Syrian uprising, Wendy Pearlman underscores the widely accepted argument that religion was unrelated to the motivations of the protestors, who were instead driven by political and economic grievances. Yet she also details how religious infrastructure played a critical role in the process of mass mobilization. Popular demonstrations were often initiated at mosques at the end of Friday prayers. This was not because of religious grievances, but rather because mosques were essentially the only spaces available for mass congregations, given a long history of state repression of independent sites for civic engagement. In this sense, her analysis echoes that of McAdam (1999), who pointed to the pivotal role of Black churches in organizing dissent during the US civil right movement. With regard to electoral politics, Islamist parties have benefited from their linkages to religious institutions such as mosques to drive voter turnout (Brooke 2019, and this volume; Clark 2004; Wickham 2002) or their embeddedness in social networks, which such institutions help to reinforce (Masoud 2014, 168).

Religious Actors

Religious actors, including religious elites and scholars or ʿulamaʾ, figure prominently in accounts of politics in Muslim-majority societies. As in the case of institutions, the power of religious actors is generally not derived from doctrine but rather from their social and political status. Furthermore, doctrine itself does not determine the status of religious actors; rather, factors commonly emphasized in comparative historical analysis, such as legacies of state formation, mobilizational resources and capacity, and strategic behavior, provide more convincing explanations for the influence of religious actors on governance and public life in Muslim-majority countries. Given status, religious authorities can play a pivotal role in interpreting doctrine and thereby enjoy enormous discretionary power to shape the effects of Islam on social and political life. Thus, religious elites often deploy religious appeals to suit their aims or vision for society and politics. This raises further questions about why such language resonates among segments of the mass public, which we address in the next section on social identity.

Under some historical conditions, religious actors, notably the ʿulamaʾ, acquire disproportionate influence over social and political outcomes. In particular, scholars of the Muslim world point to the role of religious authorities in hindering political opening and the development of an independent commercial class, which is often linked to the development of the rule of law and checks on absolute authority (Kuru 2019; Rubin 2017).[6] For the most part, these accounts do not stress doctrine but rather point to the ways in which state-society relations and societal power dynamics shape regime outcomes, although Rubin (2017, 205–206) contends that Islamic doctrine serves to legitimize political authority, whereas Christian, and especially Protestant, doctrine does not.

Regardless of the precise historical factors that led to the empowerment of religious elites, the evidence suggests that when clerics with anti-democratic or illiberal views enjoy great influence in politics and society, Muslim-majority countries are more likely to exhibit a democratic deficit—a finding that undoubtedly extends beyond the Muslim world. A number of contributions to this volume support this claim. In his chapter, Eric Chaney argues that the authoritarian equilibrium in the Muslim world stems from a sequence of historical developments culminating in the emergence of an influential class of religious elites who brought about the "religionization" of civil society by the eleventh century CE. The formal institutions devised under the authority of these conservative elites cemented authoritarian rule, which Chaney posits endured through at least the nineteenth century. Based on a more temporally proximate argument, Maya Tudor, too, points to the role of elites committed to particular religious ideas in undercutting democratic development. Contrasting the case of Pakistan to that of Indonesia and India, she shows how the fusing of the majority religion, Islam, with national identity at the country's founding hindered the formation and durability of democracy because religious leaders were able to undermine minority rights. In his chapter on Pakistan, Matthew J. Nelson also argues that conservative political and religious elites have pushed through constitutional provisions that privilege their interpretations, diminishing the rights of non-Muslims and resulting in an illiberal form of democracy, which significant portions of the population appear to endorse.

Religious elites are not always anti-democratic. In the case of Senegal, as Dominika Koter shows, religious leaders from different Muslim brotherhoods have played a key role in driving voter mobilization, brokering votes, and even issuing directives to their followers to go to the polls. Furthermore, her analyses of electoral data indicate that religion is not a strong predictor of vote choice and that Muslim religious leaders back politicians across political and religious groups, facilitating more robust political competition. The contrast between her findings with those of others in this volume, and with the broader scholarship on authoritarian durability in the Middle East, underscores the need for more cross-regional comparative historical analyses to untangle the conditions under which religious authorities adopt conservative positions that undermine democratic competition. In a complementary analysis of three Southeast Asian Muslim-majority countries, Kikue Hamayotsu argues that an elevated role for religious leaders in state formation undermines democratic consolidation. In her account, when "religious regimes," or institutionalized relations between political and clerical authorities, crystallize prior to the formation of the modern state and the rise of popular democratic movements, religious elites are more likely to hinder democratic consolidation.

The role of powerful religious elites is also linked to economic and social outcomes (Bazzi, Koehler-Derrick, and Marx 2020; Chaney 2013). In this volume, Jared Rubin maintains that the relative power of religious leaders impeded economic development in Muslim countries over the long run in comparison with the West. To bolster their authority, Muslim rulers relied more heavily on religious legitimacy than their Western counterparts. As a result, economic elites had less influence on policymaking, leading to weaker institutionalization of property rights, which are often linked to growth and development. Focusing on social outcomes, notably literacy, Adeel Malik and Rinchan Mirza also highlight the ways in which the elevated status of religious actors impedes development in certain contexts. In Pakistan, shrine elites, or caretakers of the tombs of saints venerated by Islamic mystical orders, became empowered after the coup of General Zia ul-Haq in 1977 through his selective opening of the electoral arena. Although Zia presided over a major expansion of educational infrastructure, shrine elites, who were averse to mass schooling, leveraged their newfound political power to suppress literacy expansion in the regions they dominated. More broadly, Malik and Mirza emphasize the interplay between religious power and formal institutional arrangements, showing how the effects of historically embedded religious power can remain latent for a long time and only become salient after conducive policy shocks.

In some contexts, religious elites play a key role in providing or arranging access to social services, as Steven Thomas Brooke's overview of the literature on Islamist service provision in this volume documents. In Mali, for example, Jaimie Bleck and Alex Thurston's chapter demonstrates that religious actors provide key services, such as education and justice, to the population. Although religious parties and politicians do not exist in Mali, clerics engage indirectly in politics by shoring up support for political authorities and exerting influence over policymaking through their patronage networks. In this way, clerics effectively work within the system. In recent years, however, jihadists, who have an antagonistic relationship with the state, are increasingly involved in service provision, potentially shifting the long-standing pattern of accommodation between the state and religious actors in Mali.

Finally, by virtue of their status, religious elites may have unique abilities to mobilize people even in the absence of providing social benefits. Based on a study of female Muslim preachers in online fora, Richard A. Nielsen explains the growing appeal of female preachers with a social movement logic. Islamist movements benefit from the fact that female preachers face fewer constraints to preach online than they do offline in order to tap into new audiences of both women and men. In this interpretation, religious ideas serve as a normative constraint that compels female preachers to operate online, not as a cause of this growing phenomenon, and religious ideas about gender segregation do not explain the popularity of female preachers.

In short, extensive evidence from this volume and from preexisting research indicates that religious institutions and actors shape important social, political, and economic outcomes, but few contemporary scholars endorse the claim that their influence is derived solely from Islamic doctrine.

Religion as Social Identity

As argued previously, religion as social identity is distinct both from religion, understood as a culture, and from the concept of religiosity. Yet they have often been conflated in the case of Islam. This tendency has fostered the view that religion both pervades

Muslim societies and that Muslim societies are deeply religious. Perhaps the best example is the substantial—and quite influential—literature that emerged in the 1990s, which made claims about the inherent incompatibility of Muslim-majority states and democratic regimes based on an essentialist view of Islamic culture and society (Huntington 1996; Kedourie 1994; Lewis 1995). In sum, Muslims were presumed both to have negative attitudes toward democracy—with implications for both their voting preferences and mobilization potential (i.e., they would necessarily support Islamists [Woltering 2002; Yavuz 1997])—and positive attitudes toward violence (Kramer 1997).

In this volume, we not only eschew a cultural definition of religion but also distinguish the role of religiosity, including how it is measured, from that of religion as a social identity. In other words, religiosity and religious identity are not just distinct conceptually, they also influence attitudes and behaviors in different ways. More specifically, several chapters in this volume examine the influence of religiosity and religion as social identity on four main outcomes identified as salient in the literature: (1) attitudes toward democracy, (2) voting behavior, (3) social mobilization and political participation, and (4) support for violence and terrorism.

When it comes to attitudes toward democracy, the findings across the chapters in this volume suggest that neither religiosity nor religious identity have an effect. However, they also suggest that both religiosity and religious identity can influence the type of democracy that emerges. These findings are largely consistent with more recent scholarship based on survey research in the 2000s, which argues that Muslims are mostly supportive of democracy as a form of government and do not view democracy as necessarily incompatible with their religious principles (Esposito and Mogahed 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Rose 2002; Tessler et al. 2012). Also like recent scholarship, they are largely consistent across Muslim-majority states in different regions of the world.

The chapters in this volume that examine the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward democracy find that being more devout does not promote antidemocratic attitudes among Muslims in countries as distinct as Turkey and Pakistan. For example, based on data from a series of nationally representative surveys, S. Erdem Aytaç's chapter on religiosity and political attitudes in Turkey finds that devout Muslims have actually become more favorable toward democracy under the Party of Justice and Development (AKP). He argues that this is because the AKP has allowed religion to play both a more public and visible role, leading to "a rapprochement of devout Muslims with the political regime," whereas democracy under the previous (centrist) party leadership was associated with restrictive policies toward religion in public life. Similarly, based on the most recent Pew Research Center survey data (2015) for Pakistan, Niloufer A. Siddiqui argues that religiosity has a positive effect on attitudes toward democracy as a form of government. She finds that higher levels of religiosity, regardless of how the concept is measured, are linked to greater support for democracy.

Yet these two chapters reach slightly different conclusions regarding whether religiosity is linked to support for less inclusive (or illiberal) forms of democracy. In the case of Turkey, Aytaç finds that more devout Muslims are less likely to have a pluralistic understanding of democracy. Instead, they are more likely to hold a populist view of politics, and thus to support policies that benefit the majority in the name of popular sovereignty. Such policies are consistent with the AKP's platform, suggesting that devout Muslims in Turkey have become more pro-democracy with the election of a party that represents their own views. At the same time, Aytaç finds that devout Muslims under the AKP have become less conservative in their political views; for example, they are less likely to favor the establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state in Turkey. Siddiqui's chapter introduces the important caveat that whether religiosity promotes more conservative political attitudes depends on how it is measured. Her three-fold measure of religiosity maps onto the aforementioned distinction between beliefs, behavior, and belonging: (1) dogmatism ("support for Islamic law in governance"), (2) piety ("participation in religious ritual"), and (3) devotion ("role of religion in one's life"). She finds that when religiosity is measured as either behavior or belonging, higher levels of religiosity are associated with more conservative political views that can make democracy less inclusive, such as support for restrictions on blasphemous speech. However, when it is measured as belief, higher levels of religiosity are not associated with more conservative political views.

What about the relationship between religious identity and democracy? Here, other relevant chapters in this volume point to similar findings. Focusing on religion as a social identity at the national level, both Maya Tudor and Matthew J. Nelson argue that when religion and the state are intertwined, religious identity constrains both democracy in general and liberal democracy in particular. Tudor compares three postcolonial countries in South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, and Indonesia), arguing that the strategies of indigenous elites to mobilize the population in support of their nation-building projects had long-term consequences for the viability of democracy. More specifically, when these elites chose to make religious identity central to "founding nationalisms," stable democracies were less likely to emerge. Pakistan is a case in point. Whereas the anti-colonial movements in India and Indonesia actively sought to separate nation and religion, Pakistan's independence movement deliberately fused religious and national identities. Islam has thus played an oversized role in regime legitimation, and, as a result, Pakistan has been plagued by "an unstable [democratic] regime with autocratic tendencies." Nelson corroborates this argument by demonstrating that both autocratic military regimes and democratically elected civilian regimes in Pakistan have endorsed conservative constitutional provisions that are consistent with the country's dominant interpretations of Islam. These provisions, which establish different rights for Muslims and non-Muslims and restrict speech that might be considered disrespectful to Islam or Muslims, have served to institutionalize regimes that are both exclusionary and illiberal.

The findings across the chapters in this volume are also mostly consistent with recent scholarship concerning the influence of religious identity and religiosity on voting behavior in the Islamic world. Democratization and multiparty competition in several Muslim-majority societies, particularly over (roughly) the past two decades, has enabled scholars to investigate this question empirically (Masoud 2014; Pepinsky et al. 2012, 2018). These studies largely conclude that Muslims are strategic voters who are motivated to cast their vote for a party for much the same reasons as voters in other, less developed democracies, notably access to public and private goods, economic policy and performance, and ideological affinity. In other words, contra earlier studies (Esmer and Pettersson 2007), religion does not seem to be the driving factor behind Muslim voters' preferences. Recent studies also highlight the diversity of electoral agendas among Islamist parties, which offer different choices to voters (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010).

The chapters by Thomas Pepinsky and Steven I. Wilkinson in this volume contribute to this growing literature by problematizing the common inference that voting for a religious party can be interpreted as support for a religious agenda. Pepinsky's analysis is based on two Muslim-majority societies (Indonesia and Malaysia) that differ in several important ways, including their ethnic and religious composition, but have experienced competition between parties that "implicitly or explicitly invoke Islam" (i.e., Islamic parties) and those that do not (i.e., non-Islamic parties). He argues that one of the reasons it is so difficult to determine whether religiosity is driving voter support for an Islamic party is that these parties differ from non-Islamic parties in ways other than the religious aspects of their platforms. Inferring that a voter's support for a non-Islamic party is not linked to religiosity is also problematic because these parties can be—and have been, in the context of Southeast Asia—responsible for implementing religious policies. In sum, Pepinsky cautions that "voting for an Islamic party is not always a vote for Islam and voting for a non-Islamic party sometimes is." Wilkinson makes similar claims in the context of South Asia. He argues that Indian voters—both the majority Hindu population and the substantial Muslim minority—have consistently been motivated by economic issues rather than religious and caste identities. Thus, votes from "a particular group . . . for a particular party" are often misinterpreted as a "group vote" when they are actually a vote for development. Conversely, he argues that the mediocre electoral support for religious parties in Pakistan is not an indication that voters do not support their religious agenda, but rather that this agenda has already been institutionalized.

The insight that voters in Muslim-majority societies are not swayed solely or even primarily by religious appeals is echoed in Daniel Corstange and Erin York's chapter comparing linkage strategies across regime and opposition parties in Lebanon, Yemen, and Morocco. They argue that parties in Muslim societies operate under the same constraints as parties in non-Muslim societies at similar levels of political and economic development when it comes to developing strategies to capture vote share. In particular, they "find evidence that Muslim and Arab polities are not, in fact, more clientelist than comparable non-Muslim states." The incentive to engage in clientelism, moreover, applies to Islamic and non-Islamic parties alike. In both Lebanon and Yemen, for example, all major parties—not just the Islamist Hizbullah and Islah—focus on delivering services and offering material payoffs to their constituents in order to win elections, although regime parties often have an advantage given their access to state resources.

The chapter by Ellen Lust, Kristen Kao, and Gibran Okar presents a more nuanced view of the role that religion plays in shaping voter preferences, particularly regarding

Islamic parties. Based on an analysis of elections during political transition in three Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia), they argue that religious factors are more important determinants of electoral support for Islamists than economic or organizational factors. However, an important caveat is that their argument is based on an understanding of religion that differs from the one we offer in this chapter. Consistent with the other chapters in this volume, they find that religious identity (i.e., measured as choosing "Muslim" as one's primary identity) did not influence the decision to cast a vote for Islamists in any of these three countries. More inconsistent with the predominant approach in this volume, they find that religiosity (measured as the frequency with which one engages in religious practice) did appear to affect electoral support for Islamists, albeit only in Tunisia. Religion as they define it seems to have the greatest influence on voter preferences when it comes to attitudes toward the relationship between religion and politics. In Egypt and Libya, they find that those who favored religious over secular parties were more likely to support Islamists, while in Tunisia and Libya they find that those who responded affirmatively to the idea that religious leaders should influence politics were more likely to support Islamists.

Religion as social identity seems to exercise the greatest influence on attitudes and behavior in Muslim societies when it comes to social and political mobilization. Whereas some scholars have pointed to religion's intrinsic value as a mobilizational tool (Aminzade and Perry 2001; Tarrow 1998), the chapters in this volume emphasize the role of collective practice in shaping religious identity and, consequently, attitudes toward activism. Avital Livny argues that the gap in political participation between Muslim and non-Muslim societies cannot be attributed to the degree of religiosity, but rather to how it is expressed. That is, the type of practices in which Muslim engage, and not their level of piety, affects political participation. Specifically, she argues that collective religious engagement, such as mosque attendance, bolsters protest potential among Muslims because it promotes social relationships based on interpersonal trust that can help to overcome barriers to collective action. Dustin Gamza and Pauline Jones also explore the relationship between communal practice and political mobilization. Their focus, however, is different in that they examine Muslim attitudes toward political action in response to state repression of individual (wearing the hijab) versus communal (gathering in Qurʾan study groups) practices. In some respects, their findings are distinct from those of Livny. Contrary to their own expectations, they find that when communal practices are repressed, Muslims are less willing to support mobilization against the state than they are when individual practices are repressed. However, like Livny, Gamza and Jones link these findings to the social bonds that are forged through communal practices. Importantly, these chapters (as well as the chapter by Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox) are consistent with the broader literature on religion and politics across various faiths that emphasizes the role of communal practices in shaping political attitudes and behavior (Harris 1998; Putnam 2000), particularly when it comes to group mobilization (Harris 1998; Jamal 2005; Ludden 2005).

In seeking to explain violent forms of mobilization, past work has consistently invoked religion as intrinsically related to violence (see Brubaker 2015 for an overview). For the Muslim world in particular, the dominant narrative has long been that Muslim societies are more prone to engage in or support violent conflict because Islamic doctrine legitimates violence and its devoted adherents are motivated by calls to defend their religion (Jackson 2007). Two chapters in this volume provide a much different view. They go beyond the existing literature finding no association between religiosity and support for violence (Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer 2009; Tessler and Robbins 2007), by actually detecting a negative relationship. Based on an embedded experiment in the 2016–2017 Arab Barometer surveys, Mark Tessler, Michael Robbins, and Amaney Jamal focus specifically on attitudes toward the Islamic State. Across seven different Arab countries, they find widespread disagreement with both the goals and tactics of the Islamic State among ordinary Sunni Muslims. Moreover, the greatest disagreement seems to be among the most religious, who are more likely to endorse the statement that "the actions of the Islamic State are not compatible with the teachings of Islam." In the case of Pakistan, Siddiqui finds that, whether measured as belief, behavior, or belonging, greater religiosity has a negative effect on attitudes toward religious violence. Specifically, respondents who are either more devout or more dogmatic are also more likely to reject the claim that violence can be justified on religious grounds.

More recent research has argued that the relationship between religion and violent conflict is more complex and, like nonviolent forms of mobilization, may be mediated by the salience of social identities forged through communal religious practice (Hoffman and Nugent 2017). The chapter by Alexandra Scacco and Shana S. Warren corroborates these claims, albeit in the opposite direction. Based on a study of Christian and Muslim residents in Kaduna, Nigeria, who directly experienced large-scale deadly religious violence, they argue that exposure to conflict can reinforce strong intragroup ties that create obstacles to intergroup reconciliation after conflict.

BEYOND RELIGION

Research on the Muslim world links social and political outcomes to a host of factors beyond what we refer to as religious infrastructure. Indeed, because they have so convincingly demonstrated that nonreligious factors drive political behavior and outcomes in the Muslim world, scholars with expertise in Muslim-majority countries often view arguments rooted in religion with skepticism. Instead, they link a variety of analytically distinct institutions and actors, which are not religious but are nonetheless sometimes conflated with religion, to political and economic development, political values, collective action and mass mobilization, and other social and political phenomena in the Muslim world. Here we highlight some of the existing scholarship and chapters in this volume that emphasize nonreligious institutions and actors.

Nonreligious Institutions

Research on the Muslim world points to a variety of institutional forms that arise from nonreligious influences and range from those that originated in the deep past to those from more contemporary periods. More temporally distant institutions date back to the pre-Islamic period and even earlier, the Muslim conquest, the subsequent rise of various Islamic empires or, more proximately, the colonial era. Alternative accounts trace the roots of the social and political phenomena in Muslim societies to the 20th century, when many Muslim-majority societies emerged from colonial occupations or were established as independent states. Even when there is nothing particularly "Islamic" about these institutions, because they are not part of the social infrastructure of Islam itself, they are sometimes conflated with Islam because they interacted with religious institutions or advantaged religious actors in shaping economic and political development.

The deep history of state-building is a prominent explanation for the distinctiveness of politics and economic development in the Muslim world. More specifically, the development of state institutions in the pre-Islamic period, which resulted from the topographical conditions in the regions where Islam first spread, has been linked to the absence of democracy in Muslim-majority polities (Hariri 2015; Kennedy 1981). In places where agriculture called for irrigation techniques, more centralized and top-down political forms developed to coordinate the prevailing mode of production and persisted over time. During the colonial era, European powers were less likely to establish direct rule and to attract European settlers in these contexts, inhibiting the transmission of democratic institutions and practices (Hariri 2015). Beyond the troubling normative implications of this argument—that the suppression and occupation of indigenous people is a major route to democratization in non-Western settings—historical evidence shows that local political actors sought to construct representative institutions in the 19th and 20th centuries, but that the French and British actively dismantled them (Atallah 2010; Thompson 2020).

Another genre of long-run historical argument points to distinct types of institutions unique to Islamic societies but, again, that were not derived from Islam per se. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney (2013) argue that the development of military slavery (*mamluks*) and a system of agricultural taxation (*iqta*), which developed after the Arab conquests, hindered the establishment of checks on political authority. Rather than conscription from the local population, importing slave soldiers from afar ensured that these coercive forces were dependent on the ruler and were not socially embedded. Similarly, the *iqta* system, which granted tax rights to the landholder that could not be inherited or sold in return for military service, prevented the rise of an independent class of landholders that could counterbalance the ruler's power, a pattern of state-society relations that is linked to the rise of representative institutions in the West. Blaydes and Chaney emphasize that these institutions do not stem from Islamic doctrine, but, given their prevalence across the Arab, Persian, and Turkic areas, mamlukism and *iqta* effectively evolved to become properties of many Muslim societies with enduring effects.

In this volume, Lisa Blaydes and Safinaz El Tarouty focus on nineteenth-century Egypt to show how this historical legacy of an unconstrained executive permitted excessive borrowing, which paved the way for European interference. Although Egypt under Muhammad Ali had embarked on state centralization efforts that were similar to those occurring in Europe at the time, no domestic actor held sufficient power to rein in excessive spending. Their argument spotlights institutions that developed in a Muslim-majority society rather than features of Islam or Islamic institutions per se. It also raises questions for further research about the conditions under which elites oppose ruler borrowing, especially if they do not want to be taxed and external sources of capital are available.

It is important to note that such long-run historical approaches discount the importance of subsequent historical developments, such as colonialism, which they depict as endogenous to the weakness of Muslim societies as a result of institutions dating to the pre-Islamic or classical Islamic periods (Blaydes 2017, 488). Even if the decline of Muslim empires over centuries made them more vulnerable to foreign occupation and control, however, colonialism could still have independent effects on social and political outcomes in the colonized territories. As economic historians have shown, colonial practices in the Ottoman Empire, such as the Capitulations or the establishment of distinct commercial regulations for minority communities, had deleterious economic effects on the nascent economies of the post-independence Middle Eastern states (Owen 1993; Owen and Pamuk 1999).

In this volume, several chapters argue that European colonialism led to variation in social and economic development in Muslim societies. Melina R. Platas documents a human development gap between Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa, where Muslim-majority countries are on average poorer and exhibit inferior social outcomes. She argues that norms and beliefs about gender equality, fertility, and schooling as well as differential investment in education help to explain this gap. Yet the religious content of institutions or beliefs do not explain these differences; rather, distinct patterns of colonial governance may have undercut the accountability of local leaders in Muslim areas in comparison with those controlled by non-Muslim authorities in the precolonial and colonial periods. Melani Cammett, Allison Spencer Hartnett, and Gabriel Koehler-Derrick also focus on the variation in colonial institutions, in this case to explain distinct patterns of welfare infrastructure development in post-independence Middle Eastern countries. They argue that the relative reliance on public versus private institutions during the colonial period shaped the postcolonial extension of public health and education institutions. However, the effects of colonialism are also conditional on the nature of the governing coalition at independence: when new ruling elites brought about a revolutionary break from the past, new patterns of welfare regime performance arose. Malik and Mirza's chapter also stresses the impact of colonial influences. The British colonial administration bolstered the power of historic religious elites by introducing property rights that made religious succession more hereditary in shrine institutions and structurally aligned the interests of shrine elites with other landholders. Furthermore, by classifying shrine elites as "agrarian castes," colonial authorities made them eligible to receive landed gentry status.

Are Muslim societies stuck in a negative economic and political equilibrium as a result of long-run historical factors? A skeptic could reasonably argue that such historical approaches rob post-independence elites and citizens of their agency.[7] Post-independence political and economic institutions, the result of elite choices and bargaining among state and societal actors, constitute more proximate influences on social and political outcomes in the Muslim world and may even establish new "paths" that erode the influence of historical legacies (Cammett 2017).

Some authors in this volume argue that political institutions established in the post-independence period shape current political and economic development. To explain "executive aggrandizement" in Turkey, Feryaz Ocaklı emphasizes the deficiencies of state institutions, which have permitted President Erdogan and his allies in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to tilt elections in their favor and to staff government agencies with loyalists. Although the AKP is an Islamist party by many definitions, its behavior is not rooted in religion but instead employs strategies that were present during long stretches of secular rule in Turkish politics. Islamists are no more or less trustworthy than their secular counterparts; rather, institutional weakness enables incumbents—in this case, Islamists—to strengthen their grip on power.[8] Elizabeth R. Nugent's chapter, too, centers on more contemporary political institutions, documenting that party systems in Muslim-majority countries are less competitive and institutionalized than their counterparts in non-Muslim-majority contexts. But to understand the origins of these institutions, she argues, we should look to historical developments dating back to colonialism and persisting over time. In particular, the colonial powers established unrepresentative legislative institutions and favored some groups over others in divide-and-rule strategies, practices that influenced the creation of electoral rules in post-independence regimes.

Nonreligious Actors

Many accounts of social and political phenomena highlight elite and non-elite actors beyond religious authorities. Relevant actors include political and economic elites, the military, opposition figures and parties—most notably Islamist parties, which we consider to be nonreligious actors, as noted previously.

In their role as policymakers, political elites have the potential to shape political and economic outcomes most directly. To explain post-independence economic development trajectories in Syria and Turkey, David Waldner (1999) argues that conflict among elites compelled them to establish broad coalitions, which led to the creation of institutional arrangements that undermined capital formation and investment. In a similar vein, Ferdinand Eibl's chapter in this volume explains the emergence of Middle Eastern welfare regimes, which differ in their accessibility and generosity, in part as a result of cross-national variation in social coalitions at independence. Unlike Cammett, Hartnett, and Koehler-Derrick, as well as Platas, Eibl focuses on the postcolonial period, but like these authors he does not locate the roots of varied development trajectories in religion or in religious institutions and practices.

Political elites across the Muslim world also affect outcomes by explicitly deploy religious appeals and using religious infrastructure to their advantage (Abboud 2015; Baram 1997)—a phenomenon that extends to politicians in Western societies, for example, who make explicit references to Christianity in their public statements. Pearlman's chapter provides a recent example in her account of the Syrian war. She argues that the sectarian dimensions of the conflict escalated not because the opposition was motivated by religion or religiosity, but rather, in part, because the regime deliberately labeled political activists as sectarian extremists. This contributed to perceptions of sectarian threat among members of minority groups in Syria (Pinto 2017) and facilitated the entry of armed Islamist groups into the conflict, some of whom were purposefully released from Syrian jails to bolster the regime's claim that the opposition was composed of religious extremists.

What about the role of political elites when it comes to violence in the name of religion? Lawrence P. Markowitz and Mariya Y. Omelicheva's chapter offers a unique perspective by exploring what some have characterized as surprisingly low levels of violence and terrorism in the Muslim-majority countries of Central Asia. They argue that state actors can reduce the incidence of terrorist violence by essentially partnering with groups that would be most likely to engage in such behavior. Specifically, when the state's political and security elites are intertwined with informal and illicit economies like the drug trade, they can actually decrease incentives and opportunities for violence.

The military as a corporate group is another key actor in social science research on the Muslim world. This is ironic given the general presumption that religion and religious mobilization is difficult to suppress in Muslim-majority countries, and yet there are coercive forces that routinely repress religion across the Muslim world. Nicholas J. Lotito's contribution to this volume focuses squarely on the military, demonstrating that it plays a key role in perpetuating authoritarianism by quashing protests in Muslim societies, a finding that does not hold in non-Muslim contexts (Bellin 2004). In probing potential explanations, he finds no support for the claim that culture or religion shapes the behavior of the military. Instead, chronic insecurity, foreign assistance, and features of the organizational cultures of the armed forces may at least proximately explain high levels of military repression in Muslim countries. Other chapters in this volume also highlight the role of repression in sustaining authoritarianism—or at least tempering democratization—and countering mass mobilization. For example, Nelson emphasizes that the military retains special status in Pakistan, limiting the scope for democratization; Jean Lachapelle argues that the repression of Islamists helps to cement authoritarianism in Egypt by garnering support from non-Islamist publics, who regard the incumbent authoritarian ruler as the least worst option (see also Lust 2011); and Pearlman contends that state repression drove the sectarianization of the Syrian war.

The choices, strategies, and ideologies of political parties also figure prominently in some accounts of politics in Muslim-majority countries. Much research focuses on

Islamist parties, which have become increasingly prominent actors since at least the 1980s in many Muslim countries and performed well in founding elections in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings. A growing research program explores their behavior in and out of office and the determinants of individual support for Islamists.

Multiple chapters in this volume assess the mobilizational strategies and appeal of Islamist and other religious parties. Wilkinson's chapter analyzes the shifting influence of religion on politics in India, which is home to the world's largest Muslim-minority population, and Pakistan. In recent decades, religious parties have gained strength in both countries, albeit for different reasons in these distinct contexts. In India, the BJP has steadily gained power, culminating in a national electoral victory in 2014. In order to broaden its electoral appeal, however, the party downplayed its hardline Hindu nationalist agenda—at least until recently—and instead played up its message of good governance and development. For political elites in Pakistan, where religion was central to the founding national myth (see Tudor's chapter in this volume), activating religion is a strategic choice aimed at cementing winning coalitions and marginalizing rival, nonreligious parties and politicians.

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Islamists were the major beneficiaries in some countries, yet they played distinct and often marginal roles in organizing and participating in the uprisings themselves. In her chapter, Chantal Berman asks why Islamist mobilization was more visible in protests in some countries than in others, and whether Islamist beliefs shaped the likelihood that supporters of Islamists would participate in the protests. Comparing Islamists in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, she argues that the decision to urge supporters to protest depended on their experiences of state repression. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers operated in a "middle ground" between repressed outsider and regime insider, party leaders called upon their supporters to participate. Conversely, in Tunisia, where Ennahda was totally repressed under Ben Ali, party leaders could not mobilize their followers. Finally, the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (PJD), a member of the loyal opposition, urged its supporters not to protest. Berman then analyzes how their followers responded, finding that some followed their leaders' edicts to either protest or abstain, while others protested without formal Islamist leadership, galvanized by economic grievances. Thus, strategic rather than religious factors shape the behavior of Islamist parties, and religion may have shaped the motivations to protest of only a portion of participants in the Arab uprisings. In her chapter, Alexandra A. Siegel explicitly argues that religion does not explain the success of Islamist mobilization in Egypt during the Arab uprisings. Rather, the superior capacity of Islamists to project a coherent narrative, in this case through social media, enabled them to more successfully advance their goals than other opposition groups. At the same time, she cautions, the very technologies that facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood's mobilization efforts have also undermined it by accelerating organizational fragmentation, amplifying extremists, and providing the regime a new tool to repress the Brotherhood.

Once elected, how do Islamists perform in office? In particular, given their reputation as conservative actors, how do they represent female constituents? Lindsay J. Benstead's chapter analyzes these questions in the case of Morocco, finding that Islamist parties address the concerns of women more effectively than their "secular" counterparts. Her data show that women were more likely to contact both female and Islamist deputies concerning personal and community problems. She argues that an "Islamic mandate effect," or a commitment to serve marginalized communities while respecting piety by using female members to mobilize female voters, helps to explain these findings. Corroborating existing research (Blaydes 2014; Meyersson 2014), Benstead therefore finds that Islamists exhibit responsiveness to female constituents, at least in some policy domains.

Beyond Islamist parties that contest elections, the Arab uprisings and other regional and global developments led to a renewed focus on ideologically or tactically extremist Islamist actors, such as Salafis and armed jihadist groups. Focusing on the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia, Frédéric Volpi's chapter traces the rise of Salafi networks, specifically Ansar al-Sharia, which gained appeal through its "Islamically framed" messages and activism. Ultimately, however, the organization failed for reasons that had little to do with religion, notably its inability to rein in internal disagreements and to impose party discipline on its supporters. Even the Islamic State, which some argue deploys a traditionalist interpretation of Islam to justify its mode of governance and goals, does not deploy religious repertoires to govern and mobilize. As Megan A. Stewart argues in this volume, there is nothing particularly Islamic about its governance and warmaking strategies, which mirror standard approaches implemented by leftist rebel groups during the Cold War.

Despite the preponderant focus in Western social science research on Islamists and on their apparent ability to outmaneuver other opposition groups, Adria Lawrence warns that the Islamist-secularist "divide" is overplayed. Instead, she contends in her chapter, religious frames are not the unique purview of Islamists. Ostensibly secular parties sometimes justify their policies on religious grounds, while Islamists express support for nonreligious or even secular goals. Similarly, in his chapter on Islamic parties in Southeast Asia, Pepinsky argues that support for religious parties should not be interpreted as support for a religious agenda, nor should voting for nonreligious parties be viewed as opposition to religion in politics.

As we noted at the outset, most social scientists who specialize on Muslim-majority countries argue that religion does not explain party-voter linkages in the Muslim world—even when explaining the electoral successes and mobilizational appeal of Islamist parties (Blaydes 2010; Cammett 2014; Cammett and Jones 2014; Lust-Okar 2005; Masoud 2014; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). Similarly, in their analyses of party strategies in Muslim societies, Corstange and York find that Arab and Muslim polities are not characterized by more clientelism than others, and political and economic factors rather than cultural attributes such as religion are associated with the use of clientelist outreach. Although ruling parties have an advantage in using this linkage strategy given their greater access to the resources at the heart of most clientelist exchanges, other parties can successfully employ constituency service to garner support as an alternative approach.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we explore how—if at all—religion influences social, political, and economic outcomes in the Muslim world. When religion is defined narrowly as doctrine—that is, the set of beliefs and practices that delimit a particular faith—we argue that religion is not the root cause of various social, political, and economic outcomes in the Muslim world. We offer a broader conceptualization of religion as both the beliefs and practices that constitute doctrine and the infrastructure that sustains these beliefs and practices. We argue that doctrine is critical to understanding religion's potential force, whereas infrastructure—specifically, social organization and social identity—is the key to understanding why, when, and where religion has agency to enact that force. Based on this definition of religion, we can offer general insights about how religion influences a variety of important social, political, and economic outcomes that can be applied beyond Muslim-majority states. First, religion as social organization (i.e., institutions and actors) can provide a technology of mobilization, particularly under conditions of state repression. Second, religion as social identity can impact social and political outcomes through the communal bonds it fosters among religious adherents or members of the same religion. Finally, religion is best situated to influence social and political outcomes when religious institutions and actors are empowered.

Western scholarship has often depicted social and political life in the Muslim world as disproportionately influenced by religion. For at least some scholars based in Western institutions, however, the picture is more nuanced, especially in more contemporary research. The contributions to this volume are representative of this emerging and important scholarship. Collectively, they ask not only *whether* religion matters, but also *how* it matters. The authors represent a diverse set of scholars in terms of their methodological approaches and geographical specialization. The breadth of their area expertise enables us to gain insight on the role of religion in Muslim-majority countries across regions and to move beyond the predominant focus on the Middle East and North Africa. Because these insights concern some of the most salient outcomes in the social sciences, they also help to integrate the study of Muslim societies into mainstream comparative analytical frameworks.

At the same time, we acknowledge that there are some important limitations to a volume that focuses solely on Western scholarship. A crucial next step is to bring these perspectives in dialogue with the work of scholars based in Muslim-majority countries. Knowledge production from the diverse countries of the Muslim world is vital to broaden the scope of what is deemed important to study, what factors are most important to explaining these outcomes, and how they should be studied. On both empirical and normative grounds, it is urgent for scholars in Western institutions to learn more from their colleagues in the places they study. Only though this engagement will we be able to fully explore the role that religion and other factors play in shaping contemporary social, political, and economic outcomes in Muslim-majority countries.

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NOTES

1. Our focus is primarily (though not exclusively) on Muslim-majority societies, which we define in demographic terms. We include countries in which the majority of the population are nominally categorized as "Muslim," whether Sunni, Shiʿa, or another subgroup therein. Globally, this amounts to approximately fifty countries with broad geographic scope beyond the usual suspects in the Middle East, notably the Balkans, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. (For a full list of countries, see footnote 1 in Corstange and York's chapter.) This more inclusive scope of Islamic countries not only fulfills a demographic definition of Muslim-majority, but also expands the scope of our analysis. Some scholars explicitly differentiate between how Islam is practiced and institutionalized in the Middle East versus other regions. Here, we seek to investigate whether the influence of religion on social and political outcomes is also distinct.
2. By "Western scholarship," we mean academic research produced in institutions located in the West, notably Europe and North America. As we emphasize in the conclusion, Western scholarship should engage more extensively with scholarship generated by researchers in Muslim-majority countries.
3. Like Durkheim's, our conceptualization combines a substantive and a functionalist definition of religion. It both "informs us of what the sacred is" (substantive) and "what religion does" (functionalist) (Droogers 2018, 6).
4. As others have argued, the applicability of Durkheim's definition to modern and non-Christian contexts is limited because it emphasizes "unity" based on an "image of one society with one religion" (Yang 2011, 32).
5. This is consistent with Avital Livny's (2020, 125) novel conceptualization of group identity in the Muslim context as "primarily about an attachment to other members of one's religious community . . . rather than a sense of individualized attachment to a set of beliefs or duty to God."
6. Another genre of long-term historical argument credits a distinct set of actors—slave soldiers—with enabling the relative lack of checks on absolute authority in the Muslim world. Rulers' reliance on a military class that was not conscripted from the local population allegedly reduced the checks on their authority (Blaydes and Chaney 2013). For discussions of these types of long-term historical arguments, see Cammett (2017, 14–15) and Kuru (2019, 197–202).
7. Personal communication with Tarek Masoud, Harvard Kennedy School, January 25, 2021.
8. Masoud (2008) makes a similar argument.

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PART I

REGIMES AND REGIME CHANGE

CHAPTER 2

ISLAM AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

ERIC CHANEY

For centuries, scholars have argued that religion and politics are uniquely linked in the Islamic world. Lapidus (1996, 3–4) sums up this scholarship, noting how it claims that "binding religious norms" dictate that "Islam [encompass] all domains including law and the state" impeding the "secularization and development" of Islamic societies. According to this line of thought, the union of religion and politics traces its roots to the actions of the Prophet Muhammad himself and can explain the region's historical institutional path and present-day democratic deficit.

This chapter combines historical evidence with recent research to propose an alternative narrative for the institutional evolution of the Islamic world. In particular, it roots the region's democratic deficit in a sequence of critical junctures in history and not in Islamic doctrine. Thus, I hypothesize that the Arab conquests led to a spread of tribal modes of governance and the rise of military slavery. These institutional changes, in turn, contributed to the decay of secular bureaucratic structures, the emergence of an influential class of religious scholars, and the "religionization" of civil society. I conclude by arguing that the region's present-day democratic deficit is rooted in the crystallization of this institutional framework more than four centuries after the Prophet Muhammad's death.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the chapter's main thesis. Figure 2.1a provides the partial relationship between democracy and adherence to Islam in 2010, conditional on continent indicator variables.[1] Figure 2.1b shows this same relationship, adding a dummy for the prevalence of parallel cousin marriage to the continent indicators, which I claim proxies for the spread of Arabian tribal forms of societal organization.[2] As Figure 2.1 makes clear, the addition of the parallel cousin indicator variable completely explains the "Islam democratic deficit" from a statistical standpoint, suggesting that the spread of tribal forms of organization may enhance our understanding of the region's political difficulties.

I hypothesize that following the Prophet Muhammad's death, tribal elites (many of whom were late converts to Islam) seized power and sought to undermine the positions of Muslims from outside pre-Islamic elite circles. To undercut growing attempts by this disempowered group to constrain their rule, rulers harnessed the fiscal systems of the conquered non-Muslim populations to develop the "slave soldier" military system (Blaydes and Chaney 2013). Under this system, foreigners played an increasingly central role in the military, eventually destroying the landed elites on which pre-Islamic bureaucracies depended. Tribal networks centered around religious elites replaced these structures, leading to a collapse in secular state capacity and the religionization of civil society. The concomitant militarization of society and the resulting surge in the political power of religious leaders was the ultimate product of the victory of tribal forms of societal organization over previous modes of governance centered around landed elites. These institutional developments culminated in the eleventh century CE, leading to institutional forms that persisted in many areas through the nineteenth century. This institutional persistence, in turn, explains the democratic deficit documented in Figure 2.1.

The evidence presented in this chapter weighs against the traditional view that the region's autocratic institutions are rooted in Islam. Rather, the historical record and empirical evidence seems more consistent with the view espoused by the Enlightenment thinkers credited with laying the ideological underpinnings of modern democratic institutions in Europe (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 69; Israel 2011). These thinkers, on the whole, viewed Islam as a "pure monotheism of high moral calibre" and tended to attribute the negative aspects of some interpretations of Islam to the actions of rent-seeking elites in the political and ideological arenas (Israel 2006, 615, 616, 620).

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of the traditional view of the political impact of the intertwining of religious and political authority throughout Islamic history. The second section provides qualitative evidence casting doubt on this view. The third and fourth sections propose an alternative narrative. The fifth section provides preliminary empirical support consistent with this alternative view and briefly explores the ideological impact of these historical institutional arrangements. A final section concludes the discussion.

Religious Origins?

Traditionally, Western scholarship highlighted the religious origins of the Islamic state (e.g., Lewis 1993).[3] While there are variations on this theme, its logical thrust rests on two premises: (1) the Prophet Muhammad combined both religious and political functions, and (2) this union of religion and politics became fixed in religious norms from an early date. These two premises are used to argue that Islamic doctrine legitimates institutions that link politics and religion.[4]

Religion is believed to have affected the Islamic world's institutional development from the start. After the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, the caliphate continued to



[N = 160; b = −0.21; se = 0.07]

[N = 160; b = 0.03; se = 0.08]

FIGURE 2.1: Islam, democracy, and tribal structures.

Note: Both graphs use ISO country codes to denote countries. For a link between country codes and country names, see https://www.iban.com/country-codes.

combine religious and political functions. However, as the Islamic state expanded, political institutions and Islamic ideals increasingly diverged.[5] This led religious circles to view the caliphate as fundamentally illegitimate, forcing the caliphs to import slaves to staff their armies from the ninth century CE onward. Pipes (1981) directly links military slavery to this legitimacy crisis, arguing that the introduction of slave soldiers resulted from the failure of Islamic polities to successfully integrate religion and politics.

This hypothesis has the virtue of neatly explaining many features of the Islamic world's institutional history. Military slavery characterized much of the Islamic world for roughly a millennium and has no equivalent outside the region. Moreover, it seems to concisely account for the eventual collapse of the institutional framework of Islam's "golden age."

Gibb (1955a, 1955b) provides one overview of the classical interpretation of this process. He begins by explaining how Muslim rulers rapidly developed political structures built on Roman and Persian foundations. These institutions were "peculiarly inorganic," due in part to Islam's inability to legitimize secular state structures. The ensuing legitimacy crisis led to Muslim indifference and withdrawal from the political arena, and to the concomitant militarization of government power through the use of slave armies. This militarization gradually undermined early Islamic state structures, resulting in the emergence of a more legitimate—but less intellectually dynamic—institutional framework in the eleventh century CE (Gibb 1955b, 124–128).

Much of this account has withstood the test of time. For example, scholars continue to believe that the institutional changes of the eleventh century CE ushered in a novel and remarkably enduring institutional framework that characterized much of the Islamic world until the nineteenth century (e.g., Lambton 1991, 53).[6]

THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE, TRIBES, AND MILITARY SLAVERY

Despite possessing many strengths, this narrative suffers from some difficulties. First, the fact that military slavery was absent from much of the Islamic world (e.g., much of Southeast Asia; see Crone 1980, 80) casts doubt on the idea that this institution is rooted in Islamic doctrine. In addition, Lapidus (1975, 1996) notes that while religion and state were united in some Islamic societies, those in which state and religion were clearly differentiated represented the historical norm (Lapidus 1996, 24).

On the theoretical side, although Muhammad indisputably combined both religious and political functions, the enduring institutional consequences of this union are less clear. The Qurʾan precluded another prophet, and Muhammad did not name a successor prior to his death. Muhammad's death consequently necessitated institutional change via his replacement, but denied unequivocal divine sanction to any successor, since no one could claim his prophetic status doctrinally.

Muslim elites sought to solve the resulting power vacuum through the creation of the caliphate, which as an institution emerged from political struggles following Muhammad's death (e.g., Madelung 1997). The tribe of Quraysh, which had dominated much of the Arabian Peninsula prior to the advent of Islam, ended up controlling the caliphate. This resulted in the exclusion (and subsequent alienation) of many of the most devout and prominent Muslims from other tribes (e.g., the Ansar) from positions of influence. The subsequent struggle for power eventually led to the emergence of the Umayyad Caliphate in 661 CE, in which the clan of Umayya from within the tribe of Quraysh converted the caliphate into a hereditary dynasty.

The following century was dominated by a search for reliable nontribal sources of military power (Crone 1980).[7] The Umayyads first relied on Syrian tribal forces, but quickly transitioned to professional armies staffed by both Arabs and non-Arabs. These professional armies suffered from factional rivalries little better than the tribal ones, which led to the downfall of the Umayyads and the rise of the Abbasids. The Abbasids faced similar difficulties, which they attempted to resolve through the use of military slavery. Blaydes and Chaney (2013, 2016) build on this literature, arguing that the introduction of military slavery was a critical juncture in which rulers sought to lessen constraints on their rule by establishing loyal armies that were not susceptible to local power struggles. This view is consistent with Ibn Khaldun (1989, 141), who argued that the introduction of slave soldiers enabled the ruler to claim "royal authority all for himself" in a tribal milieu.

How did tribal social structures lead to military slavery? I hypothesize that by facilitating collective action in a tribal setting, Islam endowed tribes with greater political power (see, e.g., Chaney 2013).[8] These tribal units used their political influence to resist a reversion to pre-Islamic institutional forms, yet were not a suitable base for autocratic state structures, since tribal societies tend to be "egalitarian, consensus based, and fractious" (Fukuyama 2011, 303). Military slavery provided one solution to this tension, by allowing rulers to maintain a cohesive military without relying on domestic social structures that tribal elites deemed unjust. In other words, in the absence of military slavery, the tribalization of society combined with Islam would have led to the disintegration of the military, as tribal units undermined the hierarchical structures on which pre-Islamic military structures depended. Military slavery prevented this from happening and represented a "brilliant adaptation designed to create a strong state-level institution against the backdrop of one of the most powerfully tribal societies on earth" (Fukuyama 2011, 303).[9] This institutional innovation, in turn, allowed the Arabs to become "the only tribal conquerors to have caused the cultural traditions of highly civilized peoples to be reshaped around their tribal heritage" (Crone 1994, 459).

TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE

Ibn Khaldun (1989) famously argued that the first millennium of Islamic political history could not be disentangled from tribal forms of societal organization. In this and the following section, I explain how these social structures both impacted institutional developments and spread across areas that were conquered by Arab forces.

Following the conquests by Arab-Islamic tribes, society was divided as the conquerors segregated themselves from the conquered. In an attempt to consolidate power, caliphs began to disempower conquering tribal elites by relying on the pre-conquest institutional forms that existed in the conquered areas. Tribal elites responded by rallying around religious ideals. This led to the emergence of two competing forms of social organization. The first—henceforth *tribal*—descended from the tribal forms of organization brought by the conquering Arab-Muslims, whereas the second—henceforth *landed*—traced its roots to the more autocratic traditions of the pre-Islamic empires of the newly conquered lands.[10] Although the caliphs emerged from the tribal conquerors, they adopted the more centralized government of the conquered, seeing that as a more secure (and autocratic) form of power for themselves. Other tribal leaders resented this and used existing tribal and religious traditions to constrain caliphal power.

The tribal society used parallel cousin (*bint ʿamm*) marriage to maintain and expand clanic structures, emphasizing the "personal liberty and dignity which was expected by the Arabian tribesmen," and the idea that "all men were on the same level before God."[11] The landed society was more "aristocratic," being based to a large degree on "agrarian traditions such as those which had been kept alive from Sasanian times among the landed gentry of the Iranian highlands" (Hodgson 1974a, 253, 280, 281). These two movements developed competing interpretations of Islam. The tribal group largely adhered to traditionalist Islam and argued that following the death of Muhammad, religious authority passed to those who remembered his teachings.[12] Thus, while political power might reside with the caliph, religious authority was dispersed among the scholars who "owed their authority entirely to their learning." As the caliphate became increasingly autocratic, this group refused to "recognize the legality of the [resulting] regime or to cooperate with it" (Athamina 1992, 153–154).[13] Largely excluded from political power, they began the process of developing what would eventually become Islamic law. Some scholars have referred to this group as the "constitutionalists," in the sense that they argued that political power was subject to the constraints imposed by this group's interpretation of Islamic law.[14]

The landed group "tended to cooperate with the state" and adhered to rationalist interpretations of Islam (Lapidus 2014, 130).[15] Adherents of these rationalist interpretations benefitted from the expansion of secular bureaucratic institutions under the Abbasids. They were often highly educated, "trained to think on the basis of human rather than revealed information," and "disinclined to defer to religious scholars" (Crone

2006, 23–24). These individuals sought to retain pre-Islamic social structures, while also absorbing certain Arabic and Islamic elements (Gibb 1982, 66).

This institutional and ideological divide came to a head during the Mihna (833–849), when caliphs attempted to force religious scholars to adopt rationalist interpretations of Islam. The subsequent ideological confrontation has been viewed as an attempt to subsume the religious scholars and their institutional framework into the growing bureaucratic machinery of the Abbasid Caliphate (Watt 1963, 44). The traditionalist religious scholars—buttressed by popular support—proved stronger in what has been described as the "victory of the constitutionalist[s]" (Watt 1963, 52). This victory thwarted the growing autocratic trajectory of the caliphate, allowing Islamic law to continue its development outside state structures, and perpetuating the tension between tribal and landed forms of organization.

This victory demonstrated the growing strength of the tribal type of societal organization, which, given its characteristics, was an ill-suited military base for caliphal autocracy (Lapidus 1982, 718). Yet the strength of this organization also precluded a transition to pre-conquest social and institutional structures. As noted above, I hypothesize that the resulting tension explains the ultimate emergence and rapid spread of military slavery. In other words, caliphs could not co-opt this tribal/traditional element, but they also could not rely on it to support autocratic institutional arrangements, and so they turned to military slavery.

The Origins of a New Political Equilibrium

Institutionalized military slavery has been called a "major innovation in Middle Eastern history," introduced in response to a "pressing military and political need for loyal troops" (Lapidus 2014, 86). While caliphs initially sided with landed elites and the existing forms of pre-conquest government, this need ultimately resulted in the destruction of pre-conquest bureaucratic institutions and the emergence of a new political framework. For centuries, however, the stalemate between landed forms of societal organization (on which secular bureaucratic structures rested) and more egalitarian tribal arrangements helped power development.

Traditionalist religious leaders—as representatives of tribal forms of social organization—crafted Islamic law to "neutralize caliphal power in favour of retaining power diffused in society at large" (Hodgson 1974b, 119). These constraints are believed to have undermined institutional elitism, encouraged "equality among the Muslim faithful," and resulted in "a high degree of social mobility" (Hodgson 1974a, 303–304). This meritocratic environment was arguably pivotal in the cultural, technological, and scientific advances collectively known as the Islamic Golden Age.[16] However, the secular bureaucracy that rested on landed elites also played an important role in these developments by constraining the populist and anti-science tendencies of the traditionalists, providing an environment in which Hellenistic, philosophical, and secular views flourished.[17] In other words, these two competing forms of societal organization checked each other, creating a supportive environment for intellectual discovery.

Military slavery eroded this balance of power by undercutting the landed elites on which secular bureaucratic institutions rested. Rulers assigned military slaves the right to collects taxes in lieu of salary (these administrative grants were known as *iqtas*), and these soldiers were rotated from *iqta* to *iqta* at the will of the ruler (Lapidus 2014, 198–199). Given their short time horizons, military slaves had "no permanent interest in the land and were concerned in the main with squeezing in the shortest possible time as much as they could out of the land in their temporary possession" (Lambton 1991, 53). Predictably, this predatory behavior decreased revenue flows to the bureaucracy. In addition to undermining bureaucratic structures through this channel, military slaves also destroyed the power of landed elites more broadly (Lapidus 2014, 199). The historian Miskawayh (who died in 1030 CE) provides one contemporary description of this process, noting how after the introduction of slave soldiers, "the bureaucracy was shut down and the bureaucratic secretaries and tax collectors disappeared [. . . instead the land was managed by] slave soldiers and agents who did not take care of what was in their power or manage the land in a fruitful manner" (Miskawayh 1915, 97–98).

Traditionalist religious elites benefitted from these developments, filling the void created by weakening bureaucratic structures. As the bureaucracy increasingly struggled to provide basic public goods and forms of civic organization, the religious scholars "took charge of judicial administration, local police, irrigation, public works and taxation" (Lapidus 1996, 13). These developments encouraged the spread of tribal forms of social organization and Islamization.[18] The ultimate result was that traditionalist religious leaders took charge of civil society as "old landowning and officeholding notables lost their power to new military regimes dominated by slave soldiers" (Lapidus 2014, 224). Since military slaves did not have a vested interest in local prosperity or stability, they did not fill the void of the bureaucracies they replaced, and they failed to constrain and balance the tribal traditionalists the way the landed bureaucrats had.

These societal changes culminated in what is known as the "Sunni revival." This term, which goes back at least to Gibb (1955b), reflects the historical emphasis on the ideological shift away from rationalist Islam favored by secular bureaucrats and toward more traditionalist interpretations. Gibb (1955b, 126) emphasized the top-down aspects of the shift, arguing that the Seljuks supported institutions such as madrasas to engineer the spread of what he called "orthodox" Islam, as well as to train a new "orthodox bureaucracy" to replace its secular precedent. Scholars employed in these institutions provided the intellectual underpinning for this new orthodoxy.

In a seminal article, Makdisi (1973, 168) questioned this view, suggesting that the Sunni revival was instead a bottom-up process in which traditionalist Islam triumphed over rationalist alternatives. This alternative view is consistent with historical evidence that traditionalist Islam had gained societal influence prior to the advent of the

Seljuks in the middle of the eleventh century CE. In addition, it sees Seljuk politicians as maximizing agents more interested in co-opting influential religious leaders than in championing one particular ideology over another (Makdisi 1981, 237).

The preceding discussion helps explain the Seljuks' actions during the revival. When the Seljuks conquered much of the Islamic world in the eleventh century, they encountered an environment in which tribal forms of societal organization centered around traditionalist religious elites had become dominant.[19] Consequently, they devised a new set of formal institutions to reflect this reality. In other words, while Seljuk policy generated a discrete change in formal institutions, these changes should ultimately be viewed as the reflection of the final victory of traditionalist-tribal forms of societal organization over rationalist-landed alternatives, a victory that had taken place before the Seljuks arrived on the scene.

Islamic Law, Traditionalism, and the Institutions of the Sunni Revival

An influential literature has highlighted the long-run impact of Islamic law on a host of political and economic outcomes (e.g., Kuran 2011). The previous discussion, however, suggests that this legal system may have been endogenous to the political system in which it was embedded. Indeed, in recent decades, scholars have increasingly linked the institutionalization of Islamic legal structures to the broader changes that occurred during the Sunni revival. For example, Ephrat (2000, 1) notes how during the Sunni revival, "the four Sunni schools of legal interpretation (*madhahib*) were consolidated as scholarly establishments, the nuclei of the Sufi fraternities were formed, and the 'law college' (madrasa) and Sufi hostel (*khanqah* or *ribat*) were founded, based on substantial pious endowments (*awqaf*)." This new institutional framework—which marked the emergence of a "pattern of governance that was to be emulated and reinforced until the nineteenth century"— was characterized, in part, by the dissociation of legal and state structures (Hallaq 2009, 77, 146).

Such evidence raises the possibility that Islamic law was ultimately developed to organize a tribal society outside of traditional bureaucratic structures. Indeed, what eventually became traditionalist Islamic law began to develop among Arab tribes in garrison cities and drew heavily on pre-Islamic tribal law (Hallaq 2009, 42–43). Non-Muslim populations and many recent converts continued to be subject to more bureaucratic pre-Islamic legal structures of the conquered areas (Glick 1995, 53). In other words, legal institutions appear to have paralleled societal structures as there arose a divide between those living under "tribal" law and "landed" law.

The historical record suggests that tribal forms of organization may have encouraged traditionalist interpretations of Islam. Initially, tribal legal structures differed markedly by geographic location, as the Arab Muslim populations drew on different tribal precedents. Traditional Islam worked to counter these centrifugal tendencies through the construction of religious authority (Hallaq 2009, 49, 58) by drawing heavily on "traditions" that claimed to be the words or deeds of the Prophet Muhammad as handed down by a line of trustworthy persons (Schacht 1993, 34). These traditions once linked to Muhammad were used to buttress religious authority, stifle dissent, and induce conformity against an otherwise diffuse and fractious tribal backdrop. In other words, in a tribal society resistant to authority, religious authority became a central component in ordering tribal communities. Rationalist Islam made it more difficult to organize tribal units by undermining such authority, suggesting one reason why Islamic law developed in a traditionalist direction in tribal communities.

As was the case with the broader political framework, the transition to tribal law was not immediate: for centuries, secular bureaucratic elites competed with traditionalist religious leaders "for recognition of their capacity to establish rules for effective government" (Bligh-Abramski 1992, 42).[20] The Sunni revival marked the final victory of traditionalist Islamic law over competing interpretations. Thus, the Seljuks crafted a new institutional arrangement under which rulers relied on traditionalist religious leaders to administer the tribally organized populations that now constituted their domains (Hallaq 2009, 150). In this new equilibrium, "the ruling elite received the cooperation of the scholars and their promotion of its legitimacy, while the scholars received a salary, protection, and the full right to apply the law as they saw fit" (Hallaq 2009, 152). Military leaders henceforth used religious endowments organized under the law of waqf—particularly madrasas—to purchase the allegiance of many of the most prominent religious leaders, who performed many of the functions previously carried out by the bureaucracy. In so doing, these new elites encouraged the spread of traditionalist legal structures, which represented a "watershed in the history of Muslim institutions" (Makdisi, 1981, 237).

In sum, the evidence suggests that the victory of traditionalist interpretations of Islamic law was rooted in the attempt to organize a tribal society outside bureaucratic structures. This evidence weighs against the traditional view that the dissociation of the religious legal system from state structures was the deterministic consequence of the original union of religion and politics in Islamic doctrine. Instead, the preceding discussion has traced this and other institutional developments to the evolution of the balance of political power in a monotheistic tribal milieu. In particular, I have hypothesized that the emergence of religious authority and the ultimate victory of traditionalist interpretations of Islam were closely related to the victory of tribal forms of societal organization over landed alternatives.

Diffusion, Persistence, and Ideological Impact

The Sunni revival's institutional framework spread rapidly across the Islamic world at the time, becoming "the norm almost everywhere" in the areas of initial Muslim conquest (Hodgson 1974b, 57). As the Islamic world expanded, Muslim dynasties at times attempted to export this institutional framework to conquered regions (Lapidus 2014, 331). Yet more recently incorporated regions often enjoyed significant autonomy and did not experience many of the societal changes that occurred following the Arab conquests. This may be due, in part, to political changes during the early modern period stemming from technological change (such as the spread of the use of gunpowder) and/or other causes.[21] Whatever the reasons, an institutional divide arose in the Islamic world between areas that had been incorporated early into the Islamic world and those incorporated later.

As a consequence, the institutions of the Sunni revival did not flourish outside of tribal areas and regions that were conquered in the centuries following the original Arab conquests. Thus, in areas such as Malaysia and Indonesia, pre-Islamic societal structures largely survived conversion to Islam (Geertz 1968, 9). Rulers did not use military slaves (Crone 1980, 263), Islamic law seems to have been confined largely to family matters in much of this area (Hadi 2004, 238), and local populations did not adopt parallel cousin marriage (Korotayev 2000). These observations are consistent with the view that the revival's institutions were rooted in tribal social structures rather than in Islamic doctrine.

Subsequent dynasties found tribal areas difficult to govern due to the "weakness of the state apparatus," and continued to rely on military slaves to help administer these regions (Lapidus 2014, 367, 374). When European colonial powers arrived in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they found weak civil societies and exploited this situation to their advantage. Consequently, when these areas gained independence after World War II, the new states were weakly institutionalized, with little history of civil society or checks and balances to draw on. Chaney (2012) explains how this environment contributed to the emergence of autocratic institutions, providing empirical evidence in support of this narrative.

Table 2.1 replicates the analysis in this paper, while adding a variable for the incidence of parallel cousin marriage to the analysis to further investigate the historical narrative developed in the previous sections.[22]

Column 1 confirms the conventional wisdom that across the world larger Muslim populations are associated with lower levels of democracy. Column 2 shows that this relationship persists even after including an indicator for whether a country was fuel-endowed or not. In column 3, I include a dummy variable equal to 1 if parallel-cousin marriage is preferred, as coded in Shulz (2019, 50). When I do this, the coefficient on Muslim majority drops in absolute value and is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The negative link between Islam and democracy completely disappears when continent dummies are included, as shown in Table 2.1, column 4. In column 5, I demonstrate that this coefficient and that on a variable measuring the extent to which a present-day country was conquered by Arabs are almost identical. In other words, today the only areas in the Muslim world that demonstrate a democracy deficit are those that were conquered by Arabs and those where parallel cousin marriage is preferred.

Table 2.1: Arab Conquest, Tribal Structures, and the Democracy Deficit in 2010

	Dependent Variable:						
	Normalized Polity Score 2010					Cousin	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Muslim Majority	-0.31^{***} (0.05)	-0.26^{***} (0.06)	-0.11^{***} (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.39^{***} (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)
Fuel-Endowed		-0.25^{***} (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.15^{*} (0.09)	0.45^{***} (0.10)	0.18^{**} (0.08)
Parallel Cousin			-0.37^{***} (0.08)	-0.34^{***} (0.08)			
Arab Conquest					-0.32^{***} (0.09)		0.76^{***} (0.11)
N	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Continent Dummies?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.19	0.23	0.31	0.44	0.43	0.56	0.77

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for details.

Columns 6 and 7 are consistent with the claim that these two variables measure the same treatment (up to measurement error). Column 6 shows that, in general, Muslim countries are more likely to prefer cousin marriage. Column 7, however, shows that this effect is entirely driven by countries that were conquered by Arab armies. In other words, the results are consistent with the hypothesis developed in this chapter that Arab Conquest → Tribalization → Weak Civil Society → Autocracy today. More broadly, these results cast doubt on the hypothesis that something inherent in Islamic doctrine impedes democratization.

Ideological Impact

Did the tribalization of society have an ideological impact? The narrative proposed in this chapter suggests that it should have led to the spread of traditionalist interpretations of Islam. Analysis in Makdisi suggests that this indeed occurred and that traditionalism "in the history of Muslim religious thought has been minimized, and its importance overlooked" (Makdisi 1963, 37).[23]

While the place of traditionalism within Islamic religious history remains a topic of ongoing research, many have argued that the ascendancy of traditionalist views was detrimental for the region's intellectual development. For example, scholars have often highlighted the negative effects of the doctrine of occasionalism, which denied the necessary relationship between causes and effects (Huff 2003, 110, 113). Some have gone so far as to attribute the decline of scientific activity in the Islamic world to these ideological developments, arguing that if not for this ideological shift, “the Arabs might have been a nation of Galileos, Keplers, and Newtons” (Sachau 1879, x). Of course, such ideological explanations face the difficulty that, as previously noted, traditionalism developed centuries prior to the Sunni revival, when the Islamic world was indeed a leader in scientific production.

In a recent working paper, Chaney (2016) provides empirical evidence linking the shift in the region’s intellectual development to the institutional changes described in this paper. In particular, he shows that the decline in scientific output coincides with a rise in the proportion of authors affiliated with madrasas. Madrasas, in turn, are believed to have been controlled by traditionalist religious leaders who used them as a “weapon” to undermine rationalism (Makdisi 1984, 21). Such evidence suggests that the ideological changes that occurred during the revival were a product of the societal changes documented in the chapter, rather than a cause of them. Consistent with this view, the following centuries were characterized by relative stability in the dominant interpretations of Islam, which contrasted with the pre-revival period’s “wide range of movements and intellectual currents featuring a varied mixture of reason and revelation” (Hallaq 2009, 502).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the Islamic world’s institutional development from the death of the Prophet Muhammad to the present. It has provided evidence weighing against the traditional view attributing the region’s political structures to Islamic doctrine. Rather, the historical evidence raises the possibility that influential interpretations of Islamic law and doctrine are rooted in the tenacious persistence of tribal forms of social organization following the Arab conquests. I have hypothesized that these forms of societal organization encouraged the introduction of military slavery, leading to a drop in secular state capacity and the tribalization of civil society. This institutional legacy, not Islam, lies at the root of much of the region’s ongoing difficulties today.

Somewhat paradoxically, given the anti-tribal bent of much of Muhammad’s message, the historical evidence suggests that Islamic law developed to help organize tribal populations outside of traditional bureaucratic state structures.[24] I have hypothesized that this environment encouraged interpretations of Islam emphasizing conformity and obedience and discouraging free thought in order to maintain cohesion across tribal units and maintain order for military regimes. In this sense, the analysis is consistent with claims by Muslim intellectuals that some influential interpretations of Islam—rooted in part in the teaching of the religious elites of the revival and after—can best be characterized as distortions of Muhammad’s message generated by rent-seeking elites rather than as the essence of Islamic doctrine.[25]

The analysis in this paper shows that the relationship between Islam and political structure is not static, and raises the possibility that the dominant interpretation of Islam in a given time and place is related to the political equilibrium. In particular, the results suggest that rationalist interpretations of Islam are more likely to flourish in strongly institutionalized societies.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Data used to generate this graph are drawn from Chaney (2012), except for the dummy for parallel cousin marriage, which is taken from Shulz (2019, 50, Figure A.5) (I slightly modify his data by setting modern-day Israel to zero). See Chaney (2012) for evidence that these patterns have remained roughly constant over the past decades. For more information on the data see this source and the analysis below.
2. A parallel cousin is descended from a parent's same-sex sibling. The hypothesis that this form of marriage essentially proxies for the spread of Arabian social structures goes back at least to Korotayev (2000).
3. Given the many variations of state structures in the Islamic world, the definition of the "Islamic state" is by necessity arbitrary. For the purposes of this paper, I will use this term to refer to the political structures that developed in the core areas (i.e., from the Nile to the Oxus Rivers) of the Islamic world. This political evolution, which crystallized in the middle of the eleventh century, led to the development of the "most common state type of Islamic society" (Lapidus 2014, 492).
4. The concept of legitimacy is vague. Given its widespread use in the secondary literature, however, I use it when referring to this literature. Lipset (1959, 86) defines legitimacy as "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for society." In other words, legitimacy is related to individual perceptions of optimality. As a concept, it only is relevant to the extent that people's perception of what is legitimate deviates from what is optimal to believe in a given environment. In a religious context, legitimacy is usually tied to the pronouncement of religious elites (Rubin 2017, 32). If this is correct, legitimacy (for the purposes of this paper) is closely related to the ability of religious leaders to convince the population that suboptimal institutions (from the point of view of the population) are optimal. In other words, the concept of religious legitimacy is tightly linked to rent-extraction by religious elites through their control over beliefs.
5. Between 632 and 750 CE, Arab-Muslim armies conquered a vast geographic region reaching from modern-day France to Pakistan.
6. This framework was characterized by, among other things, the spread of the use of religious endowments such as waqfs and a decline in formal governmental structures. See the section titled "The Origins of a New Political Equilibrium" below for additional details.

7. The existing literature tends to stress the instability of tribal military forces, which are "egalitarian by nature [and] resistant to the establishment of political structures outside of the tribe" (Guichard 1976, 517). Similarly, Athamina (1998, 374) argues that the loyalty of Arab tribesmen to rulers was "doubtful at best because their true loyalty lay solely with their tribes." See Moscona, Nunn, and Robinson (2019) for empirical evidence linking tribal environments and conflict.
8. This idea goes back at least to Ibn Khaldun, who argued that "Arab peoples in particular need religion to achieve the levels of [cooperation] essential to conquest and royal authority because their natural savagery ordinarily inhibits cooperation. Religion enables them to restrain themselves and cooperate in a common cause. It supplements family loyalties to create wider, more encompassing solidarities" (quoted in Lapidus 1990, 18). Similarly, Lapidus (1990, 31) argues that "Islam could be used for the unification of fragmented populations." This view is also consistent with a large literature arguing for the importance of ideology in solving the collective action problem (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 126).
9. This naturally raises the question of why the Arabian Peninsula generated this type of society to begin with. Crone (1994, 449) suggests that it may be related to the physical environment of the Arabian Peninsula and the historical reliance on camel pastoralism.
10. The terms *tribal* and *landed* are admittedly imprecise. Throughout this chapter, I follow Crone (1994, 447) and define *tribe* as a "a descent group [. . .] which constitutes a political community." Landed is best identified with the Persian aristocracy, which is "generally believed to have existed in pre-Islamic Persia" (Lambton 1967, 41), although similar arrangement likely existed in other regions prior to the Arab conquest). This societal divide resulted in the emergence of "two institutional structures with different elites and a different ethos" (Lapidus 1996, 11). While there may be differences in how these two groups are defined and debates regarding the extent to which these societies were feudal (Zakeri 1995, 13), the claim that what I call landed pre-Islamic arrangements were not tribal is uncontroversial.
11. Thus, this tribal society grew, incorporating new converts to Islam from non-Arabian backgrounds through the institution of *wala* (see Bernards and Nawas [2005] for an overview of this institution). Given present-day anthropological evidence discussed throughout this paper, it seems likely that these new arrivals adopted some Arabian tribal practices, and that the "full-fledged Islamic civilization" that seems to have emerged by the tenth century CE (Nawas 2006, 75, 88) contained many of these tribal characteristics.
12. Makdisi (1963, 22) concisely differentiates between the two groups as follows: "The traditionalists made use of reason in order to understand what they considered as the legitimate sources of theology: scripture and tradition. What they could not understand they left it as it stood in the sources; they did not make use of reason to interpret the sources metaphorically. On the other hand, the rationalists advocated the use of reason on scripture and tradition; and all that they deemed to contradict the dictates of reason they interpreted metaphorically in order to bring it into harmony with reason."
13. For additional evidence linking religious elites with tribal elites excluded from power, see Bligh-Abramski (1992, 54).
14. This divide emerged very early, and by 700 CE it was clear that a "wedge existed between the ruling elite and the emerging religio-legal class" (Hallaq 2009, 128).
15. Crone (1980, 64) argues that "from the start" the Abbasids supported rationalists who "as religious disputants and propagandists played an integral part in the Abbasid

establishment" and "soon inherited the bureaucracy." Crone (2006, 24) argues that the preference of bureaucratic officials for such rationalism continued long after the Mihna. See Zakeri (1995, 11) for evidence that rationalist Islam was linked to the landed aristocracy.

16. In addition, it helps explain why the pre-conquest bureaucracies did not generate similar results.
17. See Chaney (2019) for evidence that the bureaucracy played a central role in encouraging scientific development.
18. Islamization and tribal forms of organization did not necessarily go hand in hand (Guichard 1976, 223), but the ultimate collapse of landed state structures encouraged tribalization (in some ways in a similar manner to the process through which peasants adopted a lord to protect their property and lives during the feudalization of Europe). In a recent article, Rapoport and Shahar (2012, 29) suggest that this tribalization of society in regions conquered by the Arabs may have been widespread. This hypothesis is also consistent with modern-day evidence that the form of cousin marriage practiced in the Arabian Peninsula is primarily practiced today in areas that were conquered by Arab tribal forces (e.g., Korotayev 2000), and with the analysis below.
19. For evidence that the demise of the landed elites preceded or at the very least coincided with the Sunni revival, see Bulliet (1972, 22, 25).
20. Lambton (1967, 42) notes the link between the landed aristocracy and the bureaucracy by noting that after the Arab conquest the landed elites "retained their importance and continued to act as a link between the government and the people. Their functions, however, were bureaucratic."
21. For example, from the late sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, the breakdown of military slavery combined with a host of additional factors to generate "profound changes in the Ottoman political system" (Lapidus 2014, 366).
22. As Chaney (2012) notes, the econometric framework is kept simple, running a regression of the form $\text{Democracy}_{ic} = \beta_1 \text{Muslim}_{ic} + \beta_2 \text{ArabConquestic}_{ic} + \gamma' x + \varepsilon_{ic}$ where Democracy_{ic} is the 2010 polity score in country i on continent c normalized to lie on the interval [0,1] (higher scores more democratic), Muslim_{ic} is an indicator equal to 1 if at least half the country's population is Muslim, $\textit{ArabConquestic}_{ic}$ is a measure of the extent to which a country was conquered by Arab forces, and x is a vector of covariates, including continent dummies, and an indicator equal to 1 if a country is fuel-endowed. See Chaney (2012) for further details on these variables and their construction.
23. Although the idea that tribal forms of societal organization encourage more conservative interpretations of Islam awaits systematic empirical investigation, there is some qualitative evidence supporting this view. For example, the cash waqf—which was viewed by conservative Muslims as violating Islam's usury ban, but nevertheless used in much of the Ottoman Empire—was adopted very late if at all in areas conquered by Arab forces (Mandaville 1979, 308).
24. Ibn Khaldun (1989) recognized that the Prophet Muhammad taught against the very tribalism that he argued was the motor of Islamic political history. Thus, he notes that "we find that Muhammad censured group feeling [i.e., tribal *asabiyya*] and urged us to reject it and leave it alone. He said: 'God removed from you the arrogance of pre-Islamic times and its pride in ancestry. You are the children of Adam, and Adam was made of dust.'"
25. For example, al-Afghani criticized post-revival Islam's "passivity and resignation," which he viewed as a corruption of true Islam, which was "a religion of reason and the free use of

the mind" (Lapidus 2014, 519). For a more recent take on this theme, see https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/islamic-history-is-full-of-free-thinkers-but-recent-attempts-to-suppress-critical-thought-are-9993777.html.

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CHAPTER 3

STATE-FORMATION, STATIST ISLAM, AND REGIME INSTABILITY

Evidence from Turkey

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Religion, and particularly the forces of political Islam and state secularism, have been central to discussions of regime stability in the Turkish case.[1] After its founding as a single-party and eventually self-declaredly secular state under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s, the country effectively transitioned to a multiparty system in 1950. Yet intense polarization, political instability, and military interventions have propelled the Turkish Republic into crisis about once every decade since. Successful military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the "postmodern coup" of 1997, the 2007 military "E-memorandum," and most recently the failed coup of 2016 have all interrupted the process of democratic deepening. In light of Turkey's most recent bouts of political upheaval, scholars have struggled to definitively characterize Turkey's regime "type," alternatively labeling it "tutelary democracy" (Höjelid 2009), "elusive democracy" (Tezcür 2010), "secular democracy" (Secor 2011), "delegative democracy" (Taş 2015), "illiberal democracy" (Göl 2017), "competitive authoritarianism" (Çalışkan 2018; Esen and Gumuscu 2016), "neo-fascism" (Tuğal 2016), "spindle autocracy"(White 2017), "fragile or weak authoritarianism"(Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016), and finally, building on Guillermo O'Donnel's concept, a "brown country" that functionally and territorially mixes key democratic and authoritarian characteristics (Kurban 2020).

These difficulties in classifying Turkey's regime reflect the broader absence of regime stability in Turkey's modern history. That is to say, they reflect a lack of strong democratic *or* authoritarian consolidation. Scholars have attributed this instability, in part, to the cycling of one of the country's master narratives of conflict, which allegedly pits the forces of political Islam against Kemalist secularism. Guardians of the Kemalist tradition have been depicted as "working from inside the state system" to limit expressions of religion in the public sphere and repress pious elements in society via assertive forms of state secularism (*laïcité—lâiklik)* (Kuru 2009). Political Islamists, by contrast, gained attention for "working from outside the system" to mobilize religious identity and contest the state's repression of religious freedom via local politics and the grass roots (White 2002). More recently, after nearly two decades of rule by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was first democratically elected in 2002, it is argued that the tables have been turned. Now in control of the system, political Islamists are said to be using it to flout the very democratic institutions that brought them to power, to desecularize the state, and to impose Islamic values (Cornell 2017).

To make sense of these upheavals, and to shed light on some of the reasons why both democracy and authoritarianism have "failed to stick" in the Turkish case, this chapter advocates for a more long-term historical assessment of the relationship between religion and regime. The chapter makes two interlocking arguments. First, using evidence from the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican Turkey, I argue that processes of state formation shaped the subsequent trajectory of Islamist politics in modern Turkey, which came to be dominated by *statist* or *state-centric* political Islamist currents. Power arrangements fortified during state formation imbedded elements of the dominant religion (Sunni Islam) within the state and subsequently structured "the deep rules of the game" in Turkish politics. As such, far from being a reactionary force working primarily from outside of the state system, political Islamists in Turkey learned to operate largely from within state organs and with statist prerogatives. They continue to do so.

Second, and relatedly, although Turkey's political Islamists have indeed used grassroots strategies to inspire and mobilize the masses (Delibas 2015; White 2002), legacies of late Ottoman and Kemalist state-building have contributed to another set of strategies at the elite level that are less visible and still poorly understood. State-centric Islamists in Turkey have wielded their moral authority to homogenize and nationalize society, as well as to build and reorient the state in their own image. They have used coalition-building, coalition-balancing, and patronage politics to expand their foothold in state institutions. They have consistently and steadily gained influence through a patient strategy of temporary bargains with the anti-democratic forces of Kemalist secularism against mutual enemies (leftists, minority groups, etc.). Finally, state-centric Islamists have aspired for institutional capture rather than protracted power sharing—much like their Kemalist counterparts. The emergence of state-centric political Islam has thus contributed to regime instability because many big political battles are fought *within* the critical institutional corridors of the state—security, judiciary, education, etc.—and are thereby destabilizing to it, whether in democratic or autocratic form.

Before turning toward empirics and further elaborating the arguments presented thus far, a few definitional notes are in order. First, in its approach to religion, the historical analysis in this chapter focuses on how the emerging Turkish state engaged three discrete aspects of the dominant majority religion, Sunni Islam: religious elites, religious institutions, and religious attachments. Disaggregating religion in this way shows appreciation for the fact that religious authority—which can equally be a potential challenge or supplement to state authority—is embodied in the form of individual power brokers (elites), their organizational structures (institutions), and norms regarding identity and belonging (attachments). Such an approach also restores agency to Sunni Muslim religious elites in the history of state-building, secularization, and modernization, which is key to understanding how subsequent power relations between the emergent machine of the centralized state and the traditional loci of religious authority evolved.[2]

My use of the term "political Islam" corresponds to the Turkish terms *İslâmcılık* (Islamism) or *siyasal İslâmcılık* (political Islamism), which are used to describe the agenda and activities of individuals and groups who claim to defend the religious sphere from various forms of encroachment and to protect the interests of the pious and religious elites (Fabbe and Balikçioglu 2019). "Secularization" is a more difficult term to pin down. As I have noted elsewhere, I harbor deep skepticism about the usefulness of secularism and secularization as face-values concepts, while also admitting that the terms are hard to avoid (Fabbe 2019). Here I contend that *state formation is a kind of secularization*, insomuch as it involves the expansion of state-centric norms of sovereignty and institutional hegemony over specific "disciplinary" domains (in the Foucauldian sense) of human interaction. Hence, when I write of secularization or secularizing strategies, I refer to their Jacobin orientation; that is, to a belief in the possibility of transforming society through totalistic political action designed to reorient loyalties toward the state by controlling traditional influences and generating modern/civic identities (Eisenstadt 1999; Fabbe 2019).

Finally, the labels of "Kemalist" and "Islamist" are not without their problems, paradoxes, or ambiguities—but both terms are used widely and self-referentially in Turkey (White 2002), and thus they are also retained here.

STATE FORMATION AND THE HISTORICAL PRECURSORS OF STATIST ISLAM

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the emerging Turkish state made durable advances in sovereignty and hegemony by deploying the symbolic resources of Sunni Muslim identity, by leveraging religious institutions, and by imbedding individual religious elites into nascent, state-centric structures of education, law, and bureaucracy as part of the state-building process. Specifically, institutional changes in education and law that were set into motion during the reign of Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II (r. 1876–1909), and were continued subsequently under the rule of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and in the early Kemalist period, demonstrate how modern Turkish state formation led religious elites to develop state-centric prerogatives and orientations. Using evidence from the periods of Hamidian, CUP, and Kemalist rule, I show how a lack of manpower for modernizing reforms led the state to expand into education and law by creating new institutional layers on the edge of traditional religious structures. Institutional layering was further undergirded by the incremental, piecemeal co-optation of a sizable number of religious elites, a process that realigned their interests and rendered them largely state-centric. As a result of this state formation process, the traditional religious institutions of Sunni Islam gradually eroded in the late Ottoman period, and the interests of Islamists increasing assumed state-centric orientations.

The Late Ottoman Legal and Educational Landscape under Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II

Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II, who ascended to the throne in 1876 at the age of thirty-four, came to power in the midst of a gathering political storm. Foreign (British, French, Russian) interventions had whittled away Ottoman influence. The internationally imposed autonomous provinces of the empire—Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Crete, Samos, Mt. Lebanon, Egypt—began to slip further from Ottoman control, largely as a result of European meddling (Findley 2010). By the 1870s and 1880s, Ottoman political elites and the empire's Muslim population became increasingly unwilling to accept any kind of European interference in Ottoman affairs, with the French conquest of Tunisia (1881) and the British occupation of Egypt (1882) particularly offensive to them. Furthermore, for the empire's Christian elite, the idea of Ottoman citizenship was beginning to lose its appeal, making way for the politics of self-determination (Rodogno 2012).

ʿAbdulḥamīd II thus inherited a host of political and fiscal problems, while also under pressure to centralize, modernize, and consolidate his power base. Despite these impediments, ʿAbdulḥamīd II ruled as an absolute monarch for some thirty years and managed to make great strides toward developing modern infrastructure, even amid the impending chaos. In large part this was because, from approximately the mid-1870s onward, he supported modernizing reforms in the fields of education and law based on a strategy of institutional layering, which continuously blurred the distinction between "state" and "religious" institutional structures and helped consolidate state authority.

For example, in the field of education, the term *ibtidāʿī mektebi,* which is often used interchangeably with the terms "modern," "secular," or "state" schools in the secondary literature, was actually also the standard term for traditional Qurʾan schools in many official government documents during this period. The "usage of the term *ibtidāʿī mektebi* both for Qurʾan schools and for government schools in official documents," argues Akşin Somel (2001, 109), is "related to the 'historical relict' of considering primary education as an integral part of religious instruction." Work by Benjamin Fortna also illustrates that during the reign of ʿAbdulḥamīd II the character and content of late Ottoman "state" education became *more* Islamic than it had been immediately after the first wave of Tanzimat reforms. Fortna writes that "Western subjects were deemphasized and a considerable amount of classically Islamic content such as Quran, ḥadīth and jurisprudence were introduced into an otherwise largely secular lesson plan" (Fortna 2011, 81).

This blurring of lines between religious and state institutional structures in the field of education was born from the imperatives of state-building under constraints—especially severe shortages in civilian-trained (in this case, nonreligiously trained) teachers. This can be illustrated by figures compiled by the Ottoman statistical office for the year 1897–1898 (1313). The total number of schools is listed as 29,081, consisting of 55 "high schools" (*mekātib-i ʿidādiyye*), 412 "middle schools" (*mekātib-i rüşdiyye*), and 28,614 "primary/elementary schools" (*mekātib-i ibtidāiyye*). However, the same records do not indicate there being anywhere near an adequate amount of nonreligiously trained teachers to fill these schools—the total number of state-employed teaching staff and other personnel was listed as only 3,613! Furthermore, the number of students enrolled at the empire's 14 state-created training programs for elementary school teachers (*dāru'l-muʿallimīn*) was only 277 that same year, meaning that a new crop of available teachers was not on the horizon (Güran 1997, 106–109). Elites at the helm of the Ottoman state were aware of this manpower predicament, as evidenced by an 1888 document issued by the Ottoman Commission for Education, which stated that, "regarding the appointment of individuals capable of teaching in the new method, because of serious concerns about empty teaching slots and the absence of teachers, recourse has to be taken by continuing [to appoint] those with traditional training in existing [religious] methods" (Kodman 1980, 240).

In the legal realm, too, centralizing reforms had not and did not ostracize the religious establishment. The Provincial Law of 1864 marked the beginning of a separation of administrative and judicial powers and paved the way for the consolidation of the *Niẓāmiye*[3] court system as a set of institutions that was theoretically distinct from the shariʿa courts. At this stage, however, the entire judicial system (including commercial and criminal elements) was still subordinate to the Şeyẖülislām, and thus the religious establishment (Rubin 2011, 21–29). What is more, the beginning of the new *Niẓāmiye* system did not immediately herald the end of the traditional shariʿa courts, the *ḳāḍī* system, and/or religious legal order. For one, Aḥmed Cevdet Paşa, a shariʿa jurist, who can by no means be labeled a "secularist," spearheaded the *Niẓāmiye* system. Between 1870 and 1877, Cevdet Paşa led an effort to codify the shariʿa based on the *corpus juris* of the Hanafite school. These developments culminated in the creation of the *Mecelle* (*Mecelle-yi aḥkām-ı ʿadliye*), a civil code that was a hybrid legal artifact with European structure but distinct Islamic features and content (Hallaq 2009, 409–411). The *Mecelle* was applied in both traditional shariʿa courts and in the new *Niẓāmiye* system, showing the close relationship between the two.

Furthermore, the creation of the *Niẓāmiye* courts did not occur at the expense of religious elites' career advancement. Shariʿa judges instead just assumed a new duty as the chief judges of the new *Niẓāmiye* courts, now under the new title of *nāʾib*. The traditional kadıship thus evolved into something akin to "fellowship" for medrese students. Research into the personnel records of late Ottoman *nāʾibs* reveals that many entered the religious hierarchy of kadıship in their student years and then were promoted to the position of *nāʾib* in the new *Niẓāmiye* system, marking a high degree of fluidity between the traditional shariʿa system and the new state-centric *Niẓāmiye* courts, as well as new pathways for upward mobility (Akiba 2005). Similarly, analysis of the judicial personnel in the *Niẓāmiye* courts shows that initially many hailed from the medreses, the new *Niẓāmiye* law school (which itself drew from the medreses), and the School for Shariʿa Judges (Akiba 2018; Rubin 2011), established in 1855.

The Rise of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and its Approach to the Religious Establishment

Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II's approach to religion had, in many ways, bolstered his authority and centralization. Nonetheless, iron-fist tendencies and a penchant for the brutal suppression of potential opponents earned him a number of enemies. As discontent with the seemingly endless military campaigns and economic crises brewed among the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and military, organized opposition took shape (Karal 1962; Pekdemir 2008). Namely, the Young Turk movement (the intellectual movement from which the Committee for Union and Progress [CUP] eventually emerged) appeared on the scene in the late nineteenth century.

The movement began as a group of exiles, intellectuals, military officers, and civil servants connected by virtue of their opposition to ʿAbdulḥamīd II's regime. The organization's self-proclaimed goal was a return to the political structures of the First Constitutional Period—namely the reinstatement of the constitutional monarchy and revival of the Ottoman Parliament, which had been enacted by the Basic Law/Constitution (*Ḳānūn-ı Esāsī*) of 1876. This First Constitutional Period was short-lived, lasting only two years before being abolished by ʿAbdulḥamīd II, who then reinstated an absolute monarchy with himself at the helm in 1878. The CUP won a major victory in July 1908, when the group's "Young Turk Revolution" succeeded in forcing ʿAbdulḥamīd II to acquiesce to their demands that the 1876 constitution and Ottoman Parliament be reinstated. Although the event was a major victory for the Young Turks, it did not provide the CUP with a free hand to systematically disenfranchise religious influence. Nonetheless, as Şükrü Hanioğlu has observed, there was also growing sentiment within CUP circles that the social position of the ulema and its role in state affairs should be substantially curtailed (Hanioğlu 1995, 2005) in the interests of state centralization and modernization.

The religious elite were more than a mere nuisance for the reform-minded CUP. As available data reveal, by virtue of size and position, the ulema was both a potential breeding ground for collective resistance to the forces of further state centralization and a reservoir of expertise and manpower that had to be taken very seriously. Approximately 3,278 upper-level ulema members (at the rank of *ḳāḍī, müftü*, and *nāʾib*) were, at least in theory, operating across the empire (Albayrak 1996, vol. 1). To this figure needs to be added the number of medrese instructors, *ṭalebeler/softā* (students), *imamlar* (prayer leaders), *müez̲z̲inler* (call to prayer reciters), and *ḥāfıẓlar* (Qurʾan reciters). Precise numbers are elusive, but some basic estimates are possible: in 1892 Ottoman authorities estimated the number of medrese students in the capital alone to be near to 12,000, a sizable number indeed (Bein 2006, 289), while another estimate put the combined number of *imamlar*, *müez̲z̲inler*, and *ḥāfıẓlar* empire-wide at 188,000 (Karpat 1985, 218). Finally, detailed qualitative analysis of the career trajectories of 140 randomly selected ulema members working during the final decades of the empire reveals that over two-thirds of them transferred between (or simultaneously worked in) "traditional" religious institutions and new "state-centric" institutions (Fabbe 2019). Put simply, the Sunni Muslim religious establishment was sizable and embedded.

As relations between the CUP and the Sunni Muslim religious establishment unfolded, two points became increasingly clear. First, the primary preferences of these religious elites lay not in some fundamental, religiously dictated distaste for modernization or even centralization, but in a more basic desire to preserve their own position in society, their institutions, and their livelihood. This meant that the Sunni Muslim religious establishment was largely divided regarding its attitudes toward the CUP (Ardıç 2012; Bein 2011). Second, the CUP recognized the importance of religious attachments and moral authority. The organization extensively used religious language and rhetoric to broaden its mass appeal and to placate men of faith as well as the pious. In CUP publications, evidence to this effect abounds, and CUP leaders often claimed to be better Muslims than the Sultan-Caliph himself (Emil 1979; Gündüz 2008; Hanioğlu 2001; Mardin 1964).

While the CUP struggled to formalize its political influence with ʿAbdulḥamīd II still on the throne, opposition to the CUP began to rear its head. Political factions opposed to a CUP takeover consolidated. On September 14, 1908, the Liberal Union (ʿOs̲mānlı Aḥrār Fırḳası) was founded, a liberal group popular with minorities and in favor of decentralization—as opposed to the CUP's centralization policies. This group was headed by Prince Ṣabāḥaddīn, nephew and fierce opponent of ʿAbdulḥamīd II (Kuran 1948, 229).[4] Furthermore, the İttiḥād-ı Muḥammedī Fırḳası (Society of Muhammadan/Moslem Union), a religiously conservative Islamic faction demanding the full implementation of the shariʿa, also appeared on April 5, 1909 (Tunaya 1984, 1, 182–200). Less than a week prior, this faction's leader had led a large uprising in the capital, demanding a full implementation of the shariʿa while the Liberal Union stood by in tacit support (Albayrak 1987; Atilhan 1956; İrtem 2003; Kutay 1977). Despite the ostensibly Islamic aims of the uprising, it seems that, at its core, the real subject of dispute was whether state-centric expansion should proceed or not. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the strange merging of political bedfellows that led the Liberal Union—a vociferous opponent of Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II that was backed by Christian and Jewish minorities—to support a group of pious, Sunni Muslim, anti-CUP demonstrators protesting for the full implementation of the shariʿa.

More interestingly, for our purposes here, despite the emergence of an "Islamic party" and the existence of a "religious uprising" at this juncture in 1909, the Sunni Muslim religious establishment itself did not fully coalesce behind either; rather, it fractured further still. And, while exceptions certainly did exist, the lines of these fractures began to take a clearer form. Upper-level ulema members with a secure position in the religious establishment's hierarchy often tended to view themselves as better off defending the CUP's state centralization efforts and the constitution (*Ṭanīn* 1908; İ. Kara 1994, 2005; Kuran 1948; Tunaya 2003; Unat 1960). They wanted to maintain their social status and position, which was still possible in the contemporary political climate as a result of the incentives being offered by the CUP leadership in return for compliance. Low-level religious functionaries and students of religion, on the other hand, had much less to gain by siding with the CUP and tended to support the protestors (Farhi 1971). Religious students and low-level functionaries saw the very institutions that were supposed to afford them upward mobility being neglected, as upper-level ulema joined new state-centric institutions of education and law, not to mention entered the political fray. Lower-level members of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment had no place in the new centralized state system from the outset, and they thus attempted to resist as the CUP tightened its grip on power.

The CUP's response to the uprising was as swift as it was brutal, replete with arrests, public hangings, and widespread general repression. It also, however, included deferential gestures toward those members of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment that had supported it. First, the CUP institutionalized an ulema branch of its organization in order to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to religion (Hanioğlu 2001, 306). Second, it maneuvered to acquire a fatwa providing an official religious justification for ʿAbdulḥamīd II's dismissal, thus sealing his fate (Hür 2008). Finally, even though the 1876 constitution had been reinstated, the reforms of 1909 made the document substantially more "Islamic" in both tone and content than the 1876 original. An alteration to Article 10, for example, added a reference to the shariʿa in connection with the lawful reasons for arrest, and a change in Article 118 made Ḥanafī jurisprudence (*fiqh*) a major source for new legislation (Hanioğlu 2008, 160). The constitution thus earned the praise of many influential Sunni Muslim religious elites (Berkes 1964, 368–370).

What is shocking is that certain members of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment continued to back and legitimate the CUP's next set of moves, which made it clear that the CUP sought to decrease the administrative and spiritual influence of a key religious institution, the Meşīḫat (the office of the Şeyḫülislām). The CUP let its motives toward the office of the Şeyḫülislām be known early in 1909, when one of its key activists began publicly advocating that all judicial and educational institutions should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Education, respectively (Bein 2011, 20). Key ulema came to the CUP's defense, providing religious justifications for treating the Meşīḫat as a subordinate arm of the state completely devoid of autonomous spiritual authority (Ardıç 2012, 40). The CUP won an additional victory in 1910 when an ulema member who was sympathetic to reorganizing the administrative, judicial, and educational functions of the religious establishment was appointed to the role of Şeyḫülislām (Bein 2011, 40). By 1912 political maneuvering and rhetorical battling within the religious establishment's ranks, centering on control of the office of the Şeyḫülislām, had fractured the Sunni Muslim religious establishment into three main groups: those who supported the CUP and bolstered its religious credentials, those who mounted defensive opposition to CUP endeavors, and those who kept their heads down in an attempt to remain apolitical while maintaining their careers (Bein 2011, 101). From 1912 through the First World War, these groups jockeyed for influence, undermining one another in the process.

Co-optation and Professionalization: Islamists in an Era of State Secularism

The religious establishment, for its part, was certainly not looking to forfeit authority and autonomy to state-centric control. Nor were members of the religious establishment entirely ignorant of the fact that reformers were being strategic in their appropriation of religious rhetoric. At this point, however, the divisions within the religious establishment were so acute that its collective defenses had been greatly weakened. Furthermore, the continued availability of new professional avenues for Sunni Muslim religious elites in this crucial reform period aligned a significant portion of their interests with those of the emerging state, especially as religious institutions themselves languished. This gradual shifting of allegiances paved the way for the Kemalists' final push to completely subordinate Sunni Muslim religious institutions to state-centric purposes. Later in the chapter I provide examples of this phenomenon in education, law, and the creation of the bureaucratic institution that eventually became Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyānet İşleri Re'īsliği, later to become the Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı, and from now on referred to herein simply as "the Diyanet."

Education

From the aforementioned qualitative analysis of 140 ulema biographies (Fabbe 2019), I find that approximately fifteen ulema members taught in the new primary education system at some point, and forty additional ulema members fulfilled some sort of educational role in connection with the state as the medrese system was reformed and brought under the state mantle prior to being "abolished" in 1924. Local records paint a similar picture. For example, records from the Annual Education Yearbooks (*Maʿārif Sālnāmesi*) from the Diyarbekir vilayet from 1898 to 1903 show that the vast majority of teachers at all levels came from the learned religious class (Şimşek 2006). Beyond attempts to expand modern teacher-training programs, which ulema members were encouraged to join, I have found no evidence to suggest that the CUP made any effort to rid the state educational system of its religiously trained personnel.

Notably, even as religious teachers were co-opted and became a mainstay in the primary schools for the time being, religious instruction itself was on the decline. More specifically, the religious content of official primary-school curricula was not immediately eradicated—even with the Kemalist revolution—but rather slowly phased out over the course of thirty to forty years. Tracing staffing figures, changes in textbook content and class scheduling, and the observations of primary-school students all emphasize that religious messages and morality actually began to be stripped away from educational texts long before schools were stripped of their "religious" teachers (Doğan 1994; Somel 2001; Ünal 2008). In other words, the Second Constitutional Period is characterized by a cadre of religious functionaries teaching on the basis of materials that were slowly moving away from traditional Islamic doctrine and toward a modern synthesis that fused a nominal version of Sunni Islam with an emergent state-centric nationalism.

Finally, the gradual decline and concomitant nationalization of the late Ottoman medrese education system shows that, although the medreses were indeed formally abolished by the Kemalist government in 1924, the gradual processes of change leading up to that point had weakened these religious institutions to such a degree that abolition and usurpation of the system's resources was a viable policy. Two newly fashioned "medreses" that focused on the professional preparation of religious functionaries were opened in late 1912, the *Medresetüʿl-vāʿizīn* and the *Medresetüʿl-eimme ve'l-ḫuṭebā* (Akiba 2003). This trend toward professionalization culminated in the "Reform of the Medreses" bill (*Iṣlāḥāt-ı Medāris Niẓāmnāmesi*) in 1914. This sweeping reform program centralized, regularized, and effectively "nationalized" medrese education in Istanbul (similar changes were later made outside the capital), organizing it into a three-tiered system (primary, secondary, higher) modeled on the structure of the state school system. New curricular changes were also slowly introduced in an effort to blend the content of the medrese and state systems closer together (Kütükoğlu 1978; Ürgüplü 2015).[5] Finally, and most significantly, with the 1914 reforms, caps were placed on medrese enrollment. In 1914 enrollment in the capital was limited to 2,880, and in 1917 it was further reduced to 1,350 (Bein 2011, 66). Interestingly, senior representatives from the medrese system fully endorsed these caps, arguing that it helped to maintain student quality and weed out free riders.

Thus, when the republican regime passed the Unification of Education Law (*Tevḥīd-i Tedrīsāt Ḳānūnu*) on March 3, 1924, which effectively transferred all medreses to the control of the state Ministry of Education (Ayhan 1999), the medrese system itself had been substantially weakened. Even as the medreses were forced to shutter their doors, most of the ulema members who worked in them were not left out in the cold. The Kemalists softened the blow by adding Article 4 to the Unification of Education Law, which provided for the opening of a network of so-called Imam Hatip schools, which were designated with training prayer leaders and preachers who would comply with principles of the new republic. These schools continue to exist to this very day and enroll a substantial portion of secondary and high school students in Turkey (Öcal 2007; Ünsür 2005).

LAW

In the legal realm, similar dynamics played out as reformers slowly phased out shariʿa courts and grew the system of centralized *Niẓāmiye* courts described earlier in this chapter by co-opting Sunni Muslim religious elites. Data derived from the catalog of Ottoman court records (Akgündüz and Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı 1988) show that in 1908, the year of the Young Turk Revolution, 121 of the 166 established judicial centers for shariʿa law (73 percent) were still producing bound volumes of witness testimony and judicial verdicts, meaning, of course, that they were still active and hearing cases. By 1922, however, that number appears to have dropped to 32, meaning that only 19 percent of these centers were still active. The interesting question, then, is not how Mustafa Kemal closed the shariʿa courts in 1924, but rather how these courts were successfully phased out in the period before he rose to power. Evidence suggests that the layering of modern and traditional legal institutions (combined with the gradual co-optation of judicial personnel from the religious establishment) created a situation in which many ulema became tightly enmeshed with the emerging state's legal apparatus in the late Ottoman period, even after the Young Turk Revolution. Although this layering took numerous forms, particularly important in this respect was the fluidity with which personnel flowed between the two systems for decades.

In the 1870s the Ministry of Justice had assumed the role as the administrative headquarters for the *Niẓāmiye* court system, while the shariʿa courts remained under the direction of the *Meşīḫat* (office of the Şeyḫülislām). As historians have observed, however, the structure of the *Niẓāmiye* court system actually created a sort of "special partnership" between the Ministry of Justice and the office of the Şeyḫülislām in the domain of civil law that endured through the Second Constitutional Period. This was because the civil sections increasingly operated in accordance with *Niẓāmiye* procedure, but were presided over by judges from the religious establishment (Akiba 2018; Rubin 2011). For example, Rubin (2011, 78) finds that the majority of judges who presided over the *Niẓāmiye* courts of first instance—or the civil sections thereof, to the extent that any distinction was maintained—were *nāʾibs*. That is, they were shariʿa judges from the ranks of the ulema and employed by the office of the Şeyẖülislām. Rubin also finds that, according to Ottoman statistical yearbooks (*sālnāmeler*), these were the same individuals who served as *ḳāḍīs* in the local shariʿa courts (147). There is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry of Justice made any effort to expel *nāʾibs* from the civil section of the *Niẓāmiye* system or rid the court of members of the religious elite, even after the Young Turk Revolution, unless they resisted reform very directly (Akiba 2018, 234).

Qualitative analysis from the aforementioned 140 randomly selected ulema biographies corroborates these findings. Fifty-nine of these ulema members worked as *nāʾibs* in the *Niẓāmiye* court system. Of these fifty-nine individuals, twenty-seven simultaneously served as both a *nāʾib* in the *Niẓāmiye* system and a *ḳāḍī* in a shariʿa court. Furthermore, an additional eleven individuals did some sort of clerkship or scribal work in the *Niẓāmiye* courts over the course of their lifetime (Fabbe 2019).

Given the high degree of fluidity and overlap between the *Niẓāmiye* and shariʿa systems for decades, it is perhaps not surprising that the religious establishment offered little protest in 1917 when two important laws were passed that fused the institutions further. The first law, which was actually even signed by the Şeyẖülislām, subordinated the shariʿa courts to the Ministry of Justice. This law stripped the office of the Şeyẖülislām of some of its most critical administrative assets without actually threatening the existence of the shariʿa courts or the jobs of those who worked in them. The second law was the Law of the Shariʿa Court Procedure, which further formalized the unification of judicial procedure across the various courts and thereby made a significant step toward formally centralizing the judiciary under an ordered set of regulations devised by the state (Rubin 2011, 26–50).

One final piece of evidence from the Turkish ulema biographies and career trajectories helps to summarize the data presented here about religious co-optation into new state-centric institutions for law and schooling. Of a sample of seventy-eight biographies of ulema members (Miller 2005, 103) that extend directly into the Republican period, we see the following trajectory for members of the religious establishment:

- 22 went on to work in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments/Diyanet, and 24 went on to work in the Justice Ministry
- 14 went on to secure teaching positions
- 11 remained unemployed
- 6 were imprisoned or fled the country
- 1 committed suicide

In other words, these biographies depict a situation in which a large segment of active ulema members were given the opportunity to incorporate themselves into the nascent institutional framework of the centralized state and, as a result, opted for cooperation with, rather than active resistance to, policies to completely subordinate and dismantle religious institutions once the Kemalists seized power.

Forging the Religious Bureaucrat

As the above examples demonstrate, work in the state's judiciary and education systems was a popular alternative to obsolescence or resistance for religious elites. So too was serving as a bureaucrat in the predecessor of Turkey's ministry for religious affairs. The creation of this bureaucracy, its objectives, its exclusion of non-Sunni Muslims, and its subsequent growth and entrenchment stand as perhaps the best examples that the "secular" Turkish state created institutional conduits for religious elites and future Islamists that flowed within and through the arteries of the state.

The immediate roots of Turkey's Diyanet and its religious bureaucrats can be traced to 1920, when the Şerʿiye ve Evḳāf Vekāleti (Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments) was established after the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly by Mustafa Kemal's newly established shadow government in Ankara. Amit Bein's excellent history of the late Ottoman ulema shows that this short-lived ministry "served as a de facto alternative to the Şeyḫülislām and was primarily staffed by reform-minded ulema" (Bein 2011, 71–72). In 1922 the Grand National Assembly also moved to strip Sultan Vaḥīdeddīn of his role as caliph on the basis of treachery, transferring the position instead to the more pliable ʿAbdülmecīd Efendi and sending out a circular to inform all local imams and *ḫatībs* about this change.[6] Soon thereafter, close on the heels of the Treaty of Lausanne, in August 1923 the Kemalist assembly approved a resolution to make Ankara the capital of the new state while retaining Istanbul as the seat of the actual Caliphate (Ahmad 2003, 87). With these moves, the Ankara assembly managed to temporarily preserve the symbolic authority of Islamic leaders and the Caliphate while isolating them ever further from the inner workings of the new government in the Republic's first crucial months.

Finally, in March 1924, Kemal abolished the Caliphate completely in a demonstration of national authority and state sovereignty. Interestingly, the actual proposal to abolish the Caliphate was presented by the religious scholar and Sufi leader Sheikh Ṣafvet Efendi, who rationalized that, "because the Caliphate is essentially intrinsic to the concept and purview of the government and republic, the office of the Caliphate is abolished" (Ardıç 2012, 296–297). A telegraph was sent to *müftülüḳ*s (mufti offices) announcing the abolition and further instructing them that Friday sermons should emphasize prayers for the well-being (*selāmet*) and prosperity (*saʿādet*) of the religious community, whereas any other sermon or message that would instigate chaos should be avoided.[7] Simultaneously, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments was shuttered and replaced by the even more "domesticated" Diyānet İşleri Re'īsliği (Presidency of Religious Affairs, later to become the Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı). From now on, all cadres of preachers—*vāʿiz*, *müʾezzin*, imam, and/or *ḫatīb*—would be civil servants working for the Diyanet. They would be required to send in their documents, including the information on their identity cards, so as to monitor their compliance with the state. Local *müftülüḳ*s were turned into representatives of the Diyanet in their respective jurisdictions, sometimes making decisions on behalf of the Diyanet as needed. [8] Simultaneously, the resources and property of the religious establishment—and especially the former Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments—were dismantled and conferred to other departments such as the Ministry of Education.[9]

Strikingly, between 1920 and 1925, Mustafa Kemal and his allies did not take many hostile actions against the Sufi orders or tekkes. With the abolition of the Caliphate and the creation of the Diyanet, however, a Rubicon had been crossed. Soon thereafter the Kemalist government abolished the shariʿa courts,[10] forced medreses to close their doors, and imposed a number of other decrees that demonstrated the hegemony of state sovereignty over the religious realm. With respect to the Sufi orders, the Sheikh Saʿīd Rebellion in the predominantly Kurdish southeast in February 1925 marked a critical turning point, for it provided direct evidence that tekkes and tarikats (especially in non-ethnically Turkish areas) could still potentially serve as reservoirs of resistance to state consolidation and modernization. The next fall, with the passage of law 677v, the religious orders were formally abolished and their tekkes closed. In the debate over the passage of the law, almost no one, not even those with medrese educations and Sufi backgrounds, defended the tekkes (M. Kara 2001, 19–34; Silverstein 2011, 84–88). By the 1930s the term *ulema* itself was even banished from the official lexicon (Bein 2011, 103).

The Diyanet, however, remained. With an official budget and state protection, it created something akin to a bureaucratic shelter for those religious elites who were, if not entirely comfortable, then at least somewhat secure working in the service of the state. The Diyanet also quickly went about a general process of granting those members of the religious establishment who were sympathetic to the Kemalist cause with official papers certifying their affiliation with the Diyanet, so that they could circulate freely.[11] The Diyanet also continued to pay out salaries to a number of religious teachers and officials whose status was questionable.[12] That said, the Diyanet was only viable as a stable bureaucratic institution because the religious establishment that staffed it had grown collectively weak as a result of educational and legal reforms based on strategies of co-optation, internal divisions within the establishment, and reformers' ability to instrumentalize religious rhetoric and attachments for nationalist purposes. The Diyanet's position relative to the government was made even weaker over the course of the next decade. At its absolute nadir in 1931, the Diyanet even lost effective administrative authority over mosque officials and employees for a significant period of time (Aytür, Çelik, and Şahinaslan 1989; Bein 2011, 143).

Although largely powerless back then, what remained of the Diyanet was not without purpose. The Kemalists (and subsequent governments) used the Diyanet in a "productive" capacity to help forge a bridge between traditional Sunni Muslim religious attachments and modern nationalist loyalties. Now at the almost complete behest of the Republic, religious administrators and civil servants were given a clear new mission: to help finish the job of transforming the masses into loyal citizens of the state through state-sponsored and religiously grounded Turkification and nationalization initiatives (Fabbe 2019; Lord 2018). Immediately after the Caliphate's demise in March 1924, the

Kemalist government released a circular requiring all religious elites to use the occasion as an opportunity to proselytize on the virtues of the nation-state in public prayers and sermons.[13] In the 1920s and 1930s, the government tasked religious elites in the Diyanet with producing modern Turkish translations of the Qurʾan and other sacred texts, as well as publishing sermons for use in mosques across the country (Bein 2011, 121). Remarkably, in 1925 Ḥamdī Aḳseki, who would later serve as the Diyanet president between 1947 and 1951, even wrote and published an instructional guide to teach Islam to privates in the military, titled *ʿAskere dīn kitābı* (The book of religion for soldiers). The book was reprinted several times and depicts military service as both a civic and a religious duty (Gürpinar and Kenar 2016, 66–67).

It was not until 1928 that the Turkish Constitution substituted the line declaring Islam as the religion of the state with the pronouncement that Turkey was a secular (*lâik*) republic. And even then, it did not abolish the Diyanet. The triumph of the Kemalists was therefore not the separation of religion and state, but the usurpation and domestication of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment by the state. This was achieved gradually and largely before the Kemalists came to power by the co-optation of religious elites, the gradual undermining of religious institutions, and the repurposing of religious attachments. Weak and diminished though they were as a group, many members of the ulema had not been ostracized by the state but retained a steady foothold as civil servants. This form of institutionalization not only cemented the peculiar synergies between Kemalism and Islam (and thus religion and state), but set the stage for Islamists' eventual renaissance and re-emergence as a *state-centric* force for change in subsequent decades.

STATIST ISLAM INTO THE POST-KEMALIST ERA

Turkey's religious bureaucracy was at its weakest in the 1930s. In the Republican Era, Islamist critics who remained outside the institutional framework of the Diyanet or the state were stigmatized (by the state and its Islamist cadres alike) as pro-shariʿa (*şeriâtçılık*), backward, and/or reactionaries (*mürteci* or *irticâ yanlısı*). Some were sanctioned by the Kemalist state accordingly, whereas others broke rank with the Kemalists in favor of other emerging political factions or apoliticism (Fabbe 2019, 123–125; Fabbe and Balikçioglu 2019). Regardless, by the 1940s Islamists *were* exerting influence on the state and on politics. Members of parliament began debating the role of religion in primary education, with many wishing for a greater inclusion of religious curriculum. Optional religion courses were placed in public schools in 1949, Qurʾan seminaries/courses were given permission to function, and a Faculty of Divinity was established at Ankara University that same year. By 1950 the abolition on using Arabic instead of Turkish for the called to prayer (*ezân*) was also lifted (Gözaydın 2008, 222).

All of these moves signified a growing space for religious activity, albeit mostly under the mantle of the state. Space limitations do not allow for a detailed analysis of subsequent state-centric patterns in Islamist behavior in the post-Kemalist era, which could easily warrant a chapter (or two) on their own. Nonetheless, I offer here some *very* brief pieces of suggestive evidence revolving around key Islamist actors in contemporary Turkish politics to illustrate this point. Key Islamist figures emerged from within the state and have worked through it—despite their allegiances to informal (and ostensibly illegal) *cemaats* (religious brotherhoods) and *tarikats* (religious orders). Although many have been vehement critics of Kemalist policies, they have also partnered with Kemalists at various points over the last seven decades.

One example is Mehmet Zahid Kotku, who had been initiated into the influential Khālidī branch of the Naqshbandī Order in 1918, took over leadership of the *cemaat* in 1952, and became an influential, state-sponsored prayer leader at the İskender Paşa Mosque. Kotku became increasingly popular among student circles, growing a community of followers. In his *sohbets* (religious conversations) and teachings, Kotku encouraged his disciples to be active in worldly and state affairs, and he and his *cemaat* quickly emerged as one of the most influential leaders of Turkish political Islam. Kotku and his followers did not shun the state, nor did Kotku "hold esteem for more radical Islamists" who viewed state sovereignty with scorn (Mardin 2005, 158). Rather, he and his movement embraced a synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam, positioning his *cemaat* to help establish, support, and promote political, economic, and press activities (153–155). By the 1960s, Naqshbandī-Khālidī Sheikh Kotku's *sohbets* began to take place in important state institutions, including the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı), thereby signaling this *cemaat*'s willingness to participate in institutionalized politics. Preeminent figures that later came to dominate Islamists politics in Turkey—and contributed to major regime ruptures in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s—including Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, both participated in Kotku's *sohbets* in the 1970s (Silverstein 2011, 102–103) and subsequently followed his statist approach.

Similarly, an offshoot of Said Nursî's Nurcu *cemaat* call *Hizmet* (Service) emerged around the popular preacher Fethullah Gülen, who also worked for the Diyanet and followed a statist agenda—although not always openly. Gülen worked as a Diyanet-appointed *imam* from the late 1950s to the 1980s, during which time he learned how to position himself with other state actors and avoid restrictions on his community of followers (Lord 2018, 221). His movement grew in popularity as a result of his oratory skills and his writings, and recordings of his preaching began circulating widely in the 1980s. To further build its base, the movement typically established individual charitable foundations with no official link to one another, although they were all tacitly and ideologically connected to Gülen's teachings. In this manner, the group developed a formidable network of subsidized private educational institutions, preparatory schools, and dormitories, which filled widening gaps in the state's developmental capabilities (White 2002, 207). Gülenists also used charitable trusts, nongovernmental organizations, firms, business associations, media outlets, and certain arms of the state bureaucracy to expand their influence and support (Lord 2018, 219–225). The police schools, the military schools, the judiciary, the Ministry of Education, the Diyanet, and the human resource arms of all of these state institutions were all targeted by movement members to increase their influence in the state. In the wake of the 1980 coup, especially, Fethullah Gülen worked directly with the Turkish junta government, demanding that the religious community comply with military directives and even providing a religio-legal opinion in favor of the coup d'état (Çakır 1994; Yavuz 2005).

Many additional examples—the long string of Islamist parties influenced by Erbakan and Erdogan and their unlikely coalition partners over the last six decades, the role of Islamists in the recent Ergenekon and KCK trials, and the intra-Islamist splits within the Turkish state and Diyanet that recently came to a head with the failed coup of 2016—could be provided, but space does not allow. In the interests of brevity, suffice it to say that modern Turkish politics has been characterized by existential power struggles for the control of state institutions that involve Islamists and are largely invisible to the general public as they unfold. These often paranoid and obsessive elite efforts to maintain hegemony within state institutions have destabilized both democracy and autocracy. They birth acute periods of crisis in which elite actors (Kemalist and Islamist alike) turn against the perceived "enemies within" the state to shift balances of power—causing repeated democratic and autocratic ruptures.

CONCLUSIONS

Instead of centering the story of religion-state relations in Turkey on the Kemalist phenomenon and its accoutrements, I have shown that it can be illuminating to focus on the critical historical antecedents that structured the nascent state's expansion into education and law from roughly 1870 to 1928. When set in this broader historical perspective, the supposedly miraculous story of Turkey's Kemalist secularization, as well as its more recent (and, to some, disappointing) "reversal," begins to seem much less surprising. The Kemalists could relegate religion by decree because they were confronting a gradually but greatly weakened religious establishment, many members of which already had a vested interest in the triumph of the state and state-centric institutions. Furthermore, state formation in Turkey forged institutional and ideational links between the pious and the national, and it drew on Sunni Muslim religious resources, networks, and privilege to help create state-centric loyalties. The eventual counterpart to the Kemalist's secularizing achievements was the emergence of Islamists with statist characteristics and prerogatives. Thus, this chapter contributes to a growing body of work that has increasingly, and in my view rightfully, questioned the validity of viewing political Islam as diametrically opposed to the forces of state secularism (Baskan 2014; Fabbe 2019; Lord 2018; Tepe 2008; Tuğal 2009; Turam 2007; White 2013, 2017).

Some of the reasons behind Turkey's failures of democratic maintenance are related to religion, but not in the way political science scholars deductively theorize

(Islamic values in conflict with democracy, competing overarching doctrines of shariʿa versus sovereignty, etc.). From the outset, the Turkish state relied on religion as much as it repressed it, and the nature of this reliance has contributed to regime instability. Democracy in Turkey was not derailed by a group of outsider Islamists seeking to overthrow the state and impose a new religious order or an Islamic state. Turkey's political Islamists have long been a fixture in the state apparatus, they tend to value the state as a valid social ordering principle, and they have gradually worked through state arteries and institutions to promote their agenda. Many contemporary observers of Turkish politics have therefore inadvertently gotten things backward: it is not the rise of Islamist party politics that is reshaping the state from the outside; rather, the gradual and ever-closer intertwining of Islamist movements and the state has recently culminated in its ultimate political expression with the AKP—though the failed 2016 coup and the subsequent purge of Gülenists from the state led to yet another outbreak of instability. Scholars that seek to understand if and how religion impacts regime type in Muslim majority societies are thus urged to shine a light on how the historical foundations of state secularism have shaped the evolution of political Islam.

NOTES

1. This chapter has drawn heavily upon Kristin E. Fabbe, Disciples of the State? Religion and State-building in the Former Ottoman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), © Kristin Fabbe 2019, reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.
2. In addition to housing Turkish-speaking Sunni Muslims, the Ottoman imperial territories that became Turkey, and even the modern Turkish state, included a substantial number of religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities, including (but not limited to) Alevis, Arab Christians, Jacobites and Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Karamanlides, Greek Orthodox Christians, Kurds (both Kirmanji and Zaza), Jews, Dönme, Laz, Pontics, and Roma. Religious heterogeneity—like other forms of identity-based diversity—was neither entirely static nor exogenous to the politics of state-building in this period, though it is beyond the scope of this chapter. In other work I demonstrate that fusions between Sunni Islam and the Turkish state pushed states toward an exclusionary style of religious nationalism that was further consolidated through state-sponsored efforts to eradicate religious diversity via forced migration and ethnic cleansing. See Fabbe (2019), chap. 8.
3. The term *Niẓāmiye* is derived from the word *niẓām*, meaning order and regularity.
4. In addition to religious minorities, the LU also drew some of its support from CUP defectors who had become disillusioned by the organization's aims and/or frustrated by their own inability to secure a more prominent position. Because the party was weak compared to the CUP, it occasionally joined forces with smaller left-wing parties such as the center-left Democratic Party (Fırḳa-yı ʿİbād). In essence, then, the organization was a strange hodgepodge of political factions united in little more than their opposition to the CUP's aggressive drive toward state centralization.
5. Several years later, however, the curriculum was again readjusted to ensure that the ulema members held most of the faculty positions and did not lose their jobs.

6. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 14/12/1922/Fon 51.0.0.0/Yer 13.113.66. Another copy of this announcement can be found in Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 1/1/1923/Fon 51.0.0.0/Yer 2.4.3.
7. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 7/3/1924/Fon 51..0.0.0/Yer 2.1.30; Tarih 6/3/1924/Fon 51..0.0.0/ Yer 2.12.8.
8. See Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 7/3/1924/Fon 51..0.0.0/Yer 2.134; Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 17/ 6/1924/Fon 51..0.0.0/Yer 3.25.6; Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 22/9/1925/Fon 51..0.0.0/Yer 3.16.2.
9. Several telegraphs discuss the future of the medrese buildings after the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments was reduced to a directorate. See Cumhuriyet Arşivi/ Tarih: 1/2/1925/Fon 30..10.0.0/Yer 192.313..9/Documents 1–6. Documents 4–6 announce that some of the dilapidated and abandoned medrese buildings should be transferred to the Ministry of Education for repurposing.
10. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 29/3/1924/Fon Kodu 30..0.0.018.1.1/Yer 9.19..1.
11. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 17/6/1924/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 3.25..6; Tarih: 18/10/1924/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 5.43..11. In some cases there were delays; see Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 22/9/1925/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 3.16..2.
12. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 5/11/1925/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 12.99..20; Tarih: 16/1/1926/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 12.100..11.
13. Cumhuriyet Arşivi/Tarih 7/3/1924/Fon Kodu 51..0.0.0/Yer 2.1..30.

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CHAPTER 4

STATES, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Comparative Religious Regime Formation

KIKUE HAMAYOTSU

The long-established "secular" premise of modern liberal democracy—separation between church and state—is under critical scrutiny. Newer scholarship in the fields of religion and politics and comparative democratization demonstrates that complete separation of church and state or active marginalization of religion in the realm of politics and policymaking is not the norm across various political regimes and various religious traditions. Furthermore, comparative studies of Christian-dominant democracies suggest that religious institutions could play a positive role in facilitating a transition to and consolidation of democracy (Driessen 2014; Kalyvas 2000; Kselman and Buttigieg 2003). However, we are still unsure how and under what conditions particular state-religion relations are formed and consolidated in Muslim-majority societies. Moreover, whether newly emerging Muslim-dominant democracies are similarly equipped to guarantee state protection of basic democratic rights and freedom of various religious (and nonreligious) communities and populations is still contested.

This chapter seeks to account for the *political origins* of what I call "religious regimes" through a comparative historical analysis of three Muslim-majority Southeast Asian nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Despite relatively similar historical, geopolitical, and sociocultural conditions—and against their original intentions—these three nations have established distinctive types of religious regimes since independence: secular-dominant (Indonesia), established-religion (Malaysia), and religious monarchy (Brunei). The chapter also asks what the effects of the type of religious regime on state protection of democratic civil rights of religious (and nonreligious) communities and members are.

I advance two theoretical arguments. First, I argue that the varying pathways adopted by these three nations are the result of state formation—specifically, the ways in which secular political elites pursue and consolidate their state powers and domination following independence. Second, my comparative case studies demonstrate that the *type* of religious regimes formed in Muslim-majority societies—as well as the *timing* of religious regime formation—will likely impact the ability of late-developing democracies to protect basic civil rights and freedom of religious and secular communities. This addresses an unresolved question pertinent to the prospect of modern constitutional democracy in the age of thriving religious fundamentalism and what Stathis Kalyvas (2003) calls “unsecular politics.” In contrast to Christian-dominant Europe, where mostly secular regimes were concurrently formed to facilitate democratic rule and consolidation, postcolonial Muslim societies saw the institutional foundations of religious regimes built earlier, and *prior to* the rise of democratic movements and institutions, allowing established religious authorities greater influence to complicate the trajectories of democratic consolidation.

Comparative Religious Regime Formation: State, Organized Religion, and Democracy

Institutional separation of church and state, or what some scholars term “political secularism,” has long been an established premise in the formation of modern democracy across Christian-dominant Europe and America (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, chap. 3). Scholars argue that such an institutional condition is a prerequisite for establishing modern democracy and expanding constitutional civil rights and freedom (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011, Introduction; Kselman and Buttigieg 2003). Culturalists highlight cultural and/or theological differences between religious traditions to argue that religious and state powers should be closely intertwined in Muslim societies according to Islamic theology and traditions. An ideological antagonism by clerical elites and Islamists to political secularism and Western liberal democracy is often said to be a justification for blurred relations between the two institutional powers and a collective aspiration to build an Islamic state and society guided by shariʿa (Islamic laws). According to this position, a lack of political secularism is also a source of autocratic rule and illiberal characteristics and attitudes in predominantly Muslim societies (Tessler 2000, 2002; Tibi 2008, 2012). Furthermore, many scholars suggest that flourishing religious fundamentalism, radical Islamism, and theocratic rule across Muslim societies in the past few decades are the result of Muslim grievances and resistance against the penetration of the Western powers and cultural traditions that

Islamists perceive as "infidel" and an insult against Islam (Barber 1995; Dalacoura 2005; Huntington 1993; Inglehart 2000; Kepel 1997; Mamdani 2004; Roy 2007).

However, such theoretical premises based on *religious* differences are under critical scrutiny among newer scholarship of religion and politics, comparative regimes, and democratization. Comparative studies have contributed to new classifications of, and explanations for, a variety of forms of political secularism and relations between political and religious authority—not only across various religious traditions, but also within them (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011; Fox 2006, 2008; Fox and Sandler 2005; Künkler, Madeley, and Shankar 2018; Kuru 2009; Shah, Stepan, and Toft 2012; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). Ahmet Kuru (2007, 2009), for example, advocates for the typologies of "passive secularism" and "assertive secularism," not only to categorize state-religion regime types, but also to account for state approaches to religious institutions and authority both across and within religious traditions. His comparative case studies of Christian-dominant France and the United States and Muslim-dominant Turkey demonstrate that types of state-religion relations are attributed to the presence (or lack) of dominant religious authority in imperial ancient regimes *prior to* the formation of a modern state and national identity.

Furthermore, some scholars focus on the *institutional* characteristics of dominant religious authority and its relations with the state to account for democratic transition and consolidation—or enduring autocracy—across various religious traditions (Kalyvas 2000; Koesel 2014; Künkler and Leininger 2009; Menchik 2018; Stepan 2001). Stathis Kalyvas, for example, argues that the rise of Christian democracy in Catholic Belgium and the failure of Muslim Algeria to attain democratic transition results from the highly centralized ecclesial order of Catholicism and decentralized Islamic authority (Kalyvas 2000). The concept of "twin tolerations" Alfred Stepan advanced is another shining example of this scholarly trend. He argues that it is mutual respect for autonomous relations and interactions between the secular state and religious authority that facilitate the consolidation of modern liberal democracy (Stepan 2001). Overall, there is increasing consensus that it is not simply separation between church and state that facilitates democratic governance, but possibly "friendly relations" and collaboration between the two, which allow religious authority to play a positive role in the expansion of democracy (Driessen 2009, 2010).

Despite this theoretical progress, the extent to which, and the manner in which, religious authority is organized and institutionalized, and how clerical authority and elites relate to secular political authority among Muslim societies, is relatively understudied and unknown.[1] Moreover, the ability of emerging Muslim-dominant democracies to ensure equal membership and protection for not only religious, but also nonreligious, populations, a basic condition for a modern democratic state, is still questionable. As Mirjam Künkler and Shylashri Shankar (2018) rightly point out, Muslim societies, whether democratic or not, tend to be insensitive, or often unambiguously violent to nonbelievers, not allowing their citizens "not to believe." A number of Muslim-majority states tend to be aggressive in requiring and coercing religious membership, identity, and piety among citizens. The conditions for religious freedom and minority rights to believe (and not believe) are not necessarily protected by democratic regimes, as espoused by theorists of modern democracy, Robert Dahl and Alfred Stepan in particular (Dahl 1986, 1991; Stepan 2001, 2011).

Even though the culturalist premise that particular religious traditions—especially Islam—are unfit for the establishment of liberal democracy is largely discredited in theory, we are still uncertain whether emerging predominantly Muslim democracies are willing—and able—to protect various religious and nonreligious communities and populations in reality, when they are concurrently experiencing thriving religious fundamentalism. Islamist organizations, leaders, and ideologies continue to command considerable influence and appeal to mobilize a large segment of Muslim populations, posing a major threat to the democratic rights of non-Muslim and minority communities. According to the ILGA-RIWI Global Attitudes Survey on Sexual, Gender and Sex Minorities, Muslim-majority nations undeniably lag far behind other nations and religious traditions in terms of gender rights and equality, especially women and LGBTQ communities.[2] Homosexuality is typically illegal and criminalized according to shariʿa and/or civil laws. The question then becomes, what are the conditions that could facilitate state protection and promotion of fundamental civil rights for believers and nonbelievers alike in Muslim-majority nations?

My comparative historical analysis of religious regime formation in Muslim-dominant nations in Southeast Asia seeks to fill these theoretical gaps. I conceptualize the religious regime as institutional relations between political authority (a secular state) and clerical authority (organized religion). Along the lines of the state-religion regimes analyzed by Ahmad Kuru (2009), religious regimes in Muslim-majority nations are broadly categorized into three ideal types: secular, established-religion, and religious (as indicated in Table 4.1).

My regime typology focuses on the relative powers permitted to religious institutions and clerical elites (ʿulamaʾ) in four areas: (1) executive, (2) legislative, (3) judiciary, and (4) official constitutional position of Islam. This is done in order to assess the relations and interactions between secular political and religious authorities in public policymaking. These types are Weberian ideal types and continuum. Some cases fit perfectly within these ideal types, while many others sit on a continuum between them. The secular regime, for example, according to my typology, does not mean that religious authority has little to no role to play in state policymaking or politics. Religious institutions and clerical elites can legitimately participate in political activities and pursue state offices to influence state policymaking and gain access to state resources, as seen in Indonesia or Turkey. However, religious authority is not officially equipped with *veto power* to overturn or supersede laws, rulings, or policies made by secular political and legal authority, in the way that they are in established-religion or theocratic regimes, such as Malaysia and Brunei.

Likewise, the religious regime allows secular elites and institutions to influence and participate in policymaking and government. The key distinctive feature of the religious regime is that religious authority and laws (shariʿa) are paramount and predominant. Secular elites and institutions are not equipped to veto decisions and policies made by

Table 4.1: Types of Religious Regimes in Muslim-Majority Nations

	Secular	Established-Religion	Religious
Executive	Secular	Secular	Religious (monarchic or theocratic)
Legislative	Secular	Secular	Shariʿa/fatwa
Judiciary	Secular	Mixed	Shariʿa/fatwa
State religion	Islam not privileged/ nominal	Islam	Islam
Examples	**Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey**	**Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh**	**Brunei, Saudi Arabia (monarchic)** **Iran, Taliban's Afghanistan (theocratic)**

Source: Kuru 2009, 6–10, 247–254.

ʿulamaʾ according to their theological rationales and interpretations. Moreover, my typology makes an important distinction between two subcategories of the religious regime—monarchic and theocratic rule—according to this veto power principle. In monarchic religious regimes, a hereditary ruler is usually the head of the state religion. In contrast to theocratic rule, ultimately his power or authority are not defined by theocratic expertise, or by divine will. He reserves discretion to make, remake, and unmake shariʿa or theologically certified opinions (fatwa) and policies according to his worldly will and needs, in almost the same manners that Christian kings or sultans ruled their realms in premodern Europe or empires in the name of God.

The religious regime is distinct and independent from the political regime as a regime typology. It is analytically beneficial for comparative analysis, because the latter tends to ignore the institutional and ideological powers of organized religion or religious authority. Moreover, it is the timing of religious regime formation, and the patterns of interactions between the two institutional powers—secular and religious—that this chapter suggests will impact the ability of a democratic regime to protect constitutional and civil rights of religious (and nonreligious) citizens and minorities in the context of thriving religious fundamentalism in Muslim-majority nations. What factors or conditions have contributed to the diverging patterns of state-religion relations across Muslim-majority nations? What are the effects of the type of religious regime on the democratic rights and freedom of religious (and nonreligious) communities, majority as well as minority alike?

This chapter focuses on three Muslim-majority nations in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei—to answer these questions. Despite relatively similar religious and cultural traditions, historical legacies of colonial rule by European powers, and geopolitical conditions, these nations have established three distinctive types of religious regime that fit the three ideal types mentioned above, offering valuable comparative case studies: secular (Indonesia), established-religion (Malaysia), and religious monarchy (Brunei). They all adhere to Sunni Islamic traditions and Muslim societies are commonly considered to be more moderate, tolerant, and peaceful than their counterparts elsewhere, in the Middle East, Africa, or South Asia (Hefner 2000; Menchik 2016; Peletz 2002; Sloane-White 2017). Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia achieved a relatively peaceful transition to democratic rule—in 1998 and 2018, respectively—after a few decades of autocratic rule, whereas Brunei has established one of the most stable absolute monarchies, allowing empirical observation of interactions between various political regimes and religious authority. Further, in the run-up to independence from colonial rule, the place of Islam, the majority faith, was commonly a major source of constitutional debates and political conflict among Muslim ruling elites. The secular Muslim rulers had no intention to build a state primarily based on, or guided by, shariʿa and clerical authority. Arguably, these Southeast Asian nations could have taken converging paths, resulting in a mostly similar religious regime. In contrast to the original intentions of the founding fathers to build a largely secular modern state with ceremonial religious characters, however, the three nations have taken diverging pathways to establish three distinctive types of religious regime.

I advance two theoretical arguments. First, the religious regimes formed in Muslim-dominant Southeast Asian nations are the result of state formation, specifically the ways in which secular political elites pursue and consolidate their state powers and domination during post-independence institution building. When secular rulers compete with traditional clerical elites (ʿulamaʾ) over the ideological foundations of the nascent state and distributions of state powers and resources, thereby not needing the latter's sociocultural assets or legitimization for their regime survival, the state tends to adopt a more secular and pluralistic position, as attested in a largely secular-dominant Indonesia. On the other hand, when secular rulers need the cultural assets and legitimizing powers of religious authority to achieve their domination and survival, the state is likely to grant a privileged position and exclusive patronage to the majority religion in the formal constitutional and bureaucratic structures. Malaysia's established-religion regime, where Islam is the state religion, and to a much greater extent Brunei's religious monarchy are testament to this theoretical model.

Second, my comparative analysis suggests that the *type*—and the *timing*—of religious regime formation accounts for the ability—and willingness—of late-developing democracies such as Indonesia and Malaysia to protect basic civil rights and freedom of religious (and nonreligious) communities and people. In contrast to Christian-dominant Europe, where mostly secular regimes were formed concomitantly to facilitate democratic transition and consolidation, late-developing Muslim democracies have seen the consolidation of religious regimes *prior to* the formation of modern state and popular democratic movements and consolidation. As a result, late-developing Muslim democracies tend to see more aggressive religious authorities contesting and complicating the trajectories of democratic consolidation. The secular regime of Indonesia is better equipped than the established-religion regime of Malaysia to tame assaults against religious minorities, thanks to the institutionalized religious *subordination* to the secular state authority. However, in practice, even a consolidated secular democracy such as Indonesia is constrained by thriving religious fundamentalism and the latter's ideological and political appeals to mobilize a large segment of pious Muslim populations, because of the timing of religious regime formation.

Indonesia: The Making of a Secular-Dominant Regime in the Face of Powerful Islamism

Indonesia has established a largely secular religious regime as a result of secular-sponsored state-building since independence, under the autocratic regimes of the first president, Sukarno (1945–1965) and the second, Suharto (1966–1998). The secular domination of the Indonesian state—constitutional domination of secular political elites, and subordination of religious authority and elites to the state — has taken place against all odds, as a comparatively large Muslim population (close to 90 percent), active and competitive religious civil society, and historically powerful Islamist movements have contested the secular state. The largely secular nature of the religious regime has been consolidated even further after a relatively peaceful consolidation of democratic rule since 1998, primarily to reinforce the secular nationalists' hold on to state powers, while marginalizing radical forms of Islamism.

Making of the Unitary State of the Republic and the Pluralist National Identity, Pancasila

In the process of preparation for independence of the republic and crafting of the constitution, the place of Islam, the majority faith, in the making of a new state and unification of a fragile archipelagic nation was much more contentious in Indonesia than in its Muslim neighbors. In contrast to colonial rule in British Malaya, Dutch colonial rule in the East Indies was generally much more hostile to Islam and suspicious of religious authority as a potential source of political disturbances and opposition against colonial rule. The Dutch promotion of secular indigenous elites and legal traditions in the colonial state, and the exclusion of ʿulamaʾ and Islamic traditions from that state—as well as toleration of Christian missionaries in indigenous communities—gave rise to deep anticolonial and anti-Christian sentiments, as well as powerful nationalist movements led by ʿulamaʾ (Laffan 2003), a phenomenon not witnessed in British Malaya. It was an ad-hoc alliance of these nationalist movements and political parties, Islamist and secular, that fought and won the revolutionary war against the Dutch to gain full territorial independence in 1949.

To what extent the state integrates and elevates shariʿa and privileges Islam and the majority Muslim community was a main source of constitutional debates, further deteriorating political rivalry between secular and religious nationalist leaders (Boland 1982; Cammack 1989; Cammack and Feener 2012; van Dijk 1996; Elson 2009; 2010; Elson 2012; Elson 2013). The secular Muslim elites, especially President Sukarno, a secular nationalist, had no intention to build a new republic based on Islam or guided by shariʿa. In fact, Sukarno was determined to make a secular modern state—wherein political authority is emancipated from, and superior to, religious authority, which Sukarno and other secularists considered feudalistic and unfit for building a modern republic. For the secularists, Atatürk's Tukey was a model for state-building. On the other hand, religious elites from major Islamic movements—traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and modernist Muhammadiyah—as well as more radical Islamist groups, were eager to build the new republic based on Islam and guided by religious authority and shariʿa. They insisted that the constitution should assure the majority faith a superior position as the ideological and legal foundation of the state (Cribb 1999; Feith and Castles 1970; Kahin 2013).

In the face of the still extremely frail foundations of political sovereignty, territorial and national unification, and imminent threats of secessionist movements in predominantly Christian regions, Sukarno's Indonesia could not afford to lose the allegiance of non-Muslim regions and populations. Without royal or aristocratic lineage or affinity in the feudalistic Indonesian society, his legitimacy and survival as the founding president were largely dependent on his charismatic personal characters and political skills to integrate the culturally and ideologically divided nation together and make it a more egalitarian society (Benda 1965; Cribb 1999; Feith and Castles 1970). In order to prevent the disintegration of the nascent state and cultivate pluralistic national identity, he invented a novel national doctrine called *Pancasila* (meaning "five precepts" in Sanskrit) as the constitutional foundation of the state-building.[3] The state's elevation of Pancasila was much to the chagrin of the religious leaders who were determined to see Islam privileged as the state religion. Having their Islamist ambitions defeated constitutionally, some of the regions dominated by Islamist leaders rebelled against the central government to create an Islamic state (Boland 1982; Formichi 2012; Harvey 1977; Horikoshi 1975). However, Islamist rebellions were militarily pacified, while Islamist parties and leaders were banned and marginalized thereafter.

Consolidation of Military Rule and Subordination of Religious Authority to the Secular State

The political ascent and consolidation of military-dominant autocratic rule under General Suharto largely relied on his pledges to restore political order and stability to attain economic growth and improve the basic welfare of impoverished populations. Secular political and business elites generally perceived Islamism or organized religion as a major threat not only to political and social stability, but also, and more importantly, to their own domination after the state-sponsored mass termination of the organized Left, Communism. Secular dominant state-building after the fall of Sukarno in 1966 primarily countered traditionally strong Islamism to cement institutional and ideological allegiance of religious authority and elites to the secular state (McVey 1983).

First, the state requires popular allegiance to the state-sanctioned official religions (originally four, increased to six in 2001): Islam, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The Ministry of Religious Affairs was created in 1946 to placate the religious leaders, but does not privilege Islam even ceremonially, in stark contrast to Malaysia and Brunei.[4] State jurisdiction over religion (Islam in particular) was, and remains, limited primarily to family and ritualistic matters. Second, failures of religious elites to establish Islam as the state religion meant that religious organizations and clergies were largely left autonomous to run their religious missions, activities, and programs, and to meet the spiritual and welfare needs of Muslim populations. The two largest Islamic associations, NU and Muhammadiyah, traditionally monopolize the domestic religious market, and compete with one another over membership, resources, ownership, authority, and power within the Muslim community, thereby retaining considerable social influence (Bush 2009; Federspiel 1970; Feillard 1996, 1997; Jung 2009).

However, the regime adopted various measures to limit the political and ideological powers of religious civil society, thus subjugating it to the secular state. Ideologically, the government enforced a policy called *asas tunggal* (sole ideological foundation) to require all religious and social organizations to pledge absolute allegiance to Pancasila, the state ideology widely viewed by religious elites as a secular state's political tool to undermine religious authority. Politically, the regime reorganized all the political parties into the three state-sanctioned parties—the regime party, a Muslim-based party, and a non-Muslim (largely Christian and secular) party—to further curtail the political powers of organized religion. The secular domination of the state has changed little, even after Suharto's efforts to woo the modernist Muslim communities in the final years of his rule, primarily to ensure his regime's survival and domination in the state (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996).

Democratic Rule and Consolidation of the Secular Pluralist State

Successful transition to consolidated democracy since 1998 has not altered the subordinate position of Islam and religious authority to the secular state at all levels (legislative, executive, and judicial). Democratic legislative elections introduced in 1999 have led to a mushrooming of political parties, including Islamist parties. In contrast to post–Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia (or Turkey), however, Islamist parties proved to be rather weak from the onset (Fealy 2009; Hamayotsu 2011a, 2011b, 2012a). In general, Islam does not seem to sell among Muslim voters, despite flourishing Islamist and radical (and even terrorist) organizations and religious conservatism under democratic rule (Kuipers 2019; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012, 2018).

At the executive level, the ascension to the presidency of the exceptionally liberal cleric and former chairman of NU Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 brought about unprecedented institutional changes favorable to religious and ethnic minorities. The country's fifth president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004), chairwoman of the secularist PDIP, and her successor, the former military general Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) had little interest in altering the essentially secular domination of the state, although Yudhoyono acknowledged the political benefit of clerical elites and organizations to strengthen his support base in civil society (Bush 2015; Hamayotsu 2013).

The decentralization of administrative and fiscal powers to more than five hundred districts and cities, and the introduction of direct elections of the local executive offices in 2005, also contributed to the increasingly competitive religious market (Hoesterey 2015). A number of districts and cities in traditionally conservative regions issued local by-laws and executive orders to introduce religiously inspired regulations, such as the banning of alcoholic beverages, fueled further anxieties about sweeping Islamism (Buehler 2016; Bush 2008). In practice, however, there is no adequate evidence to indicate that religious authority has gained more legal or administrative powers to supersede the secular dominant state and legal institutions and political authority under democratic rule. In stark contrast to the strengthened religious legal authority and coercive powers in Malaysia and Brunei, the secular regime of Indonesia, in fact, has been further consolidated to keep religious authority and institutions firmly subordinate to the secular state.

First, the religious bureaucratic and legal reforms over the past few decades have limited state jurisdiction over shariʿa strictly to matrimonial matters (marriage and divorce), while placing it under the secular Supreme Court (Cammack 1989, 1997; Feener and Cammack 2007). Except for the special autonomous region of Aceh, there is no equivalent of the powerful independent shariʿa courts or religious apparatus developed in Malaysia or Brunei that could constitutionally supersede and veto the secular courts and laws (Feener 2013). Second, the government passed laws to restrict civil society's ideological deviation from Pancasila, thereby tightening state control over religious organizations. President Joko Widodo, who took office in 2014, is a secular nationalist PDIP politician who is overwhelmingly popular among minorities, and he has gone even further to tighten the state's coercive power over Islamism to defend the secular multireligious foundation of the state. He enacted the Executive Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) in 2017, widely seen as targeting radical Islamism, authorizing the government to ban any organizations deemed to contradict Pancasila, or "national unity."[5]

Consolidated Democracy and Religious Conservatism

In short, the democratically elected state has consolidated the secular regime even further, keeping religious authority tightly subordinate to secular political authority in the state. However, the rising influence of radical Islamism and religious conservatism during the successful consolidation of democracy has posed a major challenge to the democratic regime. Even though the secular regime is better equipped with state and legal apparatuses to protect the pluralistic foundations of democratic rule and tame religious radicalism than the other religious regimes, secular elites, be they executive or legislative, are still on the defensive when it comes to religiously sensitive issues and policy areas. They are usually unwilling to interfere overtly in sensitive areas such as LGBTQ rights or anti-Christian movements—not because the state privileges Islam, but, ironically, because of democratic elections. Muslim politicians are afraid of losing Muslim votes by offending socially influential ʿulamaʾ and their religious decrees, now that their political survival and legitimacy are dependent on the ballots. Against the backdrop of deep-seated, and politicized, religious identity, Muslim politicians find themselves vulnerable to popular religious sentiments.

MALAYSIA: MARRIAGE OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE ESTABLISHED-RELIGION REGIME

In contrast to a secular Indonesia and a number of other Muslim-majority states, Malaysia has formed the established-religion regime, wherein the dominant religion and its ecclesiastic order are constitutionally integrated into the secular state and legal structures. The majority faith—Islam—has constitutionally been the official religion of the Federation of Malaysia since independence in 1957. The constitution confers Islam and the majority community privileges, a superior position that Indonesian clerics and Islamists have fought hard legally and illegally, but failed or compromised on, as discussed above. Although secular authority largely dominates the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the party-dominant regime has actively incorporated and elevated religious authority in the state—especially the powers of shariʿa courts and laws, and provision of welfare services and education.

The formative years of state-building under British colonial rule and after independence is essential to account for the way in which the established-religion regime was formed. Under the constitution, nine sultans or hereditary Malay rulers (constitutional monarchs) serve as the head of the state religion in a respective state, a unique institutional innovation and legacy of British colonial rule. The institutional power of religious authority and institutions, however, was extremely small in practice and largely ceremonial at the onset. Malay political elites who formed the ethnic-based nationalist party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to prepare for British-sponsored independence had no intention of building an independent state guided by Islam or shariʿa. Nor did they have an interest or need to share powers with ʿulamaʾ, whom they generally considered irrelevant in the building of a modern state. However, the Malay elites depended on and needed the symbolic powers of Malay hereditary rulers to negotiate the constitutional superiority of the Malay community and their own political domination in the new independent state (Fernando 2006). The official religion and established-religion regime were originally introduced, and gradually consolidated, not because of strong Islamism or powerful clerical authority, but rather to strengthen the state dominated by the ethnic Malay elites in an ethnically divided plural society and economy.

Formation of the National Faith and Religious Authority under the Secular State

The institutional foundations of the established-religion regime—reminiscent of the Church of England under the British Crown—were originally laid under British rule. In stark contrast to the Dutch East Indies, the "divide and rule" policies in British Malaya institutionalized and reinforced the cultural and religious authority of the Malay hereditary rulers within the indigenous Malay communities. Unlike the Dutch rulers, who were either suspicious or hostile to traditional religious authority, and to Islam in general, British officials considered the latter an integral source of political legitimacy and stability, and of social order in the midst of a booming colonial economy and the rapid social and demographic transformations that were underway.

Under the auspices of royal and imperial powers, the emerging secular state assumed and sponsored religious functions and activities, thereby sanctioning an official interpretation and jurisdiction of religion in the areas that secular officials considered the purview of the colonial state. Each state government codified and legislated "Islamic laws," created shariʿa courts, and appointed mufti (Islamic supreme jurists) and shariʿa judges to be integrated into the lower echelons of the colonial state and administrative structures. Wealthy states and sultans such as Johor also founded and sponsored traditional religious schools for Malay children, who were generally very poor and lacked access to modern education.[6] Moreover, all the Malay rulers established a Council of Religious Affairs to take care of general affairs of religion. One of the most important functions assigned to state religious officials was to collect and manage zakat (Islamic tithe) and waqf (religious endowment), essential financial sources to fund their modest offices, salaries, and activities (Roff 1974; Yegar 1979).

The establishment of the official faith under colonial rule meant that the secular state attained legitimacy and a near monopoly over the interpretation, codification, and regulation of religious matters, including law, education, and proselytization. Importantly, the religious regime formed in British Malaya effectively hindered the emergence of vibrant religious civil associations and movements, potentially challenging the monopoly of the religious market and civil society by state-sanctioned religious authorities (Jesudason 1995). However, clerical authorities integrated into the colonial state were typically underqualified loyal servants for the Malay monarchs. They lacked the administrative and legal expertise and the financial base to wield influence, in contrast to secular, English-educated westernized Malay administrative and legal elites who came to dominate the state after the peaceful departure of colonial rulers. Overall, religious elites and officials were poorly funded and largely neglected in the secular-dominant state formation in the formative decades after independence. The Malay nationalist elites, especially the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, were determined that an independent Malaysia be secular, and that state and religion be separate. However, they needed the symbolic and legitimizing powers of Malay hereditary rulers to claim their political domination and entitlement to state powers and resources. Having shared the same royal and aristocratic lineage with the hereditary rulers, Tunku and other Malay elites had no intention to demolish or destabilize the feudalistic social and political order centered on royal powers, of which they were an integral part. Thus, they negotiated and granted a constitutionally privileged—but merely ceremonial—position to Islam and Malay monarchs only to ensure the state was controlled by the ethnic majority, with mostly immigrant and economically affluent ethnic minorities, Chinese and Indian, as subordinate partners.

Expansion and Centralization of Religious Authority under the Ethnic Party Regime

Party-dominant autocratic rule under UMNO in the post-racial riots of 1969 further consolidated the established-religion regime, especially after Mahathir Mohamad became prime minister (1981–2003). The federal government—the powerful Prime Ministers' Office in particular—has built and centralized the religious bureaucracies and functions to gain unprecedented authority and power to enforce a range of "Islamization" policies in order to strengthen the ethnic-based party regime. Against the backdrop of growing religious fundamentalism in civil society at home and abroad, the party-dominant regime co-opted one of the most influential and charismatic Islamist leaders in the country, Anwar Ibrahim, into the ruling party and government. Anwar and his men associated with the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement (ABIM) quickly rose up in the dominant party to achieve strategic and powerful positions in government. Mahathir's action was widely regarded as a regime strategy to counter the electoral challenge of the Malay-based Islamist party, the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), within the increasingly self-consciously Islamic Malay populations (Jomo and Cheek 1988).

Unlike Suharto's Indonesia, however, Malaysia's party regime had to work within the institutional framework of the established-religion regime, wherein religious authority was integrated into constitutional monarchic powers. Nine sultans, heads of the state religion in a respective state, were easily defensive of their already diminished turf of influence and authority. They perceived that Malay politicians were eagerly attempting to strip them of religious authority and power against the backdrop of constitutional reforms intended to weaken monarchic power and authority under Mahathir. In order to work around this constraint, the federal government invested abundant political, administrative, and economic capital to centralize and expand religious bureaucracies and authority under the prime minister's office. It amended the constitution and enacted legislatures not only to upgrade the jurisdiction of shariʿa courts and laws independently from—and on a par with—the secular civil courts, but also to build an extensive network of modern Islamic schools and shariʿa-based financial, corporate, welfare, and charity institutions across the country (Hamayotsu 2004, 2018; Sloane-White 2017).

As a result, the party regime further strengthened and consolidated the established-religion regime inherited from the British Crown, turning the majority faith and religious authority into extremely powerful functionaries of, and ideological capital for, the secular modern state. As the religious and ethnic identities are meshed to cement the deep-seated ethnic cleavage and politically salient communal identity, the legal and living conditions of ethnic and religious minorities, and of nonbelievers, suffered neglect and deterioration. Furthermore, powerful state-sanctioned religious authorities were equipped with extensive formal coercive powers to monitor, regulate, and criminalize behaviors and movements they classified as "unorthodox," "heretical," or "forbidden" to certify legal and physical assaults, accusations, and discriminations against gender and sexual minorities.

Transition to Democracy and Growing Religious Nationalism and Conservatism

The dominant party regime collapsed unexpectedly through competitive and peaceful elections in 2018, giving way to democratic rule, but the powerful established-religion regime remains intact. As discussed in the case of democratic Indonesia, the religious regime continues to condition significant debates, laws, and policies that pertain to democratic and civil rights, communal and minority rights, and religious freedom for believers and nonbelievers alike (Hamayotsu 2012b; Moustafa 2018; Neo 2015; Shah and Sani 2010). In Malaysia, it is the state-sponsored religious authority, subordinate to secular elites, that has been among the most eager to elevate the position of Islam and integrate and expand shariʿa *within* the state and legal structures. Their authority and powers have been strengthened considerably so as to sponsor state-formation dominated by the Malay ruling elites and to consolidate the ethnic-based party regime.

Nascent democratic rule, brought about by an anti-regime coalition of urban-based ethnic minorities and progressive Muslims, is perceived as a threat to the ideological and institutional foundations of the ethnic-based majoritarian rule and the established-religion regime. As a result, the political regime change has given rise to interreligious tensions and aggressive pro-shariʿa and anti-minority nationalist movements, not only in civil and political societies, but also within the hearts of state and judicial bureaucracies dominated by politically and culturally conservative Muslim elites. Newly elected Malay elites are not equipped or ready to tame radical and conservative Islamism, because their political survival and legitimacy is still dependent on their ability and willingness to preserve the constitutional privileges granted to Islam and the majority Muslim community. Promotion of minority rights—especially sexual minorities—is especially damaging and costly for their political and regime survival.

Brunei: A Marriage of Political and Religious Authorities in the Making of a Religious Monarchy

Religious monarchic rule in Brunei is a relatively new institutional innovation, a result of state-formation almost exclusively sponsored by the absolute monarch (the house of Bolkiah) to ensure sovereignty, legitimacy, and survival of his kingdom. The sultan is the head of state and state religion (Islam), similar to the Malaysian sultans. However, the regime's religious characteristics have grown much greater under the current sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, who came to power in 1967 and has actively cultivated and centralized religious as well as political authority. Under his personalistic rule, the state has built an extensive religious apparatus to legislate and implement laws and policies not only to run the government, but also to regulate the society and economy according to shariʿa. In contrast to Indonesia's secular-dominant and Malaysia's established-religion regimes, political and religious authorities here have been increasingly fused to form one nearly undistinguishable and mutually reinforcing authority to rule this tiny oil-rich autocratic state. The regime is couched in the uniquely Islamic concept of sultanate. Brunei looked as Malaysia's established-religion regime at independence, and in fact planned to join the Malaysian federation. However, after three decades of royal-sponsored state-building, it is almost identical to Saudi Arabia and other small old-rich Arab monarchies. It is a religious regime, but not theocratic, differing from post-revolution Iran or the Vatican, where religious authority and rule are supreme and absolute. ʿUlamaʾ are extremely powerful functionaries of the state, but their official positions and powers are ultimately subordinate to the sultan.

The sultan is unconditionally above the law, with no other institutions or individuals equipped to check or veto his absolute powers. The sultan monopolizes absolute executive and legislative powers—being prime minister; minister of finance, defense, foreign affairs, and trade; chief commander of the army and police; and head of the state religion (Islam) concurrently. His rule is not dictatorial, however. The government emphasizes the rule of law and provides exceptionally generous welfare to his subjects. He is popular, despite international condemnation against his initiatives to expand enforcement of shariʿa, including the stringent Islamic criminal codes known as *hudud* (Müller 2016, 2017). Under this religious regime, dominant secular and clerical powers are married and fused to run a powerful authoritarian state monopolizing the commanding heights of the economy—oil and gas. The formation of the religious monarchic regime is primarily intended to achieve legitimacy and survival of hereditary rule of the house of Bolkiah before (and after) Brunei gained full independence in 1984 from British imperial rule.

Searching for Regime Survival: Political Origins of Religious Monarchy

Brunei is ruled by one of the oldest dynasties and is one of the few surviving absolute monarchies in the world today (Fanselow 2014, 90; Saunders 2013). It is a mistake to assume that the sultanate of Brunei—officially named Brunei Darussalam—was rich, powerful, and religious from its inception. On the contrary, the previous 28th sultan, Omar Ali Saifuddien III (1950–1967), who negotiated the country's independence with the British and Malaysian governments, did not have the intention or the ability to build an independent modern state purely guided by shariʿa or Islam. His primary concern was the survival of his tiny kingdom and vulnerable royal household, surrounded by much larger and powerful neighbors, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The sultan originally intended to join the Federation of Malaysia, then ruled by like-minded ethnic-Malay Muslim aristocratic elites, to enter the Council of Malay Rulers (or sultans) as an equal royal member and constitutional monarch of the federation. He and a small assembly of Malay aristocrats in the Bruneian court were typically educated in Britain or English-medium elite boarding schools in Malaysia or Singapore. Just like Malaysian royals and aristocratic elites, they were usually Anglophone and westernized to behave just like British aristocrats (Milner 1981, 1994). Sultan Omar had the only one wife, which is very rare for powerful Muslim kings and royals elsewhere. He was strongly opposed to his son, then Crown Prince Hassanal Bolkiah, attempting to marry a second wife when his son fell in love with a much younger Malay commoner, so as to safeguard their pure royal blueblood and hereditary rule. Furthermore, the sultan was knighted to officially carry the British nobility title conferred by the British Crown, exhibiting his affinity with, and allegiance to, the latter (Saunders 2013, chaps. 8–10).

The sultan and his court were born royal, with a lineage said to be at least six centuries old. In this regard, his claim to the throne and state powers was relatively unquestioned among his Malay subjects. In practice, however, the sultanate was very poor and not even financially self-sufficient to maintain his household, let alone to protect his tiny territory and sovereignty, until a British petroleum company finally discovered oil and natural gas in the 1970s. Because of the lack of the fiscal, administrative, military, and security powers to maintain his household and government, and to protect his kingdom and subjects, the sultan and his advisors were on the payroll of the British government and heavily dependent on the British Crown as a protectorate for their immediate survival (Saunders 2013).

The sultan cared for the general well-being of the Muslim community and Islam, similar to the Malaysian sultans. The kingdom had traditionally been defined as an Islamic state on paper, making Islam the central pillar of the ethnic- and religious-based national identity and state ideology; it was later propagated more officially as *Melayu Islam Beraja* (*Malay Islamic Monarchy*, or *MIB*), a concept introduced under British imperial rule.[7] Originally, however, the national ideology was merely a vague and symbolic concept to bolster royal sovereignty and legitimacy to rule his Malay subjects. It was primarily meant to enshrine superordinate and absolute powers of the sultan as the guardian of his Malay subjects, Malay culture, and Muslim faith. In contrast to Malaysia, other ethnic and religious minorities, including the largest minority (Chinese, around 10 percent), were not granted equal citizenship, let alone constitutional rights, because of this iron rule of ethnic- and religious-based birthright to be legally recognized as citizens of the religious monarchic state.

Bureaucratization and Expansion of the National Religion and Ideology

The absence of an Islamist threat to the state and active religious civil society in the run-up to full independence, the state (sultan), subsidized by the British Crown, had built the slowly emerging “national church,” or ecclesiastic bureaucracies, in order to legitimize and strengthen the absolute powers of hereditary rule. The sultan is the head of the state religion, but unlike his largely ceremonial Malaysian constitutional monarchs, the current sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, had actively expanded and sponsored the state apparatus, which ran religious (Islamic) affairs, to turn religious institutions and clergies into powerful functionaries of the absolute state.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs established in 1959 is exclusively responsible for all matters considered to be the traditional purview of religious authority in Islam: building and maintenance of mosques, managing pilgrimage, compulsory Islamic education, propagation, alms, charities and social welfares, halal certification, and banks and financial institutions, among others. The ministry also manages the shariʿa judiciary, which runs in parallel with the civil judiciary introduced by the British. The religious ministry is among the largest government agencies (Müller 2018, 153–155).

All Muslim clergies are loyal and favorite servants of the sultan, authorized and sponsored by the state to carry out their religious missions and activities. The

Department of State Mufti (Islamic supreme jurist), created independently under the prime minister's (sultan's) office, is the chief interpreter of Islam, holding the exclusive authority to issue fatwas, which have legal effect (Müller 2018, 154).[8] As the sultanate became wealthier and self-sufficient to build and manage its state apparatus, the clerical officials employed by the state have become extremely powerful politically to influence public policies, and they enjoy generous budgets to expand massive religious bureaucracies and operations, primarily because of their mutually beneficial relations with the throne. For example, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has seen an increase of its already generous budget when other strategic ministries, such as Defense, saw theirs drastically cut when oil and gas prices plummeted to an alarmingly low level (Müller 2016, 163). Any competing autonomous clerical organizations, let alone anti-clerical or anti-monarchic movements, almost disappeared due to the religious as well as political markets solely monopolized and controlled by the absolute state.

Consolidation of Religious Monarchy under Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah

The sultanate is generally committed to adherence to, and promotion of, moderate Sunni Islamic traditions and watchful of infiltration of radical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamism, as well as secular liberal traditions seen as alien and infidel by the religious regime. For the sultan, it is essential to maintain the doctrinal and ideological cohesion and purity of the Malay population and popular obedience to the state religious authority and monarch. Doctrinal and ideological deviation from the state-sanctioned religious dogmas and codes is not simply a religious offense, but is considered to be subversive to the national ideology, MIB, and the state (i.e., the sultan) and closely watched by the state religious authorities (Müller 2018).

The current sultan has further strengthened religious authority and power of the state to cultivate his popularity, legitimacy, and, ultimately, hereditary rule in the kingdom. In 2014, Brunei enforced the Syariah Penal Code Order 2013, a legal reform intended to bolster and reinforce shariʿa laws even further, to the detriment of secular civil laws. The initiative stirred much debate and condemnation internationally, since it includes the severest punishments and penalties for shariʿa-derived criminal offenses while tightening regulatory apparatus and procedures to enforce these criminal codes (Müller 2015, 2016).

This proposal to strengthen shariʿa rule and the religious regime and apparatus was not a result of a penetration of puritanical or radical Islamism or increasing popular Islamic activism and movements in civil society. Such activism in Brunei is close to nonexistent. But rather, it was the result of the mutually beneficial enterprise by the two pillars of the religious monarchic regime—monarch and ʿulamaʾ—to consolidate further cohesion and domination of the national identity, and the institutional and ideological foundations of their absolute rule and survival.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has accounted for the manners in which the three Muslim-majority nations in Southeast Asia have adopted and consolidated distinctive patterns of institutional relations between political and religious authority to form diverging religious regimes: the secular-dominant regime of Indonesia, the established-religion regime of Malaysia, and the religious monarchic rule of Brunei. My comparative historical analysis highlights the analytical utility of the religious regime to demonstrate that the religious regime formation is distinctive from the formation and consolidation of political regimes. It argues that the distinctive patterns of religious regime formation are the result of state-formation, specifically the ways in which secular political elites pursued and consolidated their state powers and domination following independence.

The religious regime formation is equally useful in accounting for the role of religious authority—and the ability and willingness of nascent Muslim-dominant democracies—to protect constitutional rights and freedom of religious (and nonreligious) communities and citizens. Denial or negligence of fundamental constitutional freedom may not be so surprising in an absolute kingdom such as Brunei or Saudi Arabia. However, the declining constitutional rights of religious (and nonreligious) communities and citizens in a relatively successful consolidated democracy such as Indonesia are unexpected and as yet unexplained (Hamayotsu 2014). Declining religious freedom and tolerance—and rising communal tension—among various religious communities in a democratizing Malaysia is equally perplexing, given its sizable non-Muslim urban middle-class populations, modern economy, and absence of large-scale communal violence since 1969. The discussion above shows that the declining constitutional rights and freedoms, and the collective desires to elevate shariʿa and the majority faith, are not primarily attributed to "Islam," as the culturalists may like to insist, nor to political or electoral pressures from Islamism or radicalism. Rather, it is the result of the timing of religious regime formation, especially the manner in which the institutional relations between political and religious authority are formed and consolidated.

In contrast to Christian-dominant Europe, as well North America, where secular regimes were formed concomitantly to facilitate democratic rule and rights and protect religious freedom, the religious regimes in Muslim-dominant societies were formed earlier and *prior to* the rise of modern democratic movements and rule. As a result, more aggressive religious authorities and a religious fundamentalism tend to complicate and compromise the state's ability—and willingness—to protect democratic rights and freedom of citizens, both religious and secular alike, even after democratic consolidation.

Finally, but not least, the chapter echoes other comparative scholars and studies that champion the theoretical and analytical value of institutional and ideological powers of organized religion in political transformations and policymaking (e.g., Gill 2007; Grzymala-Busse 2012; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Kalyvas 1996; Koesel 2014; Künkler and

Shankar 2018; Kuru 2009; Levine and Mainwaring 1989; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Philpott 2007; Stepan 2001; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). In Muslim societies, organized religion and its relations with the state will continue to shape and condition the political regimes and well-being of citizens for many decades to come.

NOTES

1. There are some country-specific case studies, such as on Egypt, Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Instituitons in Contemporary Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000); Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952–94)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, no. 3 (1999); or Pakistan and Malaysia, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2. https://ilga.org/ilga-riwi-global-attitudes-survey.
3. The five precepts are: belief in the One and Only God; just and civilized humanity; unified Indonesia; democracy guided by the wisdom of the representatives of the people; and social justice for all Indonesians.
4. For a brief history of official religions, see https://www.insideindonesia.org/the-sixth-religion.
5. The president readily invoked the law to outlaw one of the most prominent Islamist organizations, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
6. In predominantly Malay rural states such as Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, local religious teachers ran their traditional religious schools supported by respective Malay-Muslim community.
7. MIB privileges Malay (*Melayu*) ethnic supremacy, Islam (as interpreted by the state), and the monarchy (*Beraja*). For the subsequent institutionalization and indoctrination of the concept, see Dominik M. Müller, "Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei Darussalam: Bureaucratised Exorcism, Scientisation and the Mainstreaming of Deviant-Declared Practices," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2018): 150–152.
8. A fatwa is a theological opinion and usually does not have a legal effect according to the Islamic tradition.

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CHAPTER 5

REPRESSION OF ISLAMISTS AND AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN THE ARAB WORLD

A Case Study of Egypt

JEAN LACHAPELLE

Anger at police brutality played a central role in ousting the Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011. A few months before the uprising that toppled Mubarak, a picture of the mangled face of Khaled Said, a young Alexandrian murdered by police officers, had been circulated on social media, triggering deep outrage among middle-class Egyptians. Such a vivid illustration of the regime's brutality sparked a wave of protest among young urbanites in Cairo and Alexandria beginning in June 2010. "We are all Khaled Said" was the title of the Facebook page created to commemorate the victim, a digital space that became a forum for citizens concerned with the repressive excesses of the Mubarak regime. The online forum would become a crucial coordinating tool for the historic January 25, 2011, protests that launched a country-wide uprising (Clarke and Kocak 2020).

Tragically, a revolt primarily motivated by indignation against arbitrary repression led to the establishment of a regime more repressive than its predecessor. Egypt's brief democratic experiment after Mubarak's ouster was interrupted by a military coup in July 2013 led by then-Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The coup was followed by high levels of lethal violence against protesters, accompanied by the Egyptian judiciary's sentencing of hundreds of people to death for a range of political crimes.

Since 2013 this new authoritarian regime has engaged in intense repression just as brutal—if not more so—than under Mubarak. For instance, between July 2013 and April 2014, over 40,000 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood were detained or arrested. The Egyptian judiciary sentenced hundreds to death, and security forces killed several hundred in street clashes (Human Rights Watch 2014; Rutherford 2018, 195–196). Yet the violence in the early years after the coup did not trigger the same waves of anti-regime protest and indignation as before.

This chapter answers two interrelated questions regarding these events in Egypt, which shed broader light on the nature of Islamist repression across the Arab world. After the 2013 coup, why did state violence increase so much in Egypt? Why, despite its scale, did this repression not backfire as it had in the past? One possible answer is that the violence of the new regime acted as a deterrent for protests. Influential scholarship explains low levels of popular mobilization under authoritarianism by pointing to the risks inherent in political activism in undemocratic spaces (Kuran 1991). According to this view, the absence of significant anti-regime protests in the early years of the Sisi regime might be due to the regime's repressiveness and the real risks of violence or death that citizens would incur for public demonstrations. However, we also know that repression often promotes further mobilization rather than diminishing it (Davenport 2007; Francisco 2004; Sullivan and Davenport 2017), and that repression may decrease dissent in some situations but increase it in others (Davenport 2007, 8). Given how repression can have opposite effects, an argument focusing mainly on deterrence seems insufficient for explaining low levels of mobilization.

This chapter argues that fear alone cannot explain low mobilization among non-Islamists against the new regime after Egypt's 2013 coup. On the contrary, less mobilization occurred because the post-coup regime was popular among some segments of the population, who saw its repressive nature as necessary for thwarting the perceived Islamist threat. Non-Islamists were willing to accept repression if it meant wiping the Muslim Brotherhood off the political map. Such popular support for repression shaped the political calculation of the new regime, and drastically decreased the costs of repression it would face.

This chapter offers a new perspective for understanding the repression of Islamists that extends beyond Egypt to the Arab world more generally. It emphasizes the role of non-Islamist audiences, defined as civilian groups who do not subscribe to the Islamists' political project, in shaping the costs and benefits of repression for Arab autocrats. Taking seriously the role that non-Islamist audiences play enriches how existing scholarship addresses the causes of repression against Islamists, which has primarily focused on either the level of direct threat that Islamists pose to autocratic rulers—a threat that arises from Islamists' presumed ideological appeal or organizational capacity—or the coercive capacity of Arab states. By contrast, I demonstrate that explaining when and why Arab rulers repress Islamists requires paying greater attention to the attitudes of non-Islamists, who constitute civilian audiences whose support authoritarian regimes can seek to cultivate.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I review existing scholarship that explains repression in authoritarian regimes through three lenses: threat perception, state capacity, and elite competition. Second, I explain the significance of non-Islamist audiences and show how they conditioned repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and helped the post-2013 regime gain popularity. I provide a case study of the non-Islamist media discourse and provide evidence for civilian support for repression against the Muslim Brotherhood based on an analysis of opinion pieces published in *Al-Masry al-Youm*, Egypt's main privately owned newspaper. Focusing on the period between July 3, 2013—the day of the coup—and August 14, 2013—the day of a large-scale massacre of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo—this analysis demonstrates how prominent non-Islamist voices expressed consistent support for a hard line against the protesters who mobilized in support of ousted president and Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi. I further suggest that such support from non-Islamists boosted the new regime's confidence that repression would not backfire, thus contributing to the government's choice to use massive repression. Finally, I briefly examine other episodes of repression in the Arab world and clarify how my argument travels beyond Egypt.

EXISTING LITERATURE

When and why do authoritarian regimes use repression against Islamist groups? Existing scholarship in political science points to three sets of explanations.

The first set of arguments focuses on the level of threat that an opposition group poses to a regime (Davenport 2007). Islamist groups are viewed as posing a unique threat to regimes because such groups are understood as cohesive, disciplined, and capable of mobilizing large numbers of followers. Strong organizational strength has roots in socialization and recruitment processes. Recruits to prominent Islamist organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood often go through a lengthy socialization, which ensures "solidarity and commitment among its members" (al-Anani 2016, 68). The organization tightly controls who moves up its ranks (Kandil 2015, 48–53) and shapes a member's entire social life. Given these characteristics, regimes may repress Islamist organizations to eliminate the threat they pose. For instance, Carrie Wickham (2013, 112) explains the Mubarak regime's repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-2000s as follows: "Although the Brotherhood was not the first or boldest group to challenge the Mubarak regime, it was the largest and best organized, making it both a greater threat and an easier target."

Another threat-based argument focuses on the content of Islamists' political message. Islamists are often considered to have a unique ability to craft and disseminate messages that resonate powerfully among Muslim populations because they tap into extant civilizational repertoires of religious obligations and political conduct that can be harnessed for mass mobilization (Lewis 1988). As Mark Tessler (2011, 47) argues, "Islam has shaped the Arabs' history, helps to define their collective national identity, and gives spiritual meaning to the lives of millions, even many who are not personally devout." From this perspective, an ability to evoke shared belief systems gives Islamists a presumed advantage in mobilizing supporters relative to non-Islamists, which makes the former potentially more threatening.[1]

Islamists' threats to Arab autocrats may derive from the former's proximity and privileged connection to ordinary citizens and local communities, which makes them strong contenders, especially during elections (Brooke 2017; Cammett and Issar 2010; Cammett and Jones 2014). For instance, Tarek Masoud's (2014) study of Egypt shows that Islamists operating under Mubarak's regime had access to a dense network of mosques that allowed them to better convey electoral messages to voters than competing leftist parties which lacked access to such networks. The delivery of healthcare services through robust infrastructures, such as hospitals and clinics operated by Islamists, also sustained an image of "competence and probity" that helped Islamists at the polls (Brooke 2017, 42).[2] The fact that states cannot easily dismantle such networks gives Islamists a powerful advantage in recruiting members capable of challenging the regime (Cammett and Jones 2014, Clark 2004; Wickham 2002). It follows that regimes repress Islamists to prevent them from winning elections. Lisa Blaydes (2011) has shown how, in Egypt under Mubarak, security forces ramped up repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the lead-up to elections to reduce their electoral gains.

According to this view, authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have different abilities to neutralize Islamists' political messages. Rulers that explicitly claim religious legitimacy, such as the king of Morocco, might be better equipped than regimes founded on secular ideologies at thwarting threats that Islamists pose. By contrast, for the Arab republics such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Islamists might pose a more severe threat because they offer a fundamental alternative to the regime's foundational ideologies of Arab nationalism. Scholars have argued that Islamists began posing an acute challenge to these regimes once their foundational ideologies failed to deliver on initial promises of economic and political emancipation (Ajami 1981; Burgat 1995; Kepel 2000; Roy 1994). Secular authoritarian rulers may use repression against Islamists to prevent them from deploying powerful religious symbols that they are ill-equipped to counter in other ways (Gerges 2018; Sassoon 2016).

The second type of argument for explaining authoritarian repression focuses on the state. Prominent literature in political science shows that state capacity shapes patterns of repression in myriad ways. For instance, states with low coercive capacity are unable to collect accurate intelligence about dissidents, which encourages indiscriminate repression (Greitens 2016; Policzer 2009). Given the secrecy of Islamist organizations, their tight-knit nature, and their embeddedness in local communities, Arab regimes have faced great difficulty monitoring them. For example, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq struggled with "[g]athering accurate intelligence about the activities of religious activists" belonging to the Daʿwa Party because the party was "insular, made of individuals with family ties and marriage connections" (Blaydes 2018, 264). Lacking capacity to monitor and collect information about Islamist organizations and their activities, the regime resorted to collective punishment that included mass killings and incarceration. Such indiscriminate repression in turn strengthened group identities in ways that further deepened the problem of monitoring dissidents.

Finally, a third approach to explaining repression centers on competition among coercive agencies. According to this argument, repression reflects coercive agencies' efforts to demonstrate their political indispensability to the autocrat by uncovering and thwarting dangerous plots. The result is a form of "coercive outbidding" that results in indiscriminate repression (Greitens 2016). An especially vivid illustration of this phenomenon is a large-scale violent crackdown against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the mid-1960s. In 1965, then-president Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered mass arrests of the Islamist organization. The Military Intelligence Department (MID) claimed it had uncovered a plot by the Muslim Brotherhood to assassinate Nasser. Research drawing on biographies suggests that the MID's primary motivation for leveling these accusations against the Brotherhood was to undermine its bureaucratic rival, the General Investigations Directorate (GID), Egypt's secret police under the direction of the minister of interior. By exposing a dangerous plot to assassinate the president that the secret police had allegedly missed, the MID sought to expose the Ministry of Interior's incompetence and show that the GID had been asleep at the wheel (Kandil 2014, 75). Large-scale repression of the Muslim Brotherhood ensued.

In sum, existing scholarship addresses state repression against Islamists through three lenses, focusing on threats, state capacity, and institutional competition. While such studies provide valuable insight into the role of Islamist organizations' strength and the state, they tend to overlook the influence of social forces and especially non-Islamist groups that may share an authoritarian regime's worry about Islamists. In the next section, I discuss how such non-Islamist audiences affect repression.

The Role of Non-Islamist Audiences

The term "non-Islamist audiences" refers to civilian groups that do not subscribe to the Islamists' political project. I argue that these groups' attitudes influence an authoritarian ruler's calculation of the costs and benefits of using repression against Islamist organizations. When non-Islamists support the repression of Islamists, the negative consequences to regimes' legitimacy are weak. By neutralizing the perceived threat that the Islamists pose, regimes present themselves as defenders of stability and can signal to non-Islamist audiences a willingness to protect them. Indeed, repression may increase an authoritarian regime's popularity when non-Islamists perceive Islamists as posing an acute threat.

Non-Islamist attitudes toward Islamists are not constant. Therefore, regimes' costs and benefits of repressing vary over time. When non-Islamists have felt threatened by Islamists, they have been more likely to support repression against them. Consider Egypt in the 1990s. The country experienced waves of violent attacks by armed Islamist groups, including in densely populated areas in Cairo. In this context of high volatility, "Legal opposition elites from both the right and the left . . . turned a blind eye to the repression of Islamists. In some cases, they even appeared to welcome it" (Lust-Okar 2005, 148). Violence against Islamists provoked little outrage and "[o]pposition papers seemed to have a "blackout" on reports of human rights violations against Islamists" (148).

When such fears are high, an autocratic ruler can repress in order to signal to non-Islamists that he is serious about dealing with an Islamist threat. Repression may serve a dual purpose for the regime: not only does it destroy a problematic opposition group, it also corrals support among civilians who share a fear of that opposition group. As I argue elsewhere, this is the situation that Egypt experienced in the summer of 2013, when generalized hostility created opportunities for the new regime to legitimize itself in the eyes of non-Islamists. This combination provided the prime conditions for using repression to build a support base after the coup, or what I call a "legitimation strategy" of repression (Lachapelle 2020).

Understanding the role of non-Islamist audiences, and how regimes seek to signal their resolve to them, attunes scholars to the indirect effects of repression upon civilians who are not its direct targets. Repression can help authoritarian regimes enhance their popularity by signaling to non-Islamist groups that the regime is willing and capable of providing order and security during chaotic times. In Egypt, repression in 2013 demonstrated to non-Islamist audiences that the new post-coup regime was capable of eliminating the Islamist threat.

This argument builds on important studies that have underscored the significance of divides between Islamists and non-Islamists in the Arab world (Albrecht 2005; Buehler 2018; Lust-Okar 2005; Shehata 2010). Notably, Ellen Lust (2005) demonstrated how regimes have been able to prevent the joint mobilization of Islamists and non-Islamists through selective repression. By creating "divided structures of contention" that punish non-Islamists for joining hands with Islamists, autocrats can thwart the emergence of a cross-ideological front. These divide-and-conquer strategies were used by the Mubarak regime to keep opposition forces divided (Albrecht 2005). My argument advances such scholarship by theorizing the costs and benefits of these different repressive strategies for the autocrat.

In the next section, I illustrate the role of non-Islamist audiences and how an authoritarian regime can use repression to build support, using a case study of Egypt. It shows the limits of existing arguments that focus on direct threats to the regime for explaining the scale of violence after the coup of 2013. Rather, as I will demonstrate, the regime repressed the Muslim Brotherhood to build its popularity and support base among civilian groups that were fearful of the Islamist organization.

CASE STUDY: REPRESSION AFTER THE COUP OF 2013 IN EGYPT

The period after the coup of July 3, 2013, provides a particularly clear illustration of the role of non-Islamist audiences for repression. The coup overthrew Mohamed Morsi, a democratically elected president and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, ushering in a period of unprecedented levels of repression in Egypt that included mass incarceration, the use of military trials against civilians, and enforced disappearances (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2014; Rutherford 2018). The use of lethal force against protesters became frequent after July 3, 2013, in contrast with the Mubarak era, when such use of lethal force was rare. The most infamous episode of violence against protesters after the coup of July 3, 2013, is the so-called the "Rabaa Massacre" of August 14, 2013, when security forces dispersed protesters sitting in front of the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Cairo, killing about a thousand supporters of the ousted president Morsi in less than twelve hours.[3]

Understanding the extraordinarily high levels of repression that occurred in Rabaa Square requires paying attention to the non-Islamist audiences that the post-2013 regime faced after the coup. It was not the case that the Muslim Brotherhood posed a greater threat to the new regime than to the Mubarak regime. This Islamist organization's popularity was at a historical low. Nationally representative data from the Arab Barometer surveys reveal that trust toward the Muslim Brotherhood had dramatically fallen between 2011 and 2013. Whereas 32 percent of respondents answered that they "absolutely did not trust" the Muslim Brotherhood in the spring of 2011 (Arab Barometer Survey Wave II), this number was 68 percent in the spring of 2013, shortly before Morsi was ousted (Arab Barometer Survey Wave III). Compared with earlier periods of Islamist political mobilization, the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 was not in a position to mobilize broad-based support, as it had lost much of its popular appeal (Masoud 2014, 209–215). Indeed, if the Islamists' popularity had rested upon a reputation for competence (Brooke 2017; Cammett and Jones 2014), then the deterioration of the economy and services that Egyptians experienced under Morsi severely harmed the Islamists' reputation. In other words, at the time, the Muslim Brotherhood's message did not resonate broadly across Egyptian society; and it was not in a strong position to challenge the post-coup government and provoke a major wave of protests.

On the contrary, the regime was able to repress the Muslim Brotherhood largely *because* of widespread animosity against it. The regime could gain popularity in the eyes of non-Islamists by being tough on the Islamist organization. This strategy involved both promoting a narrative portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat to Egypt and demonstrating the regime's own ability to destroy this threat before worried audiences. By emphasizing the threat that the Brotherhood posed, the new regime did not invent narratives out of thin air, but rather drew upon a repertoire of already existing anxieties about the Muslim Brotherhood as aiming to capture the Egyptian state and establish a theocracy (Hellyer 2017; Nugent 2020). Indeed these anxieties had been considerably heightened during Morsi's presidency (2012–2013).

Widespread fears of the Muslim Brotherhood among non-Islamists and shared concerns that its continued post-coup mobilization was leading the country to the brink of civil war helped people believe in the value of a strongman being in charge. In turn, these popular sentiments affected the costs of repression for the regime. When the regime committed the August 14, 2013, massacre, there was little public outrage, contrary to what literature on backlash mobilization would lead us to expect (Francisco 2004). As Kira Jumet accurately notes about the public reaction to the massacre, "Large segments of the Egyptian public reacted to the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre with enthusiastic approval of the government's action" (Jumet 2018, 205).

One way to examine the sentiments of non-Islamists audiences during that period is through popular opinion pieces written in the Egyptian press. I scraped all opinion pieces published in the privately owned newspaper *Al-Masry al-Youm* between July 3 and August 14, 2013 (from the day of the coup to the day of the Rabaa massacre). Among the 852 articles that I obtained, I identified those discussing the Rabaa sit-in using an automated textual analysis following the method developed by Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi (2016) and made available through the *stm* package in *R*. I ran a structural topic model of seven topics on all unigrams and bigrams of stemmed words, and the stemming was done using the *arabicStemR* package (Nielsen 2017). The anti-coup mobilization by the Muslim Brotherhood stood out as a topic, through the high frequency of words such as "Rabaa" "sit-in," and "Ikhwan." I kept articles with a topic proportion greater than 0.5, for a total of 132 articles.

This analysis shows high levels of expressed support for repressing the Muslim Brotherhood. Contributors to *Al-Masry al-Youm* made repeated calls for the government to take a hard-line approach against the Islamist protesters. They demanded that security forces end the sit-in and warned against seeking political reconciliation with Islamists. Whereas the regime certainly promoted anti-Brotherhood narratives in the media, these declarations reflected genuine sentiment. Large swaths of the non-Islamist intelligentsia had supported the coup and celebrated the Muslim Brotherhood's fall from power. Such attitudes often extended to support for the government's hard-line position. One article cautioned against seeking reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and warned the organization, "[I]f you seek a safe exit, I can assure you it will not happen."[4] Another columnist told people "not to cry" for "an armed group that has armed militias and threatens the country's safety."[5] Another wrote that "the police must deal with this outpost [the sit-in] as it deals with criminals and murderers. Such banditry is a violation of the law, and it should not be tolerated," adding that "the responsibility of the police towards the people is to protect them from advocates of violence and bandits."[6]

Similarly to *Al-Masry al-Youm*, most media outlets promoted a hard-line approach against the Muslim Brotherhood and protesters at the Rabaa sit-in. Well-known intellectuals accused proponents of moderation of being unpatriotic. For instance, on the day of the Rabaa massacre, famous novelist and Mubarak critic Alaa al-Aswani tweeted to his two million followers: "In Egypt now there is a people, a government, a police force and an army in the confrontation with an armed terrorist group that is committing the most heinous of crimes for power. There is no middle ground. Either with Egypt or with terrorism" (quoted in Hefny 2018, 154–155).

The regime also encouraged mass demonstrations in support of repression against the Brotherhood. In late July, Sisi, who was still minister of defense at the time, had publicly asked the population to give him a "mandate to confront terrorism."[7] Large numbers of people responded to this call, expressing their support by mobilizing in large crowds across Egypt. These demonstrations gave visible expression to popular support for forceful measures against the Islamist organization. Shortly after these protests, the government approved a plan for the removal of protesters in Rabaa and Nahda Squares. Public declarations made by Egyptian officials after the massacre suggest the authorities expected the likely number of casualties to be in the thousands (Human Rights Watch 2014, 102).

There were few efforts to downplay the scale of the violence after the massacre. The official number of casualties announced by the Health Ministry's Forensic Medical Authority was 627 deaths, a number comparable to the estimates of Human Rights Watch.[8] Prime Minister al-Beblawy told a local newspaper that he estimated the number of casualties from the clearing of key sites in Cairo where Muslim Brotherhood supporters were repressed—namely, the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins—to be almost 1,000.[9] Whereas many authoritarian regimes go to great lengths to try to hide their uses of violence, the Egyptian government in the summer of 2013 did not, which is consistent with the signaling argument advanced in this chapter.

Since this incident, Egypt's regime has detained tens of thousands of people, and the courts have issued hundreds of death sentences in mass trials. In addition, local NGOs as well as Amnesty International have documented hundreds of disappearances.[10]

BEYOND EGYPT

Understanding the role of non-Islamist audiences in Egypt after the 2013 coup invites scholars to rethink prominent episodes of repression across the Arab world, where authoritarian regimes have targeted Islamist opposition groups. In Syria, the regime of Hafez al-Assad adopted especially drastic measures against the Muslim Brotherhood. In the early 1980s, Assad's regime made membership in the organization a criminal offense that was punishable by death and killed large numbers in a crackdown to suppress a Brotherhood-led armed uprising in the city of Hama (Lefèvre 2013, 115). Indeed, the Syrian regime besieged the city, and its repression resulted in over ten thousand civilian casualties (Lefèvre 2013, 128). In Tunisia during the early 1990s, the regime of Ben Ali rounded up several thousand Islamists and sentenced them to heavy prison sentences (Shahin 1997, 101). Algeria has similarly witnessed the mass repression of Islamic opposition groups, such as the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) after a coup in 1992 that annulled the legislative elections (McDougall 2017, 278). Likewise, in Iraq in 1982, Saddam Hussein's regime executed and imprisoned large numbers of the Daʿwa Party in the city of Dujail after a failed assassination attempt against him (Shanahan 2004, 946).

At the same time, repression has not been the only way that regimes across the Arab world have dealt with Islamists. In Jordan, the regime has allowed the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, to participate in elections since the legalization of political parties in 1992 (Boulby 1999, 117; Schwedler 2006, 52) and repression against the Muslim Brotherhood, the country's most powerful Islamist organization, has been rare. Events such as when the Jordanian regime arrested four members of Parliament belonging to the IAF in 2006 have been the exception

Table 5.1: Repression against Islamist in the Arab World since 1980

Country	Years	Episode
Algeria	1982	Arrest of about 1,000 Islamist activists
	1991	Arrest of leaders of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)
	1992	Arrests of thousands of members of the FIS
	1992–2000	Counterinsurgency against armed Islamist groups
Egypt	1987	Hundreds of arrests and detentions against the Muslim Brotherhood
	1995	Over 900 arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood
	1992–2000	Over 50,000 arrests in counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamic Group
	2007–2008	Hundreds of arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood
	2013–2014	Killing of hundreds, jailing of thousands against the Muslim Brotherhood
Jordan	2006	Arrest of 4 parliamentarians from the Islamic Action Front
Morocco	1983	Arrest of leader of al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, Abdsalam Yassine
	1984	Arrest of 71 members of al-Shabiba al-Islamiya
	1992	Arrests of Guidance Bureau of al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan and followers
	2006–2008	Arrests of about 5,000 members of al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan
Syria	1982	10,000 to 40,000 killed in Hama massacre
Iraq	1982	Over one hundred killed in Dujail massacre
Tunisia	1981	Arrest of over 60 leaders of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI)
	1987	About 3,000 arrests against the MTI
	1990–1992	About 8,000 arrests against Ennahda

Sources: Algeria: McDougall (2017, 278) and Hafez (2003, 80); Egypt: El-Ghobashy (2005, 379), Hafez (2003, 90), and International Crisis Group (2008, 10); Jordan: Hamid (2013, 548); Morocco: Shahin (1997, 187–88, 194–95), Salgon (2012, 20); Syria: Lefèvre (2013, 128); Tunisia: Shahin (1997, 87, 101) and Jones (1988).

rather than the rule (Hamid 2013, 548). In Morocco, the regime has more often engaged in targeted repression of Islamists, such as the arrests of rank-and-file and leadership of the al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan movement, a charity movement that has refrained from participating in formal politics. However, the Moroccan regime has also allowed the country's main Islamist party, the Parti de la Justice et du Développement, to participate in elections and to hold cabinet positions (Buehler 2018). Table 5.1 summarizes some of these prominent episodes of state repression in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria since 1980.[11]

In short, repression against Islamists in the Arab world has not been a constant, but has been subject to variations in timing and place across the Arab world. To understand these patterns of repression, one must look beyond typical threat- and state-centered approaches and consider a broader range of actors. When Arab autocrats repressed Islamists, they dealt not only with their direct targets, but also indirectly with non-Islamists audiences. Pointing to the dangers that Islamists posed to civilian audiences would often prove a powerful way of justifying repression and diminishing repression costs. How much such messages resonated among non-Islamists audiences has varied, shaping the cost and benefits of repression for autocrats.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the role that non-Islamist audiences play in shaping the repression of Islamists through a case study of Egypt. Whereas existing studies focus on threat perception, coercive state capacity, and institutional competition to explain repression, I argue that non-Islamist audiences shape repression against Islamists. The experience of Egypt since 2013 illustrates how a new authoritarian regime that came to power through a military coup has used repression to garner the support of non-Islamist audiences that feared the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond Egypt, this argument helps explain patterns of violence against Islamists across the Arab world. When regimes could not justify the repression of Islamists to domestic audiences, they tempered their repression. However, when non-Islamist audiences acquiesced to or encouraged the repression of Islamists—because they believed that the Islamists threatened the country's national character or security—authoritarian regimes could repress Islamists at little political cost.

Notes

1. For an insightful discussion of the Islamists' electoral advantage see Cammett and Jones (2014).
2. A party's Islamist designation may also offer an "informational shortcut that communicates something positive about a party's policy intentions" and translates into electoral gains (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012, 586).
3. Human Rights Watch, which conducted an in-depth investigation of these events, counted 904 casualties in the two locations, but stresses that the true number is most likely "well over 1,000 protesters." Human Rights Watch, 2014, "All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt," August 12, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt.

4. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/198391.
5. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/198842.
6. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/198615.
7. https://www.ft.com/content/41af5f60-f435-11e2-a62e-00144feabdc0.
8. Human Rights Watch (2014).
9. https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=396463&IssueID=2985, cited in Human Rights Watch (2014).
10. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/egypt-hundreds-disappeared-and-tortured-amid-wave-of-brutal-repression/.
11. I include campaigns against armed militant groups only if these groups established a stronghold in urban areas, such as the Islamic Group's insurgency in Egypt in the 1990s, which managed to establish a stronghold in the Cairo suburbs of Imbaba, or the Muslim Brotherhood's uprising in the city of Hama in Syria in 1982. The list does not include military operations against armed Islamist movements that occurred in border regions, such as Egypt's Sinai, or the clashes between the Algerian state and numerous armed groups operating in the Sahara regions.

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CHAPTER 6

REGIME TYPES, REGIME TRANSITIONS, AND RELIGION IN PAKISTAN

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How does religion shape regime types, and regime transitions, in Muslim-majority states? In this chapter I examine the effect of religion on transitions between military and civilian-led regimes in Pakistan, noting that *both* types of regimes have generally embraced the *same* religious constitutional provisions. In Pakistan, these provisions outline different rights for Muslims and non-Muslims, and since 1973 they have also restricted speech said to infringe on "the glory of Islam." Although Pakistan has experienced six major regime transitions since 1947, few of these transitions have been driven by religious groups or religious ideas. Religion rarely drives the process of regime transition in Pakistan. At the same time, however, I note that ostensibly religious constitutional provisions have underpinned a series of "exclusionary" and "illiberal" regimes.

Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, civilian-led regimes have been removed in three military coups—in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Only one of these (1977) highlighted religious concerns.[1] Military-led regimes were later removed following widespread protests on three occasions—in 1969–1970, 1988, and 2007–2008. These protests, however, featured nonreligious more than religious demands. While each protest-based transition *away* from military rule suggested a push in the direction of "democracy," the regimes that subsequently emerged were characterized by (a) reserved domains of military decision-making (e.g., security policy) and (b) religious constitutional provisions restricting free speech and diminishing the rights of non-Muslims. As such, I do not describe the civilian-led regimes that emerged in the wake of each transition away from military rule as broadly inclusive liberal democracies.

An inclusive liberal democracy is characterized by civilian power obtained via regular, competitive, free-and-fair elections based on universal adult suffrage as well as a firm constitutional commitment to (a) the separation of powers (i.e., horizontal accountability) and (b) fundamental individual rights without exceptions for particular groups. Within the civilian-led regimes of Pakistan, however, policymaking domains reserved for *non*civilians (e.g., enduring military control over security policy) have pushed against these parameters. Furthermore, limitations on freedom of religion and freedom of speech (so-called "illiberal" restrictions), as well as limitations targeting particular groups (i.e., "exclusionary" restrictions), have remained in place with widespread popular support. Even beyond persistent forms of military tutelage, in other words, civilian-led regimes in Pakistan have been *detached* from strong demands for liberal democracy.

The presence or absence of popular pressure for an "inclusive" or "liberal" democracy is, of course, an empirical question. In Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, Kathleen Collins and Erica Owen (2012) found that, while religious affiliation (e.g., Muslim/non-Muslim) did *not* shape individual levels of attachment to democracy, higher levels of Muslim "religiosity" (i.e., higher levels of individual religious commitment or more extensive forms of individual religious practice) *did* suggest a preference for "Islamic" more than "liberal" democracy.[2] Frédéric Volpi (2004, 1061, 1069) has articulated a similar argument. He noted that Muslims who express an appreciation for democracy might simultaneously oppose "liberal" democracy, turning instead toward what Volpi called an Islamic "pseudo-democracy" defined by a focus on community or state-based mobilization for religious values (i.e., a "positive" focus on religious virtue) rather than widespread popular support for the "negative" constitutional protections commonly associated with liberal democracy (i.e., limitations on state power in favour of individual constitutional rights).

In this chapter, an inclusive "liberal" democracy differs from an "Islamic" democracy insofar as the latter is associated with freely elected civilian-led regimes in which various expressions of Islam (i.e., specific *interpretations* of Islam) are politically, legally, and constitutionally salient even if those interpretations are neither liberal nor inclusive with respect to individual rights and/or nondiscrimination at the level of particular groups. I do not argue that Islam is inevitably incompatible with liberal democracy. My argument is simply that, in Pakistan, elected civilian-led regimes have long embraced illiberal and exclusionary constitutional provisions broadly associated with that country's prevailing interpretations of Islam.

It is possible that grass-roots electoral support for nonsecular politics could encourage leaders who articulate a liberal reading of their own religious tradition (i.e., religious leaders who use religious ideas to defend nondiscrimination as well as an appreciation for fundamental individual freedoms vis-à-vis religion or speech). Fazlur Rahman (1982) in Pakistan and Abdolkarim Soroush (Sadri and Sadri 2002) in Iran famously stressed the possibility of pro-liberal politics within the Islamic tradition. But, historically, grass-roots support for electoral but nonsecular politics in Pakistan has rarely overlapped with widespread support for such leaders; in fact, Pakistan's first wave of pro-democracy activism (1969–1970) coincided with Fazlur Rahman's forced departure into exile. Support for civilian elected regimes in *Pakistan* has long coexisted with popular support for *illiberal* and *exclusionary* forms of ostensibly "Islamic" constitutionalism.

Assessing multiple features of Pakistan's political and constitutional history, this chapter locates Pakistan within a much broader literature on regime types and regime transitions, arguing that while *non*religious grass-roots protests figure prominently in Pakistani transitions away from authoritarianism, broadly democratizing transitions tend to preserve a "Pakistani" approach to Islamic constitutional provisions, pulling away from an inclusive liberal democracy. As such, this chapter builds on Jan Teorell's (2010, 156) call for a greater emphasis on "the subjective experience of ... [democratizing] actors," highlighting an appreciation for what elected civilian-led government in Pakistan has actually meant for those seeking to introduce and constitutionalize it.

PAKISTAN: REGIME TYPES AND REGIME TRANSITIONS

Tracking regime transitions requires a sense of the regime types from which, and to which, those transitions occur. Increasingly, scholars with an interest in regime transition have moved beyond a simple account of "democracies" and "dictatorships" (Alvarez et al. 1996) to examine a wider range of regime types. At the relatively open or competitive end of the scale, social and even secular democracies are said to include substantive elements that press beyond the procedural core associated with Robert Dahl's definition of "polyarchy" (Dahl 1971, 1982; Diamond 1999). At the more constrained or authoritarian end of the scale, Samuel Huntington (1991) and Barbara Geddes (1999) have noted that transitions often involve a shift between several different types of autocratic leaders, including (a) personalistic leaders (e.g., monarchs), (b) military leaders, and (c) single-party leaders. Most regimes, however, are no longer characterized as "open" democracies or "closed" dictatorships. Instead, they are categorized as hybrid regimes, including so-called "defective" democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Merkel 2004; O'Donnell 1994; Zakaria 1997) and "electoral" autocracies (Brumberg 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006) that *combine* electoral procedures with various autocratic constraints (Bogaards 2009; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011; Morlino 2009; Wigell 2008).

Making no a priori normative claims about secular/nonsecular, liberal/illiberal, or inclusive/exclusionary regimes, I examine four different modes of regime transition in Pakistan (1947–2019), highlighting the analytical importance of various "hybrid" regimes:

1. outright military dictatorship → "hybrid" autocracy (aka electoral autocracy)
2. "hybrid" autocracy → outright military dictatorship (generally involving constitutional abrogation/suspension; no elections)
3. outright military dictatorship → "hybrid" democracy (e.g., exclusionary/illiberal democracy; generally including reserved domains of military power)
4. "hybrid" democracy → outright military dictatorship (e.g., military coup)

Outright military dictatorships originating in a military coup (No. 4) are easy to identify in Pakistan; they occurred in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Each coup, however, was followed by a *further* transition from outright dictatorship to some type of “hybrid” autocracy (No. 1). For scholars like Levitsky and Way (2002, 16), or Andreas Schedler (2013, 29, 82), “hybrid” electoral-authoritarian regimes require competitive party-based elections for both the executive (e.g., the presidency) and the national legislature. But, in Pakistan, *presidential* polls occasionally involve *non*competitive referenda rather than party-based elections. And, under both military and civilian-led regimes, Pakistan has also conducted several “indirect” polls in which *non*party local elections produce an electoral college for subsequent National Assembly (NA) and/or Provincial Assembly (PA) elections. As such, *none* of Pakistan’s military regimes has met the definitional standard set by Levitsky, Way, and Schedler for an “electoral-authoritarian” regime.

Within Pakistan’s military-led regimes, *party*-based NA/PA elections have also appeared unevenly. Under General Ayub Khan (1958–1969), *non*party elections were held in 1959–1960 and 1962. And, under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988), party-based activity was largely proscribed, notwithstanding electoral activity in 1979, 1983, 1985, and 1987 (Shah 2014, 158–159). General Ayub Khan, however, *did* hold party-based NA/PA polls in 1965. And, historically speaking, party-based affiliations were also an open secret under General Zia (1985). General Musharraf (1999–2007) went on to hold party-based elections in 2002 and 2007–2008. As such, I adhere to the convention among Pakistan experts, highlighting transitions *within* each military-led regime between “outright military dictatorship” and hybrid forms of “electoral autocracy.”

My main interest, however, is not military coups or intra-authoritarian transitions from outright military dictatorships to electoral autocracies. Instead, I focus on a two-step process of regime transition from military rule back toward an “Islamic” democracy: specifically, I focus on (a) transitions from electoral autocracy back to outright military dictatorship (1969, 1988-A, 2007),[3] and, shortly thereafter, (b) broadly “democratizing” transitions from outright military dictatorship to some type of civilian-led regime (1970–1972, 1988-B, 2008). As noted above, this two-step process typically begins with widespread *non*religious protests. But, when a re-imposition of martial law fails to quell these protests, the second step involves military leaders handing power back to civilians via elections.[4] Again, the protests that play such a crucial role in Pakistani transitions from military to civilian rule rarely stress religious demands. But, in due course, the regimes they engender invariably retain the “exclusionary” and “illiberal” constitutional provisions of their predecessors.

“Hybrid Democracy” and the Constitutional Status of Religion

Following the rise of each civilian-led regime in Pakistan, extra-constitutional but increasingly formalized patterns of military power—in effect, “reserved” domains of military decision-making—have persisted alongside constitutional provisions that diminish the rights of non-Muslims (and, since 1973, restrict fundamental rights). These factors ensure that Pakistan's civilian regimes do *not* amount to an inclusive or a liberal democracy. I have examined the origins of Pakistan's exclusionary constitutional provisions elsewhere (Nelson 2016); Maya Tudor also addresses them in this volume.

Few twentieth-century states were created as territorial homelands explicitly associated with particular religious communities—only Pakistan (Muslim, 1947) and Israel (Jewish, 1948). In fact, even among Muslim-majority states, few were deliberately created to transform a national Muslim minority (e.g., Muslims in India) into a majority (i.e., Muslims in Pakistan). This unusual history directly underpins Pakistan's national identity and, therein, its constitutional approach to religion (specifically, Islam). Since Pakistan's first constitution was introduced in 1956, only three twentieth-century constitutions have actually placed the word "Islamic" in the name of the state itself: Mauritania since 1958, Iran since 1979, and Afghanistan since 2004. Indeed, Pakistan has never treated its majoritarian Muslim identity as an open constitutional question; if it did, the state's historically rooted *raison d'être* would unravel. The illiberal and exclusionary features of Pakistan's constitution, however, do not follow seamlessly from Pakistan's Muslim-majority or "Islamic" constitutional identity; instead, these features flow from historically and politically embedded processes privileging a specific *interpretation* of that identity.

Pakistan's most important constitutional provision concerning religion—in many ways its first constitutional provision—is known as the Objectives Resolution. Initially approved by the Muslim members of Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly over the objections of every non-Muslim member within that Assembly (1949), then introduced as a preambular provision within Pakistan's first constitution (1956), this resolution was subtly diluted in Pakistan's second constitution (1962) before being restored to its original form in a constitutional amendment one year later (1963–1964). It has remained an important feature of every constitution since then—for example, in Pakistan's third constitution (1973)—becoming a substantive article within that constitution (Article 2A) in 1985. Reflecting a nuanced compromise between Islamist and nationalist elites (Nelson 2016), this resolution states that, while "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to . . . Allah" and the state's authority will be exercised "within the limits prescribed by Him," state authority must be exercised by "the people" of Pakistan via their "chosen representatives" working alongside an "independent" judiciary.

Since 1956, this resolution has co-existed with further constitutional elements explicitly focused on "Islam." These elements specify that no Pakistani law may be repugnant to the injunctions of the Qurʾan and sunna (that is, the practice of the Prophet and his closest companions), with Pakistan's head of state (for example, the president) appointing an "advisory" Council of Islamic Ideology to guide each NA/PA in defining the parameters of repugnancy (1956, Article 198; 1962, Article 204; 1973, Articles 227–230). Together, these "Islamic" provisions aim to promote conformity with the injunctions of Islam while, at the same time, framing Pakistan as an Islamic "republic" in which *parliament* retains the power to frame the state's interpretation of Islam (Nelson 2016).

As noted above, identifying a state religion—as in the United Kingdom, Denmark, or Costa Rica—need not automatically restrict liberal rights (e.g., freedom of religion or freedom of speech). But, in the UK, Denmark, and Pakistan after 1973 (Article 2), the constitutional identification of a state religion has also been associated with "exclusionary" provisions declaring that *only* those adhering to the *state* religion will be permitted to serve as head of state (Pakistan: 1956, Article 32; 1962, Article 19; 1973, Article 41). In fact, since 1973, related constitutional provisions in Pakistan have gone on to clarify that, not unlike the British Queen vis-à-vis the Church of England (specifically) or Denmark's strictly Lutheran head of state, Pakistan's president must be, not merely a "Muslim," but a Muslim in a specific doctrinal sense—i.e., *not* part of a heterodox minority known as the Ahmadiyya (1973, Third Schedule). The Ahmadiyya describe themselves as Muslims but, since 1974, they have been constitutionally reclassified as "non-Muslims" (Article 260) owing to certain views articulated by their late-nineteenth-century founder Ghulam Ahmed—namely, that he was not just a religious reformer but a "prophet" after Mohammad. (Typically, Muslims see the Prophet Mohammad as the final "seal" of prophecy itself [Qurʾan 33:40].[5])

In 1973, Pakistan combined these *exclusionary* constitutional provisions regarding the country's head of state with *illiberal* provisions removing free-speech protections for any statement that might be said infringe, not on the personal security of fellow citizens, but rather on an abstract idea, namely, "the glory of Islam" (Article 19). Whereas in countries like the UK, broadly related criminal laws concerning anti-"Christian" blasphemy were removed in 2008, constitutional protection for laws specifically concerning anti-"Muslim" blasphemy remain in place in Pakistan.

In 1956, and again in 1973, the introduction of Pakistan's exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions was initiated by religious groups claiming special religious authority to define the doctrinal boundaries of Pakistan's Muslim majority—above all, groups that initially opposed the nationalism of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his ostensibly "secular" anti-colonial Pakistan movement, including (a) the urban middle-class Jamaʿat-i Islami (JI, Party of Islam) and (b) the madrasa-based Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI, Party of Islamic Scholars).[6] These religious groups boycotted the late-colonial provincial elections that underpinned the formation of Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly; as a result, they were not physically present when Pakistan's first constitution was drafted. But, even so, their relevance was recognized by the members of Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly through an ancillary body charged with considering religious views (namely, the Talimat-e-Islamia Board, i.e., the Board of Islamic Instruction). And in due course some of the exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions demanded by this board were formally adopted by Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly.

Since the early inclusion of these exclusionary provisions (e.g., 1956, Article 32; 1962, Article 19; 1973, Article 41), subsequent military regimes as well as parliamentary majorities containing very few JI or JUI members have also opted to retain them. Indeed, alongside constitutional provisions explicitly excluding non-Muslims from the presidency (1973, Article 41), an exclusionary constitutional amendment formally redefining Pakistan's Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims (Article 260) was passed *unanimously* by a freely elected NA in 1974.[7] And, in 2010, Article 91 was amended by another freely elected civilian NA to state that NA members were only permitted to choose a "Muslim" member—i.e., not an Ahmadi—to serve as prime minister (85 percent in favor). Initiated by religious leaders but formally introduced and persistently retained by military as well as civilian leaders, Pakistan's exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions reflect widespread views regarding the parameters of a "Muslim" (non-Ahmadi) as opposed to a more inclusive liberal regime.

To avoid conceptual slippage vis-à-vis the terminology commonly used for "hybrid" regimes, my discussion relies on two terms developed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) to describe (a) "dictablanda" hybrid regimes at the relatively closed end of the regime-type scale, including electoral autocracies, and (b) "democradura" hybrid regimes at the relatively open end of the scale. In democradura regimes, free-and-fair elections are the norm. But, at the same time, several different limitations are possible, including (a) constitutional "brown areas" (i.e. territories where constitutional provisions simply do not apply),[8] (b) reserved domains lying beyond the control of elected leaders (i.e. "tutelary" spheres of policymaking), (c) limitations on constitutional checks-and-balances such that the power of elected leaders is partly despotic (i.e. "delegative" or "cæserist" democracies), and (d) barriers to equal participation ("exclusionary" limits) as well as (e) restrictions on fundamental individual rights like due process or freedom of religion and speech ("illiberal" constraints) (Adeney 2015, 120; Dahl 1971). I focus on the latter two: exclusionary and illiberal constraints.

Exclusionary Constraints

In Pakistan, "exclusionary" constraints targeting the notion of equal citizenship first emerged in 1955 when the territories of West Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP) were combined as "One Unit" with the same number of elected representatives as East Pakistan (Bengal), despite the latter having a larger population. Until this One Unit scheme was removed shortly before Pakistan's first national election in 1970, this provincial set-up challenged inclusive notions of equal participation by undermining electoral equality. In short, those in East Pakistan (Bengalis) were "excluded" from equal citizenship.

The most persistent exclusions, however, have been associated with religion, including (a) the presence of "separate electorates" for those defined as non-Muslims (1947–1956, 1985–2002, and with continuing relevance for the Ahmadiyya)[9] as well as (b) constitutional provisions stressing that, as noted above, Pakistan's president and prime minister must be "Muslims," not members of any other religious groups (e.g., Hindus, Christians, or Ahmadis).

Illiberal Constraints

With reference to the Ahmadis, illiberal measures also extend to Pakistan's Second Constitutional Amendment (1974, Article 260). This amendment unilaterally defined the Ahmadis as "non-Muslims," thus undercutting their fundamental individual right to religious self-identification (Article 20A).[10] Furthermore, as noted above, Pakistan has illiberal constitutional provisions removing individual free-speech protections for otherwise peaceful statements deemed to infringe, not on the safety of other citizens, but rather on "the glory of Islam" (Article 19).[11] In addition, Pakistan offered no legal recognition for the marriage, divorce, custody, or inheritance rights of individual Hindus until 2017. With respect to fundamental individual rights of legal equality (Article 25) and, with reference to inheritance, personal property (Articles 23–24), this exclusion was also clearly illiberal.

It is not merely that religious references have played a formal constitutional role in every Pakistani regime. It is, rather, that Pakistan's elected civilian regimes qualify as "hybrid" democratic regimes precisely owing to Pakistan's constitutional interpretation of that role. This is not a normative statement; it is an analytical statement growing out of prevailing scholarly definitions of "exclusionary" and "illiberal" regimes, with particular reference to the *constitutional* interpretation of Islamic ideas in Pakistan (Bogaards 2009; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Wigell 2008; Zakaria 1997). One aspect of hybrid democradura regimes—namely, reserved domains of military power—has been widely discussed in the case of Pakistan (Adeney 2015; Mufti 2018; Shah 2014). I focus on Pakistan's constitutional treatment of religion (Islam) instead.

Religious Parties and the Shape of "Electoral Autocracy"

Within Pakistan, transitions to outright dictatorship via military coups are well known. But, as noted above, different types of elections also figure prominently *within* the dictablanda regimes that have emerged in the wake of each coup. The first type of election includes direct local elections held at a district and a subdistrict level on a *non*party basis. The second consists of NA/PA elections conducted with or without political parties (including religious parties). There is no consistent pattern across these two types of "military" elections: under General Ayub, local elections produced an electoral college for *non*party NA/PA elections in 1960, but as noted above, after Pakistan's NA passed a new "Political Parties Act" in 1962, further district- and subdistrict-level elections under General Ayub produced an electoral college for *party*-based NA/PA elections later that same year (and again in 1964–1965);[12] furthermore, under General Zia-ul-Haq, party-based elections were formally proscribed, but nonparty NA/PA elections were conducted in 1985.

A third type of military-led voting includes indirect/direct and nonparty-/party-based *presidential* polls. As noted above, General Ayub's local elections produced an electoral college for indirect (*non*party) presidential polls in 1960. This was followed by direct (*party*-based) presidential polls, also under General Ayub, in 1965. Thereafter, however, voters returned for nonparty presidential polls under General Zia (1984 referendum, 98 percent in favor) and General Musharraf (2002 referendum, 98 percent in favor; 2007 "indirect" polls, 57 percent in favor).

Crucially, elections under *both* military *and* civilian-led regimes have produced governments including key religious parties. In fact, despite their weak electoral performance in every poll since 1970, politicians from the JI and/or the JUI have managed to join a ruling NA or PA coalition in almost every subsequent regime. In 1970, for instance, despite these two religious parties winning just twenty seats—JI 4 (NA); JUI 7 (NA) + JUI 9 (PA: NWFP)—JUI leader Mufti Mahmud emerged as the NWFP's provincial chief minister. This pattern, linking religious parties to some form of participation in government, has faltered only three times since 1970: in 1985, 1997, and 2018 (see Table 6.1).

After General Zia's military coup in 1977, JI and JUI members were appointed to Zia's (advisory) cabinet even as they continued to push for the NA/PA elections that Zia repeatedly promised.[13] The JUI largely boycotted Zia's nonparty NA/PA elections in 1985, but 10 JI-affiliated candidates still prevailed as "independents."[14] These independents, however, remained outside the formal governing coalition created by Zia's hand-picked prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo; in fact, as shown in Table 6.1, 1985 marked the first occasion when *no* religious party was included in *any* NA or PA government (Nasr 1994: 196–197). This is ironic, given Zia's reputation as a key "Islamizing" dictator.

After Zia was killed in a plane crash (1988), the chairman of Pakistan's Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was constitutionally elevated to the presidency. At the same time,

Table 6.1: Pakistan: Religious Parties in Government since 1970

1970-71	NWFP PA: JUI	1997 –
1977	Advisory Cabinet: JI/JUI	2002 NA + NWFP PA + Balochistan PA: "MMA" **
1985	**—**	2008 NA + Balochistan PA: JUI-F
1988	Balochistan PA: JUI-F; Punjab PA: "IJI"*	2013 NA: JUI-F; NWFP (renamed KP) PA: JI
1990	Balochistan PA: JUI-F/"IJI"; NA + Punjab PA: "IJI" *	**2018 –**
1993	NA: JUI-F	

* Within the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI; including JI and JUI-S), religious parties did not hold cabinet posts.

** Within the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA; including JI, JUI-S, and JUI-F), the JUI-F held cabinet posts in Balochistan and, together with the JI, in NWFP.

the Islamist JI and a faction of the madrasa-based JUI known as the "JUI-S" (Sami-ul-Haq faction) worked with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to create a right-wing alliance known as the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJI) under the leadership of Punjab chief minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. In the ensuing elections (November 1988), however, this alliance was defeated by a left-leaning NA coalition brought together by Benazir Bhutto, the leader a party known as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). But, in due course, Bhutto's coalition also incorporated a separate faction of the madrasa-based JUI known as the "JUI-F" (Fazlur Rahman faction).[15] In fact at a *provincial* level the JUI-F also secured cabinet posts in Balochistan even as the right-wing IJI captured power under Punjab's chief minister, Nawaz Sharif. Again, this pattern of religious-party involvement, *both* at a national level *and* at a provincial level, was the norm.

When Benazir Bhutto tried to control military appointments, however, the army's corps commanders instructed President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss her NA coalition. The IJI went on to win the next round of elections (1990) both in Punjab (PA) and in Islamabad (NA). (The IJI also created a provincial coalition with the madrasa-based JUI-F in Balochistan.) But, when IJI prime minister Nawaz Sharif sought to review the constitutional article that empowered Pakistan's president to unilaterally dissolve Pakistan's NA (Article 58(2)(b)), his own NA was dissolved instead (1993). The Supreme Court struck down Sharif's removal; but, almost immediately, the military persuaded both Prime Minister Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to step down, leading to fresh elections.

This time, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) lost to a PPP + JUI-F coalition led by Benazir Bhutto. But, after Pakistan's new president, Farooq Leghari, returned to the powers enshrined in Article 58(2)(b) to dismiss Prime Minister Bhutto in 1997, the PML-N was brought back into power with a massive single-party majority—the *second* of three occasions when *no* religious party held power in *any* NA/PA government.

Sharif quickly built on his two-thirds majority in parliament to pass Pakistan's Thirteenth Amendment (removing Article 58(2)(b)) before replacing Chief of the Army Staff Jahangir Karamat with General Pervez Musharraf.[16] And, after comprehensive talks with Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Sharif also signed a landmark India-Pakistan agreement known as the Lahore Declaration in 1999—unaware that General Musharraf had already launched an offensive military campaign across the Line of Control in Indian-administered Kashmir. US pressure forced Musharraf to retreat. But when Prime Minister Sharif moved to sack General Musharraf in October 1999, Musharraf simply deposed Sharif in Pakistan's third military coup.

Despite marginalizing several seasoned PPP and PML-N politicians by requiring NA/PA candidates to possess either a university degree or an advanced madrasa certificate, Musharraf's own party, known as the Pakistan Muslim League "Quaid-e-Azam" faction or PML-Q, fell short of a parliamentary majority in the dictablanda NA elections of 2002. In fact, with just 26 percent of the NA vote and only 37 percent of the seats, Musharraf's PML-Q was forced to construct a governing coalition with a collection of religious parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or MMA. (The MMA or United Council of Action included all of Pakistan's major religious parties: the JI, the JUI-S, and the JUI-F.) Yet, five years later, when Musharraf was ousted via mass demonstrations and replaced with an elected government led by the PPP (2007–2008), the madrasa-based JUI-F returned to power as a junior partner in yet another ruling coalition led by the PPP.[17]

Nawaz Sharif's PML-N defeated this PPP-led coalition during the NA/PA elections of 2013. But, again, the JUI-F switched sides and secured a place in Sharif's new government. The Islamist JI also joined a ruling *provincial* coalition with Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in Peshawar. The PTI or Pakistan Movement for Justice returned to power—both at a provincial level in Peshawar (PA) and at a national level in Islamabad (NA)—following elections in 2018. But, at this point, religious parties were excluded from the NA and all provincial governments. Again, this is unusual. Since 1970, elections have routinely provided Pakistan's religious parties with access to governing power. Religious parties have not governed on their own. But, since 1970—across both dictablanda and exclusionary/illiberal democradura regimes—religious parties have rarely been excluded from government.

Scholars occasionally claim that adding religious parties to civilian-led governing coalitions will foster "more" democracy (or, at least, more inclusive forms of democracy), whereas marginalizing such parties amounts to "less" democracy (Fair and Patel 2020). In Muslim-majority contexts, however, these claims remain underspecified without a better sense of the ways in which the governments that include these religious (Islamic) parties articulate their specific understanding of Islam, particularly with respect to matters of individual and group-based legal equality. There is, again, no inherent or inevitable link between the inclusion of these parties and the presence of an inclusive liberal democracy.[18]

REGIME TRANSITIONS AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION

Elsewhere in the Muslim world—in the Middle East, for example—secular militaries and secular political parties tend to distance themselves from right-wing Islamist parties. But, in Pakistan, *every* leading party (PPP, PML-N, PTI), including General Musharraf's "king's party" (PML-Q), has invited these parties into a ruling coalition. As such, it is difficult to say that Pakistan's military is automatically inclined to place a check on Islamist parties or, as noted above, that *including* Muslim religious parties within a civilian-led government might signal a shift toward a more inclusive liberal democracy.

Leonardo Morlino (2009, 283) uses a horizon of ten years to distinguish established regimes from "transitional" polities.[19] But, in Pakistan, every regime has collapsed within this ten-year horizon or just one year beyond it (e.g., 1947–1958, 1988–1999), placing Pakistan in something resembling a state of permanent transition (Hoffman 2011, 91–92). In what follows, however, I do not locate Pakistan within a state of permanent transition; instead I focus on electoral-autocratic and exclusionary-democratic hybrid regimes—neither ever fully consolidated—and, then, having done so, I focus on the *non*religious factors that underpin periodic transitions between them.

In Pakistan, "hybrid" democradura regimes never collapse directly into "hybrid" dictablanda regimes (Knutsen and Nygård 2015; Sanchez-Urribari 2011). Instead, all of Pakistan's hybrid, civilian-led, democradura regimes have ended with a military coup and a stretch of outright military dictatorship. Similarly, hybrid dictablanda regimes never transition, directly, into hybrid democradura regimes (Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Instead, ostensibly "democratizing" transitions (1969–1971; 1988A–B; 2007–2008) tend to involve widespread nonreligious urban protests followed by an intermediate stage of hardening military rule.[20]

In 1969–1970, for instance, the electoral autocracy of General Ayub Khan (1962–1969) came to an end when *non*religious ethnic (Bengali) protests in East Pakistan combined with smaller urban protests in West Pakistan—in this case, ethnic (Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch) protests demanding a restoration of the provinces that were merged under West Pakistan's One Unit scheme as well as left-wing labor strikes and demonstrations challenging the "modernizing" religious reforms of General Ayub's Central Institute of Islamic Research (Rahman 1976, 301; Sobhan 1969).[21] These demonstrations eventually prompted the exile of the institute's leader, Fazlur Rahman, followed further protests leading to an intra-military transfer of power from General Ayub Khan to General Yahya Khan. General Yahya Khan then proceeded to harden military rule by reimposing martial law.

The same hardening of authoritarian rule unfolded in between the dictablanda regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1985–1988) and the democradura regime of PPP prime minister Benazir Bhutto (1988)—partly owing to *non*religious protests led by a PPP-based movement known as the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (1983) as well as ethnic protests (1985–1986) in which Pashtun urban migrants battled an ethnic formation known as the Mohajir Qaumi Movement or MQM supported by General Zia in Karachi (Khan 2010, 39, 41).[22] Finally, in 1988, Zia responded to these protests with a return to outright military rule, dissolving his dictablanda NA.

In fact the same authoritarian hardening emerged between the dictablanda regime of General Pervez Musharraf (2002–2007) and the democradura regime of PPP prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani (2008)—this time, in response to *non*religious protests led by district lawyers demanding the reinstatement of Supreme Court Chief Justice Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhry, who was sacked after challenging General Musharraf's effort to stand for re-election as president without first holding the NA/PA elections required to install a new Electoral College for that purpose (Kokab 2013). Once again, after sacking Chief Justice Chaudhry, Musharraf cracked down with a return to martial law.

In Pakistan, the spasms of street-level protest that end authoritarian regimes are rarely framed by religious parties, religious groups, religious ideas, or religious demands. As noted above, however, religious actors often intervene *after* each protest-led transition in favour of civilian rule to marshal support for the preservation of exclusionary and illiberal "religious" constitutional provisions—provisions that obstruct the emergence of a more inclusive liberal democratic regime.

Nonreligious Transitions: Economic and Institutional Drivers

The case of Pakistan is an awkward fit for most of the literature addressing key drivers of regime transition, including arguments focused on (a) economic shocks, (b) authoritarian legislatures (and regime-oriented political parties) that might serve as a bridge during such transitions, as well as (c) anti-regime decisions delivered by constitutional courts. In what follows, I examine this awkward fit before moving beyond these key drivers to stress an account of democratizing transitions rooted in (d) urban protest—not *non*violent or *religious* protests, but historically specific configurations of *non*religious and occasionally *violent* protests.

As noted above, religious groups and religious ideas are not a key driver of regime transition in Pakistan. Religious elements merely intervene post hoc to stress an exclusionary interpretation of Pakistan's Muslim identity (i.e., "Muslim," not Ahmadi). This pattern of post hoc religious intervention has ensured that broadly democratizing transitions (otherwise rooted in *non*religious protest) pull away from the parameters of a more inclusive liberal democracy.

Economic Drivers

Following Guillermo O'Donnell (1973), who argued that democracies faced with economic shocks might shift in the direction of authoritarianism to advance unpalatable reforms, some have noted that, even if economic *growth* tends to be associated with regime survival, recessionary *shocks* can promote regime collapse (Markoff and Baretta 1990). Mark Gasiorowski (1995, 882), for instance, has traced the drivers of democratic collapse to recessions, even as Milan Svolik (2008, 153) has found a role for recessions in the collapse of what he calls "non-consolidated" democracies (see also Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 512). While Gasiorowski and Svolik linked recessions to transitions *away* from democracy, however, Thomas Pepinsky (2009, 1–2, 34) also found that destabilizing debt crises could promote the collapse of *authoritarian* regimes (e.g., in Indonesia). Jan Teorell (2010, 76) later extended this argument. Returning to the underlying features of "democratization," he used large-n statistical analyses to argue that recessionary shocks generally *increase* the possibility of so-called "democratizing" transitions.

In Pakistan, however, these findings are difficult to replicate, mostly because, until the global Covid-19 pandemic in 2020-21, Pakistan had never actually experienced a recession.[23] In fact, pulling away from Gasiorowski (1995), Svolik (2008), and Teorell (2010), we see no clear macro-level economic trends anticipating any transition toward, or away from, democracy. Before the coup led by General Ayub Khan in October 1958, for instance, Amina Ibrahim (2009) noted that annual GDP growth rates in Pakistan climbed from 2.0 percent (1955) to 3.5 percent (1956) before falling back to 3.0 percent (1957) and, finally, 2.5 percent (1958). This might point to a link between declining growth and authoritarian backsliding. But, before the coup led by General Zia in July 1977, World Bank figures show GDP growth climbing from 3.5 percent (1974) to 4.2 percent (1975) and, finally, 5.2 percent (1976).[24] In fact, before the coup led by General Musharraf in October 1999, we see GDP growth rates falling from 4.8 percent (1996) to 1.0 percent (1997) before climbing back to 2.6 percent (1998) and, finally, 3.7 percent (1999).[25]

The same inconsistency can be seen in the years preceding each *collapse* of military rule in Pakistan. Under Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan (1958–1970), for example, GDP growth rates bounced from 5.4 percent (1967) to 7.2 percent (1968), then back to 5.5 percent (1969) before reaching their highest-ever level in 1970 (11.4 percent) and their lowest-ever level (0.5 percent) during the civil war that preceded Pakistan's democratic transition in December 1971. Under General Zia, rates fell from 7.6 percent (1985) to 5.5 percent (1986) before climbing to 6.5 percent (1987) and, then, 7.6 percent (1988). Yet under General Musharraf, GDP growth fell from 7.7 percent (2005) to 6.2 percent (2006) to 4.8 percent (2007) and, finally, 1.7 percent (2008) when Musharraf actually stepped down. Macroeconomic growth, or recession, does not reveal any consistent patterns vis-à-vis regime transitions in Pakistan.

Institutional Drivers: Legislatures and Political Parties

In Pakistan, the meso-level mechanisms *through* which economic shocks often express themselves—including legitimation crises rooted in fragmenting patronage coalitions—have also been uneven.

In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (1986), Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter focused on the role that elected dictablanda legislatures might play in reinforcing authoritarian rule by accommodating competing elites and facilitating redistributive pacts between them (see also Blaydes 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Karl 1987; Lust-Okar 2006). O'Donnell and Schmitter paid relatively little attention to specific political *parties* within authoritarian legislatures (e.g., king's parties), but this dimension was taken up by Jason Brownlee (2007) and Jennifer Gandhi (2008). Whereas Brownlee argued that authoritarian parties help to *sustain* authoritarian regimes, however, Gandhi stressed the value of authoritarian legislatures without finding *any* link between party-based legislatures and patterns of authoritarian survival.

Yet again, the experience of Pakistan is an awkward fit for this literature regarding the role of regime-oriented political parties and elected legislatures in the context of authoritarian survival, mostly because every military-led dictablanda regime with an elected national legislature in Pakistan has ended after just three to five years, with or without the presence of (a) authoritarian king's parties or (b) supportive religious parties: Ayub Khan (authoritarian NA, authoritarian king's party, no religious parties 1965–1969); Zia-ul-Haq (authoritarian NA, no parties at all 1985–1988); Pervez Musharraf (authoritarian

NA, authoritarian king's party, supporting religious parties 2002–2007). In Pakistan, neither authoritarian NAs nor authoritarian king's parties (nor supportive religious parties) seem to facilitate the extended survival of electoral autocratic regimes.

It may be that, in Pakistan and elsewhere, military regimes create regime-friendly parties to protect their interests both within the regime itself and after any subsequent (election-based) transition to civilian rule. But, again, this pattern is difficult to trace in Pakistan, where prominent king's parties—the Convention Muslim League (CML) under General Ayub Khan and the Pakistan Muslim League "Quaid-e-Azam" faction (PML-Q) under General Pervez Musharraf—have *not* fared well in any subsequent elections. During the "democratizing" elections of 1970, for instance, Ayub Khan's CML won just 7 out of 300 seats. And, during the transitional election of 2008, Pervez Musharraf's PML-Q won only 50 out of 341. Contra Joseph Wright and Abel Escribà-Folch (2012, 292–294, 302), in other words, elite-incorporating authoritarian parties have *not* provided the sort of "exit guarantees" that might allow dictablanda regime-based elites to defect in favor of democradura-oriented regime transitions. (In fact, spanning both sides of most transitions, Pakistan's autonomous *religious* parties have generally fared much better.)

Institutional Drivers: Courts

Like those who track the possibility of a counterintuitive link between authoritarianism and elected legislatures, scholars have also examined the ways in which patterns of judicial independence—a familiar marker of democracy—might coexist with patterns of authoritarian survival (Moustafa 2014). In recent years, some scholars have also built on this literature to consider the role that senior judges might play in driving regime transitions.

With reference to regime survival, Christopher Larkins (1998, 424), focusing on Argentina, noted that outright authoritarian governments and what he called anti-rule-of-law "delegative" democracies tend to use senior judges to preserve their regimes in different ways: whereas authoritarian governments limited judicial independence by restricting courts to particular types of cases, for instance, delegative democracies tended to appoint biased judges.[26] In short, different patterns of judicial (in)dependence were associated with different types of regimes. But, again, Pakistan is an awkward fit, particular insofar as *both* authoritarian *and* democradura leaders have tended to stress *similar* judicial limitations.

Whereas General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf introduced mandatory oaths of allegiance (stacking their courts with loyal judges) (Kokab 2013, 33), for instance, they also expanded the role of military courts to limit the role of Pakistan's civilian judiciary (Shah 2014, 153 fn13, 160 fn41; Tate 1993, 323, 325, 332). Pakistan's civilian leaders, however, opted for very similar strategies. Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, for example, stacked Pakistan's Supreme Court with loyal judges by amending the constitution to retain a sitting Chief Justice beyond his original retirement age.[27] And, in due course, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif permitted a constitutional amendment expanding the role of Pakistan's military courts (targeting those accused of "terrorism").[28] Divergent approaches to judicial independence—or dependence (as the case may be)—have *not* distinguished Pakistan's military and civilian-led regimes.

Moving away from patterns of regime *survival* to matters of regime *transition*, however, Raul Sanchez-Urribarri (2011, 878) and Jill Goldenziel (2013) highlight the ways in which superior-court judges might facilitate both the rise and fall of hybrid dictablanda regimes. During Venezuela's move away from democracy under Hugo Chavez, for instance, Sanchez-Urribarri notes that judicial appointments were often reshuffled to create a more "compliant" dictablanda judiciary. Goldenziel, in turn, examines trajectories of Middle Eastern democratization, noting that, after the emergence of electoral autocracy in Egypt, Turkey, and Kuwait, even ostensibly compliant judges began to read (unfair) election results in ways that helped to identify moments of regime vulnerability or weakness—moments the judges *reinforced* with decisions challenging each country's authoritarian government.

Regimes dislike anti-regime judgments and, in many cases, they seek to constrain the courts (or individual judges) to avoid them. But, following Goldenziel, it may be that dictablanda regimes also produce illuminating electoral outcomes that open up space for anti-authoritarian judicial decisions (see also Helmke 2002). In 2004, for instance, many Pakistani legislators refused to support General Musharraf's indirect re-election as president (44 percent abstained or failed to vote). And in 2005, local election turnout scarcely exceeded 50 percent. *Thereafter*, Supreme Court Chief Justice Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhry used his suo motu powers to target General Musharraf (Kennedy 2012), focusing on the military's post-9/11 "disappearance" of suspected militants (2005) as well as instances of high-level government corruption (2006). In other words, anti-regime Supreme Court judgments followed the poor electoral performance of Musharraf's dictablanda regime. In 2007, Musharraf sacked Chief Justice Chaudhry. But, shortly thereafter, widespread protests led by furious lawyers prompted Musharraf to impose one last gasp of authoritarian martial law. When this move from electoral autocracy to outright dictatorship failed to end the protests, Pakistan experienced yet another authoritarian → democradura transition.

Nonreligious Transitions: Urban Protest

In each Pakistani transition away from authoritarian rule (1969–1971, 1988, 2007–2008), the common denominator has involved provincially dispersed urban protests. With the partial exception of the late 1960s, however, these protests have *not* drawn on religious rhetoric to target the incumbent regime. Indeed, if transitions *away* from democracy have been achieved via self-serving military coups that, apart from 1977, rarely refer to religion (but, pushing in the direction of electoral autocracy, incorporate NA/PA elections that almost invariably leave room for religious parties), transitions *toward* civilian rule have generally unfolded via short-lived *reversions* to outright authoritarian rule that *fail* to overcome largely *non*religious grass-roots urban protest.

During the 1990s, Terry Lynn Karl (1990) was pessimistic about the ways in which grass-roots protest might support a consolidation of democracy. Whereas Karl argued that mass protests often generate an anti-democratic backlash among frightened elites, pulling away from democratic power-sharing, however, Nancy Bermeo (1997, 315–316) saw this risk of elite defection rooted in mass-based protests as relatively limited. Specifically, Bermeo saw this risk as limited to cases in which violent protests directly targeted prominent individual elites.

Dan Slater (2010) also focused on the relationship between grass-roots protests and particular types of regimes. Specifically, he argued that different state *responses* to protest tend to produce different *types* of "authoritarian consolidation," with (a) urban protests demanding radical economic redistribution along ethnic or communal lines facilitating elite domination underpinned by democradura "protection pacts" (e.g., Singapore, Malaysia), and (b) rebellions threatening the territorial integrity of the state producing dictablanda forms of bureaucratic authoritarianism (e.g., Burma, Indonesia).

If we consider urban protests demanding economic redistribution and political restructuring in *West* Pakistan alongside proto-separatist calls for ethnic redistribution in *East* Pakistan during the 1960s (or, for that matter, economic redistribution along ethnic lines in both Sindh and Karachi throughout the 1980s), however, we see something different. In particular, departing from Burma and Indonesia, redistributive ethnic protests demanding territorial autonomy in East Pakistan during the late 1960s produced a call for NA/PA elections followed by a civil war and, then, *a return to civilian rule*. And, departing from Singapore and Malaysia, urban protests demanding economic redistribution along ethnic lines during the mid-to-late-1980s were followed by NA/PA elections in which the election of an ethnic minority (Sindhi) prime minister (Bhutto) was accompanied, once again, by *a return to civilian rule*. Departing from Slater, in other words, urban grass-roots protest in Pakistan has *not* played a role in "authoritarian consolidation." Instead it has tended to facilitate forms of authoritarian collapse.[29]

Urban Protest: Violent or Nonviolent?

A large-N study conducted by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Franz (2014, 326) found that "coerced" transitions from authoritarian rule (i.e., violent protest-based transitions) were especially unlikely to push in the direction of democratization. In fact, they argued, military dictatorships were more likely to collapse *without* coercion (e.g., via national elections) (see also Teorell 2010, 116).

But again, the experience of Pakistan is different. In Pakistan, large-scale and often violent protests in urban areas have often pushed in the direction of democratization, with dictators repeatedly stopping short of the brutality required to crush the protests that threaten them. In 1968–1969, for instance, Ayesha Jalal (1990) noted that violent urban uprisings were a crucial part of General Ayub Khan's decision to step down. And, in 1970, his successor General Yahya Khan promised national elections only *if* the country's ongoing violence came to an end (Jalal 1990, 308). (The violence continued, but elections and, then, a transition to civilian rule went ahead.)

In 1988, Paul Staniland (2008) noted that Pakistan's corps commanders finally decided to call for NA/PA elections owing to "growing resentment . . . on the street," with Michael Hoffman (2011, 88) citing "difficulties presented by [the] suppression [of protesters]" as "the major factor driving the military's decision [to step aside]."[30] In fact, the only partial exception to this violent, urban, protest-led pattern of democratizing transitions involved the largely *non*violent protests led by lawyers in 2007–2008—protests that eventually forced General Pervez Musharraf to relinquish power.

Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014, 325) found that only one in five cases of "coerced" authoritarian breakdown moved in the direction of democracy. But in Pakistan—tracking exclusionary and illiberal hybrid "democradura" regimes rather than non-hybrid "democratic" regimes—three out of four cases belong to this 20 percent.[31]

If urban protests play a consistent role in Pakistan's transitions away from authoritarianism, but neither economic recession, nor ethnic/territorial mobilization, nor religious rhetoric, nor the use of violence is a consistent feature of these protests, it bears asking why Pakistan's authoritarian leaders—so well known for their repressive capacity in other contexts (e.g., Bengal, Balochistan, Karachi, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)—have failed to crush the demonstrators that eventually remove them from power. (On decisions to repress or not, see Bellin 2004, 146; Davenport 2007; Escribà-Folz 2013; Ulfelder 2005.) Unfortunately, apart from Hoffman's (2011) account of Pakistan's democratizing transition in 1988, I am not familiar with any study that successfully exposes the decision-making processes *within* Pakistan's military or its associated "king's parties" to illuminate why, exactly, the army has generally avoided the brutal measures required to end the protests that topple it.[32]

Bellin (2004, 144–145) suggests that authoritarian regimes well versed in repression are most likely to lose their "will and capacity to hold onto power" when, *inter alia*, their "financial foundation is seriously compromised" or they lose "crucial international support." But, again, there is no indication that the financial position of Pakistan's dictablanda or authoritarian regimes faced any consistent pattern of economic decline before their removal. Nor is there any indication that key foreign allies—above all the United States—fully abandoned General Yahya Khan (1971), General Zia-ul-Haq (1988), or General Pervez Musharraf (2008) before their regimes collapsed. Further research is needed to understand why Pakistan's army imposed far-reaching restrictions on civil liberties (1970, 2007) but, then, faced with urban protests that threatened the army's corporate interests (see Gartner and Regan 1996), chose to hand over power.

Religious Influence after "Democratizing" Transitions

Although religious protesters criticizing the ostensibly "modernizing" religious reforms of General Ayub Khan and Fazlur Rahman emerged within a wider mix of urban unrest during the late 1960s, religious claims did not figure prominently in the democratizing protests of 1988 or 2007–2008. In fact, transitions away from dictablanda regimes have typically proceeded via *non*religious protests followed by what might be described as a temporary reversion to outright authoritarian rule that fails to end the protests. Religious actors have then intervened *after* each protest-led transition to preserve the "exclusionary" and "illiberal" constitutional provisions (e.g., Articles 19, 41, 260; Third Schedule) that, by definition, obstruct the formation of a more inclusive liberal democracy.

Both the JI and the madrasa-based JUI played a role in delegitimizing General Ayub Khan during the late-1960s (Rahman 1976, 288, 296). But, as noted above, the religious concerns of these two parties were dramatically overshadowed by ethnic and economic protests led by (a) Bengalis in East Pakistan and (b) Z. A. Bhutto's left-of-center Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in West Pakistan. In fact, even as religious parties helped to oust General Ayub Khan in 1969, a JI-affiliated militia known as Al-Badr actively *supported* the army's repression of Bengali protesters in East Pakistan throughout 1970–1971. Indeed, even after the separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971, the *same* religious parties and protesters resurfaced during (West) Pakistan's subsequent constitutional debates to reinforce and *extend* Pakistan's illiberal and exclusionary constitutional provisions (ref. Articles 19, 41, 260) (Qasmi 2014, 175–179). While religious protesters worked alongside ethnic and economic protesters to initiate a "democratizing" transition from General Ayub to General Yahya Khan and, shortly thereafter, from General Yahya's military dictatorship to the civilian-led regime of Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, in other words, the same religious actors simultaneously ensured that, ultimately, this transition toward a civilian-led regime did *not* push in the direction of an inclusive liberal democracy.

A similar pattern unfolded during the democratizing transition away from General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. In this case, nonreligious ethnic protests led by Sindhis, then also Mohajirs and Pashtuns, helped to spur a two-part transition from the dictablanda regime of General Zia's hand-picked prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo, toward an outright dictatorship led by Zia himself and, then, from Zia's outright dictatorship toward a "democradura" regime led, first, by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (PPP) and, then, by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (IJI/PML-N) (1988–1999).

In this context, the role of religious parties in stifling a transition toward a more inclusive liberal democracy was more complex. Under General Zia, a pair of JI and JUI-S senators introduced a bill aiming to make the Qurʾan and sunna Pakistan's supreme law. After Zia dismissed his dictablanda NA in 1988, however, Zia went on to introduce a very similar ordinance of his own (which, as an executive "ordinance," required NA endorsement within four months to reappear as a piece of ordinary "legislation"). This four-month window, however, lapsed after Zia's death in August 1988. So, after the election of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1988, a group of IJI-affiliated senators prepared a *third* bill to accomplish the same objective. This bill, however, was not confirmed by the legislature before Bhutto's own NA was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990.

Finally, following the election of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in November 1990, a *fourth* version of the same bill was brought to a vote and passed—ironically, *without* any religious-party support (Kennedy 1992, 774–780). In fact, after the nonreligious protests that prompted the demise of Zia's outright military dictatorship (Hoffman 2011), followed by Pakistan's democratizing transition in 1988, the JI refused to support

Nawaz Sharif's "shariat bill" because, according to the JI, that bill failed to satisfy the JI's comprehensive understanding of shariʿa. Specifically, and despite serving in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's IJI-led governing coalition, the JI insisted that its own understanding of shariʿa should be treated as an even *more* exclusionary and illiberal "supra-constitutional" source of power—one that constrained not only Pakistan's legislature, but also its constitutional courts. In other words, religious parties like the JI sought to ensure that Pakistan's post-Zia "democratizing" transition was even *further* removed from a rigorous defense of legislative power and individual constitutional rights.

The same sequence—nonreligious protests, followed by a democratizing transition, followed by ostensibly "religious" support for illiberal and exclusionary constitutional provisions—emerged in 2007–2008, when nonreligious protests by thousands of lawyers spurred a two-part transition from the dictablanda regime of General Pervez Musharraf to a stretch of martial law (November-December 2007) followed by the election of a civilian-led regime under Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani (PPP, 2008–2012), then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N, 2013–2017) and Prime Minister Imran Khan (PTI, 2018–present). The omnibus Eighteenth Amendment (2010) that emerged shortly after Pakistan's restoration of civilian rule did not remove any of the constitution's exclusionary and illiberal clauses. Instead, it altered Article 91 to state even more explicitly that Pakistan's prime minister must be a "Muslim" (not an Ahmadi). Again, religious parties did not play an important role in the protests that ousted General Musharraf. They simply persisted *after* this protest-led transition, as part of Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani's ruling coalition, to *enhance* Pakistan's exclusionary constitutional provisions.[33]

CONCLUSION

Regime transitions in Pakistan, both toward authoritarianism and away from it, are rarely driven by religious groups or religious ideas. Transitions pushing away from democracy toward authoritarianism are typically associated with self-serving military coups (1958, 1977, 1999)—coups that have, invariably, moved beyond outright military dictatorship in favor of "electoral autocracies."

Pulling away from authoritarianism toward democracy (1969–1970, 1988, 2007–2008), however, Pakistan also departs from much of the literature linking democratizing transitions to the shock of economic recession, the bridging role of authoritarian legislatures (or "king's parties"), and the anti-authoritarian decisions rendered by constitutional courts. This chapter stresses, instead, the "democratizing" role of widespread urban protest—not nonviolent or religious protests, but broadly nonreligious protests that often turn towards violence.

Beyond the nonreligious drivers that underpin broadly democratizing transitions in Pakistan, however, I also stress the importance of illiberal, exclusionary, and ostensibly religious constitutional provisions to account for the "hybrid" regimes that Pakistan's democratizing transitions produce. Introduced and retained by civilian as well as military-led regimes, Pakistan's "illiberal" constitutional provisions restrict otherwise peaceful forms of speech seen as infringing abstract principles like "the glory of Islam" (Article 19). "Exclusionary" constitutional principles simultaneously prevent particular groups like the Ahmadiyya and non-Muslims from enjoying equal forms of political participation (Articles 41, 260, Third Schedule). Even beyond the constraints associated with extra-constitutional patterns of "tutelary" military authority, in other words, explicit constitutional provisions situate Pakistan's elected civilian-led regimes within the realm of illiberal and exclusionary (rather than "liberal") democracy.

The exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions underpinning this categorization grow out of widespread attachments to an "Islamic" rather than a "liberal" democracy. In fact, *all* of Pakistan's exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions were introduced or retained by huge parliamentary majorities. And, when proposals seeking to *amend* the provisions growing out of these articles have been introduced, enormous protests have forced Pakistan's NA to retreat. In 2017, for instance, changes seen as relaxing the electoral registration procedures for Ahmadi parliamentary candidates were met with significant protests led by religious activists. These protests prompted a unanimous parliamentary vote to leave the country's more exclusionary provisions unchanged.

In 2015, Katherine Adeney examined the prospects for "democratic consolidation" in Pakistan. But, avoiding the question of democratizing *transitions*, she argued for a multidimensional measure of hybrid democratic *regimes*. Focusing specifically on 2013—the first year in which Pakistan saw a direct transfer of power from one elected NA to another—Adeney stressed the presence of an elected regime characterized by persistent military intervention (i.e., reserved domains of military decision-making) as well as a weak defense of (a) civil liberties and (b) legal equality. Departing from core themes in this chapter, however, she did not examine the ostensibly *religious* constitutional provisions that *underpin* Pakistan's illiberal and exclusionary constraints. Nor did she consider Pakistan's history of political support for such provisions. In this chapter, I stress the ways in which, spurred by religious groups like the JI and the JUI, Pakistan's elected civilian leadership has actively promulgated (often unanimously) the exclusionary and illiberal constitutional provisions that underpin what Adeney describes as Pakistan's weak defense of "civil liberties" and "equality."

Citizens may protest for, and succeed in achieving, a greater role in public decision-making. But in Pakistan, following largely *non*religious protests, religious parties like the JI and the JUI have often taken the lead in reinforcing the illiberal, exclusionary, and ostensibly *religious* provisions of Pakistan's postcolonial constitutions. In doing so, however, they have rarely faced significant popular or parliamentary resistance.[34] On the contrary, the exclusionary and illiberal constitutional amendments that underpin Pakistan's understanding of an "Islamic" democracy have passed with large parliamentary majorities. Indeed, despite adjustments revising *other* religious ordinances and statutes—for example, ostensibly religious criminal laws concerning "rape" (previously conflated with "adultery")—Pakistan's illiberal and exclusionary *constitutional* provisions have remained firmly intact for decades.[35]

As Steve Wilkinson (2000) points out, civilian regimes in Pakistan have generally "fail[ed] to revoke" what he calls "anti-minority laws" because, turning to prevailing strains of Islamic interpretation, the leaders of Pakistan's civilian regimes have feared widespread religious criticism. Specifically, Wilkinson argues, civilian regimes have feared "being labelled [an] enemy of Islam" (221–222). In Pakistan, I argue, popular pressure for a liberal and inclusive democracy does *not* follow from ostensibly "democratizing" forms of anti-authoritarian mobilization.

NOTES

1. The coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq in June 1977 was precipitated by protests regarding alleged rigging in the re-election of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto three months earlier. Protesters associated with a coalition known as the Pakistan National Alliance led by the Jamaʿat-i Islami (Party of Islam) and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Party of Islamic Scholars) called for a political turn to the "system of the Prophet." The coups in 1958 and 1999 were motivated solely by military self-preservation—on the part of General Ayub Khan (facing retirement in 1959) and Pervez Musharraf (facing dismissal after a military misadventure in Kashmir).
2. The World Values Survey (2010–2014) found that, across sixty countries, 66 percent of its respondents described themselves as "religious." That figure rose to 72 percent in Muslim-majority countries and nearly 100 percent (99.7 percent) in Pakistan.
3. This process usually involves imposing martial law (except 1988) and dissolving the NA (except 2007).
4. Religious rioting in 1953–1954 was followed by a stretch of martial law and the dissolution of Pakistan's first Constituent (National) Assembly. After several weeks, however, these protests were controlled.
5. The Third Schedule specifies presidential and prime ministerial oaths stating that these officials must believe in Mohammad as "the last of the Prophets."
6. Within a 22-Point manifesto drafted in 1951 by thirty-one religious leaders meeting in Karachi was a demand for a "Muslim" head of state; Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly accepted this demand in August 1952 (Binder 1961, 226). In 1973–1974, religious parliamentarians guided Pakistan's attorney general, who oversaw the unanimous amendment of Article 260 (Qasmi 2014, 185–220).
7. Following General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup in 1977, Pakistan's constitution was held in abeyance for nearly eight years. During this period Zia also introduced Article 203C creating a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and a Shariat Appellate Bench of Pakistan's Supreme Court. When the constitution was restored in 1985, Zia required his newly elected (nonparty) NA to incorporate Article 203C as well as Article 62 (requiring Muslim parliamentarians to "practice [the] obligatory duties prescribed by Islam" and remain "righteous" and "honest" in a specifically Qur'anic sense).
8. In Pakistan, brown-area restrictions pertaining to the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were removed in a Twenty-Fifth Amendment (2018) merging FATA with NWFP (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010).
9. Pakistan's 1956 constitution allowed each province to adopt joint *or* separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims (Article 145). This provision was removed (restoring joint

electorates) in 1962 and 1973, then revived by General Zia in 1985 (Eighth Amendment), then removed by General Musharraf in 2002 (Conduct of General Elections Executive Order No. 7) *except* for the Ahmadiyya (Executive Order No. 15).

10. Article 20A notes that "every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion."
11. As a constraint on freedom of speech and religion, Pakistan Penal Code restrictions on blasphemy (§295, 298) might be described as a "religious" component of illiberal democracy, but, as a general rule, Pakistan's courts have not justified these restrictions in religious terms—instead they rely on liberal notions of "public order" in constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom (Nelson 2020, unpublished). *Constitutional* provisions limiting liberal rights (e.g., for the sake of "public order") are common; these provisions draw attention to the narrow line between liberal and "hybrid" (e.g. illiberal) democracies (Dyzenhaus 2011).
12. In a Cold War constraint on left-wing politics, the Political Parties Act (1962 §3-1) said that no party could act against Pakistan's "Islamic ideology"; this exclusionary *statutory* provision was removed in 2002.
13. Most JI and JUI representatives resigned from Zia's cabinet in 1979. After 1981, however, JUI-S leader Sami-ul-Haq continued to serve in Zia's hand-picked Majlis-e-Shura.
14. In 1985 Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S) was elected to Pakistan's Senate.
15. In this chapter, there are two Fazlur Rahmans: one led General Ayub Khan's Central Institute of Islamic Research; one led the "Fazlur Rahman" faction of the JUI (JUI-F).
16. The Thirteenth Amendment restored the prime minister's power to appoint provincial governors, military service chiefs, and, in collaboration with the Supreme Court Chief Justice, superior-court judges.
17. In 2008, the JUI-F also joined the ruling PA coalition in Balochistan.
18. Fair and Patel (2020) highlight the link between democracy and the inclusion of such parties in urban, educated, middle-class contexts in Bangladesh; for an account of such contexts in Pakistan see Maqsood (2017).
19. Wright (2008, 329) prefers a three-year horizon.
20. Bogaards (2009, 404) sees such reversions from a hybrid dictablanda regime to outright military dictatorship as extremely rare; he cites only Pakistan, Peru, and Belarus.
21. See note 29.
22. A Pakistani "mohajir" is related to partition-era (1947-1948) Urdu-speaking migrants from North India.
23. See World Bank data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PK) and IMF data (https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61545852); Amina Ibrahim (2009, 19) uses different data to show negative GDP growth—unrelated to transitions—in 1952 (−1.9 percent) and 1997 (−0.4 percent).
24. During this period, inflation fell from 26.7 percent (1974) to 20.9 percent (1975) to 7.2 percent (1976).
25. During this period, inflation fell from 11.4 percent (1997) to 6.2 percent (1998) to 4.1 percent (1999).
26. Larkins builds on Neal Tate (1993) regarding the Philippines, India, and Pakistan, 1977–1979.
27. See the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments (1975–1976; removed under General Zia's Eighth Amendment 1985).

28. On judicial appointments, see the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The Twenty-First Amendment regarding military courts included a two-year sunset clause; military courts were not renewed in 2019.
29. On protest and regime transition, see also Collier and Mahoney (1997) and Wood (2001).
30. Paula Newberg (1989, 566) discounts the role of protest.
31. On the factors that push protesters seeking self-governance towards violence (or not), see also Lichbach (1987) and Pearlman (2011). Pearlman notes that movements with strong leaders, a coherent ideological focus, and other features of organizational cohesion are better able to sustain *non*violent protests. This may help to explain why anti-regime protesters in Pakistan embraced (a) *violence* during the organizationally and ideologically disparate late-1960s/1980s and (b) *nonviolence* during the more cohesive (but equally effective) Lawyers' Movement of 2007–2008.
32. On military decision-making regarding the repression of territorially based religious insurgents (rather than nonreligious urban protesters) in Pakistan, see Staniland, Mir, and Lalwani 2018 (incl. fn32 on the difficulty of accessing data regarding military decision-making).
33. The omnibus Eighteenth Amendment received Presidential assent with 85 percent NA and 90 percent Senate votes.
34. Philpott (2007, 522) sees Pakistan as a "consensual" integrationist state seeking a strong constitutional role for Islam alongside democratic electoral politics.
35. See (a) the 2006 Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act retaining religious punishments for "adultery" in General Zia's Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (1979) but shifting cases of "rape" to §375-376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, as well as (b) the 2016 Criminal Laws (Amendment) (Offenses Relating to Rape) Act revising §151-154 of Zia's Qanun-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) Order (1984).

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CHAPTER 7

REGIME CHANGE UNDER THE PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT (AKP) IN TURKEY

FERYAZ OCAKLI

Turkey has completed its transition to an authoritarian regime. After more than six decades of multiparty politics, it no longer satisfies the minimal expectations of democratic rule. Turkey has slid gradually from a majoritarian, illiberal democracy constrained by military tutelage to an authoritarian regime in which a dominant political party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), and an even more dominant president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, monopolize the commanding heights of political power. Erdoğan's claim to Turkey's supercharged "executive" presidency is not subject to free and fair elections contested on an even playing field. The political, economic, and institutional context in which elections take place are heavily skewed in favor of incumbents, and the ballot box has become a tool to legitimize the government rather than holding it accountable. How did this transition take place? What were the factors that enabled Erdoğan to centralize power so significantly? What role, if any, did religion play? This chapter analyzes the different sources and dimensions of regime change in Turkey under the AKP.

Turkey fits into the broad pattern of democratic backsliding that is observable around the world. Bermeo (2016) defines democratic backsliding as "the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy." The clear distinctions between democracies and military, one-party, or personalistic regimes that were typical during the Cold War have given way to regimes in which elected authoritarians regularly subject the highest political offices in the land to unfair, but competitive, elections (Schedler 2015). Within this framework, Turkey's recent experience most closely fits the model of executive aggrandizement. An elected government has eroded the democratic characteristics of an imperfect but serviceable illiberal democracy. Erdoğan and his allies have built a formidable institutional structure that, although still open to some contestation, largely operates as a means to manage societal problems through organization and regulation rather than coercion under an authoritarian regime (Gobel 2011).

The breakdown of Turkey's already flawed democracy happened gradually. If we conceive of political regimes as spectrums rather than binaries, as collections of rules and practices that vary in terms of how democratic or authoritarian they are, then we can visualize this transformation as a slide on a scale. The transition was not smooth or linear, however. It was characterized by fits of crises and occasional reversals under the pressure of social movements. The origins of regime change date back to the first single-party government the AKP established in 2002. The political, economic, and institutional foundations of authoritarian transition were laid early in the party's tenure in government. Significant events that accelerated regime transition, such as controversial court cases, constitutional amendments, and a failed coup attempt, built on a preexisting framework of authoritarianization.

It would be counterproductive to categorize the AKP's trajectory in terms of a democratic early phase and an authoritarian later phase, as many observers of Turkish politics have done. A series of EU-oriented reforms in early 2000s led Western journalists and policymakers to conclude that the AKP started out its time in government as a force for liberalization and democratization, only to transform into an authoritarian force much later (Berlinski 2017). Although the AKP did enact reforms in line with EU accession criteria, they failed to make formal institutions more democratic or inclusive. These reforms set the stage for the removal of bureaucratic resistance to the AKP's domination over state institutions.

The shift in perceptions of the AKP, from a seemingly democratic early phase to an authoritarian later period, poses a challenge to the study of democratic erosion. How can we identify the early signs of democratic backsliding? Existing studies have focused on populism (Levitsy and Loxon 2013), elected authoritarians' rational fear of being overthrown through bureaucratic and social pressure (Bermeo 2016), and the voters' willingness to tolerate authoritarian practices in polarized societies when the incumbent delivers economic gains (Svolik 2020). The analysis of Turkey's transition to authoritarianism presented here bears out each of these expectations in different ways—the AKP delivered economic development in its early years in office, Turkish society became increasingly polarized, and Erdoğan was nearly overthrown by the military and the Constitutional Court. However, early signs of democratic backsliding in Turkey predated massive polarization, coup attempts, and the economic boom. The AKP leaders initiated programs that would eventually enable them to control Turkey's political, economic, and institutional spheres as early as their first year in office. What changed over time was the ability of other power blocks, such as Kemalist bureaucratic institutions, conglomerations of big business, and oppositional civil society to resist the AKP's power. The cross-class coalition led by the AKP defeated a series of oppositional resistance centers that often lacked ideological or organizational cohesion. The AKP used strategies of political control and institutional domination that were part and parcel of secular Turkish politics even before Erdoğan's rise. What distinguished AKP rule from its predecessors was its ability to wield a variety of such tools consistently over time to defeat its political opponents. Religion or Islamist ideology had little to do with the state's authoritarian turn.

Turkey's transition to authoritarianism upended theoretical as well as common-sense expectations from an economically successful country led by moderate Islamists. Significant economic growth after 2002 not only solidified electoral support for the AKP, it also positioned Turkey as a middle-income democracy. Modernization theory, including its updated versions, predict wealthier democracies to be resilient to authoritarian transition. Furthermore, Turkey under the AKP was upheld by the international community, and by Western media and policy circles in particular, as the leading example for the coexistence of Islam and democracy. The "Turkish model" was an inspiration for democratically minded Islamist movements and parties such as Tunisia's Ennahda. The fall of the Turkish model challenged the optimistic expectations many held for Islamist groups to lead democratization movements in authoritarian Muslim-majority states.

Research on contemporary Turkish politics has identified a plethora of factors that account for its authoritarian transition. This chapter organizes and builds on these findings by focusing on political, economic, and institutional dimensions of regime change. The purpose of this style of exposition is not to identify the most important causal variable or the one that has the greatest explanatory value. Regime change in Turkey is likely overdetermined by the convergence of a variety of factors, and this chapter examines some of the most salient ones.

Religion played a limited role in this transition. The party and the leader responsible for leading the authoritarian turn are Islamists in their ideology and political socialization. The AKP was one of two parties in the electoral arena that clearly represented an Islamist choice—in a moderate, or "Muslim-Democrat," form. Turkish society has also become more Islamic over time, with overt signs of religiosity on display throughout the country. However, it is not clear whether religious identity, institutions, and movements enabled Erdoğan to centralize power, or if it was Erdoğan's growing authoritarianism that strengthened the former. The causal arrow seems to run in both directions. The rest of this chapter elaborates on the complex relationship between religion and regime change by clarifying how the two interacted within specific political, economic, and institutional domains.

The next section examines the political dimensions of regime change. It focuses on politics with a small "p," meaning party strategy, electoral competition, personal conflicts among politicians, and co-optation of rivals. The following sections expand the analysis to economic and institutional spheres.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITION

The origins of the AKP can be traced back to student organizations and Sufi brotherhoods that opposed Turkey's state-led secularism. The relatively liberal political context that emerged following the ratification of the 1961 constitution gave rise to a range of mass movements and political organizations that challenged the status quo. These movements spanned the ideological spectrum from communist factions and labor unions to religious brotherhoods and ultranationalist crack squads (Zurcher 2004). The Selamet Hareketi (Salvation Movement) emerged from a religious and conservative milieu, had close ties to the Sufi Naqshbandi Order, and established the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) in 1970. The party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was a spiritual student of Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (Sezgin 2011). He became a central figure of the political Islamist movement, and went on to establish a number of Islamist parties that played a crucial role in Turkish politics.

The movement's Refah Partisi (Welfare Party—RP) formed grass-roots activist networks in the growing shantytowns surrounding Turkey's large cities throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. It encouraged Islamic civil society and media, formed organic links to pro-Islamist labor unions and business associations, and won over municipalities in Istanbul, Ankara, and across much of the country.

One of Erbakan's protégé's, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came of age as an activist in this environment. As a member of the younger cohort of Islamist politicians, Erdoğan was fully enmeshed in the party's voter outreach efforts, local organizing, and civil society functions. His first major political achievement was to be elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, which launched his reputation as an up-and-coming Islamist politician.

Despite finding success in municipal elections, the RP was constrained by two major factors that prevented it from holding office at the national level in a meaningful way. The first was the adamant opposition of the Kemalist military and judicial bureaucracies to Islamist groups (Yavuz 1999). Although White (2002) found that they were able to build public support through formidable grass-roots mobilization, the Islamists were squeezed out of national office by the intransigence of the state bureaucracy. The second factor was the enduring power and popularity of the more traditional center-right parties. The Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party—ANAP) and the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party—DYP) represented the tradition of the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party—DP) that had initially staked a claim in the popular center-right of the political spectrum in the 1950s. Together they controlled upward of 50 percent of the vote in the mid-1990s (TUIK). The Islamists remained in the periphery of right-wing politics.

Faced with external threats from secularist regime forces and internal dissent from younger activists, the political Islamist movement experienced a generational split in 2001 (Mecham 2004). The movement's older leaders established the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party—SP), which would continue the same Islamist tradition. The younger and reformist cohort formed the AKP. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, Abdüllatif Şener, and their colleagues established their new party in response to the anti-systemic ideology of the movement's older leaders, as well as the illiberal secularism of the Kemalist bureaucracy. In an effort to placate the military and the Constitutional Court, they declared their intention to make peace with the secular principles of the constitution.

It is tempting to look back at this moment in history as a breaking point for Turkish politics. The AKP would eventually rise to dominate the political arena and usher in an authoritarian regime. However, the future of the party in 2001 was far from certain. The highest vote share received by the AKP's immediate predecessors was 21 percent in 1995, and that number had declined to 15 percent in 1999. The Constitutional Court had banned two Islamist parties between 1998 and 2001. There was no guarantee that the AKP could avoid being thrown into the ash heap of history by the same intransigent Kemalist bureaucracy, or by the voters. What enabled the AKP's dramatic rise was a combination of shrewd political strategy and good fortune. The year 2001 saw the collapse of the political and economic system that had emerged following the 1980 military coup.

The AKP was in the right place at the right time. The 2001 economic crisis eroded trust in the political parties that had failed to avert the catastrophe (Öniş 2010). The parties in power at the time of the crisis, a coalition of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party—DSP), the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party—MHP), and the ANAP suffered a severe defeat in the 2002 general elections (Öniş 2012). The two center-right parties, the DYP and the ANAP, were also roiled in a deep corruption scandal (Çarkoğlu 2007). This gave the AKP an opportunity to expand its vote share at the expense of center-right parties at a time when the electorate was largely alienated from all systemic parties.

The AKP adopted a strategy of targeting center-right voters by recruiting local elites who were previously integrated into the DYP and the ANAP's patronage structures (Ocaklı 2015a). Businesspeople, merchants, clan leaders, civil society leaders, and local politicians enabled the AKP to penetrate local social networks, and to present itself as a moderate alternative to the discredited parties of the system. Erdoğan and his allies formed close links with local clan networks in the Kurdish provinces (Ocaklı 2017b), and sought to distance themselves from Erbakan and his legacy in the heavily secularist districts of Western Anatolia (Ocaklı 2017a). A formidable grass-roots organization enabled the AKP to become an enduring presence in the everyday lives of potential voters (Eligür 2010). The party was able to mobilize its supporters effectively both in and out of the election cycle through close cooperation with business associations and migrants' civil society organizations (Ocaklı 2016a, 2016b).

Apparent ideological moderation, the ability to present itself as an outsider, avoiding blame for the economic failures that led to the 2001 crisis, and an uncanny ability to mobilize grass-roots networks at the local level enabled the AKP to win a series of elections from 2002 onward. The AKP's formative years in government corresponded with a significant uptick in global commodity prices (Baffes and Haniotis 2010; Barua and Kumar

2014). Buoyed by a favorable global economy and the political stability of a single-party government, the AKP's neoliberal economic program delivered significant economic growth. The economy grew by almost 6 percent per year from 2002 to 2006, while poverty and income inequality declined and the middle class expanded (Acemoglu and Ucer 2015). The AKP had firmly established itself as the party of economic growth and prosperity by the time the 2007–2008 global financial crisis reached Turkey. The combination of political stability, economic growth, divided opposition, and an active voter-outreach strategy enabled the AKP to completely displace the traditional center-right parties and win a series of elections.

The AKP established an enduring support base during this period. The elections were largely free and fair. The party's popularity only increased when the military attempted to meddle in the presidential elections in 2007 (BBC 2017). The AKP's persistent electoral victories throughout the 2000s were a significant factor in its ability later to change the political regime (Bakiner 2017). They gave Erdoğan and his allies the time and the ability to change power dynamics within the state institutions. The Gülen network was able not only to infiltrate, but also establish significant power over the judiciary and the police force. The stage was set to purge secularist officers from the military through a series of court cases beginning in 2008. The AKP created a codependent relationship with a number of corporations that profited from lucrative state contracts in return for political and economic support. It also expanded social welfare programs that benefitted current or potential supporters. Hence, it is plausible to suggest that if the AKP had to share the government with a coalition partner, or had it outright lost an election during this period, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for Erdoğan to change the regime.

Electoral integrity declined in the 2010s. Although it is difficult to point to a smoking gun, there is evidence to suggest that the two general elections in 2015, the constitutional referendum in 2017, and the general election in 2018 were rigged. A forensic study of the 2015 election found significant fraud in eastern Turkey, particularly in the areas where the pro-Kurdish Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party—HDP) was dominant (Mebane, Hicken, and Kollman 2016). The fraud strongly favored the AKP. The constitutional referendum of 2017 ratified the country's transition from a parliamentary to a presidential government, concentrated power in the office of the "executive presidency," and weakened checks and balances (Çalışkan 2018). A forensic study found systematic and significant support for vote rigging and ballot stuffing in 11 percent of the stations (Klimek et al. 2018). The same study found further support for fraud of a similar size and direction in the 2018 presidential elections. These findings were confirmed by election observers who witnessed ballot stuffing firsthand (Sendika.org 2017).

Islamic identity was a factor in the AKP's relationship to voters. There is some support for the argument that religious voters may have preferred the AKP over other parties (Gidengil and Karakoc 2016). It was widely known that the AKP's principal leaders, including Erdoğan, Gül, and Arınç, had an Islamist background. They were close associates of Necmettin Erbakan, and had been active in Islamist politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s. They had moderated but not fully disowned their Islamist backgrounds in the

2000s (Yilmaz et al. 2017). The AKP was a natural home for the Islamist base. However, it had to share this base with the party of the Islamist old guard, the SP. Although the SP's fortunes had declined shortly after its establishment in 2001, it would re-emerge as a challenger later in the decade.

The Islamist old guard struggled unsuccessfully against the AKP in the early 2000s. They lacked the charisma and vitality of Erdoğan or Gül. Islamist voters abandoned them en masse. The response came in 2008, when the party leaders finally decided to try a new strategy. They unanimously promoted a young firebrand named Numan Kurtulmuş to party leadership. Kurtulmuş was an economic and Islamic populist. He articulated a devastating critique of the AKP from within the Islamist camp, accusing its leaders of selling out the Islamic cause in favor of materialism and corruption. Although the SP never acquired the vote share that could threaten the AKP, the presence of a charismatic young leader in the Islamist camp challenged Erdoğan's grip on his base.

Before the SP could launch a credible offensive, however, it fell victim to internal conflict. According to Israfil Bayrakci, an SP official at the party's Ankara headquarters, the political ideology articulated by Numan Kurtulmuş "strayed too far towards liberalism" (I. Bayrakci, personal interview, September 16, 2015). The party's veteran leadership grew unhappy with his ideological flexibility. The discontent within the SP led Kurtulmuş to split the Islamist movement once more. He took over half of the party's local organizations with him to establish the Halkın Sesi Partisi (People's Voice Party—HAS Parti) in 2010. The SP's division worked in Erdoğan's favor, and he co-opted Kurtulmuş by recruiting him to the AKP in 2012. Kurtulmuş has been a deputy party leader and a close confidant of Erdoğan since then.

Co-opting rivals has become an important instrument of Erdoğan's efforts to centralize power. By bringing Kurtulmuş into the fold, he silenced a potentially effective adversary who could threaten his standing among the Islamist base. He used the same strategy toward Süleyman Soylu, a young politician in the center-right DYP. He was elected party leader in 2008 when the party changed its name to Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party—DP). Similar to Kurtulmuş, Soylu vociferously criticized Erdoğan and the AKP for corruption. However, he also chose to join the AKP following Erdoğan's invitation in 2012. Since then, he has been a deputy party leader and a power broker within the AKP organization.

By recruiting Kurtulmuş and Soylu, Erdoğan not only pacified credible politicians in the Islamist movement and the center-right, he also expanded the pro-Erdoğan contingent of elites within the AKP. Both of these recruits have been strong supporters of Erdoğan against his rivals within the party organization. Strictly pro-Erdoğan politicians in the AKP are often referred to as "reisçi," or "supporters of the chief." The rise of the reisçi and the decline of other AKP leaders is well illustrated by the story of Ersönmez Yarbay.

I met Ersönmez Yarbay in 2015 in his real estate office in Ankara that overlooks a busy avenue in the city center. A middle-aged, effusive man, Yarbay was more politician than real estate broker. Others came in and took their seats silently as he described his achievements in a former life—a founding member of the AKP, president of the party's

Ankara organization, and two-term parliamentarian. Once a close associate of Turkey's most powerful men, Yarbay's political career came to an abrupt end in 2007. "The boss wrote me off," he said, referring to President Erdoğan. "My career was in his hands. You have to butter up the boss if you want to prosper. This is what happens if you don't." He did not mince his words as others entered his office: "I have no expectations and nothing to hide. My political life is long over."

Yarbay still commanded respect among veteran Islamist politicians. His old friends referred to him as an honest man who made a mistake by throwing in his lot with the younger cohort of the Islamist movement. His rise and sudden estrangement from the AKP is not an exception. It is a story shared by a growing number of former Islamist heavyweights. Abdullah Gül, Turkey's eleventh president and former prime minister, Bülent Arınç, the former Speaker of the Parliament, Abdüllatif Şener, the former minister of finance, Yaşar Yakış, the former minister of foreign affairs, and Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, all founding members of the AKP, were gradually and systematically pushed out. Former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu and former deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs Ali Babacan have also lost their positions in the AKP. Erdoğan's grip on the party organization tightened over the years he spent in government. Arınç summarized the change well: "The 'we' that founded the AKP has become an 'I'" (Al Jazeera 2015).

The AKP's founders were replaced by co-opted politicians like Kurtulmuş and Soylu, Erdoğan's son-in-law Berat Albayrak, and the conspiracy-minded media figure Yigit Bulut. This new cadre is united in their unwavering support for Erdoğan over anyone else. However, conflicts between them in other areas regularly make the national news (*Evrensel* 2018).

Creeping authoritarianism and the gradual elimination of anyone who could possibly pose a threat to Erdoğan's supremacy has led some scholars to conclude that the regime in Turkey could plausibly be called "Erdoğanism" (Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018). Erdoğanism relies on an Islamist ideology and a populist political strategy. Indeed, Erdoğan's populist discourse has achieved much in the way of a deep polarization in Turkish society that contributed to democratic breakdown (Aytaç and Öniş 2014; Bilgic 2018; Somer 2019).

Erdoğan's populist rhetoric and Islamist ideological leanings could have played a somewhat unifying role for Turkey's Kurdish minority. Islamic identity was an important factor in the AKP's relationship with Kurdish voters. Following its establishment in 2001, the AKP became one of only two parties that had any real presence in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The left-wing pro-Kurdish movement and the AKP dominated the electoral arena. In this context, the AKP sought to build national harmony between ethnic Turks and Kurds by emphasizing their shared Islamic identity (Yavuz 2009). It provided a plausible alternative to the pro-Kurdish parties for the Kurds who either assimilated into Turkish culture or based their opposition to the state on a Kurdish-Islamic identity. The AKP's struggle with secular state institutions early in its existence evoked sympathy among segments of the Kurdish society (Grigoriadis et al. 2018).

The appeal to Islamic brotherhood seemed to work well for the AKP until the "peace process" between the government and the illegal wing of the Kurdish National Movement, the Partiya Kerkaren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party—PKK), collapsed in 2015. What followed was a vicious return of military conflict in the Kurdish region between the PKK's guerilla units and the Turkish military (Ocaklı 2015b). The securitization of the conflict had immediate effects for the legal wing of the Kurdish National Movement, the HDP. The AKP launched an unprecedented attack on parliamentarians and local elected officials from the HDP, removing them from office and imprisoning them (Kamer 2018). The HDP's former leader and a popular candidate for Turkey's presidency, Selahattin Demirtas, remains in prison as of late 2020.

The breakdown of the AKP's Kurdish strategy demonstrated the limits of "Islamic brotherhood" as a bond that could salve ethnic tensions. The government's severe crackdown on the pro-Kurdish politicians after 2015 also revealed the extent of the regime's authoritarian turn.

Economic Dimensions of Authoritarian Transition

There is a significant economic dimension to Turkey's regime change, without which this political process cannot be fully understood. The previous section touched upon one aspect of this economic story—the attainment of impressive growth rates and poverty reduction in the early years of AKP rule. Economic stability and growth during this period bolstered electoral support for the party, which gave Erdoğan and his allies the ability and the time required to degrade checks and balances.

Beyond aggregate growth and investment rates, however, lies a more complex relationship between the AKP and capital. The party leads a power block in collaboration with a particular faction of the business elite. Together, they have shaped Turkey's political economy in ways that have advantaged pro-government capital against their competitors, and Erdoğan against his. This alliance has played a crucial role in regime transition.

The connection between the AKP and a faction of Turkish capital dates back to the 1980s. The military regime (1980–1983) and the Özal administrations (1983–1989) implemented Turkey's first sustained neoliberal reforms. Prior to these reforms, state-led development strategies had favored Istanbul-based big businesses. Economic liberalization, privatization, and deregulation opened up new spaces for small and medium-sized businesses from across the country to join export markets. Some of these new businesses were formed in provincial areas in Anatolia, and were led by devout businesspeople who were previously shut out of privilege networks. The rise of the pious bourgeoisie empowered Islamist movements (Öniş 1997; Gülalp 2001)—particularly the Gülen movement and the Welfare Party—and may have been a cause in their gradual moderation (Gumuscu 2010). These companies were later united in a series of local associations and one national business association: the Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen—MUSIAD) (Tuğal 2002).

The AKP forged a particularly close relationship with MUSIAD and local business associations. As described earlier in this chapter, the party purposefully recruited businesspeople shortly after its founding in 2001. Local businesspeople often constituted the leadership cadres of the AKP's provincial and sub-provincial organizations (Ocaklı 2015a, 2016a), and benefitted from the party's subsequent control over municipal resources (Ocaklı 2016b).

Shortly after coming to power in 2002, the AKP began to institute a series of legal changes that would enable it to use public resources for the enrichment of pro-government businesses. First, it limited the jurisdiction of autonomous regulatory agencies that provided economic oversight (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014), and it sought to establish partisan control over them. It changed the scope and applicability of the public procurement law through amendments that gave significant flexibility to the government to reward preferred businesses (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014; Gurakar 2016). It restructured the government's role in housing construction and the real estate sector by overhauling the Toplu Konut İdaresi (Housing Development Administration—TOKİ) and the land office law (Ocaklı 2018). Through these and other legal changes, Erdoğan and his allies laid the groundwork for enriching a particular faction of capital in return for material support and political loyalty.

The legal changes soon bore fruit. Pro-government businesses expanded their areas of operation significantly to encompass construction, energy, media, tourism, foodstuffs, and a plethora of other sectors. The AKP's preferential treatment enabled them to rapidly accumulate capital. Pro-government businesses received state contracts, cheap credits, favoritism in purchasing state-owned enterprises, preferential access to state procurement deals, tax forgiveness, construction and mining permits, and access to public lands for construction purposes. At the same time, they avoided targeted tax audits and confiscation through the use of the Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (Savings Deposit Insurance Fund—TMSF). The latter institution systematically dispossessed financially troubled companies that were seen by the AKP as anti-government, and transferred their remaining capital to pro-AKP corporations (Esen and Gumuscu 2018). These policies not only emboldened pro-government capital, but also intimidated the rest.

The AKP's use of state power and resources to create a dependent business class is best illustrated through the example of TOKİ. In January 2003, less than two months after it formed its first government, the AKP passed an "Emergency Action Plan for Housing and Urban Development." It envisioned a five-year plan to build 250,000 housing units, which required vast resources and capabilities on the part of TOKİ. Over the following several years, the government completely overhauled state involvement in the housing sector (Demiralp, Demiralp, and Gümüş 2016). TOKİ was already endowed with real-estate company shares and real-estate stock due to the earlier dissolution of the Emlak Bankası (Real Estate Bank) in 2001 (TOKİ 2006). The institution was then given the legal right to make zoning plans, nationalize privately owned land and buildings, produce urban renewal projects, and build or finance construction projects in 2004. The amendment of the Arsa Ofisi Kanunu (Land Office Law) in the same year provided TOKİ with the ability to develop a virtually limitless amount of state-owned land for the purpose of housing construction (TOKİ 2006). TOKİ immediately acquired 64.5 million square meters of land (TOKİ 2013). As a result of these changes, TOKİ was a completely different organization by 2005. It boasted an impressive financial infrastructure, the ability to nationalize private property, and a mandate to develop state-owned land for housing construction.

The AKP then set out to transform Turkey's housing sector. TOKİ surpassed its own plans, and by 2013 it had started the construction of 565,000 housing units (TOKİ 2013). The institution does not physically build apartments. It contracts out the engineering and building process to private companies. TOKİ contracts have become a significant means through which pro-government construction companies accumulate capital (Ocaklı 2018). Because TOKİ projects do not require the engineering expertise that would be necessary to build more complex infrastructure projects, they can typically be undertaken by small and medium-sized companies. This has enabled the AKP to cultivate a government-dependent bourgeoisie that it can easily control.

The specific case of the housing construction sector illustrates a wider phenomenon—the elaborate system through which the AKP uses state power to enrich pro-government businesses. TOKİ appropriates publicly owned land, transfers it to private companies for construction purposes, enables them to capture the rent, and effectively privatizes public resources. Thus, it has become a crucial mechanism through which the AKP has built a pliant business elite.

In return for these favors, the AKP receives financial contributions, material support for its election campaigns, and pro-government media coverage. While direct financial contributions are not insignificant (*Cumhuriyet* 2014; *Sozcu* 2014), the most important factor in business support for the AKP is in the form of media coverage.

Before the 2001 economic crisis, Turkey's media landscape was dominated by five holding companies—the Bilgin, Çukurova, Doğan, and Uzan Groups, and the individual owner Korkmaz Yiğit (Yeşil 2018). All of these companies were invested in other economic sectors, such as banking and finance, construction, energy, and tourism, which made them susceptible both to government influence and to the business cycle. The economic crisis led to a series of bankruptcies in these holding companies, which resulted in government expropriation of their media properties by the TMSF. A case in point is the Uzan Group. Cem Uzan established a political party named the Genc Parti (Young Party—GP) shortly before the 2002 elections and competed against the AKP. When the AKP won the elections, the TMSF took control of the Uzan Group's media holdings. Bilgin faced financial troubles, while the Çukurova and Doğan Groups had their media corporations gradually expropriated by the TMSF. The same institution would later auction the *Star* newspaper and Kanal 24 TV station to the Sancak Group—a holding company closely allied to the AKP (Yeşil 2018). Other pro-AKP corporations would gradually buy these media institutions from the TMSF, as well as setting up new ones (Esen and Gumuscu 2018). By 2013, the Albayrak, Ciner, Demirören, Doğuş, Sancak, and Kalyon Groups controlled most of the media landscape (Yeşil 2018). These openly pro-AKP holding companies owned the most widely viewed TV channels (NTV, Star TV, ATV, A Haber, Show TV, and others), as well as the widest circulation newspapers (*Yeni Safak*, *Milliyet*, *Aksam*, *Star*, *Sabah*, and others). All of these holding companies have investments in a wide variety of economic sectors that benefit from a close relationship with President Erdoğan.

It is not surprising, then, that the AKP has acquired an unprecedented level of control over the flow of information in Turkey (Arbatli 2014). The distinction between real news and "fake news" or outright government propaganda has blurred. Journalists have not only been fired or pressured to tow the government's line, they also report widespread self-censorship (Susma 2018). Meanwhile, journalists who resist the dominant government-friendly discourse in the media risk unemployment or, very often, imprisonment (Beiser, 2018).

The emergence of a distinct pro-AKP business elite has skewed the playing field between the incumbents and the opposition parties (Bekmen 2014; Somer 2016). In this crony-capitalist patronage network, the AKP supports a faction of capital, and it returns the favor through donations, loyalty, and, most importantly, media control.

The AKP supplemented its system of party-business collusion by adopting social welfare programs that favored its potential supporters. Turkey's social welfare programs have traditionally been highly bureaucratic, limited, and inegalitarian. Family and informal charity played a large role. Official social welfare programs were employment-based, and hence did not cover people who worked in the vast informal economy and agriculture (Eder 2010). Following the 2001 economic crisis, the newly minted AKP government initiated an overhaul of the social welfare regime. The new system was organized at two levels: (1) programs that were managed at the national level, and (2) programs that were decentralized and operated by a variety of actors at the local level.

At the national level, the AKP sought to address social welfare needs in two main ways. The first was to rely on economic growth and macroeconomic stability to reduce poverty. As discussed earlier, rapid economic growth early in the AKP's tenure corresponded with an expanding middle class, which to some extent decreased the need for social assistance. The second was the rationalization and expansion of the existing pensions and healthcare systems. Three state-based but different healthcare and pensions systems (the SSK, Bag-Kur, and Emekli Sandigi) were unified under the umbrella of the Social Security Institution (SSI). Healthcare assistance through the "green card program" was expanded. Education continued to be state-funded from the primary school to the university level, although the quality of education between public and private institutions differed widely. The affordable housing program led by TOKİ also benefited lower income groups as well as producing revenue for pro-AKP construction companies.

The AKP's main innovation in social welfare policy came in the form of decentralization. This did not entail revenue growth for local governments to be used for social welfare purposes—public revenues in Turkey are remarkable centralized (Cammett, Luca, and Sergenti 2019). Instead, social welfare functions were devolved to local partnerships between municipalities, religious charities, corporate philanthropy, and civil society organizations. Municipalities have acquired a significant role in welfare distribution (Eder 2010; Kaya 2015). They provide soup kitchens, iftar dinners during Ramadan, as well as more general in-kind aid. Municipal resources for welfare are based not on taxation but on charity. Corporate philanthropy plays a significant role. Companies that receive preferential access to contracts, tenders, and construction permits are induced to contribute to "charity funds," which are then spent on assistance to the poor (Buğra and Candas 2011). The Islamic banks and devout capital had long been parts of the social networks connected to the Islamist movement (Gocmen 2014). The AKP tapped into their potential and encouraged these companies to engage in charitable giving directed toward the urban poor in conjunction with Islamic NGOs and local governments (Apaydin 2015). Taken as a whole, the AKP's decentralized model substituted charitable giving for rights-based social welfare (Bugra and Candas 2011; Gocmen 2014). The decline of union density and the normalization of flexible forms of work also decreased collective agency on the part of the workers and reconstituted them as consumers and social assistance recipients (Bozkurt 2013; Bozkurt-Güngen 2018).

There is evidence to suggest that the AKP uses state spending as well as decentralized social welfare to boost its support. Cammett et al. (2019) demonstrated that the party used different budget lines for strategic objectives—a practice known as portfolio diversification. Between 2003 and 2014, the AKP targeted reliably pro-AKP districts with firm subsidies and investments in education, defense, and cultural affairs. Battleground districts received significantly more investment in infrastructure spending—the kinds of non-excludable goods that symbolize good governance. Districts that reliably support the secularist opposition party received the lowest amount of public spending. Aytac (2014) reached a similar conclusion in his analysis of the conditional cash transfer program. He showed that the AKP government spent more in districts where it faced an ideologically close challenger, and less in districts where its challengers were ideologically distant. Strategic use of state expenditures, particularly in the field of social welfare, served to further strengthen the AKP's electoral advantage over its competitors.

Institutional Dimensions of Authoritarian Transition

Regime transition in Turkey was cemented by the AKP's domination of the state's security, administrative, judicial, and ideological apparatuses. Kemalist bureaucratic institutions put up serious resistance against AKP hegemony. It took a variety of strategies on the part of the latter to bring the former to heel. The initial years of AKP rule (roughly 2002–2008) were characterized by outward accommodation and EU-oriented reforms. Then (roughly 2008–2011) came the war of court cases (Ergenekon and Balyoz), through which the combined forces of the AKP and the Gülen movement purged secularist officers from the military. The 2010 referendum and subsequent legal changes sealed the government's control over the judiciary. The following period (roughly 2011–2016) saw the conflict between the former allies, the AKP and the Gülen movement, escalate. The failed coup attempt of 2016 resulted in the elimination of the Gülen movement from Turkey's economic, social, and political life, and the complete domination of state institutions by the pro-Erdoğan faction.

The AKP adopted post-Islamist language and sought Turkey's EU membership in its first term in government (Yilmaz and Barry 2020). In order to further the EU accession process, it initiated a series of reforms in 2004 and 2010 that would liberalize Turkey's laws in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. The most serious reforms concerned the role of the military in politics (Satana 2008). The reforms increased parliamentary oversight of the military budget, abolished military courts, reduced military presence in the Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (National Military Council), and increased civilian control over the Yuksek Askeri Sura (Supreme Military Council). The overall impact of these reforms was the removal of institutional mechanisms that made military tutelage over the civilian government possible (Bayulgen, Arbatli, and Canbolat 2018). The AKP was able to garner support for this program from liberal circles by emphasizing its necessity for democratization. The military seems to have acceded to a reduction in its institutional privileges because EU accession would be the culmination of an eighty-year-long Kemalist modernization project.

During the same period, the party formed an alliance with the Gülen network. An Islamic pietistic community-cum-global business and education movement-cum-secret society, the Gülenists were a natural ally for the AKP (Yavuz 2018). The two had separate historical trajectories, leaders, and mobilization strategies, but they shared a common orientation in their opposition to Kemalist-secularist institutions and policies (Tas 2018). The Gülen network had already established a formidable set of market and civil society institutions: a successful school system, financial institutions, a media empire (most prominently the *Zaman* newspaper and Samanyolu TV), and a loosely connected series of business associations. Less obvious to observers were its efforts to raise a "golden generation" of acolytes who would join, rise in the ranks of, and eventually exert control over vital state bureaucracies (Yavuz 2018). Its alliance with the AKP enabled the movement to place its members in leading positions in the police force, the judiciary, regulatory organizations, and the military.

The AKP's promotion of Gülenist cadres in the police and the judiciary provided the party with well-educated and highly skilled human resources with which to confront Kemalist hegemony in state institutions. This investment paid off with the launch of two court cases: Ergenekon and Balyoz, in 2008 and 2010, respectively. In both of these cases, prosecutors affiliated with the Gülen movement launched investigations into alleged plots to overthrow the elected government (Yavuz 2018). The hundreds of indictments targeted mainly secularist military officers, but they later grew to include politicians, academics, and journalists. Between 2008 and 2016, the court cases, prison sentences, and lengthy jail terms pending trial had a devastating impact on the secularist officer corps. This process spelled the end of Kemalist dominance over the military, and established the AKP-Gülen alliance's victory over the most prominent veto player in Turkish politics.

It is important to note that all of the defendants in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials were later cleared of charges by the higher courts. This was partly due to insufficient and false evidence. Doğan and Rodrik's (2010) exposé on the Balyoz trial demonstrates a concerted effort by factions of the police, judiciary, and the media to frame the defendants through the systematic production of false evidence. However, this reversal of fortunes only came after the collapse of the AKP-Gülen alliance, and not due to the internal workings of an independent judicial branch. Zekariya Öz, the prosecutor who led the Ergenekon case, had to flee the country in 2015 when the AKP government turned against him after falling out with the Gülen movement (Demiralp 2016).

Judicial independence has historically been a mirage in Turkey. Similar to the military, the high courts had a system of promotion that privileged Kemalist-secularist judges over others. The Constitutional Court in particular posed a serious threat to the AKP during its first decade in office. The court had banned four parties that were the AKP's predecessors in the Islamist movement, and heard a case against the AKP itself in 2008. The decision not to ban the AKP came down to a 6-5 vote (Milliyet, 2008). The confrontation between the party and the high courts reached a decisive end with the 2010 constitutional referendum. In conjunction with further legal changes in 2014, the AKP was able to pack the highest institutions of the judiciary with its supporters. According to Özbudun (2015), the constitutional amendments and additional legal changes enabled the AKP to restructure the composition of the Constitutional Court, the Hakimler ve Savcilar Yuksek Kurulu (Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors), and the other high courts. These transformations effectively ended not only the judiciary's resistance to the AKP, but also any remnant of judicial autonomy from the executive branch (Akkoyunlu 2017; Somer 2016).

What followed this impressive process of institutional engineering was the deterioration of the AKP-Gülen alliance. The first signs of conflict began emerging in 2009 and 2010 following Erdoğan's quarrels with Israeli leaders. The Gülen movement and Erdoğan expressed conflicting views on Israel. Erdoğan grew more critical following the 2008 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, and especially after the violent confrontation between the Israeli Navy and the Mavi Marmara flotilla that attempted to break the Gaza blockade in 2010. Gülen sought accommodation between Turkey and Israel, and publicly disapproved of Erdoğan's outbursts (Tee 2018). The tensions deepened in 2012 when the chief of the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (National Intelligence Agency—MIT) Hakan Fidan was called in for questioning by Gülenist prosecutors. This escalation reflected another disagreement between Erdoğan and Gülen. While Fidan was conducting secret talks with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, Gülen opposed a potential rapprochement between the Turkish state and the Kurdish National Movement (Uras 2013).

The rift between the allies reached crisis levels in December 2013. A division of the Istanbul Security Directory initiated a corruption probe targeting the highest levels of the AKP government. More than ninety people were taken into custody, including

AKP-affiliated businessmen, a mayor, and sons of cabinet ministers (Tee 2018). The AKP responded by denying all allegations, passing legislation that gave the government new powers over the judiciary, and initiating a purge of Gülenists in the police force and the judiciary (Shively 2016). This crisis exposed not only the deep corruption of the AKP leaders, but also the extent to which the Gülen movement had been able to infiltrate the state and wiretap almost everyone of significance in Ankara. Tapes leaked on YouTube in February 2014 allegedly contained private conversations between Erdoğan and his son, as well as a classified discussion of Turkish foreign policy toward Syria between MIT chief Hakan Fidan, the minister of foreign affairs, and high-ranking generals. Many other tapes were leaked later, allegedly containing damaging excerpts from Erdoğan's private phone conversations.

Throughout the growing conflict between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the government's almost reflexive response was to pass new legislation that increased its grip on the police force and the judiciary. These were the two institutions most heavily dominated by the Gülen movement (Yavuz 2018). Erdoğan's attempt to wrest control over them in order to weaken the Gülen movement increasingly subordinated the bureaucracy to the will of the AKP.

The crisis between the former allies metastasized during the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Although there is no conclusive evidence that the coup was organized with the explicit blessing of Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the Gülen movement, all available evidence points toward the central role played by a network of Gülenist military officers. The Kemalist-secularist officer corps was already purged and thoroughly demoralized by the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. This had made possible the promotion of Gülen-affiliated officers to higher ranks during the height of the AKP-Gülen alliance. By July 2016 the crisis between the former allies was severe, and numerous newspapers (both pro- and anti-government) were circulating rumors about a possible purge of Gülenist officers during the August summit of the Supreme Military Council (Likoglu 2016; Ozturk 2016). The coup attempt was most likely the final gasp of a movement under siege.

The coup itself was bloody. The plotters occupied a state-owned television station, one of the bridges over the Bosporus, and a number of police stations and military bases. They bombed the Turkish Parliament and the MIT headquarters. They attacked a Marmaris hotel where Erdoğan was vacationing, only to miss him by 15 minutes (Yavuz and Koc 2018). Overall, the coup attempt led to 248 deaths and 2,196 injuries (*Sabah* 2017). The number of casualties was high because civilians across the country mobilized against the coup attempt.

The failure of the coup marked the beginning of a new chapter in Turkish politics. Erdoğan's fierce reaction against not only the coup plotters, but also a much wider spectrum of opposition, initiated a process that may appropriately be termed a counter-coup (Tas 2018). The immediate declaration of emergency rule empowered the government to start a wide-ranging wave of investigations, arrests, dismissals, and closures. Overall, more than 150,000 people were dismissed from their jobs. These were mostly teachers, police officers, bureaucrats at the Ministry of the Interior, military officers, academics, health personnel, and members of the judiciary (BBC 2017). More than 500,000 people were investigated, and around 97,000 were arrested (TurkeyPurge). By 2019 there were around 31,000 people in prison connected to the investigations, and a further 22,000 had warrants for arrest (*Cumhuriyet* 2019). In addition, thousands of dormitories and schools were shut down, and Gülen-affiliated financial, commercial, and media organizations were expropriated.

Erdoğan's purge of state institutions and consolidation of power following the coup attempt culminated in the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential elections. The referendum officially transitioned Turkey from a parliamentary government to an "executive presidency." It confirmed what was already clear: Erdoğan had successfully centralized power, marginalized potential rivals within the AKP, and defeated his secularist and Gülenist enemies. The re-engineering of Turkish state institutions was complete.

Conclusion

Turkey gradually transitioned from an illiberal democracy to an authoritarian regime between 2002 and 2016. The main driver of the change was the elected government. Threats to democracy came from the center—entrenched powers in the bureaucracy, the growing influence of the Gülen movement in vital state institutions, and the AKP itself. Erdoğan's centralization of power was underwritten by an unwavering electoral base in a thoroughly polarized society.

Persistent electoral victories throughout the 2000s provided the AKP with the time and ability to shift the balance of power in state institutions. The AKP was able to take advantage of a favorable economic climate and displace the traditional center-right parties from the political arena. Erdoğan preempted the emergence of potential rivals in the Islamist movement and the center-right by co-opting promising politicians into the AKP. Furthermore, he gradually marginalized the other founders of the AKP in a successful effort to establish his supremacy in the party organization.

Starting in its first year in office, the AKP laid the groundwork of a highly effective patronage scheme that would distribute state resources to pro-government business elites. State contracts, particularly in the areas of procurement and construction, became the main vehicles through which pro-AKP companies accumulated capital. Meanwhile, rival business groups were targeted with punitive tax audits as well as outright expropriation in times of financial trouble. In return for state contracts and preferential treatment, government-friendly corporations made campaign contributions, gave charity to municipal social welfare funds, and, more importantly, invested in the media sector. The government gradually gained control over information flows by making sure that the media landscape was controlled by pro-AKP capital. This gave the party an invaluable advantage over its competitors, as opposition parties and movements received very little favorable coverage.

The competition over the control of state bureaucracies was less visible. Kemalist military officers and judges resisted AKP hegemony. The party partnered with the Gülen movement to advance their mutual goal—the elimination of Kemalist-secularists from the high echelons of the state bureaucracy. To that end, the AKP promoted Gülenist cadres in the police force and the judiciary. The AKP-Gülen alliance was then able to purge secularist officers from the military via the Ergenkon and Balyoz court cases. They later packed the courts with AKP supporters after the 2010 constitutional amendments. This partnership broke down in the early 2010s, leading to a number of crises that pitted the Gülen movement against the AKP. The crisis culminated in the 2016 coup attempt. The coup's failure gave Erdoğan the upper hand, and the Gülen movement was eliminated from Turkey's social, economic, and political life. As a result, Erdoğan gained uncontested dominance over all state institutions.

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CHAPTER 8

ISLAM, NATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN ASIA

Nations under Gods or Gods under Nations?

MAYA TUDOR

ISLAM is no more dangerous to democracy than any other religion. Yet research into the Islamic world has generally assumed rather than interrogated a prominence of religious beliefs in explaining social and political outcomes. As part of a volume that theoretically explores whether religiosity structures politics across the Muslim world, this chapter argues that *religiosity is significantly more likely to undermine democracy when national narratives historically centralized religious identities*. This is because when national narratives centralized religion, religious actors subsequently became powerful actors in political struggles, creating another set of interests to accommodate, and because the majoritarian ideas of citizenship that allowed subsequent political entrepreneurs to subordinate minority rights gained broad acceptance. Empirically, this chapter argues that the varying centrality of religious identity in founding nationalisms has critically conditioned the prospects for democracy in India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Nations have been perhaps most famously defined as "imagined communities." And while much attention has been paid to the word *imagined*, less noticed is that nations are still important sources of *community* in a globalized world. Nations, and the nationalism that celebrates them, transforms solitary individuals into homelands, fulfilling an abiding desire for belonging in the modern world (Tamir 2019). All communities *can* spawn discrimination against outsiders. But the tendency to denigrate outsiders is no more *inherent* to the community of nations than it is to communities such as families or neighborhoods (Li and Brewer 2004).

What distinguishes nations from other kinds of communities is not that celebration of nations is especially likely to turn against outsiders. Instead, it is that the nation is a distinctly *political* community, intimately tied to the legitimation of state power. Nations so centrally underpin our modern system of sovereign states that an eminent scholar of nationalism has gone so far as to say that it is the nation that, above all, defines modernity (Greenfeld 1992). The celebration of the nation helps to affirm the power of the state, which is after all that entity with the *legitimate* monopoly on the use of force. It is for this reason that nations and nationalism are here to stay (Wimmer 2019).

If national communities legitimate the use of state power, then a natural next question is whether different types of national communities have affect outcomes of interest within political science. But the comparative scholarship of nationalism has historically been surprisingly quiet on this topic, tending instead to privilege research into the *origins* and *spread* of nationalism (Mylonas and Tudor Forthcoming). Because nationalism's potential to undermine democracy prominently figured in the experiences of twentieth-century Europe, comparative scholarship on nationalism has tended to minimize the potential for nationalism to promote freedom and democracy, as it has for many twentieth-century ex-colonies that adapted European nationalism to gain colonial independence.

Across the colonial world, indigenous elites imagined and mobilized on behalf of new nations in the middle decades of the twentieth century. When a close identification between religion and nation was forged in order to legitimate a new regime in the name of a new people, this ideological marriage was subsequently difficult to disentangle and dampened the possibilities for postcolonial democracies to endure. There are two reasons for this.

First, when national narratives are narrowly married to religion, those institutions representing religious identities are typically emboldened to adjudicate on who is a good follower as well as who is a good citizen. After independence, when new patterns of power-sharing are first beginning to gel, the addition of a "veto player" makes it more difficult to consolidate democratic rules of the game, resulting in political instability during the critical regime-founding moment (Tsebelis 1995). The centrality of religious institutions to political power also, over time, embeds questions of religious identity into everyday political debates, creating a politics that is at once relevant to governments and state institutions for legitimating purposes, and yet *not entirely controlled* by them.

Second, when founding national identities are conceptualized in terms of a religion, status inequalities are invariably created among citizens. This is because individuals without the core religious identity are definitionally less central to the nation and are thus more vulnerable to political targeting. These status inequalities are often used by political entrepreneurs seeking to gain power. A national narrative tied to religion enables, and can even encourage, politicians to target those citizens who do not possess the core religion. Especially in times of crisis, politicians and would-be politicians can more easily propose that such second-class citizens are less deserving of state protection.

I explore this argument through the historical experiences of three postcolonial countries—Pakistan, Indonesia, and India—whose elites adopted different bases of nationalist mobilization. In all three countries, elites waited until the middle decades of the twentieth century to engage in anticolonial mass mobilization, garnering little in the way of sustained mass support until the closing decades before independence. When the nationalist movements did engage in mass mobilization, they did so by using different ideational building blocks.

Pakistan's independence movement popularized its call for independence by instrumentalizing religion, whereas India's and Indonesia's independence movements espoused a set of creedal principles to mobilize the anticolonial movement. In Pakistan, the regular invocation of religion as a means of legitimating state policies and governments has strengthened the relationships between religion and nation and has regularly provided fodder for debilitating political debates. By contrast, the relative distance between religion and nation in Indonesia and India prevented religion from assuming a pivotal place in political debates at fragile political moments. Indonesia's and India's national narrative eschewed religion and "settled" into an inclusive narrative of nation (Bonikowski 2016). The force of religion was thus, until the recent decade, surprisingly minimal within political debates. It is not religiosity per se, but rather the centrality of religion in the national imagination, that has debilitating consequences for democracy.

State-Building and Nation-Building: The Twentieth-Century Postcolonial Context

In the colonial world, the years before, during, and just after national independence were a critical period in which regime patterns were formed. The national narratives adopted to pursue colonial independence would prove formative for ensuing regime dynamics because nationalist elites used these narratives to mobilize support and embedded them in the national imagination in commemorative sites such as maps, museums, national holidays, festivals, and school textbooks (Anderson 1983, vom Hau 2009, Zubrzycki 2016). It was through these avenues that the decisions of national elites about *whom* to mobilize with *what* set of identities influenced whether newly sovereign governments could create a stable regime. These decisions had enormous consequences for such outcomes as regime stability, party systems, economic development, and genocide (Yashar 1997, Slater 2010, Tudor 2013, Riedl 2014, Liu 2015, Straus 2015).

Despite the fact that many societies in Asia were deeply religious societies, there was a great deal of variation in whether and how national elites embraced religion. To be sure, religious motifs and symbols were almost everywhere employed as the "basic cultural and ideological building blocks for nationalists" (Smith 2003, 254–255). But unlike the European experience with state formation, Asian countries typically lacked centralized and highly organized religious forces that claimed sovereignty over states. Consequently, when nationalism was imported and adapted to local contexts, elites had greater choice about whether to centralize religion (as well as ethnicity and other salient social cleavages) when defining a new nation.

PAKISTAN: RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM FEEDS AUTOCRATIC INSTABILITY

For all of its seventy-plus years since colonial independence, Pakistan has been an unstable regime with autocratic tendencies. This outcome has been critically enabled by a founding nationalism that explicitly embraced Islam as the basis of the nation, a fusion that proved difficult to subsequently repudiate, and that enabled religious leaders to become powerful political voices in key political struggles and encouraged political entrepreneurs to target religious minorities for legitimation.

The Call for Pakistan Fuses Nation and Islam

Pakistan's nationalist movement—the Pakistan Muslim League—was a movement created in 1906 primarily to protect the privileges of a group of culturally and socioeconomically distinct Muslims who were well-entrenched in British India's colonial power structures. While colonially entrenched landed aristocrats everywhere were threatened by the mobilization of the urban, educated middle class and its calls for political reform, they were generally too divided by hierarchy and language to create a unified political movement. In the United Provinces however, language, religion, and government patronage cleavages all coincided and the prospect of reforms were thus threatening in multiple ways. This threat incentivized sufficient mobilization to engender a political movement, the Muslim League. Once quotas for the political representation of UP Muslims was guaranteed in the 1909, the Muslim League remained a marginal political movement until the 1937 colonially sponsored pre-independence elections in colonial provinces.

The Indian National Congress's overwhelming success in those provincial elections posed an existential threat to the League, leading the latter to eventuall announce support for the new nation of Pakistan. Politically, those elections clearly signaled the imminence of national independence under Congress hegemony, and with it the disappearance of the colonial patronage that had underwritten Muslim power in the United Provinces. Those elections demonstrated that, even with the guarantee of quotas or 'separate electorates', the League could not retain substantial influence at a national level unless it also governed one of the two large Muslim-majority provinces of colonial India—Bengal and Punjab. The League thus forged alliances with those two regions. For these reasons, and because UP Muslims perceived a threat to a long history of cultural dominance (Brass 2005), the Muslim League began to espouse a national identity based upon the claim that Indian Muslims formed a separate nation starting in 1940 (Jalal 1995, Tudor 2013). This served to legitimate the creation of Pakistan, because the movement successfully created alliances with existing political movements in two geographically separate wings of the country.

The rallying cry for a new state of Pakistan heavily utilized religion. Though he was personally secular, Mohammed Ali Jinnah invoked Islam in order to provide "a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents" (Jalal 1990, 16). But while playing upon Islam provided the basic ideological glue together diverse geographic, linguistic, and ethnic regions, Jinnah did not specify whether and how Islam conditioned citizenship in this new political entity. In order to legitimate its participation in independence negotiations, Jinnah forged a nationalism based upon the rallying cry of "Islam in danger" that was "specifically ambiguous and imprecise to command general support, something specifically Muslim though unspecific in every other respect" (Jalal 2007 [1995], 20).

Throughout the seven years before independence, Pakistani nationalism became inextricably bound up with religion. Traditional religious elites were mobilized in order to ensure that the political interests of the landed Muslim elites were protected, either through the creation of an entirely separate state or through the creation of weak central government presiding over strong sub-national units. In the United Provinces, for example, regional Muslim League leader Nawab Ismail Khan convened a conference of *ulama* and intellectuals in order to draft an Islamic constitution for Pakistan that formed the basis of recommendations for the constitution after independence (Haqqani 2005, 67). In Punjab, *pirs*, or the religious leaders of shrines, gained votes for the 1945–1946 regional elections by explicitly linking Pakistan with Islam. The British governor of Punjab wrote in summer 1945 than "Muslim Leaguers are doing what they can in the way of propaganda conducted on fanatical lines; religious leaders and religious buildings are being used freely in several places for advocating Pakistan and vilifying any who hold opposite views" (Glancy to Mountbatten 1945, 67). By spring 1946, the same governor wrote that "Maulvis and Pirs and students travel all around the Province and preach that those who fail to vote for the League candidates will cease to be Muslims, their marriages no longer valid and they will be entirely excommunicated" (ibid., 68).

While the Muslim League sometimes attempted to position Pakistan as a secular project to audiences with different interests, such prevarication was ultimately insufficient to temper the close marriage between Pakistan and Islam in the minds of both those who voted for Pakistan and the key religious leaders whose mobilizing prowess turned out to be crucial in delivering Pakistan. In an oft-cited speech just days before Pakistan's independence, Jinnah hoped to draw a line in the sand between personal religion and citizenship by stating, "In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." Yet as many historians have noted, this one speech could not undo nearly a decade of linking Islam with the national identity of Pakistan.

The Settling of Islamic Nationalism

Upon Pakistan's independence on August 14, 1947, the tight association between Islam and Pakistani citizenship provided ready fodder for derailing Pakistan's nascent democracy. The close relationship between Pakistan and Islam legitimated religious elites as they asserted hierarchical distinctions between citizens. The marriage between Pakistani citizenship and Islam, deliberately evoked in the lead-up to independence, provided a difficult but possibly surmountable stumbling block in the early debates over how power was to be organized.

Yet the decisions taken by Pakistan's early governments only strengthened the sense among both leaders and the public that Pakistan was defined through Islam. Pakistan's first official statement of citizenship was the 1949 Objectives Resolution. The resolution stipulated that Pakistan would be guided by such principles as democracy, freedom, equality, and social justice "as enunciated by Islam," again making the relationship between the political and the religious interdependent. The Objectives Resolution also stated that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone." The Constituent Assembly, which met in different forms between 1950 and 1956, also regularly discussed religious matters such as collecting zakat, establishing institutions of religious learning, and arrangements facilitating five daily prayers. Beyond the constitutional framing debates that invoked Islamic matters, the close association between the state and religion was seen in how quickly centers of religious learning grew in the new country, from 137 in all of Pakistan in 1947 to 244 in West Pakistan alone a decade later (Haqqani 2018, 76). All these decisions deepened the link between Islam and Pakistan into a newly settled conception of Pakistan as a state of, by, and for Muslims.

The first major democratic setback in Pakistan centralized questions of both religion and power-sharing and reflected the first instance of what soon became a characteristic pattern in Pakistani politics—that religion was used as a legitimating tool for political gain and thereby strengthened the relationship between citizenship and Islam. The first instance of martial law in Pakistan occurred in January 1953, the first step toward the 1958 military coup that definitively ended Pakistan's democratic experiment. On this occasion, the central government called in the military to quell riots that ensued when an Islamic movement sought to remove the foreign minister from power on the grounds that he was a non-Muslim.

It is important to note that this conflict would not have escalated into an existential threat for the government in the absence of political entrepreneurs who exploited religious divisions to gain power. Punjabi landlords engineered the crisis and utilized the Islamic narrative of nation in order to destabilize a central government attempting to pass a constitution unfavorable to provincial power. The central government, led by the Bengali Khwaja Nazimuddin, had previously rejected a demand from the Punjabi *ulama* to consider religious affiliation a prerequisite for serving in a key position of power. The *ulama* argued that the core beliefs of the Ahmadis, which included the then-foreign minister Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, did not align with mainstream Islam. The central government refused to do so and had wide support among the Pakistani public for its refusal. The 1953 conflict, the first major public showdown over how closely religion would be tied to citizenship, saw the secular hand briefly winning out.

The victory was short-lived however, because state-level politicians chose to align with religious institutions to oppose a proposed constitution that centralized power at the national level. It was in the midst of a tussle over the constitutional distribution of powers that the chief minister of Punjab, who was also a powerful provincial landlord, publicly opposed the government on the Ahmadi issue. He announced that the central government needed to accede to the demands of the religious institutions, with the explicit intention of undermining the central government (Noon 1993, 234). When riots broke out, Prime Minister Nazimuddin responded by arresting the leaders of the anti-Ahmadi movement. This led to major riots in Lahore in February, which lasted 70 days and required military intervention to resolve, Pakistan's first invocation of martial law. Shortly after martial law was withdrawn, a civilian bureaucrat serving as governor-general dismissed the prime minister, thus removing his proposed constitution from consideration, ostensibly because of the central government's economic ineptitude (Khan 1967). Democracy in Pakistan thus faltered on the anvil of a state-centered power struggle, in which state politicians weaponized Islamic institutions and the ideas of citizenship to remove a national government. In this process and the ensuing political instability, the military increasingly became politicized.

This fusion between religion and citizenship deepened during Pakistan's first decade. The short-lived 1956 constitution pronounced "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and specified that the president must be a Muslim, and that no law must be passed that was deemed contrary to the teachings of the Qurʾan. Barring the non-Muslim fifth of the population, and even certain kinds of Muslims, from equal citizenship rights, far from laying to rest debates over the nature of citizenship, continued to fuel divisive political issues in subsequent decades (Shaikh 2009).

The next major phase in Pakistan's political history gelled the basic pattern that has endured since: a five-step dance in which the Pakistani military assume *de jure* and sometimes *de facto* executive power. Between 1958 and 1969, General Ayub Khan ruled the country as a virtual military dictator, during which time he tightened the association between Islam and citizenship. As the power-sharing struggle between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan deepened, political struggles in Pakistan began to resemble a politics of musical chairs, with each successive government's grip on power less certain (McGrath 1996, Tudor 2013). These developments caused the civilian bureaucracy and military leaders, especially General Ayub Khan, to assume greater powers of governing, culminating in the 1958 military coup.

Upon his assumption of governing power, General Ayub Khan felt Pakistan needed an ideology to provide the "tremendous power of cohesion" and thus turned toward Islam to provide this glue (Khan 1967, 196). Within a year of assuming power, Ayub Khan wrote a paper entitled "Islamic Ideology in Pakistan," which was circulated among army officers and which mainstreamed Islam as defining the nation among Pakistan's military (Gauhar 1996, 93). The key mechanism through which Ayub transmitted an Islamic ideology more generally was the educational curricula, which communicated that Pakistan was conceived during Islam's arrival on the subcontinent, in which Muslim Mughal rule was heavily glorified, and which highlighted differences between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan at the expense of the syncretic religious tradition that had dominated the areas constituting Pakistan for many centuries (Nayyar and Salim 2005). Ayub also created the Ministry of Information and the Bureau of National Reconstruction, which standardized the Islamic messages taught through schools.

Recognizing that invoking Islam to legitimate state power could potentially endanger state authority, state leaders attempted to make Islamic teachings compatible with state sovereignty over religion. Ayub claimed the authority to interpret Islamic citizenship by creating a Central Institute for Islamic Research. Led by Oxford-educated Fazlur Rahman, the institute interpreted Islamic teachings in ways that were compatible with the ultimate sovereignty of the state. Unsurprisingly, Rahman was opposed by *ulama*, who were able to force Rahman to resign when dissatisfaction grew against Ayub's rule in the late 1960s. On issue after issue—the definition of the Muslim calendar for announcing Ramadan, population control, the practices of polygamy and divorce—the *ulama* successfully determined government policy, marking a growing power of Islamic authority as the state settled. By the end of Ayub Khan's rule, Pakistani citizenship was clearly defined by Islam.

The Deepening of Islamic Nationalism

Military rule under Ayub Khan witnessed a further strengthening of links between religion and the nation through two main channels. First, after East Pakistan seceded in 1971, a newly shrunken Pakistan was overwhelmingly Muslim, which loosened any demographic constraints on political leaders appealing to Islam for political legitimation. Second, colonially trained military generals, bureaucrats, and judges who had been taught to abstain from religious legitimation were gradually replaced by those who had been immersed in the increasing religious fervor of the Ayub Khan era. During the next decades then, Pakistani politics became less focused on questions of *whether* to centralize Islam, as this was now a largely settled question. Instead, the political agendas increasingly became focused upon questions of *how* one should enforce Islamic precepts within and through the state.

When Ayub Khan stepped down in 1969 and transferred power to another military general, Yayha Khan, Yayha's short two years in power also saw him appealing to Islam (e.g., by banning any published materials that were offensive to Islam) for political legitimation, though he was not particularly known for this religious devotion (Feldman 1975, 47). When the first national elections were held in December 1970, the strongly secular Awami League in East Pakistan had won an overwhelming majority in half of the country, while the "Islamic socialist" Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won a majority in West Pakistan. Official accounts of events in Pakistan maintain that a military-sponsored campaign of demobilization began in the early months of 1971 only after power-sharing talks between the two victorious parties broke down. As has been well documented, however, the bloody genocide that occurred was planned well in advance and effectively ignored by the United States (Bass 2013). In June, addressing a country engaged in civil war, Yayha asserted that "Every one of us is a mujahid" (Hornsby 1971). With India's intervention escalating the domestic war into a short-lived international war, Yayha presided over the breakup of the country and the secession of Bangladesh. Within days of the West Pakistani troops surrendering, Yayha was removed from power.

The subsequent period of democratic politics under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not, and increasingly could not, decouple religion from state matters. Because Bhutto had campaigned upon a platform of Islamic socialism and increasingly came under attack from *ulama*, who insisted that socialism was anti-Islamic, Bhutto's rhetoric became ever more Islamic. Already at the start of his government, he unequivocally stated that he was "first a Muslim and then a Pakistani," a tendency that only became more pronounced throughout his tenure. The 1973 constitution went beyond the 1949 Objectives Resolution and now required the occupants of the two highest offices in the country—the president and prime minister—to be Muslim.

In 1974, a near-repeat of the 1953 riots over the Ahmadi community's definition of themselves as Muslims again led to wide-scale religious riots. In this case, however, in a telling sign of how far Islamization had progressed, there was no longer a prime minister in power who was willing or able to resist the demands of the *ulama*. In September 1974, Bhutto ushered through the Second Amendment to the Pakistan Constitution, stipulating that the Ahmadi community were not Muslims. The union between the state and religion was now written into the founding template of the country. From this time forward, Pakistan has unambiguously promoted Islam.

With another military coup in 1977, the Islamization policies of General Zia ul-Haq took center stage for the longest single period of government in Pakistan's history to date. Zia mainstreamed the Islamization of Pakistan in a much more comprehensive way than had been done before. Zia criminalized all manner of the Ahmadi community's activities and created shariʿa courts with the power to strike down laws deemed un-Islamic. He also enacted Islamic laws, rendering mandatory Islamic education in schools and in the military training academies, and requiring daily prayers for government. The Hudood Ordinances of 1979 legalized flogging, stoning, and amputation for crimes such as adultery and alcohol consumption. Blasphemy laws were introduced that criminalized any speech deemed offensive to Islam. The scope for Pakistan to protect the freedom of speech and association was now systematically impaired, preventing all subsequent governments from delinking Islam and citizenship. Debates over national policy no longer questioned *whether* Islam should be the central ideology of the state, but instead focused upon questions of *which interpretation* of Islam was appropriate for the state to pursue.

Yet, as is often the case when religions are adopted as central to the national imagining, these debates have not settled questions of who is a citizen. As with all universalist faiths, a range of pasts, ideologies, and sects serves only to unify in the case of an agreed-upon enemy (which, in Pakistan's case, has been India). More commonly, however, since foreign policy cannot long assume center stage in domestic politics, the centrality of faith provides ample fodder for politically divisive debates that consume politics.

The marginalization of Ahmadis that took place in the first few decades was expanded to mainstream the marginalization of the 15–20 percent of Muslims who are Shiʿa, as well as, increasingly, Sunni Muslims who speak out for the civil liberties of minorities (Malik 2002, Nasr 2007). Democratic and military governments alike have consequently borrowed from the Islamist playbook, with real or imagined indignities against Islam derailing governments and distracting from substantive economic and political questions that more prominently occupy politics in neighboring India. In 1984 General Zia required all citizens applying for a Pakistani passport to swear an oath that Ahmadis are not Muslims, epitomizing the relationship between mainstream Islam and Pakistan. Groups such as the Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba of Pakistan (ASSP) demanded that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state, spurring on the creation of Shiʿa organizations such as the Tehrik-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jaafria (TNFJ), which instead demanded the implementation of a Shiʿa version of Islamic laws. Questions surrounding the role of religion have been central concerns in every administration since Zia's and have regularly been used to legitimate fewer civil and political liberties for minorities. "If you want to destroy someone in public life [in Pakistan] it is enough to drop a hint that they are Ahmadi" (Hanif 2010).

After Zia's death in 1988, civilian and military governments alike have, with little choice, acceded to Islamic authorities on important issues and further circumscribed what limited space there is for minorities to coexist as equal citizens. In 1989, Retribution and Compensation Ordinances enabled victims of murder or assault to pay "blood money" for "honor killings," or cases where a male family member kills a woman or her lover for bringing dishonor to the family. During the 1990s, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered TV actresses to wear veils and made the death penalty mandatory for those convicted of blasphemy. In 2011, when the mainstream politician Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, spoke out against these laws by defending a Christian mother of five sentenced to death for alleged blasphemy, he was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards, a member of the traditionally syncretic Barelvi sect. President Zardari was so concerned for his safety he was unable to attend the funeral of Taseer, a close friend (Gall 2011).

Much like Indonesia, Pakistan had entered independent statehood with a political party that had possessed little in the way of clear policies, power-sharing agreements, or organizational capacity to enforce governing agreements. Yet unlike Indonesia, Pakistan's early decades witnessed a continual linking of religion with national identity. The effect of this difference, over time, would be to provide regular fodder for the state to target those citizens deemed second-class, and for military intervention into democratic politics (Shaikh 2009, Devji 2013). Military regimes have supported key religious leaders, who in turn demand strict adherence to Pakistan's blasphemy laws and persecution against sects. During ostensibly democratic governments, the military has regularly used religious disturbances to destabilize civilian governments, which in turn renders civilian governments ever more reluctant to protect the rights of religious minorities. This is Pakistan's state of affairs to the modern day. The grounding of genuinely democratic politics would require not only the military to stay in the barracks and overcome its propensity to enact coups, but, just as importantly, a reimagining of Pakistan that enables the country to pursue policies that are not subject to the whims of Islamic *ulama*.

Indonesia: Inclusive Nationalism and Party Weakness Promotes Unstable Democracy

Like Pakistan, Indonesia possessed myriad social cleavages of region and language within a Muslim-majority.[1] But unlike Pakistan, Indonesia forged a remarkably inclusive founding national narrative in the decades preceding its colonial independence in 1949. Inequalities of religion were strongly and deliberately eschewed in the foundling Indonesian nation-state. But while Indonesia's leading nationalist organization, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or PNI), advanced an inclusive founding national narrative, Indonesia also entered independent statehood lacking a developed party organization, which was to prove critical in cementing democratic rule in India. As in Pakistan, constitutional compromises over religion and region, as well as power-sharing compromises, proved chronically difficult to forge, and increasing political instability saw a military coup ending Indonesia's tentative democratic experiment. Yet in 1989, after the Indonesian military substantively retreated to the barracks, Indonesia emerged as one of Asia's steadiest democracies. Today, that trend is primarily threatened by the increasing inroads Islamists have made in redefining Indonesia.

Inclusive Anticolonial Indonesian Nationalism Bridges Key Social Divides

Colonial Indonesia was ruled by dividing communities through maps, censuses, and museum (Anderson 1998). The express intent and actual effect of colonial divide-and-rule policies was to produce status inequalities between racial, ethnic, religious, and regional communities. Indonesia's Dutch colonial state forged particular communities of support among non-Muslim and non-Javanese populations. As in many Southeast Asian countries, colonial policies also enticed a sizable ethnic Chinese population to emigrate. Indonesia's new Chinese community prospered considerably and became the first non-European business community of any size in Dutch Indonesia by the dawn of the twentieth century.

Just as in British India, the growing dominance of a new social group stimulated a reaction in the form of a political organization protecting the status quo. In Indonesia's case, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) was founded in 1912 and harnessed resentment over Dutch favoritism toward the Chinese (Reid 2010). Just as in British India, the early decades of the twentieth century also witnessed the burgeoning of religious revival organizations, which generally pursued various reform agendas that sought to influence Islamic practices across Indonesia.

As in Pakistan, the two decades before independence were the formative period for Indonesian nationalism. In 1927, Indonesia's nationalist movement, the Indonesian National Party (PNI) was founded. Just as in Pakistan, the party grew under the efforts of a single charismatic leader—the well-educated, twenty-six-year-old Sukarno. Unlike in Pakistan however, Indonesia's nationalist movement espoused an inclusive nationalism that transcended the major religious, regional and ethnic divides and managed to bridge colonially-emphasized social cleavages in an attempt to present a united front against the Dutch colonial regime. The basis of Sukarno's movement and the PNI Youth Pledge focused upon "unity" across all of the most salient social divides (McVey 1970). The PNI Youth Pledge in 1928 promoted unity across every one of Indonesia's salient social cleavages.

One important dimension through which the PNI practiced inclusivity was through its choice of language for mobilization. When the First Congress of Indonesian Youth was held in 1926, some individuals suggested Malay be used as the language of an independent Indonesia. Just two years later, Malay was adopted as the language of the Congress, and the name of the new Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) was introduced. The PNI platform called for the language of Indonesia to be based on Malay. Malay was chosen as the national language as a means to unify the 13,000 islands, despite of the fact that the Javanese were by far the single largest ethnic grouping (nearly 50 percent of the population) and made up a significant proportion of its educated elite. "Malay conveyed a message of democratic inclusiveness, unlike the more hierarchical Javanese, in which levels of language are used to reinforce status differences between the aristocracy and the lowest class" (Bertrand 2003, 273).

In addition to choosing an inclusive language, The PNI-led nationalist movement used discursively egalitarian language. Sukarno fostered the use of an egalitarian form of address, *Bung*—loosely translated as "comrade/brother"—among both PNI leaders and followers. "[The word] *Bung* was instrumental in bringing about a sociopolitical unity by reducing all to a commonly associated bond" (Sundstrom 1957, 135). In contrast to Jinnah in Pakistan, Sukarno articulated an ideology that bridged the ideological tension between Marxist and non-Marxist nationalists. This broadly inclusive ideology of *Marhaenism* was, much like India's trusteeship policy, an "attempt to draw as many groups as possible into the revolutionary struggle along with the proletariat" (Dahm 1969, 344). The ideology conceived of political relationships between PNI leaders and citizens in urban and rural areas in egalitarian terms, without the mediation of traditional elites or the dominance of a particular regional or linguistic group.

Unlike in British India, however, the Dutch Indonesian colonial government offered little space for the leading nationalist party to develop organizationally by competing through regional elections. Instead, the Dutch colonial regime banned the PNI in 1931, and it remained organizationally defunct for almost fifteen years, until Japan's wartime invasion led to the release of Sukarno and other nationalists from prison. By this time Sukarno and the PNI were no longer the only nationalist forces on the scene. Though the competition between an array of nationalist forces and the relative lack of programmatic and organizational development within the PNI limited the PNI's ability to comprehensively imprint their vision onto the institutions of state, the inclusive vision it had forged settled and institutionalized over time.

The Settling of Inclusive Nationalism

Indonesia fought to gain its independence for four years after the Second World War concluded, during which time an inclusive narrative of Indonesia deepened. On August 17, 1945, after the Japanese were defeated, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesia's independence from Dutch colonial rule and pronounced a 1945 constitution that enshrined the national philosophy of *Pancasila*. An armed struggle raged for four bloody years before independence was recognized by the Dutch. The reason for the Dutch defeat in 1949 had much to do with a highly localized popular resistance, concentrated in Sumatra and Java, that had unified around a common vision of a free nation under Japanese occupation (Kahin 1952, Anderson 1983).

The concept of *pancasila* enabled Indonesia to be established as a religious but not Islamic state. An effective compromise between the Islamist pressure to establish Indonesia as a religious state, Pancasila, or "Five Principles," stipulated that Indonesians must express faith in one God, though not necessarily the Islamic Allah. Pancasila also enabled Sukarno to recognize Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism as fully Indonesian. By making Pancasila the ideological core of the 1945 constitution, Sukarno had creatively devised a formula that embraced the anti-secularism of Indonesia's Muslims without excluding followers from other world faiths from full membership in the Indonesian nation.

While the prolonged nature of the anti-colonial struggle cohered together the nationalist movement, the PNI was hardly a dominant political force. Instead, it competed against myriad political and social organizations for political supremacy. Moreover, as with Pakistan's Muslim League, Indonesia's PNI lacked the programmatic coherence, organizational experience, and cross-cutting alliances that India's Congress party possessed, and that helped broker stability in early post-independence India. "[T]he heterogeneity of its constituent elements made the PNI an unwieldy political organization" (Kahin 1952, 156). Even if the PNI had been less factionalized, it still lacked the organizational depth to lead the nation-building process. Moreover, the PNI was just one of four parties vying for political supremacy, a fact confirmed by the parliamentary elections of 1955. Just as in Pakistan, the absence of a single, well-organized political party fed a politics of instability. Thus, Indonesia's infant democracy remained vulnerable to authoritarian challenges from the military.

Political Instability and Military Dictatorship

As governments came and went throughout the mid-1950s, and as the PNI proved unable to broker political stability, Sukarno sought to single-handedly create stability by proclaiming emergency powers, declaring martial law in 1957, and proposing a new ideology that combined three ideologies (nationalism, religion, and communism) into a new *Nasakom* ideology as a means of defanging the ideologies of his main rivals (Feith 1962, McVey 1970). Eventually, in the face of what we now know to have been active US support in fomenting regional rebellions, Sukarno claimed broad presidential powers, disbanded the constituent assembly charged with formulating a new constitution, and installed "Guided Democracy" in 1959 (Bevins 2017).

A mere six years later, General Suharto directly assumed political powers through a bloody "New Order" revolution that is estimated to have brutally murdered up to a million Indonesians for affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI). Suharto's military government would stay in power until 1998. Just as in Pakistan, where the country's military was initially politicized and deployed to protect a weak government with little grass-roots support but ended up assuming direct executive power with American support, Indonesia's military moved beyond the barracks and assumed the formal reins of power.

Suharto's regime operated primarily through repression and exclusion, but on the basis of an anti-communist Pancasila-inclusive nationalism that targetted communists rather than upon the basis of an immutable social identity such as religion. The New Order regime also " began in a revived mood of great hostility to all things Chinese, presumably based on its sharp reaction against Sukarno's closeness to Beijing and a virulent anti-communism which provided the legitimation for Suharto's rise to power" (Reid 2010, 70). Yet the Indonesian military's claim to legitimacy also rested on its leading role in the anticolonial revolution, which had centralized inclusive nationalism. Thus, Sukarno's "unitary ideal was kept sacred and central by the military-based regime of General Suharto" (ibid., 45).

Suharto eventually permitted the creation of two weak opposition parties to contest national elections in the early 1970s. These parties were direct incarnations of the PNI (the Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI) and Masyumi (the United Development Party, or PPP [Partai Persatuan Pembangunan]). They were not democratic organizations, engineered as they were for purposes of authoritarian control. The PDI eventually grew into the strongest challenger to the New Order during the mid-1990s. Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, assumed leadership of the PDI in 1993. As she criticized the government more vehemently, however, she was removed from the leadership of the party. The consequent public outcry prompted a violent crackdown against pro-Megawati protesters in Jakarta in November 1996. These dynamics would provide the basis for democratic contestation once the Suharto regime fell in 1998.

While Indonesia's military-led authoritarianism was terribly repressive, it is crucial to underline that Suharto's authoritarianism was *not* created for the purposes of excluding a particular ethnic, regional, religious, or class group from gaining power. Consequently, when the military relinquished power in a context that no longer essentialized the ideological cleavages that defined the Cold War, Indonesia's inclusive founding national narrative helped restore a regime that conceived of a broad range of ethnic, regional, and religious groups as equal citizens, i.e. a democracy.

Military Retreat, Inclusive Nationalism, and Democratic Stability

When Suharto's regime was destabilized by the 1997–1998 financial crisis that rocked much of Southeast Asia, a broadly held view was that he would invariably be replaced by another military leader (Crouch 2000). Yet the dynamics of Suharto's fall revealed the lingering influence of inclusive nationalism as Indonesia ushered in one of Asia's most unlikely democracies.

When the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia, nationalist forces engaged in mass protest. This *reformasi* mobilization transcended every imaginable categorical divide, as the leading Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah saw their leaders assuming anti-regime stances. Though Suharto attempted to target urban ethnic Chinese in an attempt to split the opposition, he was unsuccessful. Once Suharto was removed from power, Indonesia's inclusive nationalism promoted a democracy that readily accommodated ethno-religious diversity and has thus been stably remarried with democratic politics in Indonesia. At the same time, sanctioned as it is by the founding Pancasila principle committed to godly nationalism, political targeting of those without theistic beliefs readily recurs in Indonesia (Menchik 2016).

Since Suharto's fall, Indonesian democracy has combined impressive consolidation with low quality. The combination of dysfunctional parties that fail to promote the interests of their followers and an inclusive founding national narrative together provides a helpful lens through which to understand Indonesia's otherwise puzzling outcome. Unlike in Pakistan, there are no powerful voices calling for a return to military-dominated regimes, providing clear evidence that Suharto's military regime was legitimated through its fight against communism. Once communism was no longer a global threat, there was little ideational justification for authoritarian rule. However, as elsewhere, authoritarian populism continues to be a democratic threat, as leading elites can well be criticized for their failure to fulfill the promise of inclusive Indonesian nationalism.

India: Inclusive Nationalism and a Strong Party Brokers a Stable Democracy

India's eventual nationalist movement, the Indian National Congress, was set up in 1885 by a small group of English-educated elite. Congress initially aimed to only promote electoral reform within the colonial state and to hold civil service examinations in India, two aims which would solely benefit the elite founders of the Congress—a few hundred individuals in a country with a population of over 300 million. Only when these goals were frustrated over the subsequent three decades did this nationalist movement organize mass mobilization. Beginning in 1920, the Congress imported and adapted the idiom of mass nationalism, claiming it represented a new nation of India. Crucially, this nationalist movement did not embrace religion in defining India, but instead promulgated a conception of the nation that was based on secularism and linguistic inclusion.

During the nearly three decades of mass mobilization that followed, Congress adopted and adapted the idea of a nation to the local social context. Unusually, India's nationalist movement evolved a national narrative that did not build on Hinduism, the religion of approximately three-quarters of the population. Because the social fabric of precolonial and colonial India was defined by caste—an endogamous and religiously sanctioned social category that Hinduism recognized and reinforced in most interactions, including among Muslims—the very conception of a nationalism that treated religious minorities as equal citizens required a conceptual separation between private and public identities (Rudolph and Rudolph 2006). Because Congress leaders were striving to hold together a nationalist movement in a highly diverse society, they rejected religion as the basis for the nation and also sought a limited degree of social reform that helped broker a public sphere of citizenship. Espousing a relatively inclusive creedal nationalism was necessary not only in order to call a new nation into being, but also, and just as importantly, to prevent the emerging national movement from fracturing in the face of the colonial regime's persistent attempts to impede burgeoning nationalism (Anderson 1983, Tudor 2013).

By experimenting with different approaches during the period between 1920 and 1947, Congress leaders grew to understand that a united national movement necessitated a clear separation between the dominant religion of colonial India, namely Hinduism, and the Indian nation, because it would otherwise be prone to fracturing in the face of colonial *divide et impera* policies. Basic secular principles were thus written into the Congress's founding charter. While many Congress leaders were also simultaneously involved in Hindu reform movements, they drew a clear line between religious reform and political reform.

At its annual meeting in 1931, for example, the Congress adopted a formal policy that prohibited it from adopting any policy to which a majority of either Hindu or Muslim members objected—thereby providing for a minority veto on anything that was deemed sensitive. The same year, at a time when most European nations had yet to do so, India adopted a universal adult franchise internally, and argued that the universal franchise was an essential step in the fight for *purna swaraj*, or total independence. In 1935, once electoral competition was normalized as the route to political power, local political disputes regularly assumed religious overtones. Yet as a matter of formal policy and as a matter of practice, India's nationalist movement rejected Hinduism as the core building block of the Indian nation.

Beyond demarcating a clear line between the nation and the religion of the demographic majority, the Congress's nationalism was linguistically inclusive. As it engaged in mass mobilization beginning in the early 1920s, it created twenty-one regions in which nationalist organizing would be done primarily in regional languages, rendering the nationalist cause accessible to a broader class of society.

Finally, the Congress attempted to be socioeconomically inclusive, most notably by using "cloth nationalism" to communicate the contours of the new nation to a largely illiterate society. It was for this reasons that top Congress leaders universally traded in their Western clothes by the 1930s, which set the English-educated elite apart from their countrymen, and began to wear *khadi*, the homespun clothing that became the uniform of the nationalist movement (Trivedi 2003). Wearing homespun cloth was simultaneously a form of economic nationalism, hurting British cloth exports, as well as a means of generating national solidarity in a deeply hierarchical society. Cloth nationalism enabled a broad range of class actors to participate in the nationalist movement.

The Indian National Congress's nationalism was also socioeconomically inclusive insofar as its signature mobilizing tactic was nonviolent civil disobedience. The use of nonviolence, which most clearly emerged during the 1930–1931 Civil Disobedience protest, enabled wealthy industrialists and landless laborers alike to participate in the national movement without fear of violence. In particular, Gandhi's theory of trusteeship neutralized the potential opposition of wealthy industrialists, many of whom had benefitted from close relations with the colonial regime.

To be sure, conflict between cleavages of Indian society, especially along Hindu-Muslim lines during the 1930s, grew steadily as electoral politics grew in import. But overall, and especially in relative terms across Asian colonies, India's national movement was notable for its institutionalization of an inclusive nationalism along the dimensions of religion, language, and class within the purview of the well-organized Congress movement, which brokered the adoption of universal adult franchise within the Indian constitution and restrained the military from political intervention. It was because Congress leaders had popularized an inclusive Indian nation for decades as a way of gaining political power that there was little question of reneging on the democratic institutions of elections and broad civil rights for all once independence was achieved (Tudor 2013).

Inclusive Nationalism Adjudicates an Early Democratic Challenge

India's relatively inclusive conception of nation not only helped to create, but also to maintain, Indian democracy at crucial moments in its post-independence history. Notably, India's inclusive nationalism was harnessed by regional politicians to ultimately force the national government to reorganize subnational states upon a linguistic basis. The anticolonial Congress movement conducted its party business along linguistic lines starting in 1920.

During the pre-independence mobilizations, Congress also adopted linguistic inclusivity as official policy. Upon independence, as the horrors of Partition were unleashed and several states tried to secede from the Union of India, Congress leaders reversed their commitment to linguistic states because they felt doing so would boost the secessionist fevers burning across India. It was for this reason that government commissions in 1948 and 1949 recommended against the linguistic reorganization of states.

However, when regional language movements employed the ideals and tactics of inclusive nonviolent civil disobedience, which nationalist leaders themselves employed, nationalist leaders ultimately found it necessary to accommodate the regional movements for language autonomy. Throughout his tenure as India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru clearly opposed the linguistic reorganization of states. Nevertheless, Nehru ultimately accepted the need to reorganize colonial states upon a linguistic basis, both because of a long-standing commitment to an inclusive nation and because subnational movements employed the tactic of nonviolent mobilization that had been long legitimated during the anticolonial agitations. At a time when Nehru was at the height of his influence, he ultimately agreed to reorganize Indian states along linguistic lines. The single most contentious policy issue in India's post-independence decade was thus resolved, and India's democracy consequently stabilized, in part due to the inclusive nature of India's national narrative.

Inclusive Nationalism Coalesces the DemocraticOpposition

India's most severe democratic crisis occurred after Indira Gandhi assumed the position of prime minister in 1966. Top Congress bosses chose Indira Gandhi to succeed Lal Bahadur Shastri because of her pliable nature and dynastic legitimacy (Kidwai 1996). Indira's introduction of independent and left-leaning policies, despite the opposition of the party's conservative regional leaders, ultimately led to a party split in 1969. In the 1971 national elections, this split played out in national elections, with the older Congress (O) leading a coalition that campaigned on a platform of "*Indira hatao*" (remove Indira), while Indira's Congress (R) responded with a highly populist position that instead promised "*garibi hatao*" (remove poverty). When Indira's party returned with 352 of 518 parliamentary seats, Indira's populist strategy was vindicated.

Armed with an electoral landslide, Indira Gandhi sought to institutionally strengthen the position of the prime minister. Amid a deteriorating economy following the 1973 oil crisis, popular movements against corruption led by former Gandhi associate Jayprakash Narayan gained traction. When the JP movement eventually targeted Indira Gandhi herself, she arrested her political opposition, clamped down upon civil liberties, and suppressed media freedom, beginning on the evening of June 26, 1975.

During the subsequent twenty-one months, a period that became known as the Emergency, both the incumbent prime minister and her political opposition consistently tried to appeal to the public in terms of an inclusive nationalism. In her speeches announcing and justifying the Emergency, it is notable that Indira Gandhi attempted, however thinly disguised this rhetoric may have been, to use inclusive nationalism to justify her actions (Baloch 2017, 77). In her first television interview after the Emergency was declared, Gandhi stated, "Indian democracy will be threatened when any party of the extreme Right or extreme Left comes to power. It is being weakened by those who, claiming to be non-violent and democratic, give respectability to and ally themselves with fanatic religious organizations and with parties wedded in terrorism. *What holds India together is the trust that all regions and all its religious groups will have a fair deal*" (Gandhi 1975, 63; emphasis added). Indira Gandhi also sought to refute any claim that she was undermining the right to nonviolent protest (*satyagraha*) by arguing that she was protecting a core tenet of the India's nationalism-secularism: "I have always said that if somebody wants to do such a satyagraha, it does not matter because we are not against satyagraha as such; we are not against criticism as such; we are not against opposition; what we are against is when a small minority [the RSS] tries to gag the vast majority of our country" (ibid.).

But Indira Gandhi's opposition more successfully harnessed inclusive nationalism during India's most crucial election to date. On January 18, 1977, Indira Gandhi ended the Emergency by releasing political prisoners and scheduling March elections. During the eight weeks that followed, opposition across the political spectrum unified and coordinated to put forth a single opposition candidate across most districts. The question of civil liberties and the future of Indian democracy were the central issues of the 1977 national election. In its messaging, the Janata coalition emphasized the need to restore civil liberties (Weiner 1977). The right to protest, so fundamental to the Indian nation, as defined three decades earlier, helped the opposition to garner the largest percentage of votes ever gained by a non-Congress party. In perhaps democracy's most pivotal moment, the founding right to protest was invoked and successfully claimed by opposition forces.

Exclusive Nationalism Gains Traction

In recent decades, India's inclusive national identity has been increasingly supplanted by an exclusive national narrative that is making Hinduism central to the Indian nation. To the extent that the Hinduism becomes a defining feature of India's core national identity, India's democracy is likely to be significantly weakened. To be sure, some strands of nationalism identified the Indian nation with Hinduism (Jaffrelot 1999). But until recently, Hinduism could not be said to define the dominant conception of the Indian national. This changed with the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, when Hindutva, a conservative ideology that identifies the Indian nation with a pure ideal of Hinduism, became mainstreamed in Indian politics (Hansen 1999, Anand 2011).

When the Indian economy did not grow under Modi's first term, the government's platform, especially in the 2019 election, unsurprisingly turned toward a celebration of Hindu nationalism (Chandra 2017). The Modi government has systematically sought to replace a largely syncretic religious history of the Indian subcontinent with a monolithic narrative that positions Hindus as the only authentic citizens of India, and that, importantly, selectively fabricates a Hindu-centric history of India. Prior to the 2014 election, for example, the Modi campaign engaged in regular speeches that called the devout Hindu Sardar Patel a more legitimate founding father than the avowedly secular Jawaharlal Nehru. What at first glance may appear to be an obscure historical footnote was instead only the most visible element of a systematic campaign to centrally focus upon Hinduism as the marker of India's national identity. The attempt to manufacture a cultural primacy for Hindus impelled the elevation of Patel's profile, which has included building the world's tallest statue at a cost of $430 million. But the singular focus on Hinduism as defining India is also in evidence in the rewriting of classic historical texts to elevate the historical role of Hinduism and omit the contributing roles of other religions and minorities, including new holidays to honor Hindu figures, omitting "secular" from the preamble to the Indian Constitution on posters celebrating National Day, the renaming of Muslim streets, the removal of Muslim names in textbooks, and the omission of Muslim monuments (Tudor 2018, Ranganathan 2019).

To the extent that the Indian nation is seen as an exclusively Hindu nation, Indian democracy is likely to see the democratic backsliding on civil rights that has been typical of religious minorities in Pakistan. In India, nine out of ten religiously motivated hate crimes in the last decade occurred after Modi took power, and police have systematically "stalled investigations, ignored procedures or even played a complicit role in the killings and cover-ups of crimes [against minorities]" (Human Rights Watch 2019). The "obvious impunity for the string of crimes [against minorities] that have taken place, and their shameful valorization by some leaders, is distinctly a strong factor in their continuation" (Daruwala, in Human Rights Watch 2019). While it is too early to tell how enduringly the Modi government will have redefined the national narrative, to the extent that this remains the case, Indian democracy is less likely to endure.

CONCLUSION

Across the postcolonial world in the middle of the twentieth century, indigenous elites imagined, mobilized, and institutionalized new nations. In doing so, they made strategic decisions about what social cleavages, if any, these new nations build upon. These decisions, often pivoting upon short-term considerations such as how the economic and political interests of this elite were contextually advanced, had far-reaching consequences for the likelihood and stability of the country's post-colonial democracy. Across the Muslim world, as elsewhere in the postcolonial world, the choice of whether to make religion the core identity of the nation was particularly impactful. This is because the founding narratives of nation proved particularly sticky, alternatively facilitating or limiting the political scope of religious institutions and emboldening political entrepreneurs to use founding ideals to pursue political power (Gryzmala-Busse 2015).

In all three Asian countries examined here, Islam was a major religion. Yet only in Pakistan did the closeness of identification between Islam and nation serve to derail the tentative democracy instantiated upon colonial independence. In Indonesia, a crucial separation between Islam and nation was created through the principles of *pancasila*, which helped to limit destabilizing debates about the role of Islam in politics. An inclusive national narrative was no guarantee of democracy. But when democracy broke down in places with an inclusive national narrative such as Indonesia, it was crucially *not* because religion became politicized. And in India, a clear line between religion and nation has helped the unlikeliest democracy in the world to endure, a democratic resource that is increasingly threatened by a government seeking to closely identify the nation with the religion of the demographic majority. To the extent that this is successful, democracy is likely to weaken in India.

Together, these cases illustrate how narratives of nation that eschew religion, while in no way guaranteeing democracy, can either create or remove a significant hurdle that new democracies encounter in the struggle to stabilize. In and of itself, Islam poses no particular threat to democracy. Rather, a close relationship between *any* religion and the national identity can bedevil democracy.

NOTE

1. This section draws upon a previous paper coauthored with Dan Slater from the University of Michigan. For related papers, see Slater and Tudor (2019) and Tudor and Slater (2020).

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CHAPTER 9

MILITARY POLITICS IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

NICHOLAS J. LOTITO

AUTHORITARIANISM is more prevalent in Muslim societies today than in other world regions, but it has not always been so. Instead, Muslim societies have been left out of global gains in civil and political rights over the past half-century. A prominent argument attributes the "robustness of authoritarianism" in the Middle East to the strength of the coercive apparatuses, including the police and military (Bellin 2004). Does this argument apply to the broader Muslim world as well? And how does the military specifically contribute to the institutionalization of authoritarianism and its survival?

Examining cross-national data, I find that the democratic deficit observed in the Middle East characterizes the broader Muslim world as well. By way of explanation, I consider how the armed forces can contribute to the persistence of authoritarian rule. In many Muslim-majority countries, the military has sustained authoritarianism by violently suppressing anti-regime protests, thereby foreclosing the possibility of mass-based democratization. Examining global patterns of democratization since the 1970s, I find that military repression of large-scale protests has been more likely in Muslim-majority states than elsewhere. I illustrate the role of the military in responding to popular uprisings through the cases of the Arab Spring, then turn to explaining military violence against protesters.

To explain the prevalence of military repression in the Muslim world, I focus on three factors: security threats, foreign military aid, and organizational cultures within the armed forces. I find the Muslim world has been characterized by chronic insecurity, high levels of foreign assistance, and authoritarian tendencies embedded in the organizational cultures of the armed forces. These factors may all contribute to a higher propensity for Muslim-majority armies to intervene in politics, including by repressing protests. By contrast, I do not find evidence that factors related to Islam as a culture or religion have any systematic effect on military behavior. Several cases of successful democratization in the region demonstrate that authoritarianism is not an immutable feature of Muslim-majority societies.

Persistent Authoritarianism

Many authoritarian regimes *outside* the Muslim world have seen substantial improvements in civil liberties and political rights since the 1970s—Huntington's (1991) "third wave" of democratization—but Muslim-majority states have been largely left behind. Freedom House, the US-based NGO, has been tracking civil liberties and political rights around the world for the past half-century. Figure 9.1 plots the average score in each category (on a seven-point scale) annually from 1972 to 2017, grouping more developed countries, Muslim-majority developing countries, and other developing countries.

Over the period, full democracy (rated "Free") has been limited mostly to wealthy states with advanced industrial economies, represented here by OECD membership. Among poorer countries, the level of freedom was quite low in 1972, and the gap between Muslim-majority and other developing countries was small. Since the late 1970s, however, there has been a marked divergence: the Muslim world has remained predominantly authoritarian even as other states have realized democratic gains. While the average score for non-Muslim developing countries is today near the top of the "Partly Free" category, the average for Muslim-majority countries remains "Not Free." Among Muslim-majority states, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has lower average scores, but other Muslim-majority developing countries still lag far behind the non-Muslim average.[1]



FIGURE 9.1: Freedom in the World Index, 1972–2017.
Note: Excludes Muslim-majority.

Source: Data from Freedom House.

Why have Muslim societies been so resistant to democratization? As Eva Bellin (2004) has argued, the answer lies not in the absence of democratizing forces or prerequisites, but in the exceptional strength of authoritarianism in these countries. In other words, Muslim-majority states remain authoritarian because the regimes that have held power since independence are exceptionally resilient. In particular, the robustness of authoritarianism depends on the strength of the coercive apparatus: the civilian and military forces that repress dissent, undermine civilian political control, and suppress mass mobilization.

In societies where pent up demand for democratization has long been suppressed, popular uprisings are a natural pathway to political change. Between 1946 and 2010, 17 percent of cases of authoritarian breakdown occurred due to popular uprisings, which became more common after the end of the Cold War (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 179). The most common causes of regime collapse were coups d'état (35 percent) and elections (26 percent). While election-related transitions often lead to democratic regimes, such meaningful elections are unlikely to take place in the entrenched authoritarian regimes of the Muslim world. Coups d'état, on the other hand, rarely led to democratic rule during the Cold War, when they were common in the Muslim world. Coups have more often led to democratization in the post–Cold War period, but they have become less frequent as authoritarian leaders have employed coup-proofing strategies (Marinov and Goemans 2014). If both meaningful elections and coups d'état have become unlikely, popular uprisings may be the clearest pathway to democracy in many Muslim-majority societies.

Because political mobilization under authoritarianism is risky for individual participants, we are less likely to see the emergence of large-scale, pro-democracy mobilization where there is a high degree of routine political repression. Authoritarian regimes employ various internal security forces, including police, gendarmes, and intelligence services, to monitor citizens' political activities and limit mobilization. In many cases, the military contributes to this "routine" repression as well, usurping or duplicating the domestic roles of civilian forces. For example, Egypt has three main intelligence services.[2] Rather than working together in a cohesive interagency process, the components of Egypt's fragmented intelligence community duplicate many of the same roles in an effort to counterbalance each other and secure political influence (Kandil 2012; Sirrs 2010). This competition among civilian and military institutions is a common feature of authoritarian governance and can exacerbate the degree of repression.

Beyond its role in routine repression, the military also plays a unique political role as the regime's last bulwark against revolution. In most cases of mass protest, the police are up to the task of basic repression, dispersing crowds, and restoring calm. But if mass mobilization grows sufficiently large, protesters will eventually overwhelm the capacity of the civilian security forces. When protests escalate beyond the repressive capacity of the police, leaders must choose whether to resort to the most severe form of physical repression: military force against unarmed citizens. Because the military generally has the physical capacity to violently disperse demonstrations, the military often becomes a de facto arbiter between protesters and the regime. Military violence does not guarantee that an anti-regime uprising will fail, but the cessation of such violence is often a prerequisite for the movement's success. A revolutionary outcome is often marked by a loss of the monopoly of force, which occurs when the regime or the military is unwilling to use (sufficient) force against protesters (Tilly 1993, 241). As such, no process of political liberalization can go forward without the support, or at least tolerance, of the armed forces (Barany 2012).

MILITARY REPRESSION OF PROTESTS

Is military repression of nonviolent uprisings more likely in Muslim-majority states? I test this proposition using original data on military responses. First, I identify popular uprisings from 1946 to 2013 using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 data set (Chenoweth and Shay 2019). I include protest campaigns that were primarily nonviolent, called for regime change, and included at least 100,000 participants. To focus on the role of the military, I exclude campaigns that were suppressed by internal security forces alone, without requiring military backup. For each of the resulting 86 campaigns, I code a categorical *military repression* variable to indicate the level of violence employed against protesters by the armed forces.[3]

These data, summarized in Figure 9.2, illustrate three key findings. First, military violence is a common response to large protests, regardless of world region or time period.



FIGURE 9.2: Military responses to popular uprisings, 1946–2013.

Source: Data from NAVCO 2.1 (Chenoweth and Shay 2019); Lotito (2018b).

In cases where protests overwhelmed the repressive capacity of internal security forces, the military responded with violence 66.3 percent of the time. The high rate of military involvement underscores the pivotal role the army plays in revolution. Many cases of military violence ultimately resulted in success for the movement, but this does not suggest the military was therefore unimportant. Instead, the decisive moment in many such revolutionary situations is when the military stands down or switches sides.

Second, uprisings in the Muslim world have been more likely to face military repression. Nonviolent uprisings in Muslim-majority countries are one-third more likely to face military violence than similar protests in other countries (82 percent vs. 61 percent).[4] Where the armed forces are more willing to use violence to defend the regime, we are less likely to see mass challenges in the first place, because many protesters will be deterred by the risk of violent repression. Because taking to the streets in this repressive context is a strong signal of the movement's robust popular support, we might expect the military to be more reticent to use violence. Instead, the data show a low rate of large protests, but a high rate of military repression, across the Muslim world.

Third, the pattern of military repression mirrors trends in democratization. The "third wave" of democratization is clearly visible in the data from 1970 to 2010. During this period, the rate of military repression declined substantially, contributing to the success of so many democratization campaigns worldwide. However, the loosening of military repression took place only *outside* the Muslim world. By contrast, the rate of violent military repression remained high in Muslim-majority countries throughout the period. We may conclude that the continuity of authoritarianism in most Muslim-majority states is at least partially attributable to the robustness of military repression as a counterbalance to democratizing pressures.

These data offer only a partial story of pro-democratic mobilization in the Muslim world. Notably, they leave out the many protests that never matured into large, sustained campaigns, whether due to police repression, government concessions, or other causes. As the data illustrate, there have been relatively few protest campaigns in the Muslim world that have reached the threshold of potential military intervention. With fewer uprisings, we can expect fewer successes, so the non-emergence of large uprisings is an important cause of authoritarian stability. It is likely that high levels of domestic repression, carried out primarily by police and intelligence services, played an important role in preventing these uprisings from growing to revolutionary scale.

When the Arab Spring protests began in 2010, they quickly spread to virtually every country in a region where previous mobilization was limited. The widespread mobilization of the Arab Spring suggests that Muslim populations were not unmotivated to demand change, but rather that structural obstacles to mobilization had prevented the emergence of mass movements earlier. That most of these uprisings ended in military repression starkly demonstrates the military's power to sustain authoritarianism. Where national armies did not engage in repressing the protests (Egypt and Tunisia), old political leaders were swept from power.[5] But where national armies brought to bear their full military might against civilians (Bahrain and Syria), existing regimes remained in power. Even where the military split apart and mutinous troops joined the ranks of armed rebellion (Libya and Yemen), military repression kept leaders in power until foreign intervention tipped the balance.

Scholars have widely recognized the central role of the military in responding to the Arab Spring, and many have attempted to explain variations in military responses. Most of this research frames the question of military responses to protest in terms of *defection* and points to various factors that might influence the military's loyalty to the regime (Albrecht et al. 2016; Albrecht and Ohl 2016; Barany 2011; Bellin 2012; Hazen 2019; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2013). In this view, the critical question for military officers is whether to "defect or defend" (Lee 2015). Whether loyalty stems from officers' professional values (Bellin 2012; Bou Nassif 2015b; Lutterbeck 2013), material interests (Bou Nassif 2015a; Brooks 2013), or ethnicity (Bou Nassif 2015c), scholars assume that soldiers will refrain from challenging the regime, and will even fight to defend it, as long as they remain faithful to its leader. Although each of these variables—professionalism, material interests, and ethnicity—offers some explanatory power in the Arab Spring cases, none of them seem to vary systematically between Muslim-majority societies and the rest of the world. If some armies in the Muslim world suffer from poor professionalism, patronage relationships, and sectarianism, many others are highly professional, well institutionalized, and untroubled by ethnic divisions.[6]

EXPLAINING MILITARY RESPONSES TO PROTEST

While the Arab Spring cases help illuminate variations in military responses to protests, as well as the importance of the military to political outcomes, existing theories do not appear to explain the higher rate of military repression in Muslim-majority countries. Why have these armies been so likely to use repression against mass protests? This section investigates three possible explanations for the difference: chronic insecurity, foreign military aid, and military culture.

Chronic Insecurity

As security organizations first and foremost, armies are deeply affected by the security environment in which they operate. Whereas armies in the developed world are generally oriented toward external threats (i.e., foreign invasion), developing states often rely on the military for internal security as well. Scholars of civil-military relations have long warned that the involvement of the military in internal security roles and missions tends to politicize the armed forces, to the detriment of their professionalism and adherence to norms of civilian supremacy (Desch 1999; Huntington 1957, 1995). The risk of military intervention into politics is heightened when civilian institutions are weak and lack



FIGURE 9.3: Incidence of civil war, 1946–2018.
Note: Excludes countries with 2018 population under one million

Source: Data from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

legitimacy (Staniland 2008). In this view, even relatively low-intensity conflict or sporadic terrorist activity can have political consequences if the government turns to the armed forces to manage the threat. Unfortunately, many countries experience chronic violent conflict, so the involvement of the military in internal security becomes almost inevitable.

Political violence is hardly unique to Muslim societies, but the prevalence of civil conflict in the region has given the military an especially prominent role in domestic security. In the post–Cold War era, the Muslim world has experienced significantly more internal violence than other regions of the world (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). This divergence has been produced by a simultaneous increase in the rate of civil war in Muslim-majority countries and a decline in the rate for non-Muslim countries, beginning around 1990 (see Figure 9.3). By 2016 the incidence of civil war had become extremely concentrated, with six of seven active civil wars located in Muslim-majority countries.[7]

Terrorism has also become increasingly frequent in Muslim-majority countries. Despite the common association of radical Islamism with contemporary terrorism, until the 2000s, terrorism was more concentrated in democracies than in authoritarian regimes (Chenoweth 2010; Wilson and Piazza 2013). In the post–Cold War era,



FIGURE 9.4: Islamist terrorism in civil war, 1970–2012.

Source: Data from Terrorism in Armed Conflict (Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin forthcoming).

however, the correlation between regime type and terrorism has been reversed. One possible cause of this shift is that much of the terrorism observed today occurs within civil wars (Findley and Young 2012; Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin 2018; Stanton 2013). As civil wars have become more frequent in Muslim-majority countries, the terrorism rate has increased accordingly. Exacerbating the problem, within civil wars, Islamist groups tend to use terrorism more often than other nonstate combatants (see Figure 9.4). Civil war and terrorism tend to have negative effects on economic and political development, potentially undermining processes that might otherwise support democratization in Muslim-majority countries (Gupta et al. 2004; Neumayer 2004; Nitsch and Schumacher 2004).

The challenges of chronic insecurity are exacerbated when civilians enlist the military as a bulwark against domestic political threats. Islamism—a political ideology that seeks to radically change government and society to conform with Islamic principles—has motivated both violent and nonviolent challenges to the authoritarian status quo. In Muslim-majority societies, Islamists are usually among the most prominent regime opponents. Because Islamists are often quite popular, authoritarian leaders have a genuine fear of Islamist-led popular mobilization. Leaders often respond by empowering the military in an attempt to weaken their Islamist opponents (Cook 2007). Their fear also creates an interest in portraying even peaceful, everyday forms of Islamism as a national security threat. In this way, the question of religion in politics becomes *securitized*, as governments use the language of threat to describe peaceful political participation

(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; McDonald 2008). Securitizing important political debates leads to further deference to the military and provides justification for oppressive national security measures. An example of a tangible legal consequence of this phenomenon is the continuous state of emergency promulgated in Egypt during the entire tenure of President Hosni Mubarak, from 1987 to 2011 (ICJ 2018).

In sum, the tendency of the military to intervene in domestic politics could be a consequence of political violence, which has occurred at a higher rate in the Muslim world than elsewhere in the post–Cold War era. When governments rely on military forces for internal security, it is likely to increase the politicization of the armed forces and their encroachment into additional areas of political life. The problem is exacerbated when authoritarian regimes extend the discourse of domestic security to include peaceful forms of political participation, encouraging soldiers to use violence against peaceful demonstrators.

Military Aid

A second factor that might help explain the high level of military repression in the Muslim world is foreign aid. Scholars have long recognized that international support can be critical to the survival of authoritarian regimes (Skocpol 1979). In fact, the risk of sustaining authoritarianism has encouraged many donors to condition their assistance on political or human rights standards (Carnegie and Marinov 2017; Dunning 2004; Resnick 2018). The likelihood that foreign aid will discourage democratization may also be higher in countries where rulers rely on small distributional coalitions, as in most Muslim-majority countries (Wright 2009). Even when the donors are Western democracies, aid *recipients* include some of the world's most authoritarian regimes. For example, the United States has been the primary international sponsor of authoritarian regimes in Iran (until 1979), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia (until 1998), and other Muslim countries. As Jason Brownlee (2012) demonstrates in Egypt, American support has often helped those regimes stave off domestic pressures for democratization. "Elections and political reform," Brownlee observes, "are welcome only insofar as they impede extremists and enhance stability" (9).

However, the political effects of *military* aid specifically are less well understood. During the Cold War and since, the US and other great powers have provided weapons, training, and budgetary support to their allies' armed forces. Military aid can provide diplomatic benefits and improve security, but it also distorts civil-military relations in the target country by increasing the institutional strength of the military relative to other state institutions (Lotito and Joyce 2020). Military aid is particularly significant in the Muslim world: between 2010 and 2020, Muslim-majority states represented seven of the top ten recipients of US military aid.[8] Owing to the geostrategic importance of many Muslim-majority states and the global threat of Islamist terrorism, the Muslim world has received outsized amounts of foreign military aid. This pattern is clearly reflected in US military aid data (see Figure 9.5).

Military aid comes in many forms. By far the largest category of expenditure relates to the acquisition of weapons systems and other equipment. While this equipment serves no direct political function, it may nevertheless produce political effects by bolstering the organizational strength and capacity of the armed forces relative to other state institutions. In more extreme cases, military aid can exacerbate violence (Boutton 2019; Dube and Naidu 2015). Rather than provide minimal military resources to otherwise defenseless nations, US military aid has supported exceptionally high military spending across the Muslim world. In fact, Muslim-majority states comprise ten of the world's top fifteen military spenders relative to national income.[9] One consequence of extravagant defense spending has been to strengthen the military relative to other state institutions. This imbalance is reflected in public opinion surveys, which consistently find that public trust in the armed forces far outstrips other state institutions in these countries (Lotito 2018a).

A relatively small portion of military assistance is dedicated to training and educating foreign officers. This form of aid is hypothesized to create the possibility of norm change, by exposing recipient military officers to democratic values. In a few cases, Western training has apparently generated some adherence to democratic norms by supporting an intergenerational shift in organizational culture (Soeters and Van Ouytsel 2014). More generally, American training is not associated with democratization (Taylor 2014, chap. 8). Foreign training may also have perverse effects. Savage and Caverley (2017)



Excludes states with population under 500,000. Amounts in constant 2018 US Dollars.

FIGURE 9.5: US foreign aid, 2001–2019.
Note: Excludes states with population under 500,000. Amounts in constant 2018 US dollars.

Source: Data from USAID Greenbook.

find that US military training *increases* coup risk because it strengthens the armed forces relative to the civilian regime. Similarly, Casey (2020) finds that US patronage has done nothing to reduce the risk of military coups.[10] These studies do not offer definitive evidence on the effects of military aid on responses to protest; however, they do suggest that military aid does not typically foster pro-democratic behavior and may instead encourage political intervention by the military.

Military Culture

A third factor that could help explain differences in military responses to protest in Muslim-majority states is military culture. Systematic differences in the organizational cultures of the armed forces in Muslim-majority states could explain general patterns of civil-military relations in these contexts (Lotito 2018b). The organizational culture view of military behavior holds that, like any large organization, the military responds to events based on its existing practices and knowledge. The constituent elements of organizational culture, like shared understandings and repertoires of action, are difficult to observe *ex ante*, so their causal role in producing any particular action can be ambiguous. Nevertheless, we can observe stable patterns of behavior over time and identify historical legacies and critical junctures in institutional development that may have contributed to those patterns. Even if organizational culture does not fully determine military behavior, it can powerfully condition soldiers' responses to protests and, ultimately, whether the army will engage in repression.

This view of organizational culture differs markedly from arguments based on cultural essentialism. For example, a prominent argument holds that *Arab culture* explains the poor battlefield performance of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Libyan, Saudi, and Syrian armies in their wars against Israel (Pollack 2002). By contrast, the organizational culture of the armed forces may be only tangentially related to the broader national culture. Nothing intrinsic to Muslim culture or the religion of Islam explains military intervention into politics, the politicization of counterterrorism, or extraordinary foreign aid flows. Instead, the armed forces of the Muslim world have often been indoctrinated with modernist and nationalist, not religious, ideologies (Picard 2005, 121). Moreover, political intervention by the armed forces has varied greatly across the region. For example, coups d'état are commonplace in some Muslim-majority countries, yet virtually unheard of in others (Powell and Thyne 2011, 255). Similarly, the armed forces have brutally repressed anti-regime mobilization in most cases but forced dictators from power in others. Islamic culture, therefore, fails to explain any observed authoritarian tendency in the military cultures of the Muslim world.

In many Muslim societies, the military plays a dual role, responsible for both national security and regime security. The ways these roles overlap and reinforce each other have resulted in more politically influential armed forces than elsewhere. In the postcolonial states of the Muslim world, the military played a critical role in defining national identity by "erecting and defending its boundaries against external enemies and internal separatist movements" (Picard 2005, 118). Intellectuals and governments alike often viewed the military as "the ideal instrument to direct the industrialization, institutionalization, and reform necessary for a modern society" (Cook 2007, 2). In their role as nation-building institutions, the armed forces have often been indoctrinated with strict secularist ideologies, which encourage violent responses to even nonviolent Islamist activism, encouraging soldiers to view religion through a security lens. In sum, processes of postcolonial nation-building and chronic insecurity in the independence era both tended to enhance the political role of the military in the Muslim world.

A comparison of India and Pakistan illustrates how different military cultures can create divergent patterns of civil-military relations. Since Partition, India has not witnessed a single military coup or other serious breach of military professionalism. Meanwhile, Pakistan is a prime example of how a highly politicized military can serve to sustain authoritarianism in a Muslim-majority country. Superficially, the proportion of Muslims in the two countries (13 percent in India vs. 96 percent in Pakistan) corresponds to their divergent paths of civil-military relations; however, the most compelling explanations for the divergence have nothing to do with religion. Instead, scholars point to historical factors like colonial inheritances (economic and military), the strength of the ruling party in each country, and geopolitical insecurity to explain why civil-military relations have been far more democratic in India than in Pakistan (Staniland 2008; Wilkinson 2015). From a cultural perspective, Shah (2014) argues that the Pakistani army's repeated interference in the political sphere is best explained by norms within the officer corps. This "belief system" informs how soldiers perceive democratic institutions, how they interpret the proper role and function of the military, and how they respond to perceived civilian failures or threats to military interests (8). The organizational culture of the Pakistani military, Shah argues, explains its use of "virtually genocidal" violence against nonviolent Bengali protesters in 1971, among other acts of military repression (112). As Pakistan demonstrates, it is neither Islamic culture nor a universal military mindset that dictates the military's political behavior, but rather an organizational culture specific to a particular national army.

The historical persistence of military organizational culture also underscores the difficulty of democratic transition, particularly in countries where the military has played a central political role. Among the most successful democratic transitions in the Muslim world to date have been in Senegal and Tunisia, which transitioned to multiparty democracy in 2000 and 2011, respectively. Senegal's transition, which overcame potential ethnic divisions within the country, was facilitated by the military's long-held civic-national loyalty (Harkness 2018, chap. 4). In Tunisia, the military's decision not to repress a massive popular uprising enabled a remarkably peaceful transition to democracy (Bou Nassif 2015b; Brooks 2013; Jebnoun 2014; Lotito 2020). In both cases, military culture portended a successful outcome: neither army had been politically central, nor carried out a coup d'état. These factors made the Senegalese and Tunisian armies exceptional by the standards of the Muslim world, and indeed the broader developing world as well. Unfortunately, the military cultures of most of the region's other armies still reproduce authoritarian tendencies, so we should not expect them to embrace democratization anytime soon.

Still, we might take comfort in the observation that even some long-standing military dictatorships have made successful transitions to democracy.[11] In the Muslim world, Indonesia is a striking example of a state that sidelined its formerly dominant military (Lee 2009).[12] If Senegal and Tunisia demonstrate that a long-held culture of nonintervention within the military is the optimal scenario for democratization, Indonesia proves that cultural *change* is also possible. As in many military-dominated regimes, political power in Indonesia became highly personalistic under the thirty-year rule of Suharto. A military officer, Suharto seized power by coup d'état in 1967, then concentrated dictatorial powers in his own office. Having brutally repressed all dissent for many years, Suharto lost power in 1998 when the armed forces ignored his clear and public order to suppress mounting protests. The sudden and decisive shift in military policy resulted from intense conflict and rivalries within army ranks, which created an incentive for the commander of the armed forces, General Wiranto, to defect from the regime (Lee 2015, chap. 4). Yet even as multiparty democracy flourished in Indonesia, it took years of gradual reform to reduce the military's role as a political "veto player" (Mietzner 2013).

CONCLUSION

In many Muslim-majority countries, the military continues to serve as a component of the coercive apparatus that sustains authoritarianism. The military's propensity to engage in repression may be heightened by chronic insecurity, military aid, and organizational cultures favoring the repression of mass protests. As long as these factors persist, the armed forces are likely to deter or suppress future protests. Nevertheless, cases like Indonesia and Tunisia demonstrate that civil-military relations can improve in the longer term.

The Arab Spring transformed the political landscape of the greater Middle East, leading to pervasive insecurity and the retrenchment of authoritarianism. The military was a critical player in the uprisings and continues to gain political influence in a region unsettled by terrorism, civil war, and great power competition. Much scholarship has focused on the unmet promise of the Arab Spring, leaving the prospects for future mass mobilization in doubt. Having prevented revolution in 2011, will the armed forces consolidate their political position, or will the high costs of civil war deter future military repression? Will new economic challenges reinvigorate protest movements?

Finally, when authoritarian regimes do fall, opening a window of opportunity for democracy, the coercive institutions that underpinned the old regime typically remain in place. The continuity of authoritarian institutions represents a serious threat to democratic consolidation, especially when political elites lack strong incentives to carry out difficult institutional reforms (Lotito 2019). Not enough research has been done to understand the circumstances under which these reforms might be accomplished in the Muslim world. Research on the role of the military in democratic transitions in Europe and Latin America has identified critical factors like regional organizations (e.g., NATO and the European Union) or elite pacts, which may not be relevant to Muslim-majority countries (Stepan 1988; Trinkunas 2006). The transitions from military rule in East and Southeast Asia, where popular uprisings swept military-backed regimes from power, may offer more apt comparisons and useful lessons for the Muslim world. If we are serious about understanding the prospects for democratization in the Muslim world, we cannot ignore the radical political transformations that have occurred further east.

Notes

1. For 2017, political rights scores averaged 5.67 for MENA, 5.04 for Muslim developing countries outside MENA, 3.27 for non-Muslim developing countries, and 1.22 for the OECD.
2. These are the General Intelligence Service, or Mukhabarat (under direct control of the president), the military intelligence service (under the Ministry of Defense), and the National Security Agency (under the Ministry of the Interior).
3. For coding details, see Lotito (2018b), 184–186.
4. The difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
5. Egypt's subsequent military coup of July 2013 underscores the pervasive political influence of that country's military.
6. Professionalism is usually defined subjectively, but Muslim-majority countries like Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and the UAE also rate highly on more objective measures, such as expenditure per soldier and the development of national military academies or military periodicals (Toronto 2017).
7. They are Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. The other war was an Islamist insurgency in Nigeria, where the population is approximately half-Muslim.
8. The others were Israel, Ukraine, and Russia (to which aid was eliminated following the annexation of Crimea in 2014).
9. "Military Spending as a Share of GDP, The Top 15 Countries, 2019," SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-military-expenditure/military-expenditure. Of the remaining top spenders, two are great powers with major current and historical military involvement in Muslim-majority countries (US and Russia), and each of the others borders a Muslim-majority state with which it has a history of armed conflict (Israel, Armenia, and South Sudan).
10. Soviet patronage, on the other hand, helped sustain client regimes through effective coup-proofing.
11. Notably, notorious military dictatorships in Spain, Brazil, the Philippines, and South Korea gave way to democratic rule during the Third Wave.
12. Another Muslim-majority country, Mali also underwent a remarkable transition from military rule to democracy in just two years (1991–1993); however, a coup d'état in 2012 underscored the fragility of civil-military relations and democracy more broadly.

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PART II

ELECTORAL POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS

CHAPTER 10

VOTING FOR ISLAMISTS

Mapping the Role of Religion

ELLEN LUST, KRISTEN KAO, AND GIBRAN OKAR

ISLAMIST parties performed well in the first elections after the Arab uprisings. In Egypt, Islamists swept the parliamentary election, with the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) winning nearly 43 percent of the seats and the Salafist Nour Party taking another 22 percent of them. In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda party won a plurality (41 percent) of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, although Islamists did not enjoy a majority. In Libya, Islamists took fewer than 20 percent of seats contested on lists, although independent Islamist candidates performed well.

The transitional period thus raises questions and provides an important opportunity to study the relationship between Islam and voting behavior in the Arab world. What explains Islamists' success? Is it related to factors unique to Islam, such as voters' religious identity, practice, or preferences regarding the role of religion in the state? Or do the material advantages, organizational strengths, or economic policies of these parties give them the upper hand? Moreover, are the same factors responsible for support of political Islam across all countries, or do they vary given specific historical experiences and social contexts?

In this chapter, we analyze support for Islamist parties in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia during political transitions.[1] Overall, we find that religious factors are more consistently important than economic or organizational factors. However, there are variations in the particular religious drivers of support for Islamist parties across the three countries. Preference for religious parties was strongly associated with Islamist support in Egypt and Libya, but not in Tunisia; agreement with religious leaders' influence in government was associated with support for Islamists in Tunisia and Libya but remained insignificant in Egypt. Frequent religious practice was correlated with Islamist support only in Tunisia, and identifying first and foremost as a Muslim did not seem to factor into voter calculus in any of the three countries. Rarely do existing studies on voting for Islamists examine multiple measures of religious factors in this way. Moreover, despite the attention they are given in extant studies, economic and organizational factors appeared less important overall during these transitional elections.

We argue that different historical legacies and social conditions that shape political environments may explain variation in factors associated with Islamist support. Authoritarian regimes' ruling strategies left parties with different levels of organizational strength. The Egyptian regime allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain a political presence throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, while the Tunisian and Libyan regimes clamped down on Islamists' public activities. Consequently, Egyptians developed a strong taste for religious parties over secular ones. In Libya, however, although Islamist movements were repressed, the Qaddafi regime promoted religious and social conservatism. In contrast, Habib Bourguiba implemented laic policies to foster a secular society in Tunisia. Consequently, after the Arab uprisings, Tunisians were much less likely to identify primarily as Muslims or to engage in religious practices than were Egyptians and Libyans. Those who did practice, however, were more likely to vote for Islamist parties. Although these historical legacies left significant differences in the prevalence of religious identity and worship across these countries, all three saw the politicization of Islam and the growth of an ideological cleavage within the state. This was likely due to the heightened rhetoric around political Islam, both domestically and on the international stage.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It first outlines the literature, considering how debates over the success of Islamist parties have tended to focus on material and organizational factors, downplaying the importance of religion. We then turn to the cases at hand, describing the political and social landscape at the time of transitions. The third section interrogates the relationship between organizational, material, and religious factors and support for Islamist parties. We then present evidence that religious factors were most highly associated with voters' choices, although different dimensions of Islam were salient in different contexts. We conclude by considering why religious factors are more salient than material and economic ones. Throughout, we draw on surveys conducted in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia from 2011 to 2013,[2] as well as the extant literature on political Islam.

Explanations of Islamist Support in the Arab World

Explanations for why voters support Islamist parties have largely overlooked the importance of religion. Some scholars argue that organizational capacity and material incentives are the key drivers of Islamist success—a view that assumes Islamist parties are not distinctive. A few exceptions exist, yet even these studies do not fully explore whether party success is related to voters' support for a role of religion in politics, or individuals' religious identity and practice.

One set of arguments explaining Islamists' electoral advantage focuses on their organizational capacity. Established networks of worshipers and social programs proffer Islamists an advantage when they proceed to the political stage. In the context of repressive regimes, such as those in Iran and Egypt under Mubarak, the cellular nature of religious institutions allowed Islamists to maintain activities (Wiktorowicz 2004). The secretive and tight-knit nature of these organizations endowed Islamists with a determined cadre of supporters following the Arab uprisings (Kandil 2015; Masoud 2014). Religious and charity organizations also created a platform for community networking, helping to mobilize voters, as in Turkey under the AKP (White 2012).

A second strand of the literature focuses more extensively on the service provision that Islamist organizations provide. Many scholars document, for instance, extensive networks of mosques and Islamic charities that create a space in which these parties can spread their message and distribute material rewards, thereby fostering support (e.g., Blaydes 2011; Brooke 2019; Clark 2004; Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz 2004;). Similar spaces often do not exist for non-Islamist parties, giving Islamists a comparative advantage in elections relative to other groups (e.g., Cammett and Luong 2014; Tessler 2011). Islamists are thus viewed as more capable than other parties in meeting their constituents' demands, particularly among lower (Blaydes 2011) and middle classes (Clark 2004).

This demonstrated ability to administer services, and the visibility that Islamist movements gain by doing so, also translates into a reputational advantage: it lends credibility to their economic and social claims and garners them support in transitional elections (Cammett and Luong 2014; Roháč 2012a). Steven Brooke (2017), for example, argues that Egyptians' experience with the Muslim Brotherhood's service provision led them to expect the Brothers would provide similar benefits if given the chance to govern. Cammett and Luong (2014) argue that service provision promoted a reputational advantage for good governance and thus was a key driver of their widespread electoral success. This explains why support for Islamists is not limited regionally (where services are provided) or along sectarian lines (where ideological values are shared).

Other literature shifts attention from service delivery to policies. Some see voters' preference for economic redistribution as fueling support for Islamists. Historically, religious movements have both shaped and co-opted leftist, egalitarian economic and social platforms (Davis and Robinson 2012; Kahl 2005). Scholars therefore posit that voters link Islamist parties with redistribution. Masoud (2014, 123–145), for instance, argues that the "secular-Islamist divide" in Egypt is only a proxy for left-right divisions over economic futures. Others suggest similar dynamics as well: in Turkey, those negatively affected by economic downturn were far more likely to vote for the AKP (Baslevent et al. 2005; Öniş 2004). In Tunisia, voting for Islamists was tied closely to middle-income households (Fourati et al. 2016). A second perspective puts foreign policy at the center of Islamist voting. Supporters of the AKP, for instance, were far more likely to disagree with matriculation into the EU and had overall negative views of the West (Baslevent et al. 2005).

In such views, support for Islamist parties has little to do with religion. Incumbent regimes and secular parties can also offer material rewards to garner support, benefit from networks and organizations, or enjoy reputational advantages. Religion thus plays little role in a vast swath of the literature that explains support for Islamist parties. Perhaps this is because scholars of the Arab world are sensitive to arguments that exceptionalize the region or essentialize Islam (e.g., Huntington 1996; Pipes 2002). Ironically, in doing so they only further the special treatment of the Muslim world; studies of Christian Democrats in Europe and evangelical voters in the United States (e.g., de Koster and van der Waal 2007; Raymond 2011), Pentecostals in sub-Saharan Africa (McClendon and Riedl 2019), and even Muslims in other parts of the world (Hasan 2012) recognize the influence of religious values, identities, and practices on political behavior.

There are a few exceptions, of course. Wickham's (2002) study of support for the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak's Egypt finds that the Brothers were able to attract out-group members through the "transvaluation of values." The Brothers' flight away from the Mubarak regime was brought to represent a moral good through religious, interpretive frameworks, encompassing the suffering of many disenfranchised and angry Egyptian citizens.[3] Before the uprisings, some scholars argued that Islamist parties gained the lion's share of their support due to their promises to incorporate more religion into politics (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007), rather than their economic policies, which they generally regarded as ill-defined and weak (Robbins 2009, 27). Similarly, looking at data collected during the transitional period (2011–2014) by the Arab Barometer, the World Values Survey, and the Afrobarometer, Wegner and Cavatorta (2019) argue that a main factor of support was the ideological divide along the Islamist-secular fault. Empirical evidence to that effect was also seen in the Tunisian 2011 elections, wherein the role of religion in public life was a statistically significant driver of voting behavior (Dennison and Draege 2020). Grewal et al. (2019) argue that believers' interests in "divine rewards" shape voting patterns; however, their argument rests on the presumption that only the poor would seek redemption by supporting Islamist candidates.

Even these studies, however, have failed to distinguish the various facets of religion that can affect the ballot box. Religious support for Islamist parties can be understood in terms of identity, practice, and politics. It can be associated with a voter's identity as a Muslim, much in the same way that ethnic identities or sectarianism can affect electoral support (e.g. Cammett 2014; Cammett and Issar 2010; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). It can be associated with practice, the reflection of piety, and engagement in networks of other believers. And it can be related to their political beliefs regarding the role of religion in the state. Understanding the relationship between identity, practice, and political positions and voting for Islamist parties can help to shed light on the relationship between Islam and elections.

We explore the relationship between support for Islamists, religion, and other factors in the first elections following the Arab uprisings. These elections provided a unique opportunity to study voter calculus. Voters' choices were more clearly revealed in the transitional elections than they were in previous polls; before the uprisings, voters feared harassment for supporting Islamists (e.g. Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004), electoral institutions were structured to favor the regime's ruling strategy (Kao 2015; Lust 2009; Lust and Jamal 2002), and Islamist party elites limited their engagement in order to avoid provoking the ruling regime to crackdown on its members (Hamid 2011). Moreover, during transitions from authoritarianism to free and fair elections, voter calculus has been seen to shift away from analysis of incumbency, or record, and toward the potential for reform (Fidrmuc 2000).

Voters and Parties after the Uprisings

There were notable differences in the social and political landscapes of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings. In all three societies, majorities of the polity supported a role of religious leaders in politics, although citizens of both Egypt and Libya were more likely than Tunisians to engage in religious practices and to identify first and foremost as Muslim. Additionally, the societies varied regarding preferences for religious political parties. The three countries also had different political infrastructures after the uprisings. For instance, in Egypt, the Freedom and Justice Party benefitted from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's organizational capacity, which dwarfed that of Islamist organizations in both Tunisia and Libya.

Historical experiences shaped the societies in these three countries. Tunisia's first president, Bourguiba, was determined to "modernize" the country, and thus initiated a project that banned traditional and religious dress from public workspaces, implemented a Western workweek (thus working on Friday), and even encouraged Tunisians to refrain from fasting during Ramadan (Boulby 1988, 568). By 2013, only 20 percent of Tunisians identified first and foremost as Muslim, and only 35 percent of the population engaged in formal religious practices. (See Figure 10.1.) In Egypt, the seat of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, religious movements inculcated a strong Muslim identity and fostered religious piety. In 2012, 43 percent of Egyptians identified first and foremost as Muslim and 41 percent often engaged in religious practices. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the sample in Egypt preferred a religious party. Religious identity and practice were also high in Libya, where Qaddafi had promoted a conservative Islamic organization, the Islamic Call Society (Ad-Dawah). In 2013, 42 percent of Libyans identified first and foremost as Muslim and 51 percent often engaged in religious practices.

Voters across the three countries also had different perspectives on policies regarding religion. When respondents were asked to place their own preference regarding party religiosity between completely religious (1) and completely secular (9), the median voter in all three countries placed in the middle (4 and 5). (See left panel, Figure 10.2.) Egyptians, however, were more likely to state a position on this question (just 6 percent of respondents said they did not know, versus 11 percent in Libya and Tunisia), and the



FIGURE 10.1: Religious identity, practice, and policies.

Note: The question regarding identity in the top left panel is: "What label describes you best, and which is the second best? The choice set is nationality (e.g., Tunisian), Arab, Muslim, regional, local, a world citizen, man/woman, other" and is coded as "identifies as Muslim" if "Muslim" is chosen as the first identity. Note that the exact options changed slightly across different countries. The question for religious practice in the top right panel is: "On a scale of 1–9 which number better represents you, if 1 means a person who goes to a house of worship daily, takes religious lessons, listens to religious programs and reads religious books, and 9 means a person who rarely does these things (goes to a house of worship, takes religious lessons, listens to religious programs and reads religious books)?" For religious party preference in the bottom left panel, the question is: "On a scale of 1 to 9, please state your personal preferences on the positions below: 1 prefer a religious political party and 9 prefer a strictly secular party." The question regarding the role of religious leaders in the bottom right panel is: "Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: . . . Religious leaders should have no influence over the decisions of the government." For all 9-point scales used in this chapter, we biased the results away from existing hypotheses on correlates of Islamist voting, such that the middle category of 5 was coded away from signaling religious practice, identity, or party preference. The data for Libya presented here comes from the November 2013 data set.

Please note that we dropped non-Muslims from all analyses presented in this chapter, not because Christians are necessarily less likely to vote for Islamists, but because variables associated with religion would be expected to function differently for Christians than Muslims, and the theoretical model explained in this chapter is not built to understand non-Muslim voting for Islamists. There were only six non-Muslims in Tunisia and one in Libya, whereas in Egypt about 5% of the sample is non-Muslim.



FIGURE 10.2: Individuals' self-placement on religious-secular and socialist-capitalist scales. *Note:* Questions read as follows: (*left panel*) "On a scale of 1 to 9, please state your personal preferences on the positions below: 1 prefer a religious political party and 9 prefer a strictly secular party"; (*right panel*) "On a scale of 1 to 9, please state your personal preferences on the positions below: 1 being a strict socialist system with the state running all economic affairs and 9 being a full-fledged free market capitalist system." Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of respondents who were able to state their positions. Islamist parties are denoted with darkened distributions compared to non-Islamist parties and mean response point estimates are denoted with black diamonds. Data for Libya comes from the May 2013 data set.

median voter, and the distribution of voters, skewed more toward the completely religious endpoint. This perhaps reflects the historical strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. Libyans, too, were more likely to prefer a role of religion in politics than Tunisians. This is unsurprising given Tunisia's history of laicism. Despite these differences, more than two-thirds of citizens in every society agreed with the statement "religious leaders should have no influence in governance." (See bottom right panel, Figure 10.1.)

The populations also had distinct views on the role of the state in the economy. In Egypt and Tunisia, where religion had been most politicized, respondents were less likely to be able to place their own position on the economy than on religion: 80 percent of Egyptians stated their position on the economy, versus 94 percent on religion; 80 percent of Tunisians stated an economic position, versus 89 percent on religion. Only in Libya did positions on the economy and religion seem to be equally clear in voters' minds. Egyptians, Libyans, and Tunisians also held quite distinct preferences. In Egypt, which had liberalized its state-led economy in the years leading up to the revolution, there was considerable support for a strong role of the state in the economy. The same was found in Tunisia. In contrast, Libya had greater support for a capitalist economy. (See right panel, Figure 10.2.)

The countries' historical experiences also shaped their political landscapes. Prior to 2011, Egypt's regimes had stoked political tensions between Islamists and secularists in an effort to weaken opposition (Lust 2011). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been prevented from forming a political party and often suffered repression, although Brotherhood members ran in parliamentary elections, either as independents or in alliances with legal political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood won seventeen parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections and eighty-eight seats (or 20 percent of the total) in 2005.[4] The Tunisian Islamist movement fared far worse. Bourguiba's extreme version of *laicité* had softened in the 1970s, allowing a period of growth for Le Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI). The movement gained considerable power, with independents contesting the 1989 elections and winning an estimated 10–17 percent of the seats (Wolf 2017). Surprised, and perhaps terrified, by the Islamists' success, the Ben Ali regime clamped down on the movement, jailing approximately 25,000 members and sending others into exile. The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, likewise, suffered from repression. Shortly after Muslim Brothers arrived in the country from Egypt, their attempts to mobilize were met with violence from the regime. Brothers who refused to refrain from political activity were publicly executed or sent to serve sentences in Abu Salim prison. However, following overtures from Saif Qaddafi, the organization reconciled with the regime. Thus, the Islamist movement was strong in Egypt, organizationally weaker in Tunisia, and at near standstill in Libya.

The countries also entered the transition with different endowments of secular parties. Both Egypt and Tunisia had allowed opposition political parties to participate in elections under authoritarianism, and thus had several non-Islamist parties prepared to engage in the transitional elections. Libya, in contrast, had eschewed political parties altogether, going so far as to dictate that "Min tuhizb khan" (he who joins a party is a traitor), sentencing to death those who dared to form political parties. Party organizations were thus limited in Libya, and indeed a fear of party mobilization remained strong as the first post-Qaddafi elections approached. Consequently, the constellation of parties varied substantially across the three countries in the first transitional elections.[5] Egypt and Tunisia had a fragmented party system, with a mix of Islamist and non-Islamist parties, both new and old. Libya had an even more splintered system, composed primarily of small tribal and other social groupings running on unified lists.

Authoritarian strategies thus left party leaders with different strengths and weaknesses at the outset of the transitions. The majority of Egyptian Muslim Brothers who would play significant roles in the transition had been politically active inside Egypt in the years preceding Mubarak's downfall. The most prominent leaders of Tunisia's Ennahda party, in contrast, only began mobilizing for campaigns after they returned from exile. In striking comparison, Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brother who would become Egypt's first democratically elected president, had taught at Zagazig University and stood as a candidate for the 2000 elections, while Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahda, had been twice imprisoned and in exile for twenty-two years (Ashour 2016; Benotman et al. 2013, 196–197; Chemitsky 2012; Fitzgerald 2015, 178; Fredrich Ebert Stiftung 2015, 5). Yet it is possible that Islamist leaders, particularly in Tunisia, could have benefited from their repression. Kim Guiler (2020) maintains that "suffering for one's political cause" glorifies candidates juxtaposed to incumbent or nonvictimized groups, finding evidence of this in Turkey and Tunisia. However, repression also significantly weakened ties between leaders and constituents.

Likewise, repression may have undercut Tunisian and Libyan Islamists' organizational strength, particularly compared to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian Brothers played a central role in service provision after labor unions declined following economic liberalization in the early 1980s. In Tunisia, the secular-leaning trade union, the UGTT, played a more important role in mobilization, balancing the strength of the Islamist movement. Moreover, the unions took a leading role in the revolution and maintained support throughout the transitional electoral campaigns (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Yousfi 2018).[6] Libya stood in stark contrast to Tunisia. All parties lacked organizational strength, owing to years of harsh control over associational life, so discerning any Islamist upper hand in mobilization would prove difficult.

Finally, as the first elections following the Arab uprisings approached, voters and parties in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia navigated different electoral systems. These systems partly reflected the nature of political parties and the distribution of power that existed at the time of the uprisings; they also shaped the options available to parties and voters. Egypt had a mixed electoral system for the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections: Two-thirds (332 seats) of the country's 498 parliamentary seats were elected on party lists, and one-third (166 seats) to individual seats in two-seat districts (Eskandar 2011). Libya also had a mixed electoral system, with 40 seats chosen in first-past-the-post, single member districts, 80 seats for multi-member districts with single nontransferable vote, and 80 through closed lists. The distribution of list seats was complicated by a gender quota that conflicted with social norms regarding the role of women and ethnic divisions; consequently, the majority of party list seats were allocated to the larger urban areas (Smith 2012). In Tunisia, all seats for the 2011 Constituent Assembly were elected on party lists (Decree No. 35, 2011).

Islamist Parties: Organizational, Material, and Religious Advantages?

The different contexts surrounding elections in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings give us the opportunity to interrogate the association of organizational, material, and religious factors with support for Islamists. We do so by drawing upon descriptive evidence regarding how individuals view political parties, as well as regression analyses that examine the association between indicators of material, organizational, and religious positions on voter choice. We find evidence that religious factors were important across all three countries, although the specific facets of religion associated with a higher propensity to vote for Islamist parties varied between cases.

Organizational Capacity

To examine the influence of party organization on Islamists' success, we rely on voters' perceptions. These measures are unable to determine the extent to which objective organizational strength influences mobilization, but they do reflect citizens' views of organizational capacity. We find evidence that Egyptians widely viewed Islamist parties—Al Nour and the FJP—as more capable than their secular counterparts, as denoted by the mean scores (black diamonds) in Figure 10.3. Likewise, voters were much more likely to have an opinion on the organizational capacities of Al Nour and the FJP—34 percent and 40 percent of respondents rated them, respectively—compared to the next closest party, Al Wafd, which only 26 percent of voters felt confident enough to rate. In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda was comfortably in the middle of the spectrum with regard to party organization. Tunisian voters appeared to have more information on parties, on the whole, with more than 70 percent of them rating parties' organizational capacity. However, the secular Congress for the Republic (CPR) party still elicited a higher response than Ennahda (83 percent vs. 73 percent of respondents, respectively) and was rated more organizationally capable. The Islamist claim to organizational excellence fails to explain the success of Islamists alone.

We also use regression analyses to test the extent to which voters who value organizational capacity are more likely to support Islamist parties. The dependent variable is



FIGURE 10.3: Organizational capacity (Egypt and Tunisia).
Note: Egypt is presented in the left panel; Tunisia is in the right panel. Question wording: "For each of the following parties, would you say that they are organizationally capable to a large extent, somewhat, a little, or not at all?" Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of respondents who were able to state their positions. Islamist parties are denoted with darkened distributions compared to non-Islamist parties, and mean response point estimates are denoted with black diamonds. We did not ask this question in Libya.

having voted for an Islamist party list[7] in past elections.[8] We also include standard demographic variables expected to affect voting behavior (gender, age, education, and employment). We consider whether those for whom a party's organizational capacity was more important, in general, were more or less likely to support Islamist parties. We find that voters for whom organizational capacity was important were 11 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to vote for Ennahda. Organizational factors were not significant in Libya, and the substantive estimate was near zero. (See Table 10.1.) Unfortunately,



FIGURE 10.4: Economic policies.

we lack the data to test this relationship between valuing organizational capacity and Islamist support in Egypt.

Economic Platform and Material Benefits

There is little evidence across our cases that economic platforms or material benefits were the primary drivers of support for Islamists. Indeed, many citizens had difficulty placing parties' economic positions. As shown in Figure 10.4, the proportions of respondents who felt informed enough to rate parties on economic scales are notably low in all three countries. With the exception of the National Forces Alliance (NFA) in Libya, which was clearly perceived to be a neoliberal party, less than two-thirds of the sampled populations were able to place parties (including, importantly, Islamist parties) on this economic scale. For many parties, this proportion was much smaller. Citizens also only perceived small differences between party platforms on economic policies; perceptions of economic policies are clustered around the center, from 4–6, with only the Libyan NFA, as a major exception, ranking at 7.

Moreover, there is no consistent evidence that citizens are better able to place the economic positions of Islamist than non-Islamist parties. In Egypt, a higher percentage of respondents were confident enough to state economic positions of the Islamist FJP and Nour parties (with 63 percent and 55 percent, respectively, placing the party) than the next most-recognizable party, the Wafd (46 percent). In Tunisia, the percentage of respondents who felt they could place Ennahda, the main Islamist party, was higher than the percentage who could place the non-Islamist challenger Ettakatol, but not by much (approximately 60 percent versus 54 percent). Similarly, in Libya, 13 percent more of the sample could place the non-Islamist NFA than the Islamist JCP (80 percent vs. 67 percent). That is, while the economic positions of Islamist parties may be more recognizable than those of non-Islamist parties in some countries, this is not universally true.

Using perceptions of the extent to which parties assist citizens in need as a proxy for the potential material benefits parties might be expected to confer on supporters, we also find no evidence of an Islamist advantage. Descriptive evidence from Egypt and Tunisia demonstrates first that, overall, citizens do not believe that any of the major parties help needy citizens to a large extent, and second, that respondents in Egypt were far less able to position parties' assistance to citizens (19 percent to 43 percent) than those in Tunisia

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Note: Egypt is in the top left panel; Tunisia is in the top right panel; Libya is in the lower center panel. Question wording: "On a scale of 1 to 9, 1 being a strict socialist system with the state running all economic affairs and 9 being a full-fledged free market capitalist system, how would you rate the following parties?" Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of respondents who were able to state their positions. Islamist parties are denoted with darkened distributions compared to non-Islamist parties and mean response point estimates are denoted with black diamonds. Note that the Libyan dataset for this figure comes from the May 2013 data set.

(72 percent to 83 percent). On average, in Egypt, voters perceived the major Islamist parties as helping citizens in need marginally more than their non-Islamist counterparts. Yet note that Islamists were seen as helping "a little" compared to the most prevalent answer of "not at all" for non-Islamists. (See Figure 10.5, left panel.) In Tunisia, despite higher voter clarity on party actions, Ennahda is perceived to be at the bottom of this spectrum, doing less on average for citizens in need than any other party. (See Figure 10.5, right panel.) Considering the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's history of service



FIGURE 10.5: Helping citizens in need (Egypt and Tunisia).
Note: Egypt is in the left panel; Tunisia is in the right panel. Question wording: "For each of the following parties, to what extent would you say that they help citizens in need? To a large extent, somewhat, a little, not at all?" Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of respondents who responded to the question. Islamist parties are denoted with darkened distributions compared to non-Islamist parties and mean response point estimates are denoted with black diamonds. Note that this question was not asked in Libya.

provision, it is not surprising to find that Egypt's Islamist parties held the high ground in perceived service to the needy. The failure of Ennahda to capture the same accolades in Tunisia indicates that economic and material arguments for Islamist support are more likely reserved to specific social and historical contexts—and certainly, in the transition period, they had less universal weight on voter calculus than previously understood.

Our argument in this section is made clearer by regression analyses, which find little evidence that economic preferences and material benefits drive Islamist support, or at least not uniformly across the region. (See Table 10.1.) Across the three countries, there are no significant associations between individuals' economic preferences and reported vote for Islamist parties. In Libya and Tunisia, we were also able to examine the role of service provision on voter choice. We asked respondents whether a party's service provision to their constituents was an important factor in vote choice. Our data show that Libyans who value service provision from a party were 8 percentage points ($p < 0.10$) more likely to support Islamists. (See Table 10.1.) There was no significant relationship in Tunisia. In Egypt, we did not have the data to investigate service provision on electoral patterns.

Religious Factors: Identity, Practice, and Policy

Religious factors were significantly associated with support for Islamists. (See note on Figure 1 for exact question wording.) We interrogate the role of identity, practice, and policy. We find that identifying oneself first and foremost as a Muslim was not significantly associated with voting patterns in any of the countries. Religious practice was significantly associated with support for Ennahda in Tunisia, but was not significantly correlated with Islamist support in Egypt or Libya. However, religious policies were significantly associated with voting behavior across the three countries.

- Identity: We examined the association between identifying as Muslim, first and foremost, and Islamist support in our regression analyses. Identity was never significant, and furthermore, the coefficient was near zero in Egypt and Tunisia. This suggests that Islamist support is not driven by identity politics.
- Practice: We investigated the extent to which religious practice was associated with voting patterns by first identifying individuals in our data who self-identified as frequent practitioners of Islam. In Tunisia, those who self-identified as practicing Muslims were 9 percentage points ($p < 0.05$) more likely to have voted for Islamist party lists (Benstead et al. 2012). However, this association was both statistically and substantively insignificant in Libya and Egypt.
- Policy: We interrogate the role of religious policy in three ways. Descriptively, we analyze citizens' ability to locate party positions regarding the role of religion in the state. Additionally, we incorporate two measures of religious political preferences in our model of voting. We regress individuals' positions on their attitudes toward the influence of religious leaders in government, as well as their preferences for a religious party. We find strong evidence that citizens' preferences for religion in politics influence voting behavior.

Table 10.1: Individual Level Drivers of Support for Islamist Parties Compared

	Tunisia	Egypt	Libya
Prefer Religious Party	0.0153	0.175*	0.0983+
	(0.0295)	(0.0175)	(0.0520)
Religious Governance	0.0735*	0.0189	0.108+
	(0.0352)	(0.0162)	(0.0574)
Religious Practice	0.0860*	-0.00844	-0.0487
	(0.0324)	(0.0153)	(0.0472)
Muslim ID	0.0317	0.0189	0.0518
	(0.0386)	(0.0147)	(0.0518)
Organized Party	0.111*	—	-0.00336
	(0.0435)	—	(0.0439)
Service Party	-0.0461	—	0.0762+
	(0.0356)	—	(0.0393)
Socialist Party	0.0163	-0.00999	0.0449
	(0.0283)	(0.0155)	(0.0575)
Age	0.0276+	-0.0138*	0.00318
	(0.0149)	(0.00634)	(0.0245)
Male	0.103*	-0.0508*	0.0675
	(0.0290)	(0.0198)	(0.0431)
Employed	0.0562*	0.0281	-0.0861+
	(0.0286)	(0.0200)	(0.0504)
Higher Education	-0.0721*	-0.0811*	0.0426
	(0.0312)	(0.0156)	(0.0435)
Constant	-0.0429	0.846*	-0.00617
	(0.0582)	(0.0275)	(0.0694)
N	782	2021	353

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p<0.10$

* $p<0.05$

** $p<0.01$

*** $p<0.001$

Note: All variables are dichotomized with the exception of age, which is broken into age brackets of 18–30, and ten-year increments thereafter. Higher education means the respondent has a secondary education or above. We did not have variables in the Egypt data set for party organization or party focus on serving its constituents. The N in Libya is low because candidates did not compete on lists in all districts.

Ordinary least squares regression models are displayed here, but all results are robust to logistical models, with just a few caveats in Libya where all marginally significant outcomes are fully significant according to traditional levels and being male becomes a significant variable in voting Islamist. The data for Libya in this regression from the December 2013 data set.

Most citizens were able to rate party platforms with regard to the role of Islam in the state. Moreover, party placement on this religious-secular dimension was more polarized than that of economic policy. Parties varied, on average, 2 to 3 increments on a 1–9 socialist-capitalist scale; however, variation in perceived religious platforms spanned 6 increments on a 1–9 secular-Islamist scale. (See Figures 10.4 and 10.5.) Voters were also more confident in placing parties along this dimension; more than three-quarters of respondents in each country were able to position the top parties along the religious-secular dimension.

We also found evidence that citizens viewed Islamist parties' platforms more clearly than their secular counterparts, particularly with regard to the role of religion in the state. As shown in Figure 10.6, 86 percent of Egyptians felt they were able to place the Islamist FJP on the religious-secular scale, and 80 percent were able to place the Nour party. In contrast, only 60 percent were able to place the Wafd party, the most frequently placed non-Islamist party. Similarly, in Tunisia, 83 percent placed the Islamist Ennahda party, compared to 71 percent placing Ettakatol. However, in Libya, 87 percent of respondents placed the secular NFA, compared to 80 percent who placed the Islamist JCP. Citizens' greater capacity to place parties along the religious-secular divide than the socialist-capitalist one, as well as the greater variance in parties on this religious dimension, counters claims that the secular-Islamist divide served as a proxy for economic divisions at the ballot box.

Regression analyses also find support for the argument that religious policy matters. (See Table 10.1 below.) Different indicators, however, vary in importance across countries. We find that voter preference for a religious party was significantly and positively associated with voting for Islamist parties in Egypt and Libya, although not in Tunisia. In Egypt, voters who stated that they preferred a religious party were 17.5 percentage points ($p < 0.05$) more likely to report having voted for an Islamist party list; in Libya, they were nearly 9 percentage points ($p < 0.10$) more likely to do so. Our second measure, attitudes toward the role of religious leaders in government, was significantly and positively associated with Islamist support in Tunisia and Libya. Tunisians were 7 percentage points ($p < 0.05$) more likely to vote for an Islamist party list if they preferred a strong role of religion in the state; Libyans were nearly 11 percentage points ($p < 0.10$) more likely to do so. Recall that there was no significant correlation between voters' economic policy preferences and support for Islamists.[9]

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we introduced a nuanced understanding of the relationship between religion and electoral behavior, one that more closely resembles electoral studies in the United States and Europe. Examining support for Islamists in the first



FIGURE 10.6: Placement of parties on religion and the state.

post-revolutionary elections of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, we find strong evidence that religious factors drove voters' calculus during the transitional period. Moreover, Islamist support appears to be primarily driven by attitudes toward religion and politics. It is not identity voting; indeed, identifying first and foremost as Muslim is not significantly associated with Islamist support in any country. Religious practice was found uniquely significant in Tunisia. Importantly, the role of these religious factors is independent from and as strong as organizational and material factors, which have received much attention in academic circles.

We expect this is due to the historical experiences that shaped the social and political landscapes prior to and during the first post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Mapping our findings to their contexts, we find that complex social and political attitudes shaped the salience of issues—particularly religious variables—uniquely in each country. In Tunisia, we find that private religious worship, as well as attitudes towards religious leaders' influence in government, were significantly correlated with pro-Islamist voting. This could indicate that societal cleavages around public-private engagement with religion were more likely to be politicized in contexts with a history of secularization. Unlike Egypt and Libya, a strict system of *laicité* commanded the pre-revolutionary political sphere in Tunisia. Thus, religious practice in Tunisia, as well as the attitudes toward religious influence within politics, could have driven more devoted Muslims to support Islamist parties; we do not find this in the more conservative, religious societies of Egypt and Libya.

These results answer some questions, but also raise new avenues of inquiry. In Libya, citizens were more likely to support an Islamist political party if they favored a party that helped to provide services. These findings raise questions regarding why those who wanted parties to provide services saw the Islamists as the better choice, particularly as Libyan Islamists had less historical presence and record of service provision than their Tunisian or Egyptian counterparts. Likewise, in Egypt, our findings regarding identity are difficult to interpret. The Muslim Brotherhood sought to inculcate a transnational "Muslim" identity. Therefore, we could have expected religious identity to be correlated with Islamist voting patterns. However, our results do not support the common criticism that Brothers and their supporters were lacking in Egyptian nationalism.

More general questions remain as well. The facets of religion that impacted voter choice in the 2011–2013 period are found to be unique across the countries, contingent on the social and political landscapes of their time. So, too, we find that organizational

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Note: Egypt is shown in the top left panel. Tunisia is shown in the top right panel. Libya is shown in the bottom center panel. Question wording: "On a scale of 1 to 9, 1 being a strictly religious political party and 9 being a strictly secular party, how would you rate the following parties?" Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of respondents who were able to state their positions. Islamist parties are denoted with darkened distributions compared to non-Islamist parties and mean response point estimates are denoted with black diamonds. Note that the Libyan dataset for this figure is based on data from May 2013.

and economic factors are not generalizable across cases. This draws into question the need not only to recognize the importance of religion in Islamist support, but also to take into account how social and political conditions may shape the importance of various drivers of party success.

NOTES

1. In Tunisia, Ennahda is coded as the Islamist party. In Egypt, the Islamist parties include Al Nour, Al Wasat, and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In Libya, the Islamist parties include the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and the Homeland Party.
2. The household surveys included in this chapter were conducted face-to-face with respondents, employing a random sample design and the Kish grid method at the door. The Egyptian Post-Election Survey (EPES) (Lust et al. 2012) was a household survey conducted October 31–November 10, 2012 (N=4471), and drawn from a PPS sample of 21 governorates with a response rate of 67%. All governorates except the five border governorates—North and South Sinai, The Red Sea, Matrouh, and Al Wadi—were surveyed. These five governorates have less than 1% of the population in Egypt. The poll was conducted by the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) in collaboration with Ellen Lust (then at Yale University), Gamal Soltan (American University in Cairo) and Jakob Wichmann (JMW Consulting), and with support from the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI). The Libyan Post-Election Surveys (LPES) were conducted in May 2013 (N = 1152) (Benstead et al. 2013a) and November 2013 (N = 1110) (Benstead et al. 2013b) and were implemented by Diwan Marketing Research, in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), JMW Consulting, Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead, with funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Tunisian Post-Election Survey (TPES) (Benstead et al. 2012) was conducted in October/November 2012 (N = 1202) by Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), Ellen Lust (then at Yale University), and Dhafer Malouche (ESSAI), with support from the National Science Foundation, Portland State University, Princeton University, and Yale University. Probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling was used to select 73 urban and rural communes located in 16 electoral districts. More information on these studies is available at transitionalgovernanceproject.org.
3. Brown (2012) and Guiler (2020) make similar arguments regarding Islamists' moral purity or incorruptibility, but they do not focus specifically on religion.
4. Like most opposition parties, the Muslim Brotherhood was largely shut out of the 2010 elections, as tensions were rising surrounding, in part, attempts to pave the way for Hosni Mubarak's son, Gamal, to take power.
5. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Lust and Waldner (2016).
6. In the transition period, we also saw the emergence of competing unions, such as the UGET (left-wing, liberal) and UGTE (affiliate of Ennahda), which both held demonstrations and counter-protests.
7. We focused on party lists because individual candidates who ran on Islamist platforms also ran as independents in these three countries. This makes it difficult to study voting for Islamists using individual seats.
8. Comparison of the election outcomes and respondents' voter choice reported in the survey data lends confidence to our findings. In Tunisia, Islamist parties won 37% of the vote

(National Democratic Institute 2011), compared to 36% in our survey. In Libya, the Islamist parties won 13% of the vote (Carter Center 2012) compared to 10% in our survey. In Egypt, data for the percentage of votes cast for party lists was not available; however, Islamist party lists won 71% of seats allocated to parties (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015), compared to 88% reported support for Islamists reported in our survey.

9. VIF analysis showed that our regressed variables were not giving any redundant information. This indicates the independence of our religious and economic measures.

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CHAPTER 11

PARTY SYSTEMS IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

ELIZABETH R. NUGENT

This chapter explores whether and how existing theories of party system formation can help us to understand the institutions that have developed in Muslim-majority societies. I ask the following questions: Are party systems in Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority societies systematically different from each other? If so, how—and more importantly, why? I rely on cross-national time-series data of party systems and draw on the rich literature on politics in the Muslim world to answer these questions. The data demonstrate that party systems in Muslim-majority countries are consistently less competitive, less open, and less institutionalized—though I note important exceptions located in Muslim democracies.

I argue that the traits of party systems in Muslim-majority countries are better explained by specific historical developments in the Muslim world and the path dependence of party system institutions than by the political institutions prescribed by Islamic tenets. More specifically, patterns of governance and institutions adopted by European authorities during colonialism coincided with a consequential period of state-building in the Muslim world, and this in turn shaped the rules of the game in postcolonial countries. This finding is not unique to Muslim-majority societies; scholars have made similar arguments about postcolonial political institutions in other parts of the world, with variation produced through the nature, timing, and duration of the colonial experience. I conclude the chapter by outlining remaining questions about party systems in Muslim-majority societies that might shape a research agenda on the topic.

Defining and Measuring Party Systems

The study of parties and the systems in which they are organized is central to the study of politics. Drawing from the experience of early democratizing countries in Western

Europe, scholars reached an early normative consensus that parties are of the utmost importance in democratic politics (White 2006, 5–15). As democracy spread beyond Europe, political scientists employed measurements of the emergence of party competition as a proxy for successful democratization. Scholars continue to deem parties "absolutely essential for the proper functioning of representative democracy" (Montero 2003, 3).

Parties represent collective interests in political competition; in politics, "no idea has ever made much headway without an organization behind it" (Sartori 1976, 85). In their idealized form, parties simply reflect the shared, aggregated political preferences of their constituent members; they "crystallize and make explicit the conflicting interests, the latent strains and contrasts in the existing social structure" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3). But, in practice, parties exert influence on the creation and nature of collective interests. Parties have agency in choosing which constituencies to mobilize and under what banner, and in this way can exert influence on the dimensions of political contestation. The political relevance of "class, ethnicity, religion, race or nation do[es] not happen simultaneously . . . as a reflection of the objective conditions in the psyches of individuals" (Przeworski 1985, 99–101). Instead, parties may "establish themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their own alignments independently of the geographical, the social, and the cultural underpinnings of the movements" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3). Neto and Cox (1997, 150) similarly argue that "politicians can take socially defined groups and combine or recombine them in many ways for political purposes."

Parties are a function of the broader political context in which they exist. The amorphous concept of a party system refers to the interaction of parties competing with each other within a given country.[1] Scholars rely less on a clear definition of party systems and instead used different criteria to identify and compare different types. Duverger (1954) first discussed the importance of the interactions between parties as part of a larger system, in order to understand the relative options offered to voters within a given context. In addition to the characteristics of individual parties, he noted that it is important to consider the "numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, [and] political distribution" of parties competing with each other within the same political space. As the result of this interactive process, "a party system is defined by a particular relationship amongst all these characteristics" (203).

Party systems are measured by several distinct attributes. These include the number of parties contesting elections and the number of effective parties, or parties that actually win seats in government (Blondel 1968; Laasko and Taagepera 1979; Siaroff 2000). Party systems can also be categorized by the relative size, strength, and balance of parties (Rokkan 1970; Wolinetz 2006). Party systems also differ on the distribution and polarization of parties, measured by the distance separating parties on salient axes of contestation and in affect.[2] In addition, party systems differ in the degree to which competition for government is open or closed—meaning whether all parties can enter elections without any constraints or whether contestation is restricted only to certain parties or combinations of parties (Mair 1996, 2002). In terms of linkages with voters, party systems may revolve around programmatic, ideological, clientelist, or charismatic competition (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 2010). The nature of competition within a given party system determines the degree to which it is institutionalized and structures the electorate (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

These measurements help us characterize and compare party systems. The criterial approach to defining and measuring party systems bridges the divide across regime types, linking democratic and authoritarian systems on a spectrum of competition and institutionalization.

COMPARING PARTY SYSTEMS IN MUSLIM-MAJORITY AND NON-MUSLIM-MAJORITY SOCIETIES

Are party systems in Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority societies different? And if so, in what ways? To unpack this, I turn to data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2020). V-Dem is an ideal data set to use for my analyses because it includes an extensive set of indicators capturing different aspects and dimensions of party systems, as well as important correlates. In addition to aggregate scores measuring a party system's level of competitiveness or democratic quality, the data set includes fine-grained constitutive measurements capturing indicators central to comparing party systems, such as the number and relative strength of effective parties, the distribution of parties on salient axes of competition, and the nature of voter-party linkages. Moreover, the project's expansive country and temporal coverage is helpful for measuring trends and differences in party systems across time and space. I subset version 10 of the V-Dem data set from 1900 on, and separate countries with Muslim-majority populations to those without a majority Muslim population. The charts plot the raw data as well as fit lines, indicating trends in the data. All data have been recoded so that the plots read as more "democratic" (with specific meaning depending on the index or variable) as the y-axis approaches 1. The x-axis measures year.

Two indices demonstrate how party systems in Muslim-majority societies differ from those in non-Muslim societies. For each index, individual components trend the same way as the index, with some variation in the degree of difference between party systems in Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority societies, though not the level of significance. The first index, *electoral democracy*, combines a number of subcomponents measuring the openness and level of competition of party systems. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating more clean, fair, and competitive electoral institutions. The index combines measurements of freedom of expression, universal suffrage, and frequency of voting irregularities. In addition, the index includes a measurement of freedom of association, which captures whether parties are banned, what if any barriers exist to party entry into electoral competition, the level of autonomy of opposition parties, and whether multiparty elections occur. The index also includes a component capturing pluralism in elected officials holding office, similar to the idea of effective parties outlined in the previous section.

Figure 11.1 demonstrates that all party systems become more open, inclusive, and competitive over time. However, party systems in non-Muslim-majority countries consistently score higher than those in Muslim-majority countries, suggesting they are relatively more open to competition, more competitive, and fairer. The gap between party systems in the two groups of countries is persistent but appears to increase starting in the 1970s.

The second index, *party institutionalization*, combines a number of subcomponents measuring the balance and function of parties within a given system. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a more institutionalized party system that structures political competition. The index includes measurements of the level and depth of party organization and internal party cohesion in structure, platform, and ideology. In addition, the index includes a measurement capturing the extent to which party platforms are distinct from each other. The index also includes a measurement of the nature of voter-party linkages, whether these are clientelist, local collective, programmatic, or mixed between types.

Figure 11.2 demonstrates that, over time, party systems have become more institutionalized. Party systems in non-Muslim-majority countries consistently score higher than those in Muslim-majority countries, meaning they are more institutionalized. The gap between party systems in the two types of countries is persistent and consistent in size from initial differences over time.



FIGURE 11.1: Electoral democracy, 1900–2019.



FIGURE 11.2: Party institutionalization, 1990–2019.

Sociological Explanations for Party System Divergence

What helps to explain the persistent differences between party systems in Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority societies? Explanations for how parties and party systems form, and why they differ, fall into two broad categories: sociological or institutional (Boix 2009). Sociological explanations outline a bottom-up process through which societal divisions external to the political system shape the nature and function of political contestation. Underlying factors refer to the demographic distribution along social, political, and economic cleavages. Broader historical processes of nation-building, state consolidation, development, modernization, and industrialization create meaningful underlying divisions within society and variation across societies, which in turn influence party formation, placement, and function (Deegan-Krause 2007; Evans and Whitefield 2000; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Variation in party systems across cases stems from different underlying cleavage structures, and shifts within cases result from the shifting of underlying cleavages (Lupu and Riedl 2013; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Sigelman and Yough 1978; Ura and Ellis 2011).

How would a sociological explanation account for party system differences in Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority societies? It would mean that the nature of cleavages in Muslim societies would both explain the initial divergence and the persistent difference from party systems in non-Muslim majority societies. V-dem includes a proxy measurement of polarization of society, asking coders to "characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues," presented in Figure 11.3. The data is limited from 2000 to 2019, but does not indicate that Muslim- and non-Muslim-majority societies are differently



FIGURE 11.3: Societal polarization, 2000–2019.

polarized; both, on average, score a medium level of polarization. While the data does not include indicators for the early 1990s, the available contemporary data suggests there is no relationship between societal polarization and party systems.

INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR PARTY SYSTEM DIVERGENCE

Institutional explanations for party system formation outline a top-down process through which formal institutions shape the nature and function of political contestation (Boix 2009). Most influential are those features that define the internal workings of the political system, primarily electoral rules and institutions. Formal institutions can complicate the translation of underlying interests into political competition, enhance or diminish polarization, and shape what parties compete over by requiring certain thresholds for participation, forcing certain partnerships and patterns of strategic placement, and distributing public goods based on representation in elected bodies (Cox 1987; Shugart and Carey 1992; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).

How would an institutional explanation account for party system differences in Muslim- and non-Muslim-majority societies? It would mean that the nature of institutions in Muslim societies would both explain the initial divergence and the persistent difference from party systems in non-Muslim-majority societies. Historical institutionalism suggests strong path dependence after an initial critical juncture establishing institutions, so I spend more time theorizing why Muslim societies may have come to possess different kinds of political institutions in the first place.

There are at least two possible ways in which Muslim societies may have come to initially possess certain political institutions. The first is through Islamic culture. Scholars have previously questioned whether the religion of Islam is the reason behind the predominance of authoritarianism in Muslim-majority societies. The focus has largely been on whether Islam prevents the development of democratic citizens, building on the implications of canonical comparative politics texts on political culture, such as those by Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset (1969). Islam and its prescribed behaviors are argued to create a culture that is inhospitable to democracy.[3] While this claim remains influential in academic, policy, and public debates about the Muslim world, it largely lacks empirical support.[4] Islam may also influence the nature of political institutions through cultural prescriptions. Much debate has revolved around two specific institutions derived from the practices of the Prophet Mohammed and the early Muslim community. The first is *shura*, translated as "consultation." This concept refers to a process of collecting and discussing different opinions on a particular subject in order to reach a decision. The second institution is that of *bayʿah*, an oath of allegiance to a leader.

There is no theoretical or empirical consensus that these concepts deterministically translate into institutions lacking democratic qualities. Islam is a discursive tradition and is interpreted and practiced very differently by individuals across time and space (Asad 2009). For example, *shura* has been argued to both be the basis for the implementation of representative democracy as well as the basis for the tyranny of the majority, a critique notably also levied against secular institutions. Further, both in theory and in practice, Muslim polities have differed in whether consultation occurs with experts, those affected by a decision, or representatives of these groups, resulting in more and less direct representation. Similarly, interpretations of *bayʿah* differ in whether it implies a social contract in which a leader is responsible to and limited by the people he represents, or unquestioning loyalty to a leader in order to prevent disorder and thus inhibits the establishment of institutional checks and balances of executive power (Abou El Fadl 2004; Tezcür 2007). While many party systems in Muslim-majority societies demonstrate undemocratic characteristics, there are important exceptions in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Tunisia, all of which host highly competitive and open political systems that include Islamist parties and draw on religious tenets in the constitution, undermining a deterministic relationship between Islam and undemocratic political institutions. Quantitative studies demonstrate that denser and more encompassing Islamic political, educational, and financial institutions correlates with political institutions of higher democratic quality (Achilov 2010).

The second way in which Muslim societies may have come to possess different political institutions is through colonial endowments. This argument rests on a close reading of the historical political development of the Muslim world, with attention paid to when and how party systems emerged, what their initial purpose was, and how this influenced their shape and nature. European colonialism coincided with a consequential period of modern state-building in Muslim-majority societies for subsequent patterns of state capacity, the nature of coercive institutions, and economic development. The development projects that significantly shaped the institutions of states in Muslim-majority societies were guided by an overarching colonial strategy that favored the interests of the colonizer. In line with their material and strategic interests, colonial powers created or co-opted a variety of governance institutions to control local populations and channel dissent rather than to represent and respond to local interests (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Anderson 1986; Méouchy and Sluglett 2004). The institutional inheritance with which independent states were endowed shaped post-independence institutions in significant ways through mechanisms of path dependence. Party systems were no exception. Foreign colonial powers created legislative institutions that were unrepresentative, promoting certain favored groups integral to colonial rule at the expense of other groups. They also fostered, politicized, and institutionalized certain societal divisions and certain modes of contestation and redistribution that were highly contentious in order to divide and conquer local populations (Laitin 1985; Mahoney 2010; Mamdani 1996).

This institutional inheritance predicts subsequent political institutions. The nature of political institutions at the onset of liberalization accompanying independence from colonialism significantly influenced the creation of electoral rules in the subsequent regime. For example, elites in postcolonial countries that had previously been governed by a single-party system systematically adopted electoral laws that concentrated legislative power in the hands of the dominant party. In contrast, postcolonial countries that had formerly been governed by monarchies under colonialism adopted electoral rules that supported a balance of power among multiple competing forces, in a continued strategy of divide-and-conquer. In line with mechanisms of historical institutionalism, incumbents' preferences over the distribution of domestic political power vary across different types of inherited regimes, and this shapes their preferences for the distribution of power in the postcolonial period (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002).

The legacy of colonialism on party system formation in the Muslim world means that parties are less likely to serve a programmatic function. Parties may also serve distributive, surveillance, and control functions unrelated to representation of collective interests (Blackman 2019; Hibou 2011). As a result, party systems are less open to meaningful competition and less institutionalized in postcolonial periods. While the colonial experience was globally consequential, it was not even or uniform throughout the world, let alone in the Muslim world. Colonial systems of control differed in the nature and form of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized well beyond simplistic distinctions between direct and indirect rule (Crowder 1964; Méouchy and Sluglett 2004). So while colonialism generally undermined the representative and responsive functions of governance institutions, it also produced meaningful variation that is helpful in understanding and measuring its historical effect on subsequent institutions (Ricart-Huguet forthcoming).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have discussed whether, how, and why party systems in Muslim-majority countries differ systematically and significantly from those in non-Muslim-majority countries. Cross-national, time-series data from V-dem demonstrates that while the party systems of the world are generally liberalizing, including more political interests and becoming more institutionalized, the Muslim world lags behind its non-Muslim counterpart. In my reading of existing literature, this gap is better explained by institutional endowments than by cultural ones. In thinking about party systems in Muslim-majority societies, it is necessary to interrogate the theoretical and practical differences that render party systems in nondemocratic regimes fundamentally different from those in democratic contexts. What this means substantively is that scholars of party systems in the Muslim world must recognize that political institutions do not always reflect underlying cleavages or unfettered mobilization of collective interests. Instead, these party systems reproduce inherited methods of control.

Future work on the subject might expand this line of inquiry in at least two important ways. First, how do party systems persist through independence, an event that is often considered a political rupture? Existing scholarship suggests the importance of initial post-independence leaders' idiosyncratic preferences for governance and perceptions of political threats. However, we might better understand the persistence of party systems by mapping those state employees and foreign consultants who continue to staff these institutions through independence, as well as the relative balance of power between political interests as similarly shaped by colonial strategies of control.

Second, how might party systems be meaningfully reformed to become more representative, more competitive, and more institutionalized? Neither decades of foreign aid to promote democracy in Muslim-majority countries nor countless domestic attempts at mass mobilization and protest demanding democratization have significantly changed the nature of these party systems. However, perhaps in further interrogating the origins and persistence of these party systems, scholars might come up with innovative solutions to overcome the challenges of institutional inheritance. Looking to successful transitions from undemocratic to democratic party systems in Muslim majority societies may shed light on best practices.

NOTES

1. See Kitschelt (2007) for an extensive review.
2. For studies of preference polarization, see Sartori (1976), Ware (1996), and Mair (2002). For studies on affective polarization, see Iyengar et al. (2019) and Nugent (2020).
3. Scholars alternatively point to the strength of [non-nationalist] identities, the creation of docile citizens, and a lack of respect for pluralism, gender equality, and protections for minorities. See Gellner (1983), Huntington (1996), and Inglehart and Norris (2003).

4. Public opinion data largely disconfirm the hypothesized relationship between high religiosity and intolerance. See work summarized in Tessler (2011).

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CHAPTER 12

IDEOLOGIES, BRANDS, AND DEMOGRAPHICS IN MUSLIM SOUTHEAST ASIA

"*Voting for Islam*"

THOMAS PEPINSKY

In many Muslim-majority countries, elections provide voters with an array of parties and candidates, some of whom campaign explicitly on religious platforms. In studying the electoral performance of Islamic parties, analysts frequently interpret votes for Islamic parties as representing support for Islamist agendas or platforms. The underlying assumption in such analyses is that Islam is a programmatic identity shared by voters and parties alike. But just as a wealth of scholarship has questioned the homogeneity of Islamist parties and their electoral platforms (Ayoob 2004; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Langohr 2001), so too must analysts of electoral behavior take a more sophisticated approach to understanding Muslim voters at the ballot box.

In this chapter, I argue that voting for Islam is a more complicated and conditional phenomenon than the assumption of Islam as a programmatic identity implies. To make this argument, I distinguish among several different linkages between voters and political parties that might generate votes for Islamic parties: religious ideology, party brand, and demographic association. Voters face choices among religious and nonreligious parties that bundle together various appeals, only some of which are directly tied to religion, and voters may vote for parties either out of policy concerns or as an expression of their identity. The central implication of this argument is that voting for an Islamic party is not always a vote for Islam, and voting for a non-Islamic party sometimes is. This warrants caution in interpreting popular support for religious parties as evidence of popular support for religious agendas. It also warrants caution in interpreting the success of non-Islamic parties as a defense against religious agendas.

By taking seriously the linkages between voters and the parties that they choose, this argument treats elections in Muslim-majority countries as fundamentally comparable to elections in other countries with religiously motivated votes. In fact, the arguments in this chapter apply—*mutatis mutandis*—to any electoral regime in which at least one major political party either competes on a religious platform or tends to be identified with a religious community. In much the same way that evangelical Christians may support the Republican Party in the United States, or Catholics may support the Law and Justice Party in Poland, so too may religious Muslims vote for nonconfessional parties. Inferring the role of individual religion or religiosity in explaining electoral behavior requires attention to the complex array of nonreligious factors that shape party competition. In the conclusion to this chapter, therefore, I outline a research agenda that situates electoral behavior and voter characteristics (demographic attributes, religious beliefs) within their broader sociological, historical, and institutional context.

I build this argument with special reference to Islam and Islamic parties in Indonesia and Malaysia, two Muslim-majority countries with long histories of both competitive and uncompetitive elections among Islamic, nationalist, and other kinds of political parties. Close engagement with these two cases allows for a careful consideration of how religious and nonreligious factors shape party strategy and voter responses to it using the wealth of qualitative and historical data available about religion and partisan competition in these two countries. That said, all of the conceptual arguments presented here generalize beyond these two countries, to any election in a Muslim-majority country with elections that feature parties that identify as Muslim parties, either explicitly or implicitly.

Before proceeding, a note on terminology is in order. In this chapter I will use the term *Islamic* to refer to any party, organization, or movement that either implicitly or explicit invokes Islam as part of its history, foundation, or platform. I will reserve the term *Islamist* to refer to parties, organizations, or movements that explicitly seek to align national politics with Islamic principles (compare to Masoud 2014, 1; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018, 25). As an empirical matter, such labels are always contested, parties may evolve over time, and partisan platforms may be opaque. But the conceptual distinction between religious identity and religious program is important for the argument that follows.

Islam and Electoral Politics

The absence of competitive elections in many Muslim-majority countries means that the literature on religion and voting behavior in Muslim countries is comparatively less developed than the literature on religion and voting behavior in Europe and North America (for recent reviews, see Esmer and Pettersson 2007; Manza and Wright 2003). There are many questions of interest to scholars of religion and voting behavior, but for the purposes of this chapter, I confine my overview to perspectives that explain *why voters choose religious or nonreligious parties*. Broadly speaking, there are three ways to conceptualize the linkages between a party's religious appeals and the choices that voters make: religious ideology, party brand, and demographic association. Each of these has analogues in the literature on partisan competition beyond the Muslim world, and in what follows I make brief mention of the wider literatures on electoral behavior from the United States and Europe in order to link these perspectives to the general comparative literature.

The most straightforward link between religiosity and partisan vote choice runs through religious ideology. Here, the argument is that voters choose religious parties because they have religious preferences. Applied to voting behavior in the Muslim world, this perspective holds that votes for Islamic parties depend on the beliefs that Muslims have about the role of Islam in political life, and that voters choose parties that promise to achieve such goals. In the same way that an individual who holds economically conservative views may vote for a conservative political party that campaigns on conservative economic principles, so too may voters who hold religious views vote for a party that espouses religious views. This has long been the standard view in the study of Islam and democracy. Based on an impressionistic overview of the elections of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, Hamas in Palestine, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey in the early 2000s, for example, Esmer and Pettersson conclude that "Religiosity is a major factor influencing voting behavior throughout the Islamic world" (2007, 497). In this, the effects of religiosity on voting behavior in the Muslim world do not follow the predictions of the secularization thesis (see Norris and Inglehart 2004), either because secularization is not happening in the first place, or because Muslims do not respond to secularization in the way that Christians do.

It is surely true that some religious voters choose religious parties because they support these parties' religious platforms. But there is a wealth of evidence from beyond the Muslim world suggesting that voters do not vote for parties or for candidates based on their policy platforms, or indeed based on any knowledge of what parties' and candidates' actual positions even are (for an early articulation of this view in the US context, see Campbell et al. 1960). An alternative perspective is that voters choose parties based a complex mix of policy beliefs and reputation that amount to a "party brand" (see Lupu 2016). Applied to the case of religious parties and vote choice, this linkage holds that parties may have religious identities, but voters choose them because they believe that these parties represents religion as well as other things that they care about beyond religion itself. This is most apparent with Christian Democratic parties in Europe as parties of the center right, chosen by voters often with no reference to their religious heritage, even though that heritage exists and is explicit in their party platforms.[1] Observing that a voter identifies as a Christian and votes for a Christian Democratic party does not convey much information about what drives her or his vote choice, because Christian Democratic parties have broader economic and social platforms, with positions on issues ranging from economic management to welfare policy to women's and minority rights and status. So, too, do parties in Muslim majority countries, and this observation underlies a long line of research on the source of Islam's political advantage (see Cammett and Jones Luong 2014 for a review). The implication is that voters may support Islamic parties because of their party brands, which may be conservative, progressive, or reformist—or business- or social justice–oriented. Equivalently, some voters may support non-Islamic parties because they believe that these parties have *latent Islamic* brands.

Still another perspective draws attention not to parties' policy positions, but rather to the demographic characteristics of voters. In plural societies with political systems in which confessional, linguistic, ethnic, or other kinds of parties represent different social groups, voters may choose parties because they represent their group. The simplest articulation of this perspective emerges in the literature on consociationalism in the Netherlands, where under the model of pillarization that predominated prior to the 1960s, religious communities voted for parties that represented them (Lijphart 1975). As religious attendance and identification with a particular faith community waned, so in turn did votes for confessional parties (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1987). Applied to religious voting in Muslim-majority (but still religiously heterogeneous) societies, this argument implies that Muslims vote for Islamic parties they are the parties that represent their coreligionists.

These explanations for vote choice are obviously interrelated, and voters may have complex and multifaceted explanations for the choices that they make. The distinction between demographic association and religious ideology, for example, may be hard to discern among many voters. Are they voting for religious parties because they believe these parties will implement religious policies that benefit their religious group, or are they voting for religious parties because their existence represents the group's general interests regardless of the policies they enact? Likewise, the distinction between party brand and demographic association may be particularly subtle when it comes to ethnic parties. If ethnicity and religion overlap, then Muslim voters may choose ethnic parties because they know that their religious identities will also be reflected in the policy priorities of such ethnically based parties. Despite these and other empirical challenges in identifying the determinants of voting for Islamic and non-Islamic parties, these conceptual distinctions help to reveal the subtle issues involved in assessing why voters choose particular political parties, both in the Muslim world and beyond.

It is also important to distinguish religious ideology, party brand, and demographic association from explanations focusing more narrowly on partisan identity. More than simply a "running tally of party performance, ideological beliefs, and proximity to the party in terms of one's preferred policies," partisan identity is an expression of identification with the party itself as the in-group (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Fowler (2020) provides a recent synthesis of the literature and some evidence on what he terms the "partisan intoxication" hypothesis in the United States. This approach differs in that it locates the motivation for vote choice in identification with the party rather than with the community that that party claims to represent, as in the demographic association perspective. Applied to other cases of confessional parties, it would imply that voters support a party such as the Catholic People's Party in the Netherlands out of identification *with the party* rather than with the Dutch Catholic community; or in Israel, voting for Shas because of identification *with the party* rather than with the Haredi community that it aims to represent. Although I do not rule out that there may be intoxicated partisans in the Muslim world who vote for (or against) Islamic parties purely for reasons of expressive partisanship, I do not entertain this approach any further in this chapter.

Finally, note as well that the three competing perspectives outlined above ignore completely the role of mobilization and party organization in explaining vote choice. Plainly, voting for Islam does not occur in a vacuum: voters are mobilized by political actors who make deliberate religious and other appeals, through organizational efforts in mosques and elsewhere (Brooke 2019; Cammett and Issar 2010; Hamayotsu 2012; Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz 2003), and occasionally bought off directly (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019). Moreover, as Kalyvas (1996) observes in his criticism of the early literature on Christian democracy in Europe, the very existence of religious parties also requires explanation. Although a full account of voting for Islam would encompass all of these steps, putting individual votes in their sociological and historical context, I keep the analytical focus on individual decisions, given an existing set of partisan options. In the conclusion, I revisit the roles of history, mobilization, and elite politicking in our accounts of voting for Islamic parties.

Party Competition in the Muslim World

As noted previously, the literature on religion and voting behavior in the Muslim world is far less developed relative to the literature in Europe, the Americas, and other advanced industrial democracies. One simple explanation for this pattern is that elections held in Muslim-majority countries are far less likely to be free and fair than elections in the rest of the world. To establish this point, Table 12.1 compares elections using data on all elections around the world from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012), as well as data on Muslim population share across countries from the Pew Research Center (2017).

The NELDA dataset attempts to provide a standard metric of whether or not elections are competitive or not, coding elections for national office across the world between 1945 and 2006. Data were coded using secondary sources by a team of trained research assistants. More updated data from 2007 on would probably not change our inferences given the continued concerns about democracy in the Muslim world (and beyond). For the purposes of the analysis below, Muslim-majority countries are all countries whose Muslim population share exceeds 50 percent.[2]

I examine both the presence of multiparty elections (*NELDA4*) and whether or not there are concerns about the freedom and fairness of elections (*NELDA11*). The dataset

Table 12.1: Electoral Competitiveness in Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries

More than One Party Is Legal (*NELDA4*)			Concerns about Electoral Freedom and Fairness (*NELDA11*)		
	Non-Muslim	Muslim		Non-Muslim	Muslim
No	253	193	No	1,586	217
%	10.6	29.07	%	66.47	32.68
Unclear	5	2	Unclear	30	20
%	0.21	0.3	%	1.26	3.01
Yes	2,128	469	Yes	770	427
%	89.19	70.63	%	32.27	64.31
Total	2,386	664	Total	2,386	664

Source: Hyde and Marinov (2012).

contains other variables that capture electoral competitiveness, and a similar analysis with those will produce comparable results, but I choose these two because they represent both an objective measure of whether partisan competition exists (*NELDA4*) and a subjective evaluation of the state of electoral freedom (*NELDA11*). That these figures are so comparable is reassuring.

From Table 12.1, it is evident that elections in Muslim-majority countries are simply less likely to be competitive referenda across multiple parties than are elections in non-Muslim-majority countries.[3] Table 12.2 tabulates the number of multiparty elections (*NELDA4* = "Yes") in Muslim-majority countries, differentiating among levels of concern about electoral freedom and fairness (*NELDA11*).

The data in Table 12.2 have important implications for how we conceptualize voting behavior in Muslim-majority countries where voters have a choice among different candidates. Even under these circumstances, voters frequently must anticipate that there is some chance that their votes will not be fairly counted. Even in countries with long histories of elections (such as Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan), restrictions on who can compete, how parties may campaign, and the likelihood of electoral interference make it difficult to ascertain linkages between voters and parties. In Egypt, for example, explicitly Islamist parties are popular, but under the regime of Hosni Mubarak, Islamists were unable to form parties. In Iran, by contrast, an unelected council of religious figures may prevent candidates from competing in elections. Among Muslim-majority countries with extensive histories of elections, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Turkey are notable for the relative prevalence of competitive multiparty elections. But even in these cases it is important to remember that these elections usually still fail to meet the basic standards of democratic competition in the minimalist sense (Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworski 1999).

Table 12.2: Concerns about Electoral Freedom and Fairness in the Muslim World

Country	No	Unclear	Yes	Country	No	Unclear	Yes
Afghanistan	1	0	1	Lebanon	11	0	4
Albania	0	2	10	Libya	0	0	2
Algeria	1	0	4	Malaysia	9	0	3
Azerbaijan	0	0	7	Mali	2	0	7
Bahrain	2	0	1	Mauritania	2	0	6
Bangladesh	3	0	6	Morocco	5	0	5
Burkina Faso	5	3	0	Niger	1	2	4
Chad	3	0	1	Nigeria	5	0	6
Comoros	4	0	3	Pakistan	2	0	7
Djibouti	0	0	4	Senegal	5	0	4
Egypt	2	0	17	Sierra Leone	4	0	4
Gambia	8	0	2	Somalia	2	0	0
Guinea	0	0	2	Sudan (2012–)	2	0	2
Indonesia	7	0	3	Syria	2	2	3
Iran	0	1	18	Tajikistan	0	0	7
Iraq	1	0	7	Tunisia	1	0	8
Jordan	8	0	2	Turkey	15	0	7
Kazakhstan	0	0	9	Turkmenistan	1	0	0
Kuwait	1	0	1	Uzbekistan	0	0	6
Kyrgyzstan	2	0	6	Yemen	2	0	1
Total	119	10	190				

Source: Hyde and Marinov (2012).

PARTY COMPETITION IN MUSLIM SOUTHEAST ASIA

With this background in mind, I turn to a closer analysis of elections and partisan competition in Indonesia and Malaysia. I focus on these two countries for several reasons. First, they are both representative cases of party politics in the Muslim world, each having a long history of electoral competition under democratic, competitive authoritarian, and hard authoritarian rule. The two cases also differ usefully from one another, both demographically and institutionally, which helpfully increases the variation in the ways that Islamic, Islamist, and other parties compete for votes. And indeed, a common

Table 12.3: Fractionalization Indices

	Religion	Ethnicity	Language
Indonesia	0.23	0.74	0.77
Malaysia	0.67	0.59	0.60

Source: Alesina et al. (2003).

theme in the discussion of partisan competition and the determinants of vote choice is that the very diversity of party competition makes them ideally suited for illuminating the difficulty of inferring why people support Islamic and Islamist parties. Finally, a focus on Southeast Asian Islam usefully expands the study of political Islam beyond the Middle East and Arab world, and counters the implicit assumption among many who work on Islam and politics that "Southeast Asian Islam is not real Islam" (Azra 2003, 39).

Both Indonesia and Malaysia have majority Muslim populations, but with different ethnic and religious compositions. Indonesia is 88 percent Muslim, but the Indonesian Constitution does not give special consideration to Islam over other religions. Malaysia is 60 percent Muslim, and Islam is the country's official religion. The two countries likewise differ in ethnic and religious heterogeneity. To capture this, I used fractionalization indices, which provide a summary measure of how heterogeneous a population is across some group dimension. They are calculated as

$$Fractionalization = 1 - \sum_{N}^{i} s_i^2$$

where s_i is the share of group i within the population. An entirely homogeneous population with only one ethnic group would have an ethnic fractionalization score of $1 - 1^2 = 0$. A population with three equally-sized religious groups would have a religious fractionalization score of $1 - (.33^2 + .33^2 + .33^2) = .67$. And a population where one linguistic group comprises 80 percent of the population and three others comprise 10 percent, 8 percent, and 2 percent of the population would have a linguistic fractionalization score of $1 - (.8^2 + .1^2 + .08^2 + .02^2) = .34$. Table 12.3 (using data from Alesina et al. 2003) provides indices of fractionalization by religion, ethnicity, and language in each country.

These figures confirm that both countries are diverse, plural societies. But Indonesian diversity is characterized by ethnolinguistic differences among Muslims (low religious diversity, high ethnic and linguistic diversity), whereas Malaysia's is characterized by the overlap between religious and ethnolinguistic difference (common levels of religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity).[4]

Partisan Competition in Indonesia

Indonesia's post-independence political history can be divided into four periods: Liberal Democracy (1949–1957), Guided Democracy (1957–1966), the New Order (1966–1999), and the current democratic period (1999–the present). A constant theme in Indonesian party politics, both during periods of democratic competition and under authoritarian rule, is a cleavage between Islamic parties and movements and their nationalist opponents. However, this cleavage is only one of many in Indonesian politics and society, a fact that has implications for how to interpret votes for and against explicitly Islamic parties. Table 12.3 summarizes the four periods and identifies the main political parties, both Islamic and nationalist, in each.

Indonesia's short experience with Liberal Democracy in the 1950s featured a complex mix of partisan cleavages that reflected the social complexity of a newly independent state that was still in the process of developing a national identity and establishing unified control over its territory. President Sukarno's Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) represented one centrist faction that united Muslims and non-Muslims on a broadly nationalist platform emphasizing development and territorial unity. On its left stood that Indonesian Communist Party, one of the largest Communist parties anywhere in the world, which represented a more secular vision for Indonesia's political future. Two separate parties represented Muslim interests explicitly. Masjumi (short for Majelis Syuro Muslimin, or Council of Muslim Organizations) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, or Awakening of the Ulama). The former traces its organizational lineage to the Japanese occupation, as an organization representing Muslim elites and interests; the latter emerged as a party in a split from Masjumi but does claim an organizational heritage that dates to the late Dutch colonial period. NU and Masjumi differed sociologically in that the former invokes traditionalist (and especially Javanese) Muslim beliefs, whereas the latter is more modernist in orientation. Importantly, the process of writing the Indonesian constitution had occasioned fierce debate about the role of Islam in Indonesian politics, but the final outcome of this process saw no role for Islam itself, and instead emphasized the generic religiosity of Indonesian politics under the banner of belief in one god.

Table 12.4: Periodizing Indonesian Politics

Era	Years	Non-Islamic Parties	Islamic Parties
Liberal Democracy	1949–1957	Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Masjumi
Guided Democracy	1957–1966	PKI, Functional Groups (Golkar)	NU marginalized, Masjumi banned
New Order	1966–1999	Golkar, Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)	United Development Party (PPP)
Contemporary Democracy	1999–present	Golkar, PDI-P, Democrat Party, People's Conscience Party, Great Indonesia Movement Party, others	PPP, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), others

Indonesia's 1955 parliamentary elections saw PKI, PNI, NU, and Masjumi each taking approximately 20 percent of the seats—leaving no party with anything close to a majority or even a clear plurality (van der Kroef 1957). Amid general dissatisfaction with the divided and fractious parliamentary order, Sukarno brought the Liberal Democratic period to an end by proclaiming the establishment of Guided Democracy, a system that would ostensibly resolve the contradictions inherent in multiparty democracy. Sukarno banned Masjumi in 1960, and NU's influence as a party declined during this period. Guided Democracy, in turn, ended abruptly when Suharto seized power in 1966 in the aftermath of the 1965 coup and the ensuing extermination of the PKI. Suharto's New Order regime used Golkar—a corporatist mass organization created under Guided Democracy to represent different groups in Indonesian society—as its mobilizational vehicle (see Reeve 1985). Following elections in 1971, Suharto ordered all opposition parties to merge into one of two official opposition parties: the United Development Party (PPP) to represent Islamic interests, and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) to represent nationalist (and non-Muslim) interests.

Following Suharto's resignation and Indonesia's subsequent democratization, Golkar formally became a political party, and was joined not only by PPP and the PDI-P (successor to PDI), but also by a wide range of parties across the political spectrum (aside from the Communist Left). Today, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) campaigns on Islamist and developmentalist principles, whereas the Crescent Star Party (PBB) claims the heritage of Masjumi. Two other Islamic parties represent the interests of Indonesia's two largest Muslim organizations: the National Awakening Party (PKB) is associated with (but organizationally independent from) NU, and the National Mandate Party is similarly associated with but independent from Muhammadiyah, NU's modernist Muslim counterpart. Other nationalist parties have emerged as well, largely built as the personal vehicles of aspiring presidential candidates: the Democrat Party for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the People's Conscience Party for Wiranto, the Great Indonesia Movement Party for Prabowo Subianto, and others.

This brief historical overview of party development in Indonesia immediately reveals the different ways that Islamic parties capitalize on religious votes. Islamist parties like PKS and PBB campaign on religious principles, although these are coupled with developmentalist platforms. PKB and PAN have associational links with two large religious organizations representing distinct groupings of Indonesian Muslims. As I will discuss later, all other parties of any national standing also have primarily Muslim constituencies, and these nationalist parties may also appeal to religious Muslims.

Partisan Competition in Malaysia

Malaysia's post-independence political history also falls into distinct periods, although the country's form of electoral authoritarianism differs substantially from the New Order and Guided Democracy models in Indonesia, as do the cleavage structures that underlie Malaysian politics and society. Paralleling the discussion of Indonesia above,

Table 12.5: Periodizing Malaysian Politics

Era	Years	Non-Islamic Parties	Islamic Parties
Alliance Rule	1957–1969	United Malays National Organisation (UMNO, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), Democratic Action Party (DAP), Malaysian People's Movement (Gerakan)	Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)
National Operations Council	1969–1971	Parliament suspended	
Barisan Nasional (Pre-Crisis)	1971–1999	UMNO, MCA, MIC, DAP	PAS
Barisan Nasional (Post-Crisis)	1999–2018	UMNO, MCA, MIC, DAP, People's Justice Party (PKR)	PAS
Contemporary Democracy	2018–present	UMNO, MCA, MIC, DAP, PKR, Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu)	PAS, National Trust Party (Amanah)

Table 12.5 summarizes the four periods and identifies the main political parties, both Islamic and nationalist, in each.

The years immediately following independence saw the Federation of Malaya (then excluding the states of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia) ruled by the Alliance, a coalition of parties representing each of Malaya's three main ethnic groups: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) for Malays, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).[5] Each party's membership is defined ethnically, but religious affiliation is implicit, as the Malaysian Constitution defines Malayness with reference to Islam (Hirschman 1987, 555). Since all Malays are Muslims, and the party's constituency is Malay,[6] it is a party that represents Muslim interests. In opposition sat three important parties: the Democratic Action Party (DAP) representing social democratic principles, the Malaysian People's Movement (Gerakan) representing liberal principles, and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS). Importantly, although none of these parties is defined by an ethnic constituency, each disproportionately captured particular ethnic groups. DAP and Gerakan remained largely but not exclusively Chinese in membership, and PAS largely but not exclusively Malay. A roster of much smaller parties, some ethnic but most not, tended to capture votes of Malaysian Indians and non-Malay *bumiputeras* in East Malaysia.

After ethnic riots following the 1969 parliamentary elections (Goh 1971), UMNO leaders suspended parliament and declared a state of emergency. Malaysia returned to parliamentary democracy in 1971, with a newly expanded ruling coalition called the Barisan Nasional (or National Front, BN)—now including both Gerakan and PAS as well as other smaller parties. In 1977 PAS left the BN, joining DAP in the opposition. The

Malaysian partisan landscape would remain roughly fixed until 1999, when, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and a leadership struggle within UMNO, the National Justice Party (later the People's Justice Party, or PKR). This party is explicitly multiethnic in character, and joined both PAS and DAP in the country's first—but short-lived—opposition coalition (Weiss 1999).

Further factional struggles both within UMNO and within PAS led to the birth of two new important parties in the 2010s: the National Trust Party (Amanah), an Islamist party comprising progressives from PAS; and the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu), a Malay party comprising old guard UMNO politicians dissatisfied with the leadership of Prime Minister Najib Razak. In the 2018 general elections, a coalition of the DAP, PKR, Amanah, and Bersatu formed Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH), which finally defeated the Barisan Nasional. PH currently forms the government (as of 2020), and the peaceful transition of power through elections from BN to PR was an auspicious sign of democratization (Lemière 2018).

Malaysian partisan politics differs substantially from Indonesia, owing first and foremost to the explicit politicization of ethnicity, in turn reinforced through the party system. But because ethnicity overlays religion in Malaysia, Malay parties, such as the long-ruling UMNO, are effectively parties that represent nearly exclusively Muslim constituencies. Moreover, even though Malaysia has Islamist parties just as Indonesia does, they also function effectively as ethnic parties in a way that Indonesia's do not.

Voting for Islam in Muslim Southeast Asia

As noted previously, the literature on voting behavior and partisan competition in the Muslim world is underdeveloped. This is also the case for Indonesian and Malaysian politics. Although both countries have been part of the East Asia Barometer since Wave 2 (Welsh et al. 2007), I am aware of no publications using these data that have sought to explain votes for Islamic versus other parties. Political conditions in each country have also constrained research. In Malaysia, academic research on voting behavior has been politically difficult, although polling firms such as the Merdeka Centre for Public Opinion Research have been able to produce reports that have implications for research on Islam and politics (e.g., Martinez 2006). By contrast, since Indonesian democratization, there has been an explosion of public opinion polling (Mietzner 2009), with increasing involvement by social scientists seeking to understand what explains voter support for political parties (see, e.g., Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2018). However, the observation that Islamic parties have not managed to grow in size and influence relative to their position in 1955 (see Table 12.6) leads most Indonesia specialists to conclude that the drivers of vote choice in Indonesia must lie outside of religiosity.

Table 12.6: Parliamentary Vote Share in Indonesia, 1955 and 2014

Year	Islamic Parties	Other Parties
1955	43.9	55.9
2014	31.4	68.6

Source: https://bit.ly/2FX2TxR and https://bit.ly/2K0hyMz.

The task of disentangling religious ideology from other drivers of vote choice is a difficult research design problem. A naïve approach would be to calculate the conditional correlation between a measure of religious identity or religiosity and whether or not a voter supports an Islamic party, but for the reasons described in the previous sections, this is unlikely to be informative if parties differ for reasons other than just their religious ideology. Indeed, Liddle and Mujani (2007) adopt this approach and find evidence that more religious Muslims in Indonesia are more likely to support some Islamic parties (specifically, PPP or PKB but not PAN or PKS) relative to PDI-P, the most nationalist[7] of democratic Indonesia's political parties.

The first study to outline the inferential challenges associated with inferring motivations for vote choice in the Muslim world was Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2012), which developed an experimental approach to disentangle the effects of religious ideology and economic motivations for supporting political parties. Their finding—that under conditions of economic policy uncertainty, Indonesia's Islamist parties have a small but statistically significant advantage over non-Islamist parties—shows that nonreligious factors drive support for Islamist parties. They explain this finding by invoking a logic of cueing (similar to branding), in which voters associate Islamic parties with normatively good features, but choose them only when they are unable to evaluate parties on other dimensions. But isolating the effects of religious ideology from other factors requires presenting survey respondents with hypothetical parties rather than actual ones, and is incapable of assessing the relative weight of different linkages relative to one another in the aggregate, or even of inferring individual voter motives at all.

In sum, the growing literature on religion and vote choice in Indonesia finds some correlations between religiosity and religious identity and support for Islamic parties, but more methodologically sophisticated approaches reveal that it is hard to disentangle support for Islamic parties' religious platforms versus their other platforms.

The interaction between ethnicity, religion, and partisan competition in Malaysia makes this task still more difficult. Absent individual-level data, most analyses of electoral behavior have used ecological correlations that estimate the correlations between constituency characteristics and party vote shares (Ng et al. 2015; Pepinsky 2009, 2015). But because of the definitional equivalence of Malay and Muslim under the Malaysian Constitution, most research exploring the drivers of support for

Malaysia's incumbent and opposition parties focuses on whether ethnicity or urbanization (a proxy for broader processes of modernization) explains vote choice. There is limited research on religiosity per se, and what exists is methodologically unsophisticated (Welsh 2014). The fact that UMNO and PAS tended—prior to 2018—to run head-to-head in constituencies with large Malay majorities might suggest that it would be possible to explore the correlation between religiosity and vote choice in this subset of electoral contests, but even here, party lineages differ across states for historical reasons (Funston 1980), confounding any comparison of religiosity among Malays. And, moreover, PAS and UMNO differ across multiple dimensions aside from their Islamist character. UMNO under BN rule was a hegemonic party with vast resources of patronage at its disposal and an agenda that focused explicitly on Malay rights and protection of the political and economic status quo, whereas PAS is an opposition party with reformist ambitions, comparatively limited access to patronage, and an agenda that emphasizes Malay rights only indirectly. A vote for PAS might be a signal of northeast peninsular regional identity (evidence of the demographic association linkage), a demand for reform with anti-regime ambitions (evidence of the party brand linkage), or a signal of support for its religious platform.

This discussion illustrates just how difficult it is to infer what linkages are at work from observed votes for Islamic parties. Even when precisely articulated using a research design that can identify the effects of party brands independently of religious ideology, conclusions are necessarily limited in scope. For similar reasons, it is also difficult to infer voter motivations from observed votes for non-Islamic parties. As Baswedan (2004) observed early in Indonesia's contemporary democratic period, Golkar built a constituency among religious Muslims in Indonesia beginning in the late New Order period, with particular strength among religious Muslims outside of Java. Although the party does not advocate for the implementation of Islamic law, as Buehler (2013, 2016) has shown, at the subnational level, politicians from Golkar are frequently responsible for implementing Islamic regulations. A voter seeking religious policy may therefore choose *Golkar instead of an Islamic party* due to the party's ability and willingness to implement religious regulations. An implication of this finding is that we may observe a negative correlation between individual religiosity and support for explicitly Islamist parties in Indonesia, even though voters *are* explicitly voting for religious platforms by voting for the officially *non*-Islamist Golkar Party.

Likewise, in Malaysia, the fact that PAS sat opposition to the BN, and collaborated with largely non-Malay parties with multicultural and social democratic platforms, raises the possibility that a strict Islamist voter concerned primarily with religious ideology would vote *against PAS and for UMNO*. Liow (2003, 2009) and Weiss (2004) describe how UMNO has moved to adopt the Islamic agenda held by PAS as a way to preempt challenges to its religious credentials.

AN AGENDA

This chapter has outlined a framework for conceptualizing the links between Islam and voting behavior. Its main conclusions are negative. Because there are multiple linkages between religion and voting behavior, when facing the complexity of partisan competition in plural societies with multiparty elections in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, it is hard to conclude anything about voter intentions based on their decision to vote for or against an Islamic party.

One might conclude from my argument that inferring voter intentions is impossible. Although I do conclude that scholars interested in Islamic politics must take seriously the research design challenges inherent in understanding voter intentions in Muslim societies, this certainly does not imply that voting behavior is irrelevant for understanding Muslim politics. To conclude with a more constructive message, a research agenda on the links between religion and voting behavior might build on these uncertain foundations in three ways.

The first is to proceed systematically, breaking down the broader problem of characterizing the different linkages between religion and voting behavior into coherent and answerable questions. Although approaches such as that of Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2012) cannot on their own resolve all of these issues, they can at least answer one question properly. Assembling multiple studies that tackle different aspects of this broader research area is the first step in a progressive research agenda, but each will need to focus on precise questions and appropriate counterfactuals in order to distinguish among the many different explanations reviewed above for why voters choose different parties. Unfortunately, the methods developed by Pepinsky et al. are not automatically portable to all such questions. To identify empirically the role of demographic association, for example, will require a method to manipulate respondents' demographic characteristics, perhaps through priming or otherwise making more salient one particular aspect of their social identity (see Sen and Wasow 2016).

The second direction to expand is to look comparatively, focusing on the countries listed in Table 12.2. Turkey in particular has featured prominently in the literature on Islam and democratic politics, with Islamism associated both with religiosity and with a particular class formation (see, e.g., Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006; Öniş 2006; Yavuz 1997). And yet the conceptual problems outlined here have not met with satisfactory solutions—the ruling Justice and Development Party embodies, in various accounts, Islamic, reformist, developmentalist, and pro-business principles. In the case of Egypt, by contrast, Masoud (2014) shows that the Muslim Brotherhood's mobilizational capacity and other social forces explain its success during Egypt's brief experience with democracy in the early 2010s. Further extending this analysis to understand what votes for non-Islamic parties mean in regions like West Africa, where few explicit Islamic parties compete in multiparty elections, would also prove enlightening.

A third way to extend this research agenda is to question the very assumption that linkages between voters and Islamic parties matter. Scholars of Islamic politics may more profitably focus on party strategies, elite choices, and social movement entrepreneurs. As my coauthors and I concluded in our analysis of piety and public opinion in Indonesia (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018), there is little evidence that Muslim religiosity explains anything interesting about Indonesian politics. To conceptualize the role of Islam in Indonesian politics is to appreciate the autonomy of politicians and the broader social forces shaping party competition rather than the mundane politics of vote-getting and political behavior, taking seriously Islam as an identity claim rather than a set of individual beliefs and policy preferences.

Such an approach need not reject the linkages between voters and Islamic parties. After all, in electoral regimes, parties must win votes, so understanding the activities of elites and entrepreneurs is necessary but not sufficient for understanding electoral politics. Instead, it would envision a more dynamic relationship between elites and masses, or between movement entrepreneurs and voters, than a static analysis of what individual factors predict vote choice. Rather than asking whether religiosity or other demographic factors predict vote choice, researchers might consider the conditions under which religious messages appeal to voters, or whether religious elites prove to be more trustworthy messengers for non-Islamic parties. Rather than looking at vote intention or party identification, one might instead investigate the stability of partisan attachment, the decision to turn out, or the willingness to sell votes. Such approaches embrace voting behavior as essential to understanding the role of religion in electoral politics, but redirect inquiry away from general statements about voter intentions and toward what are more analytically tractable electoral questions (and, arguably, more politically consequential electoral phenomena) in Muslim-majority countries.

Notes

1. See, e.g., the program of the Christian Democratic Union in Germany, https://www.cdu.de/grundsatzprogramm-2007: “Orientierungsmaßstab ist das *christliche* Menschenbild und davon ausgehend die drei Grundwerte ‘Freiheit, Solidarität und Gerechtigkeit’” (emphasis added) [accessed April 2, 2019].
2. This coding rule thus includes Nigeria (Muslim population share is 50.4 percent) and excludes Guinea-Bissau (42.2 percent) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (40 percent).
3. These figures account for all types of elections—legislative, executive, and for constituent assemblies—and remain substantively identical when the analysis is restricted to only legislative/parliamentary elections.

4. See Hamayotsu (2002) for a comparative perspective on Islam and political development in these two cases.
5. Both MCA and MIC would change their names from Malayan to Malaysian after 1963, when the country became the Federation of Malaysia.
6. Non-Muslim indigenous Malaysians (*bumiputeras*) may join UMNO, but in practice their numbers are small and their influence negligible. The currently leadership of UMNO is entirely Muslim; see https://umno-online.my/majlistertinggi/ [accessed April 2, 2019].
7. They use the term *secular*, but it is more accurate to describe this party as *non-Islamic*.

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CHAPTER 13

RELIGION AND PARTY POLITICS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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Religion has influenced party politics in India and Pakistan since independence in 1947 in at least three different ways. First, religious parties have succeeded at winning elections directly, forming governments and implementing their own political and social visions. Only since 1990 has the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, or Indian People's Party) been able to do this at the state and national level in India, and only since 2000 have religious parties in Pakistan been able to win elections at the provincial level. The BJP is now, in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's second term, using its increased parliamentary majority and control of many major Indian states to remake India's government and institutions in Hindu Nationalist form, including reducing minorities to second-class status; banning conversions and stigmatizing interreligious relationships; abolishing the special constitutional status of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir; punishing the media, civil society organizations, and institutions (such as universities) that oppose Modi; and trying to institutionalize a particular form of Hindu nationalist identity in government institutions, education, and public discourse.

Second, even if not elected themselves, religious parties, movements, and voters can put pressure on and influence the behavior of those in government, using street protests, media protests, and informal influence. They can also shape the bounds of acceptable political debate, turning issues such as free speech, the status of religious minorities, or an individual's right to convert to another religion or preach their own into majoritarian 'valence' issues, where any politician who challenges the orthodox perspective or defends the unpopular minority does so at their peril. In Pakistan this kind of influence has been much stronger, for much longer, than in India, although the presence of Prime Minister Modi at the center has, since 2014, emboldened many Hindu nationalist activists to take an increasingly strident role on the streets and on social media.

Third, particularly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, leaders may sometimes choose to institutionalize religion in laws or state institutions, often as a way of seeking legitimacy that their own regime may lack. In Pakistan, this pattern was particularly evident in the 1970s and 1980s, first under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (President 1971–73, Prime Minister 1973–77), whose 1973 Constitution affirmed Pakistan as an Islamic Republic committed to institutionalizing Islamic principles in government and society, and who then passed a constitutional amendment in 1974 marginalizing the Ahmadi minority. The religiously conservative military dictator who displaced Bhutto, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988), went even further and institutionalized his vision of Islam in the education system, army, courts, and state administration.

In this paper I explore the reasons for the shift over time in the role of religion in party politics in both countries. In India, religion's role was initially much more limited than in Pakistan. Congress's top leadership, and in particular Prime Minister Nehru, traumatized by partition, were deeply opposed to structuring politics around communal identities, and those on the Hindu right or Muslim opposition who might have challenged Nehru on this had either left for Pakistan, were discredited by their stance on partition, or were tainted by the Hindu nationalists' role in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948. The Indian Constitution of 1950 firmly restricted the role of religion in the state and political system, and key clauses in the constitution helped instead to maximize the political importance of competing cross-cutting cleavages such as language and caste among the 82% Hindu majority as well as India's Muslim (11%), Sikh (2%) and Christian (2%) minorities. The national Congress Party, however, became increasingly associated over time with corruption and poor performance, especially after it abandoned internal party elections in 1971, which made the party less responsive to local groups and interests. Most of Congress's regional opponents and newly assertive parties from backward and lower castes were just as corrupt and ineffective, however. These parties could win in their home states but their narrow social bases, interparty rivalries, and lack of a broader unifying ideology made it very difficult to replace Congress in forming a stable national opposition. The BJP has succeeded where these other opposition parties failed for two major reasons. First, as we might expect from a party that grew out of a disciplined India-wide Hindu-nationalist organization going back to the 1920s, the BJP is itself a relatively disciplined party, and it has managed to avoid the open party splits that have plagued its competitors. Second, after suffering early reversals such as the 1994 state elections, the party has also learned to strategically downplay its hard Hindu nationalist agenda and opposition to caste politics, when necessary, and win elections instead by focusing on a message of good governance, less corruption, and more development that appeals to a wider swath of the electorate.

In Pakistan, the Islamic religious parties started out in a difficult position, because the major parties, the Jamaʿat-i Islami (JI) and Jamaʿat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), had offered only lukewarm support for the Muslim League's Pakistan project, and another party (the Ahrars) had been allied with the Congress, but they came to exercise more indirect influence than religious parties in India. They did this because of their ability to generate large-scale protests in mosques and in the street, and because the weakness of the mainstream parties (unlike in India) meant that secular-minded politicians lacked a firm base from which to defend either their own principles or the rights of unpopular minorities. Only the military, in the 1950s and 1960s when it was dominated by secular-minded officers at the top, was willing to rein in the Islamic parties when they threatened public order over anti-Ahmadi agitations (Abbas 2013, 6). This weakness in political party institutionalization, so crucial to democracy elsewhere (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), is due to two things: (1) the continuing power of large landlords and business interests whose power base is independent of the parties (Chacko 2020); and (2) the role of the military, which has actively worked to subvert any political party that looked as if it might emerge as a strong counterbalance to its own power.

The decisive period in defining state-religion relations in Pakistan was under the regimes of Prime Minister Bhutto (1971–1977) and then, after a military coup in 1977, his successor General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). Bhutto made common cause with the Sunni religious parties in 1973–1974—enshrining the Islamic character of the state in the 1973 constitution, which also in an Amendment in 1974 declared Ahmadis non-Muslims—to solidify his own power, but he never built up a genuine party organization capable of supporting his ambitions to transform the economy and society and increasingly resorted to authoritarian methods. Zia, personally committed to Islamic ideals and also in need of broader political legitimacy after his coup, quickly moved to institutionalize his conservative vision of Islam throughout Pakistan's courts, education system, administration, and even the army. The loose military-religious party alliances begun under Zia continue to this day, in part because both have an interest in undercutting the larger nonreligious political parties (Chacko 2020). The religious parties were unsuccessful at the polls for decades (Nasr, 1994), but have grown in influence partly due to the increasing religious conservatism of the country, and partly because they have become effective focal points to protest issues such as corruption or Pakistan's unpopular foreign policies. Coalitions of religious parties have formed provincial governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, where they succeeded by capitalizing on mass opposition in those provinces to Pakistan's military alliance with the United States, its policy in Afghanistan and US drone strikes. But the religious parties, splintered into many factions and performing poorly in delivering effective governance and development themselves when in provincial government, have not yet been able to break through at the national level, their twelve-party coalition winning only 8% of the vote in the most populous province of Punjab, and only 17% and 19%, respectively, in their traditional strongholds of KP and Balochistan at the last 2018 national assembly elections (Jahangir 2018).

In the following sections, I first review the ways in which religion was historically institutionalized by the colonial state in pre-independence India, and the reasons why the Muslim League pushed for partition. Second, I explore the reasons why, after independence, the Congress Party in India strongly opposed the role of religion in politics, and the ways in which the constitution, the electoral system, and demographic factors provided strong barriers to religious mobilization in India's first decades. Then I explore the reasons for the recent decline of the Congress, the rise of the BJP, and Prime Minister

Narendra Modi's current efforts to remake India and its institutions along Hindu nationalist lines. In the third section, I explore the role of Islam in Pakistan, especially the military's role in explaining why no strong secular party capable of challenging the role of religion in the state could emerge.

The Colonial Institutionalization of Religious Difference

The British colonial state in India deliberately structured representative politics and administration in India along religious lines. This was part of a conscious divide-and-rule policy in which Muslim, Sikh, and Christian minorities as well as landlords and the rulers of India's princely states (33% of the land area and 25% of the population) were seen as vital allies against Indian opposition to British rule. The colonial bureaucracy, police, and army recruited Indians from favored regions and groups along religious and caste lines—army units had separate companies and regiments from different communities, and police forces and provincial governments generally had a fixed Muslim percentage—with Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs overrepresented in the administration.[1]

When the colonial administration did grudgingly concede more democratic representation at the provincial level to meet Indian demands, in 1909 and 1919, it made sure that these institutions and elections were organized along religious lines to minimize the chance of a united Indian political opposition.[2] The devolved provincial legislatures established under the 1935 Government of India Act were also structured along explicitly religious lines, with the 25% Muslim minority voting in separate Muslim reserved constituencies in which only Muslims could stand for election. Most other Indian voters voted in "General" constituencies in which Hindus were the overwhelming majority.[3] Religious minorities in each of the provinces, whether Hindu, Sikh, or Muslim, were granted a disproportionate number of seats ("weightage"), purportedly to respond to their demands and help prevent majority domination, but also as part of this divide and rule strategy.[4]

Many influential members of the Muslim community, concerned about safeguarding their traditional political influence and because of long-term concerns that Muslims were being left behind in the race for higher education and government jobs, strongly supported these "reservations" in politics, administration, and the army. But the effect of this system of religious quotas in government administration and separate electorates, just as the comparative ethnic politics literature would have predicted (Horowitz 1985), was to intensify ethnic extremism and outbidding and diminish the likelihood of cross-community coalition building and inter-ethnic moderation. Muslims may have been overrepresented in provincial legislatures, but in almost all provinces the majority Hindu community did not need their votes. One colonial governor complained to the viceroy about the fundamental weakness of the system: "The minority cannot get their own way in the legislature, and as a permanent communal minority have no prospect of ever getting it, and they are tempted inevitably to redress the weakness of their parliamentary position by rousing religious feelings and emphasising the importance of the community outside the legislature."[5]

In the 1930s, the Muslim League, dominated by the barrister Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and reflecting the interests of Muslim landlords, businessmen, and the professional classes, became the main organization representing Muslim political opinion in most provinces of British India. Importantly for the future, though the League did well among Muslim voters in Hindu-majority provinces in the 1936–1937 elections, it did not do well in Muslim-majority provinces such as Punjab (dominated by the landlords of the Unionist Party), Bengal (KPP), and North-West Frontier (where Congress was victorious). In Punjab, Bengal, and elsewhere, these rival parties won by mobilizing strong support from landlords and traditional religious leaders (*pīr*) (Gilmartin 1990). The League's national dominance did not reflect broad membership or deep party organizational roots like that of the Congress, so much as the recognition by Muslims that Jinnah and the League were better placed than rivals to represent their interests at the provincial and especially at the all-India level (Jalal 1985).

By the late 1930s, angered at what he saw as the sidelining of Muslim interests in Hindu-majority provinces won by Congress in the 1936 elections, Jinnah focused more and more on the as yet ill-defined concept of a separate "Pakistan" ("land of the pure") that could safeguard Muslim interests in the long term: to protect the status of Muslims and the Urdu language in education and government employment, to block land reform that would threaten Muslim landlords (many of whom were leaders and financial supporters of the League), to retain Muslim personal law, and to block efforts by Hindus to regulate or ban the slaughter of cows for meat and sacrifice.

In India, although the Congress leadership at the top was secular and deliberately included prominent members of minority communities, including Muslims, in the provinces and especially in the north the party had many influential Hindu conservative members, who sought to promote such issues as the status of Sanskritized Hindi language rather than Urdu, a ban on the slaughter of cows (sacred to Hindus), and no "appeasement" on minority rights issues. At times, these politicians were either directly associated with the right-wing Hindu Mahasabha party or sympathetic to its positions. In the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), Bihar and Central Provinces, this right wing was sufficiently powerful by the late 1930s and 1940s to advance anti-minority measures that were strongly opposed by national leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi (Brennan 1993). Opposition from the Hindu right was very also important in 1945–1946 in blocking the constitutional compromise with the Muslim League desired by Nehru and Gandhi, which would have kept India together, but at what Hindu nationalists regarded as an unacceptable cost. In addition to the Hindu Mahasabha, there was also the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization formed in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim riots in 1925, which carried out drills and marches throughout the country to "protect" the Hindu majority. As relations between

India's majority and minority communities became strained in the mid-1940s, the membership in the RSS rose to 270,000 in January 1947, with a further half million more members in parallel Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh paramilitary organizations such as the Muslim League National Guards and Akalis.[6]

The bloody partition of India in 1947–1948 led to the forced movement of 14.5 million people across India, especially in Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, where the ethnic cleansing was almost total and greatly embittered communal relations. But each state was still left with substantial religious minorities in 1951: a 13% Hindu minority in Pakistan, almost all in East Pakistan, while 82% Hindu India had a Sikh minority (2%) mainly in Punjab, a Christian minority (2%) mainly in Kerala and the northeast, and a Muslim minority (11% in 1951) concentrated mainly in the north and northeast, urban areas, and in states that occupied territory that had formerly been part of Muslim-ruled princely states such as Hyderabad and Bhopal.[7]

Party Politics in India

The Congress Party that formed India's first post-independence government was highly unusual in its degree of what Mainwaring and Scully term "party institutionalization," compared to parties in most former colonies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The party was long-established (1885–); internally democratic and competitive; ethnically and regionally diverse, with millions of members across the country; and had a strong organizational structure. The party also had substantial experience in running provincial governments in the devolved system set up in 1919 and reformed in 1935. Congress was also strongly opposed, as a result of British divide-and-rule policies and the trauma of India's partition along religious lines, to institutionalizing religion in state policy. Congress used its overwhelming majority to pass a secular constitution (1950) that banned religious discrimination and overt religious appeals in elections. Over the next few years, the party also institutionalized powerful cross-cutting cleavages of caste and linguistic identities through government policies such as caste reservations in employment and politics, and the creation of new states for India's major linguistic minorities (Brass 1990; Wilkinson 2015). These created substantial barriers to political mobilization along religious lines. India's religious minorities faced two additional obstacles to mobilizing on the basis of religion: (1) doing so had been tainted as secessionist by Jinnah and the Muslim League's actions in the 1930s and 1940s; and (2) India's 1950 electoral system did away with separate electorates and institutionalized a mass franchise first-past-the-post electoral system, in which religious minorities, except in a few states and districts in which they are highly concentrated (e.g., Kerala and Kashmir for Muslims, Punjab for Sikhs), were now spread too thin to compete successfully on the basis of their minority identities. Branches of the Muslim League in India were largely wound up within a few years of independence.

The national Congress Party under Nehru (1947–1964), tried hard to integrate Muslims, appointing Muslims to several prominent (though not particularly powerful) cabinet positions in New Delhi, and making efforts to reduce discrimination against them in the states. Congress leaders were largely committed to a broad secular vision of Indian national identity, and to preserving Muslim personal law, even though this was not broadly popular with most Hindu voters. Muslim economic advancement lagged, however: Muslims were disproportionately concentrated in traditional craft occupations such as weaving, brass, and glasswork, as mechanics and repairmen, in transportation, and in insecure occupations such as vegetable sellers and laborers. Economic surveys done from the 1950s until the 1980s found that Muslims were consistently less well educated, poorer than Hindus, lived in worse housing, and had less access to clean water and toilets. Muslims were worse off than most other communities in India, excepting only the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.[8] The national Congress government promoted various Muslim development schemes from time to time, but these were ineffective in large part because most power to change Muslims' lives lay not with the national but with the state governments—which controlled agriculture and education—and here Muslims continued to have less of a claim on resources than Hindu upper and middle castes. Most Muslims by the early 1960s were voting for the Congress, but this support was never universal.[9]

The Congress Party's dominance at the all-India level was challenged in the mid-1960s, especially in the 1967 national and state elections, by new regional parties, often representing middle and lower Hindu castes. These parties grew out of farmers' movements, unions, and associations of middle and lower castes, and continued to mobilize voters through these organizations as well as the new parties. By the 1970s and 1980s, these opposition parties had fractured the dominance of the Congress Party at both the state and the national levels, in what Christophe Jaffrelot (2003) has termed the "Silent Revolution" of Indian politics. In 1989, Congress won only a plurality of seats in the national parliamentary elections, single-party dominance in New Delhi ended, and India entered an "era of coalitions" (see Figure 13.1) in which no party was strong enough to win power unaided in New Delhi. For the next twenty-five years, power at the center, as in many states, was decided through complex pre- and post-election deals, involving horse-trading and sometimes bribes to induce parties and individuals to stay as supporters, or switch sides.

In many ways this proliferation of coalitions at the national and state levels and the growing strength of parties defined by the intra-Hindu cleavages of caste and regional identities was very good for Muslim voters, because it enlarged the majority community "market" for minority votes and allowed Muslims to demand more in return for their political support. What had been happening in Kerala for several decades—a situation where Muslims helped decide which of two broad coalitions would win political power—was now increasingly likely to happen in other states. In several states, lower-, middle-, and upper-caste Muslims split their support, allying with Hindu parties with a similar caste profile and similar socioeconomic objectives. In Uttar Pradesh, for instance, the middle-caste Samajwadi Party has done well among Muslim voters from all



FIGURE 13.1: Party balance in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha 1952–2019).

Source: Data from Election Commission of India.

sections of the community, while its lower-caste BSP rival has effectively challenged it for the support of the lowest-caste Muslims (Verma and Gupta 2016, 113). This increased political leverage helped particularly in increasing Muslim security at a time of growing Hindu political mobilization. Wilkinson (2004) showed that, although anti-Muslim electoral polarization was often employed as an electoral tactic, communal violence was much less likely in states with a larger number of competing Hindu parties, where minority parties and votes were more valuable, and where Muslims could demand protection in return for their support.

Despite the growing market for Muslim votes in the 1989–2014 period, Muslims continued to fall behind economically, in part because of other Hindu communities' greater political clout, and in part because of persistent social and employment discrimination. The 2006 Sachar Committee, charged by a Congress government with looking into Muslims' economic disadvantage and how to improve things, found that for the first time since independence, Muslims in the lower age cohorts were even behind Scheduled Castes in terms of education.[10] The 2009–2010 National Sample Survey showed that Muslims' per capita expenditure was only 87% of the national average. Much of this was driven by large educational gaps between Muslims, 20% of whom are illiterate and only 35% of whom have a secondary education, and other communities.[11] The massive recent growth of the private employment market has not helped to close this gap, in part because of Muslims' lower levels of education and skills needed to compete for these new jobs, but also because of persistently high discrimination in the labor and housing markets. Indian survey experiment studies of the employment market have found, as in similar studies of anti-minority discrimination in the United States, that Muslim applicants consistently receive far fewer calls back from companies than Hindu candidates with the same credentials. If the callback rate for an upper caste applicant with a degree is 100%, the callback rate for a Scheduled Caste applicant is 66%, and that for a Muslim applicant only 33% (Thorat and Attewell 2010).[12]

More recent work by labor economists using national survey data has confirmed that Muslims now have declining prospects for social mobility compared to the past, and relative to all other groups. Asher, Novosad, and Rafkin (2018, 6) find that “virtually all of the upward mobility gains in India over recent decades have accrued to Scheduled Castes and Tribes, groups with constitutional protections, reservations in politics and education, and who have been targeted by many development policies.” Muslims, because they are deemed a religious minority, are excluded from most of the government programs meant to help lower and middle castes.[13] Even though discrimination is an important cause of Muslim disadvantage, the political appetite for dealing directly with this is lower than ever, as the BJP criticizes any effort to help Muslims as minority appeasement and “vote bank politics.” The Congress Party, 60% of whose votes in 2014 came from minorities, also has no hunger for aggressively promoting religiously targeted antipoverty policies, as it now tries to reposition itself as a party that is for the majority as well as for the minorities (Palshikar 2014).[14]

What Influences Muslim Voting in India?

Indians, the old saying goes, don’t cast their votes so much as vote their castes. And it is certainly true that, if we look at aggregate voting survey data, there does seem to be a strong correlation between caste/community and party choice. But the relationship between community and party ID has never been as clear at it seems. First, Indian voters from all communities, like voters elsewhere in the world, have consistently said when asked that they are motivated mainly by bread and butter economic issues rather than religious and caste identities. In the 2014 and 2019 elections, economic issues were again the top issues named by voters as influencing their vote choice. Table 13.1 shows the data

Table 13.1: Key Voting Issues in India’s 2014 National Election

ISSUE	
Economic Growth	25%
Corruption	21%
Inflation	18%
Personal Income	14%
Law and Order	8%
Access to Government Benefits	7%
Leadership	5%
Identity	3%

Question: which of these 8 issues will most influence your voting choice?

Source: Lok Foundation/CASI/Carnegie survey (2014).

for 2014, with economic growth, corruption, and inflation as the top three issues, and "identity" coming in eighth, named by only 3% of voters. Only at a few rare times in Indian history, such as during the 1989–1992 BJP-led movement to build a Hindu temple at a disputed mosque site at Ayodhya, has any identity issue broken into the top few concerns of voters in surveys.[15]

Second, even if someone from a particular group votes for a particular party, that is not necessarily a "group vote," but may instead reflect the party's position on some economic or social issue, which happens to align with voter preferences.[16] What seems to be a religious or caste vote might be an economic or ideological or development vote. Third, South Asia is well known to have high degrees of clientelistic politics, in which parties and politicians secure votes from groups of voters in return for the promise to distribute some goods, such as infrastructure, access to political or regulatory influence, or the direct delivery of money, food, liquor, etc.[17] High levels of group voting may therefore reflect the fact that some voters have a greater need for clientelistic transfers, or are more reachable by politicians, rather than that they are voting for group reasons.

There is a lot of evidence, in fact, that minority Indian voters, like voters elsewhere in the world, are highly strategic. Madhavi Devasher (2014), who has conducted a detailed analysis of Muslim voting in India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, finds that religion matters much less overall for Muslims' voting patterns than people conventionally think, and that Muslims are "pragmatic ethnic voter[s] who respond to local dynamics far more than blindly voting along identity lines." Her survey of 1,685 voters across forty-five constituencies finds that that Muslim voters—operating in what Kanchan Chandra (2004) has described as a "patronage democracy"—are concerned with voting for likely winners, who can deliver goods to their communities. But the ethnicity of a party's candidate or the party's ethnic profile is not always decisive to this choice. What matters is ethnicity *combined* with a party's chance of winning, which in turn depends on local ethnic demography, the signals sent by parties in terms of candidate selection, and other informational cues that allow voters to assess a party's probability of victory in a local constituency. As Devasher says, "1) parties match candidate identity to ethnic demography in order to signal a winning ethnic combination; 2) Muslim voters in India do not strictly prefer a Muslim candidate and 3) relative ethnic group size and candidate identity influence voters to pick one ethnic party over another" (Devasher 2014).

A mass of other recent evidence confirms this overall picture. Rahul Verma and Pranav Gupta (2016) used data from Uttar Pradesh (see Tables 2 and 3) to examine whether the stereotype that Muslims voted as a bloc when the BJP was powerful or the Muslim share of the population in a constituency was high was true, and found there was no relationship between either of these two main variables and the fractionalization of the Muslim vote. Verma and Gupta also confirmed, as other surveys have done, that there seems to be no difference in the way in which Muslim voters are contacted by parties compared to other groups of voters. Nor was there a difference between Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters in the influence of political and community leaders on vote choice, despite the stereotype that religious leaders have a great influence over minority vote choice (Verma and Gupta 2016, 112).

The Rise of the BJP

The BJP was founded in 1980 on the ruins of its largely unsuccessful Hindu nationalist predecessor, the Jan Sangh. The new party, like the Jan Sangh, was headed up by RSS cadres and party workers, such as Lal Krishna Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. But the new party was much more successful in broadening its appeal, especially in a large-scale movement (1989–1991) to "liberate" what it claimed was the temple site of the Hindu god Ram at Ayodhya, over which a mosque had later been constructed by the Mughal emperor Babur. In large-scale processions across India, the party's leaders mobilized support for their movement to liberate the site, with Advani in a motorized chariot made to resemble those in Hindu tradition, and succeeded in drawing millions of new supporters to the party, enabling it to form state governments in several important North Indian states. In December 1992, thousands of Hindu nationalist supporters converged on the Ayodhya site and, going back on commitments made to the government, demolished it, despite the presence of large numbers of paramilitary troops and police from the BJP-controlled state government. The national Congress government quickly dismissed four BJP state governments, but despite this setback the party established itself during the 1990s as one of the main opposition parties. Crucial to this success was the party's pragmatic willingness to periodically trim its ideological sails, for example by quickly dropping its perceived opposition to caste reservations once those cost it support in the 1994 state elections. The party has never dropped its commitment to Hindutva ("Hindu-ness") and majoritarianism, but it often relegates that part of its platform to the background and face-to-face campaigning, and it has put much more focus on economic development and governance in its election campaigns: the 2014 national platform mentioned the word "Hindu" once, and the word "development" eighty-four times.

The BJP, after establishing itself in some important state governments in the north in the 1990s, and forming a couple of shaky national coalitions (1998–1999, 1999–2004), during which it was constrained by its partners from pushing its Hindu nationalist agenda, in the 2010s unquestionably emerged as India's dominant national party. Its leadership combines many "movement Hindu nationalists" with business elites and middle classes attracted by its development agenda and many others attracted by its electoral successes compared to its rivals. The BJP relies on a combination of social service provision for poorer voters (provided by its allied Hindu nationalist organizations); a pro-economic development message; strong party organization; modern media communication through cable, press, and social media; and an emphasis on Narendra Modi as a charismatic strong leader.[18]

The dominant personality in the party since 2012–13 has been Narendra Modi, a lifelong cadre of the RSS, who first came to national prominence when he took over as chief minister of the important western industrial state of Gujarat in 2001. He was parachuted into the state by the RSS to fix things, because the previous BJP chief minister of the state had performed badly in rehabilitation work and economic recovery after a 2001 earthquake, and the BJP was behind Congress in the polls with a state election in the offing.

Table 13.2: Participation in Campaign-Related Activities in Uttar Pradesh.

	2012	2012	2014	2014
	State Average	Muslims	State Average	Muslims
Attended public meetings	36%	37%	30%	27%
Attended a roadshow	32%	34%	10%	11%
Engaged in door-to-door campaigning	17%	19%	13%	9%
Collected or contributed money	9%	10%	6%	6%
Distributed election leaflets and posters	15%	18%	12%	12%

Source: UP 2012 Post-poll and NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS in Verma and Gupta (2016).

Table 13.3: Voter Contact by Canvassers and Campaigners in Uttar Pradesh

	State Average	Muslims
Candidate/party worker/canvasser came to your house to ask your vote	64%	66%
Party/candidate contacted you or a family member though a phone call or recorded voice or SMS	19%	22%

Source: NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS in Verma and Gupta (2016).

Shortly after becoming chief minister, after a still-mysterious deadly attack on Hindu nationalist cadres on a train in the town of Godhra, serious Hindu-Muslim riots broke out across the state from February to April 2002, in which perhaps 2,000 people (overwhelmingly Muslims) died, and for which many independent observers blamed the Modi government.[19] In the aftermath of these riots, the delayed Gujarat state elections were finally held in December 2002. Before the elections, BJP election workers and candidates explicitly framed the contest between the incumbent BJP and the opposition Congress as one between India and Hindus, on the one hand, and Congress, foreign interests, and Muslims on the other. In introducing one BJP candidate, Kalubhai Maliwad (just released from months in prison for his alleged role in the riots), in Lunawada constituency, one BJP worker put this issue clearly: “The election is being fought not on issues like development, but on security” (Sharma 2004a). At another election meeting, in Halol constituency, a party worker and VHP official told voters that Muslims in the constituency had celebrated with firecrackers and a procession when the news of the murder of Hindu nationalist workers came out, and he emphasized that “This is not a Congress versus BJP election. It is Hindus versus Muslims” (Sharma 2004b).

The BJP won a crushing victory in the December 2002 Gujarat state elections, with observers noting that the party did especially well in constituencies where violence had taken place—which tended to be constituencies where the race was predicted to be close—and among Hindu voters (Dhattiwalla and Biggs 2012; Wilkinson 2004). Chief Minister Modi, now secure in power, established himself over the next dozen years as a highly effective and authoritarian chief executive who delivered high growth to the state. Modi was the BJP's national leader and prime ministerial candidate in the 2014 elections, when he easily defeated the Congress and its lackluster dynastic head Rahul Gandhi, by promising a pro-development agenda and the expansion of "the Gujarat model" to the nation as a whole. Against a very weak Congress Party, led by the uninspiring Rahul Gandhi, Modi appealed to many as just the kind of strong leader needed to carry out much needed economic reforms, root out corruption and government inefficiencies, and deliver broader development.

Once in office, though, and most especially in Modi's second term, which began in 2019, the BJP substantially dialed up its Hindu nationalist and anti-Muslim rhetoric. The party nominated Hindu nationalists to important positions in the education ministry (HRD), where they attacked "anti-national" universities by limiting them in terms of governance and student numbers, and selected vice chancellors friendly to a Hindu nationalist agenda. The HRD also supervised the rewriting of textbooks to erase the portrayal of a syncretic Hindu-Muslim past in favor of one that highlighted India's Hindu identity. A Hindu nationalist monk, Yogi Adityanath, was appointed chief minister of India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, where he proceeded to rename places with Islamic names with names drawn from Hindu tradition (e.g., Allahabad became Prayag, Faizabad district became Ayodhya). And nationally, Hindu nationalists campaigned against traditional Muslim divorce (declared illegal in July 2019), cow slaughter, "love Jihad" (cases where Muslim men allegedly tried to lure Hindu women away from their faith), and various alleged anti-national provocations by Muslims. Some members of Adityanath's party in UP have been explicit about their desire to "re-assimilate" Muslims into the Hindu fold. BJP state representative Surendra Singh Ballia has announced that "[o]nce India becomes a Hindu *rashtra* (Hindu nation), Muslims who assimilate into our culture will stay in India. Those who will not are free to take asylum in any other country."[20] Feeling supported by BJP state administrations and politicians—BJP Union Minister of State Jayant Sinha garlanded convicted Hindu cow slaughter vigilantes in the summer of 2018—Hindu activists have acted with a growing sense of impunity across northern and northwestern India.[21] One eyewitness to a Hindu cow slaughter vigilante attack in Mewat (Rajasthan) said that activists who lynched a Muslim man announced, "The MLA is with us, nobody can do anything to us. Put him (Rakbar) on fire."[22]

After the massive 2019 election victory, Modi and his right-hand man Amit Shah, whom he appointed as home minister, felt secure enough to push hard on several highly divisive anti-Muslim policies, such as abolishing the special constitutional status of Muslim-majority Kashmir; the building of the Ram temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya at which the Babri Masjid had stood until it was destroyed by Hindu militants in 1992; and a new law and census to identify and deport illegal immigrants, mainly from Bangladesh, which was directed only against Muslims. The most nationally divisive of these so far has been the Citizenship Amendment Act, which to many sought to unravel India's guarantees of religious neutrality, and was directed at intimidating Muslims in general rather than just those from Bangladesh. It prompted widespread civil society demonstrations across India in the fall and spring of 2019–2020, in which Muslim students, previously reluctant to engage in mass public protests, took a significant role. The BJP government and Home Minister Shah crushed these with the full array of the powers at their disposal (as did the many BJP-controlled state governments), including preventive arrests, trumped up charges against activists, and sending police and paramilitaries in to break up demonstrations. Although civil society organizations and opponents have filed legal cases maintaining that many of the BJP's actions have violated the constitution, an increasingly compliant court system has generally refused to review these cases.

In the National Capital Territory of Delhi, where an opposition government is in power, but the central government controls the police, police were sent into the major universities to arrest activists, and several local BJP politicians were accused of inciting a serious Hindu-Muslim riot in Delhi in January 2020, the first in the city for many decades (Minorities Commission 2020). Before the riots, one BJP state representative was filmed saying, "This is our country. If you want to live here, you will have to, like the Australian Prime Minister said, follow the country's traditions . . . . So, I warn you that CAA and NRC are made by Modi and Amit Shah. If you will go against these acts, it won't be good . . . . If you wish, you can go to Pakistan. We don't have any issues. Intentionally, we would not send you . . . . If you will act as enemies, we should also react like enemies."[23]

None of this seems to have hurt Modi's or the BJP's standing with their core Hindu supporters. Most Hindu voters may not very often vote based on religion themselves, but the flip side of that is that they are also unwilling to vote against the BJP because of its anti-Muslim stance, and many are generally sympathetic to anti-Muslim appeals. BJP national leaders generally stand aloof from directly targeting Muslims, but on the ground, in the cable and print media, and on social media things are very different. In the 2019 campaign, media sympathetic to the BJP have not been shy about portraying images of veiled Muslim voters lining up to (implicitly) cast their votes against the Hindu majority. Samajvadi candidate Ali Khan Mahmudabad, a member of a prominent UP Muslim family, complained about the frequent portrayals of lines of veiled Muslim voters in the Hindi press, next to data on turnout figures, as an implicit means of warning Hindus that they must turn out to vote.[24]

Muslim voters are in a real predicament at present, because they have few places to turn to express their opposition to Modi and his agenda. The secular opposition parties, for the most part, are worried that if they identify themselves too much with minority voters, they risk losing support from members of the Hindu majority. So a whole host of parties have, like the Congress, played up some Hindu themes and do not talk too much about their support for Muslims. Even the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, which had substantial Muslim support in a state with a 28% Muslim minority, felt it necessary to respond to Hindu nationalist attempts to appropriate the Hindu Ram Navami festival by organizing their own party's Hindu devotions during the festival, with the tacit approval of the chief minister (Roy 2017, 18–20). Most Hindu-led parties with significant Muslim support have responded to this ascendant Hindu nationalism by emphasizing their majority community credentials and reducing their public support for any issue that could be labeled "pro-minority" or "vote bank politics." Because of widespread Hindu prejudices and unwillingness to vote for Muslim candidates, and increasing voter uncertainty about which parties will win, major parties are putting up fewer Muslim candidates for election than ever before, and far fewer are being elected (Gudavarthy 2014). None of the twenty-seven Muslim MPs elected to the Lok Sabha in 2019 (4.4% of MPs, compared to 14% of the population) were from the governing BJP. Political leaders of all stripes feel increasingly compelled to portray themselves as in step with the religious majority—often through visits to shrines and the use of religious symbols—and are increasingly anxious to avoid association with pro-minority stances. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi rediscovered his previously invisible personal Hindu religiosity during political campaigns in 2018 and 2019, when he visited dozens of Hindu temples, in addition to quoting from the *Gita* in his speeches (Venkataraman 2018).

Only a few parties with very substantial Muslim support, such as the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party in UP, or with a clear minority identity, such as the AIUDF in Assam and the AIMIM in Hyderabad, are forceful in representing Muslim interests. The AIMIM, with its base in several Muslim majority urban areas in the former princely state of Hyderabad, is led by a charismatic politician, Asaduddin Owaisi, who is skilled at both English media and playing traditional politics in the Muslim areas of the old city of Hyderabad. He has tried over the past few years to extend his base from the state of Telangana, campaigning in Maharashtra and Karnataka, as well as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the north and West Bengal in the East. But apart from picking up a few seats in Muslim-majority areas of Maharashtra, and municipal seats in UP, basic electoral demography (the fact the Muslims are not a majority of voters in most areas), as well as the entrenched nature of local parties in these other states, has thus far prevented him from carving out the all-India leadership role of the Muslim minority that he seeks.[25] He faces the same electoral constraints that faced previous Muslim leaders who tried to reestablish the Muslim League as a national force: a country with a FPTP electoral system, in which Muslims are a majority or a pivotal share of the vote in only a small share of constituencies, and in which most Hindu voters will not vote for what they perceive as a "Muslim" party. [26]

RELIGION AND PARTY POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan was founded explicitly as a country where Muslims and Muslim interests were to be safeguarded, but its founder Jinnah did not see this as incompatible with rights for religious minorities. In August 1947 he famously gave a speech in the Pakistan Assembly to reassure minorities, stating, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State." Jinnah deliberately included a Hindu in his first cabinet, and he appointed a prominent member of the Ahmadi minority, Zafarullah Khan, as Pakistan's UN representative and then his first foreign minister in December 1947.[27] This tolerance from the top, however, although in some ways reflective of Sufi traditions in much of the Pakistan countryside, as in India always coexisted uneasily with the conservatism of much of the population, which provided incentives for politicians and clerics to accuse the state of supporting "anti-Islamic" policies and groups. The forbearance toward the Ahmadis lasted only a few years, with their meetings broken up in several places in 1952, religious parties (seeking to rehabilitate themselves) organizing large-scale demonstrations and riots against them in 1953, and then the forced resignation of Zafarullah Khan in May 1954. The position of Christian and Ahmadi religious minorities in Pakistan has, over the years, only become worse.

To understand why no equivalent party to Congress emerged that could have sharply curtailed the influence of religion of politics, it is vital to understand three things. First, the major party at independence, the Muslim League, had been based largely in the Hindu-majority areas that remained part of India, so it was organizationally very weak in the Muslim-majority areas that formed the new state. That lack of organizational depth and strong local ties left the League ill-prepared to deal with the many regional, sectarian, and distributional conflicts that affected the new state, especially after the death of the country's unquestioned leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in September 1948. The lack of a strong party was also due to the continuing influence of local landlords and *pīrs* in Pakistan. These landlords have a local power base that allows them to shift parties when they deem it necessary, and this base offer poor voters much more in the way of clientelistic benefits than the Islamist *maslaki* (doctrinal) parties that lack these financial and political resources (Chacko 2020, 105). The lack of a strong party, and an inattention to the need to "coup-proof" the military, created a political vacuum that was filled by the powerful bureaucracy and, increasingly during the 1950s, by the army.[28] General Ayub Khan mapped out a detailed plan to restrain what he saw as the "irresponsible" aspects of mass democracy as early as 1954, and then implemented many of these ideas after he took power in 1958.

The second thing to understand is that, since it became heavily involved in politics, the Pakistan military has had an incentive to ensure that no strong national party emerges that can challenge its own power. The only time such a party (the Pakistan People's Party, or PPP) did emerge, after the army's discrediting due to the 1971 defeat by India and the loss of East Pakistan, the leader of the party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, took several legal and practical measures to rein in the power of the military, but ultimately wasted his opportunity by increasingly authoritarian methods within both the party and the country (Wilkinson 2015). During the military's three periods of direct rule (1958–1971, 1977–1988, 1999–2008), as well as during periods of democratic government, it has always promoted "loyal" politicians and parties to legitimize its regime, draw support away from unreconciled opposition parties, and help chart a pathway to a democracy that does not threaten its interests (Siddiqa 2020). The military, which has its own powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, spies on politicians, supports those politicians and parties it regards as allies, and tries to hamper or remove those it sees as threats to its interests, which it conflates with Pakistan's interests. It does the same with the civil society organizations that in most countries underpin democratic politics, promoting some, while taking down others (Rizvi, 2011). The current governing party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by the former cricketer Imran Khan, is only the latest of these military-backed parties (Siddiqa 2020). Other examples include, at various times, the PPP in the 1960s, the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement) in the 1980s, and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) in the 1990s and Pakistan Muslim League (Q) in the 2000s. These military-party alliances are always shifting, however, with the usual pattern being one in which, as the party gets stronger or finds itself blocked from taking steps that might make it stronger, its leaders begin to chafe at military influence, leading to the military's efforts to then destabilize it and/or find other allies.

The third point is that nonreligious leaders, whether in the military or the major political parties, have with increasing frequency since the 1980s sought allies in the religious parties and initiated Islamist reforms as a way of seeking legitimacy and broadening their regimes. This process was begun by Zulfikar Bhutto in the 1970s. Bhutto was personally focused on an agenda of economic and social transformation, but sought to protect his political flank by giving way to the religious parties' demand to label Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority, and to include clauses in the new constitution that committed the state (though not immediately) to enable Muslims to "order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Qurʾan and the sunna (Abbas 2013, 68). After Bhutto's Chief of Army Staff, General Zia, toppled Bhutto in 1977, Zia turned these clauses into institutional practice, motivated by both a mix of personal beliefs and a desire to legitimize his regime. Zia's regime pursued an Islamization agenda in education, the courts, legal code, and administration that was largely successful, despite some pushback from the Shiʿa minority.[29] The constitutional clause allowing minorities to "freely practice" their religions ominously removed the word "freely" (Abbas 2013, 69). Zia also co-opted members of the JI and JUI to his advisory council, and some of these party members also gave his regime added legitimacy by standing for office in his rigged elections (Nelson, this volume).

One reason why explicitly religious parties have not been successful at the national level is that the major Pakistani parties, like the PTI, Pakistan Muslim League (N), and PPP, either support the many ways in which the Islamist agenda has already been incorporated into the state and society, or else do not dare oppose it openly. The cumulative impact of changes in the education system, courts, government, and the public sphere has led over the years to a significant narrowing of debate and growing conservatism among the population, with several generations now having received an explicitly Islamist-themed education either in the state sector or new madrasas (Rizvi 2011, 190), with 67% of the population in 2017 saying shariʿa should be the only law of the land (up from 51% in 2010), and many voters saying that religious figures should have an influence on political life.[30] That does not necessarily mean that voters subscribe to an extremist agenda—three-quarters of voters in polls say that religious fanaticism is a problem, and that Christians should be able to build churches.[31] But any civilian or military leader who can credibly be painted as "anti-Muslim" by religious organizations continues to run both a political and personal risk. This is especially true since Salman Taseer, the secular-minded governor of Punjab, was murdered by his bodyguard in 2011 over his strong stance on the need to reform the anti-blasphemy laws, which are often used to settle personal scores or to dispossess the accused. Hundreds of Sunni clerics applauded Taseer's murder, and urged clemency for the killer, and three hundred lawyers said they would defend him for free, as his supporters shouted "Allahu Akbar" and scattered rose petals as the killer entered the court (Reuters 2011). Not surprisingly, other politicians have not stepped up strongly to follow through on Taseer's agenda. Those who are tempted to do so, even in a small way—as Prime Minister Imran Khan did in 2018 by nominating a prominent member of the Ahmadi community, Princeton academic Atif Mian, to an important economics advisory panel—quickly give way once the protests and demonstrations start (Chaudhry 2018). The military, determined to weaken civilian political parties that might threaten its own powers, also help prevent any strong party from emerging that might have enough support to take on the veto power of the religious parties.

In Pakistan, religious parties still perform poorly in national elections, though since 1970 they have often been included in national coalitions (Nelson, this volume). But the Islamist *maslaki* parties have formed governments six times in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan over the past twenty years. In part the limited electoral wins by religious parties in national elections is the product of their success in influencing policy. Successive military and civilian regimes have, since the 1970s, already institutionalized much of their agenda, including shariʿa courts, harsh blasphemy and anti-minority laws, *zakat* tithes, laws on interest, and financial support for madrasas and recognition of their degrees. There are many sectarian Islamic parties, some of whom have been patronized by civilian and military leaders seeking to draw support away from other parties. These parties, allied with militant organizations or with the dominant Deobandi and Barelvi sects, have in general been much more influential as parties and movements of pressure on the administration of the day, by bringing thousands of their supporters onto the streets, than they have been in winning elections and forming governments (Chacko 2020). The strength of Islamic parties also reflects a broader increase in religious conservatism among the population in Pakistan over the past three decades, driven by foreign (especially Saudi) influence and money, widespread opposition to Western and especially US foreign policy in the region in which the military and civilian leadership is complicit, and increasing membership in Islamic movements such as *Tablighi Jamaat*.

Conclusion

In India the BJP, having won an increased majority in 2019, and within reach of being able to control the upper house (which would allow the party to amend the constitution), is now focused almost as much on implementing its Hindu nationalist vision as on the economic development agenda that was the primary reason for its election victory. Modi and his right-hand man, Home Minister Amit Shah, are using their majority to try to remake India's government and institutions in Hindu Nationalist form. The BJP has rescinded the separate status of Kashmir, an act that may be unconstitutional but which a newly compliant Supreme Court has so far declined to review. The party has used its control of higher education to target freedom of speech in universities, and to appoint professors whose Hindu nationalist credentials are stronger than their academic qualifications. The BJP has introduced new citizenship and immigration laws that in theory require all Indians to prove their citizenship, but in practice are directed overwhelmingly against Muslims.[32] In a growing number of ways—from the renaming of cities with Islamic names such as Allahabad to those with "authentic Indian" (i.e., Hindu) names, to efforts to police interreligious personal relationships, the state is clearly portraying India's Muslim minority as a threatening "anti-national" group that must be controlled and policed.

The Muslim minority in India, now 14% of the population, feels deeply threatened by this rise of Hindu nationalism and recent government actions, but it currently has few good electoral options, given the first-past-the-post electoral system and the fact that Muslims are a majority of the population in so few areas of the country. Many of the secular parties in India's system, led by the much-weakened Congress Party, have also been reluctant to defend minority interests too strongly, for fear of being seen as too aligned with minorities in an age where mass media represent them as threatening and "anti-national." India's greatest post-independence achievement, in maintaining a broadly inclusive secular state, is under greater threat now than at any time since independence in 1947. One potential danger is that Muslims, if they feel they have no other option, may turn to more radical and violent alternatives, which have so far had very little appeal in India.

Most of the BJP's voters, however, have not voted for this radical Hinduization of state and society, even though they may currently not feel they bear many of these policies' costs. One question for the future, therefore, is whether the Modi regime has sufficient time to make its majoritarian vision irreversible, as General Zia did in Pakistan in the 1980s, before the BJP's various policy missteps (e.g., the 2016 demonetization, increasing unemployment and economic slowdowns, farmers' movements, the 2020 border conflict reversals against China) combine to cause it to lose its current electoral majority.

In Pakistan, much of the Islamist agenda is now well institutionalized within the state (including the army), courts, and education system. It is difficult to see this changing, because the three potential sources of reform—change in popular opinion, in the stance of the military, or in the mainstream parties—are all unfavorable. Popular opinion has become more conservative, the military has also become more conservative, with its senior leadership now much more favorable to expressions of Islam than the British-trained military elites of the 1950s and 1960s, and the mainstream parties are unwilling or unable to push back against the institutionalization of an orthodox Sunni view of Islam within state and society. That does not necessarily mean, though, that the Islamist parties will increase their share of the vote beyond the 10–20% they have achieved in recent elections, precisely because, with most Islamist issues "settled" and off the active political agenda, most voters vote on bread and butter issues of governance and economic development.

NOTES

1. For instance, the police force in the most populous colonial province of UP, which was around 14% Muslim, was 50% Muslim in 1947 (Wilkinson 2004). The exception to the general picture of minority overrepresentation was the army where, as a result of Muslims' support of the 1857 revolt, the Muslim proportion was held at roughly the same 25% proportion as their share in the pre-1947 population.
2. One British colonial official in charge of these early 20th-century reforms remarked, in a confidential note, that "[t]he object is to satisfy this demand [for Indian representation] with the least possible disturbance of existing conditions and to do so in such a way as to give a preponderating influence in the elections to the stable elements of society in preference to the professional politicians and the middle class who are noisy in peaceful times and would be useless in any emergency." He then approvingly noted the various ways in which the Austrian-Hungarian and Prussian monarchies had rigged their own electoral systems to divide and weaken their oppositions. Indian Council Reforms: reports and notes of a committee established to consider the desirability of a council Part I (Calcutta: Office of Superintendent of Government Printing, India 1907). National Library of Scotland, Minto Papers, MS 12610.
3. The property-based franchise at this time included about 14% of the adult population.
4. The British colonial governors of each province were also granted the right to veto any legislation they felt threatened the "legitimate interests of minorities."
5. Sir Harry Haig, Governor UP, to Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, May 13, 1938." IOR L/P&J/5/265 U.P. Governor's Reports, January–June 1938.
6. Volunteer Organizations in India Secret Memo MI2 22 Jan '47, in IOR L/WS1/745, Intelligence Correspondence with War Office.
7. These proportions are for 1951. As of the 2011 Census, Hindus were 80% and Muslims 14% of the population.
8. See, e.g., the findings of the 1983 *Gopal Singh Report on Minorities*, set up by the Congress government that took office in 1980, and Shariff (1995).
9. Monthly Public Opinion Surveys by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion show Muslim support for Congress at 58% in 1952, 53% in 1957 (Vol. 2, Nos. 16–19, Jan–April 1957), dropping to 51% in 1969. *Monthly Public Opinion Surveys of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion*, Vol. XIV, nos. 4–6 (January-March 1969).

10. These data were subsequently analyzed by Rakesh Basant, a member of the Sachar Committee, and other scholars in Basant and Shariff (2010). This collection made clear the extent of disadvantage, and the great differences that exist in terms of Muslim outcomes across states.
11. NSS Report No. 552: *Employment and Unemployment Situation among Major Religious Groups in India,* Table 3.2.5.1; Community Access to Education (NSS 66th round survey 2009-10).
12. Discrimination in the housing market increases these disadvantages; see, e.g., the Thorat, Banerjee, Mishra, and Rizvi (2015) study of housing discrimination in the NCR.
13. There are a few exceptions, such as Kerala, where because of Muslims' political influence, a few Muslim castes have been designated Most Backward castes or Other Backward Castes. *Muslim India* 81 (September 1989): 432.
14. In 2014, Suhas Palshikar pointed out that "almost six of every 10 Congress voters are SC/ST/Muslim/Sikh or Christian, while these social groups account for only about three in every 10 BJP voters" (Palshikar 2014).
15. This movement reached its culmination on December 6, 1992, when, with the deliberate connivance of the BJP state government in UP, the Babri mosque was destroyed by Hindu militants, leaving a heap of rubble, and setting off religious riots across the country, and tit-for-tat attacks on religious minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Four BJP state governments were dissolved, and President's Rule imposed after the demolition.
16. It may also be the case that economic issues are seen through the prism of group identity.
17. See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and the Wilkinson article in that volume.
18. On the electoral effect of social service provision by religious organizations allied with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, see Thachil (2015).
19. One of the best researched portraits of Modi is by Jose (2012).
20. "BJP MLA says only those Muslims will stay in India who embrace Hindu culture," *Indian Express*, January 14, 2018.
21. "Jayant Sinha garlands Ramgarh lynching convicts, says 'honouring law' *Hindustan Times*, July 7 2018.
22. *Times of India*, July 24, 2018.
23. *Times of India*, July 24, 2018, 26.
24. Ali Khan Mahmudabad *Facebook* post, April 18, 2019.
25. The party won only two parliamentary seats in 2019, one from a Muslim-majority area of the city of Hyderabad, and one from the city of Aurangabad in Maharashtra, which before 1947 was also part of the princely state of Hyderabad. The victory in Aurangabad, which is around a third Muslim, was possible because of an electoral tie up with a Scheduled Caste party.
26. For Bashir Ahmed's 1970 (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to restart the Muslim League in the cities of Uttar Pradesh, see *Times of India*, June 19, 21, 1970.
27. Khan was the most prominent member of Pakistan's Ahmadi community, which regards itself as Muslim but is regarded by most Muslims as heretical, because its faith questions the finality of the Prophet Muhammad.
28. On Pakistan's institutional weaknesses at independence, see Jalal (1992), chapter 3.
29. The Shiʿa minority objected on religious grounds to the compulsory deduction of *zakat* tithes from investment and bank accounts, and their 1980 protests resulted in the tithes being made optional for Shias. See Rizvi (1988, 233–235).
30. Gallup Pakistan Poll, May 29, 2017.

31. Gallup Pakistan Polls on “Minorities in Pakistan,” January 30, 2015, and “Religion-General” September 14, 2015.
32. The laws also allow minority non-Muslim refugees from nearby countries to apply for refuge in India, but do not apply to Muslims from those countries who may also face persecution.

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CHAPTER 14

RELIGION AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN SENEGAL

DOMINIKA KOTER

Religion is a highly salient aspect of life in Senegal. Its citizens eagerly display their religious affiliation and piety, but they pride themselves on tolerance toward non-co-religionists. The country has been often lauded for its enduring peace and cooperation across religious divides. Senegal is a secular republic, but religion permeates major social debates as well as politics. On the one hand, since Senegal's independence in 1960, religious parties have been few in existence and rather marginal. On the other hand, religious leaders from different Muslim brotherhoods, especially the Mourides, have played an important role in assisting politicians in voter mobilization, acting as vote brokers, and occasionally issuing vote orders. Yet the analysis of electoral data over several decades shows that this type of mobilization has not resulted in sectarian electoral cleavages and religion is not a strong predictor of vote choice. Starting with the country's first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was a Catholic, Muslim religious leaders have supported politicians across religious and brotherhood lines, creating fluid political competition. All four Senegalese presidents have drawn support across the country's religious divides, as have the main political parties. The case of Senegal thus stands in contrast to many other Muslim-majority states. Religious leaders are central to political life in general, and political competition in particular, but the role they play is not polarizing or divisive. Why is this the case?

This chapter analyzes how religion impacts electoral competition but does not produce religious parties or divisive religious cleavages. It attributes this absence of sectarian cleavages to the role of religious leaders on the eve of independence and the existing incentive structures that made alliances with politicians across sectarian lines more beneficial. Muslim religious leaders largely emerged out of the colonial period in a strong social and material position and immediately became coveted partners for politicians looking to strengthen electoral ties with the population. In the existing electoral context, religious leaders stood to gain by supporting promising politicians even if they were non-co-religionists. The cross-sectarian partnerships forged in the early years of mass electoral politics proved beneficial to politicians and religious leaders alike, fostering a dynamic electoral marketplace, one that is structured by prospects of material benefits, rather than religious identity.

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION IN SENEGAL

Throughout the post-independence period, the share of Senegalese society that is Muslim has been over 90 percent, whereas Christians (mainly Catholics) have constituted around 5 percent (see Table 14.1). The Senegalese practice the Sufi form of Islam, with the vast majority of believers belonging to one of several brotherhoods (*tariqa*), including the Tijan, Mouride, Layene, and Quadriyya brotherhoods.

In Sufi Islam, as practiced in Senegal, individuals declare themselves followers and pledge allegiance to a religious leader, a marabout. Among Senegalese Muslims virtually everyone has a marabout. Whereas the Tijani brotherhood has the most members, the Mouride brotherhood is understood to be the most influential and powerful because of its long domestic roots and higher levels of control over its members (Behrman 1970; Cruise O'Brien 1971; Villalón 1995). In contrast to the Tijani brotherhood, which is transnational, the Mouride brotherhood is homegrown, started by Cheikh Amadou Bamba in Central Senegal in the 1880s (though there are now Mouride disciples throughout the world).

Islam arrived in Senegal from across the Sahara and it spread throughout the land largely during the colonial period in the 19th century. Catholicism was brought to Senegal by missionaries and it took hold mostly in coastal regions, particularly among the Serer and Diola groups. While some Serer are Catholic and others are Muslim, the Diola are rarely Muslim, whereas the other main Senegalese ethnic groups, including the Wolof and Peul, are almost exclusively Muslim. Thus, religious affiliation is not evenly distributed across the country, but it does create some cross-cutting ties. The same can be said about brotherhood affiliation. While the Wolof, Senegal's largest ethnic group, are members of different brotherhoods, most Peul are Tijanis and, as a consequence, most Mourides come from the Wolof ethnic group. Geographically, apart from the religiously and ethnically diverse capital, Dakar, Mourides tend to be concentrated

Table 14.1: Religious Composition in Senegal

Religion	Muslim	93.8%
	Christian (mainly Catholic)	4.3%
Brotherhood (Sufi Order/*tariqa*)	Tijaniyya	41.6%
	Mouridiyya	28%
	Quadriyya	10%

in the so-called Groundnut Basin of Central Senegal, whereas Northern and Eastern Senegal have more Tijanis. Major concentrations of Catholics are in the Saloum and Casamance areas.

The French colonizers had a rather inconsistent approach to religion in Senegal. At different points in time, they saw Islam as either a threat or as having a stabilizing effect. There were instances when they tried to limit its impact, as for example when they exiled the founder of the Mouride brotherhood, Cheikh Amadou Bamba. At other times, the French administrators seemed to resign themselves to the reality that Muslim religious leaders held a lot of sways, and they tried to work with them and saw them as a way to boost compliance with their policies. For example, Muslim religious leaders proved to be very effective recruiters of volunteers during both world wars (Robinson 1999). The colonizers also viewed Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, which they often called *Islam noir*, as a more tolerant and more amenable variant of Islam than that in North Africa or the Middle East. At the same time, the French were often mistrustful of Christian missionaries and did not wholeheartedly encourage their expansion in Senegal.

As is the case in many other religiously diverse areas, religious belonging has many visible markers. Christians and Muslims can be distinguished easily by their first names, and often by their dress (this is especially true of men and particularly on Fridays, when many Muslim men wear a *boubou*, a Muslim robe). Affiliation with different brotherhoods is not always obvious but can sometimes be inferred, because Senegalese often wear a necklace with a picture of their religious leader, or they display such pictures in their homes. They also go on different pilgrimages and on some occasions celebrate religious holidays on different days.

The Role of Muslim Religious Leaders

What is characteristic of Senegalese Muslim religious leaders is that they have historically played a very important part in the lives of their followers, well beyond the religious realm. Their role in providing material support, distributing land, managing agricultural production (especially in Central Senegal), and shaping social interactions is well-documented (Coulon 1981; Villalón 1995) and it has persisted over time. Large number of Muslim religious leaders, though not all, emerged out of French colonial rule in a strong position, benefiting to a large degree from the destruction by the colonizer of traditional social orders, especially among the Wolof, leaving the marabouts as the dominant local leaders in large parts of Senegal.[1] The marabouts have further successfully buttressed their position throughout the postcolonial period (Cruise O'Brien 2002). Contemporary survey data from the Afrobarometer indicate that the Senegalese have high levels of trust in their religious leaders, showing more confidence in them than in many state officials (see Koter 2016, 77–79). They are also very likely to turn to them for help, at higher rates than elsewhere in Africa. As in Mali (see Bleck and Thurston, this volume), religious leaders serve as important providers of material support and play a role of social mediators.[2] This outsize role in social and economic life turned the marabouts into important political actors. The broad trust that they have enjoyed over decades among the population gives them clout to influence political dynamics.

UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL COMPETITION IN SENEGAL

The most remarkable aspect of religion in Senegalese politics is that although it has been central to political mobilization for several decades, it has not produced significant religious divisions. Why is this the case? As I explained in previous work (Koter 2016), this is because politicians do not invoke identity directly; instead, they enlist religious leaders across the religious spectrum to help mobilize voters because of the marabouts' considerable clout. Religious leaders thus play only an indirect role: they parlay their influence to work as electoral intermediaries, but they avoid running for office. Religious leaders are not the only figures who play such a role—local notables or village chiefs are often also involved—but they are the main and most visible electoral intermediaries. [3]

There are several factors that can help explain why this "division of labor" between religious leaders and politicians is a common practice. First, religious leaders and politicians have distinct but complementary qualifications and skill sets. This remains the case to this day but was particularly true in the early years of political competition. Many religious leaders are not fluent in the official language, French. While literacy in French is not a formal requirement, the lack of it makes navigating formal institutions difficult. The great religious families mistrusted French education and they eschewed it for their family members, concentrating instead on their religious education. This avoidance of formal state education on the part of religious leaders is thus part of a long history. In contrast, most prominent politicians at the national level[4] have formal education and university degrees, making them better equipped to navigate state bureaucracy. Although religious leaders were historically not well positioned to enter formal politics, they could parlay their following into political influence.

I would argue that the symbiotic relationship between religious leaders and Senegalese politicians has been so successful and lucrative for the former that there are few reasons to change the winning recipe. This apparent separation of roles also seems to have become the norm in Senegalese politics. Indeed, the exceptions to this rule, such as Modou Kara Mbacké, who formed the Party for Truth and Development (known by its French acronym, PVD), or Serigne Mamoune Niasse, a marabout leader of a small party, People's Rally (RP), are both rare and controversial. Many Senegalese see this as a breach of the separation of religion and politics and they find this practice very problematic. Yet, importantly, Kara and the PVD are a marginal phenomenon with very limited electoral clout. For example, the PVD gained only 2.5 percent of the vote, and two seats, in the 2012 legislative elections.

The relationship between religious leaders and politicians that emerged in this context is mostly transactional, encouraging them to forge the most beneficial alliances, even if it means mobilizing voters for non-co-religionists.[5] The resulting electoral marketplace has been incredibly fluid in Senegal, to the exclusion of rigid religious divides or permanent alliances between different religious groups and parties. This practice has started at the onset of mass electoral politics in the 1950s, on the eve of independence, and it has persisted, with some adjustments, for most of the post-independence period. In contrast to many other African countries, Senegal experienced a relatively short period of one-party rule and saw a high degree of continuity of electoral practices, with long stretches of multiparty competition. Thus, the tradition of cross-religious political partnerships that emerged in the 1950s has been consistently renegotiated and sustained throughout the post-independence period.

I now turn to fleshing out important elements of the mechanisms tying political involvement of the marabouts to nonsectarian voting patterns, first describing their role in electoral politics and then showing how fluid their support has been, following changing material incentives. It is this fluidity of marabout support that explains the lack of religious electoral cleavages.

The Nature of Marabout Involvement in Politics

Religious notables play an important role in electoral politics by throwing their support behind political candidates. One of the main ways they help mobilize voters for given politicians is by issuing voting orders (*consignes de vote*), also widely known as *ndigal,* a religious edict. [6] While voting orders used to be very public and obvious until the 1980s, in recent years they have become much more discreet.[7] Religious leaders do not articulate an explicit voting order, but rather show their unambiguous support for a particular presidential contender, or offer prayers for his success.

A rich body of work documents the continuous use of religious leaders as electoral intermediaries by Senegalese politicians and even the French administration since the onset of mass politics in the 1950s. The marabout played a crucial role in rallying voters against independence from France during the 1958 referendum (Cruise O'Brien 1971). The two main parties in the 1950s, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), led by Senghor, and the French Socialist Party (SFIO), led by Lamine Guèye, relied on Mouride and Tijan leaders to help garner votes (Boone 2003, 62). After independence, ties with intermediaries, especially the religious leaders, were crucial for President Senghor and his UPS, which succeeded the former BDS (Schaffer 1998, 107). The same practice was continued in the 1980s and 1990s by Senghor's successor, Abdou Diouf (Schaffer 1998, 107; Zuccarelli 1988, 165). As Young and Kanté (1991, 72) noted, at the basis of Diouf's electoral success "lay networks of clientelistic linkages joining the president and party to civil society through the intermediation of a host of marabouts and local patrons." Newspaper coverage of electoral campaigns is full of politicians' visits to prominent religious leaders in search of political support. A headline in the popular daily *Walfadjri* on the eve of the 2001 legislative election, which read "Everyone Has a Turn with the Marabout," aptly illustrates politicians' electoral strategies. The article describes how both incumbent president, Abdoulaye Wade, and the former ruling party, the PS, met with all imams from the community and visited all the marabouts of all religious localities (Diebakhate 2001).

During my previous research in the run-up to the February 2007 presidential election, many of my interlocutors, including members of the then ruling PDS, talked about their reliance on local powerbrokers, especially religious leaders. Many politicians resigned themselves to the reality that parties are obligated to look for support and cultivate links with religious leaders.

Arguably, the single most important intermediary in 2007 was the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood. According to many, on the eve of the 2007 election, the Khalifa Général sent a coded voting order (*ndigal implicite*) to his followers (*taalibés*) in support of President Wade.[8] In 2007 the Khalifa's support for President Wade became clear during an announcement of the date for the annual Mouride pilgrimage, the *Grand Magal*. In 2007, the *Magal* was supposed to take place shortly after the presidential election. During the announcement, the Khalifa stated that President Wade provided all the necessary funds for the *Magal* and that right after the pilgrimage Wade would personally oversee great state infrastructure projects in the holy city of Touba, the center of the brotherhood. The fact that the great projects associated with the *Magal* were supposed to take place after the election strongly indicated that the president needed to be re-elected in order to carry out his work. While to an outside observer this might seem cryptic, or even convoluted, the Mouride voters whom I interviewed had an unambiguous interpretation of this message.[9] There is also evidence that after his 2007 re-election, President Wade attributed his high score in the department of Mbacké, including the capital of the Mouride brotherhood, the holy city of Touba, to the Khalifa's backing (Koter 2016: 103).

A very important dynamic structures the electoral engagement of religious leaders in Senegal: almost all politicians are courting the same set of religious dignitaries. In other words, politicians are approaching religious leaders from *various* brotherhoods, most attracted to those with the biggest stature. It is not the case that President Wade (in power 2000–2012), a Mouride, sought support only in the Mouride brotherhood. As the PDS's campaign chief in the department of Mbour, Magatte Diop, summed up, "Wade has tentacles in all religious families" in Senegal.[10] Diop was personally visiting local religious notables and other influential local leaders on behalf of Wade and "asking for their prayers." As Diop explained, "prayers" are a favorite campaign euphemism describing electoral support. President Wade managed to acquire all types of marabouts as intermediaries, ranging from the local to the national level.[11] After reviewing weeks of press coverage from several of the most popular newspapers for the 2007 and 2012 presidential campaigns, it became clear that all major candidates visited religious leaders from all brotherhoods. The religious capitals were bustling with visitors in the run-up to the elections, with different candidates often crossing paths as they crisscrossed the Senegalese religious establishment.

Apart from the widespread and visible use of marabouts as intermediaries by politicians, there is also evidence that religious leaders do indeed influence the voting behavior of their followers. Schaffer's excellent study of the 1988 election provides particularly clear examples. One of his interviewees explained his following the voting order from the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood by saying, "If Serign Touba orders us to do something, we do it. Even if it pains us, we have to do it" (Schaffer 1998, 111). Another voter interviewed by Schaffer said that he would have preferred in fact to vote for the opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade, but voted for his marabout's choice, the incumbent, President Diouf (110).

There are also survey data indicating that people are influenced in their electoral choices by religious intermediaries. A study conducted in 1999 in the departments of Thiès and Diourbel by Gercop, a group of researchers from the Senegalese University of Saint-Louis, found that 38 percent of their respondents admitted following voting orders (*consignes de vote*) from religious leaders.[12] The 2005 Afrobarometer survey in Senegal also asked respondents "who (if anyone) can influence their political choices."[13] Twenty-three percent of Wolof respondents reported that they are influenced "a lot" by their religious leader. Since admitting to being told how to vote might be somewhat shameful, the real number is likely to be higher.

There is broad agreement in Senegal that religious leaders from the Mouride brotherhood are more likely to issue voting orders and that Mouride voters are more likely to follow them than members of other brotherhoods.[14] This can be attributed to the nature of the relationship between marabouts and their followers in different brotherhoods; Mouride leaders have greater control of material resources and the brotherhood has more stringent norms of obedience. When compared with other brotherhoods, Mouride marabouts have greater control over their disciples (Behrman 1970). Mourides are more dependent economically on their marabouts and the brotherhood extends to a greater extent into the economic realm, in particular through their control of vast areas of land, mainly in the Groundnut Basin, as well as their infiltration of the sectors of urban trade and transportation (Villalón 1995). The Mouride marabouts also place a much higher emphasis on personal obedience than their counterparts from other brotherhoods (Coulon 1981). Cruise O'Brien (1971) argues that Mourides are more submissive and more devoted to their marabouts than members of other brotherhoods. As Villalón (1995, 119) explains, Mouride ideology "enshrined the act of submission to a marabout as a central defining feature of the order." The Mouride brotherhood also approaches education differently than other brotherhoods; it has historically discouraged the spread of literacy, fearing that state education could undermine the order's control over their disciples (Cruise O'Brien 1971). The higher deference to Mouride leaders is also reflected in the size of monetary contributions made by disciples to their marabouts; Mourides are much more regular and lavish in their payments[15] to their marabouts (Cruise O'Brien 1971, 91–96).

This greater deference to religious leaders is also reflected in survey data. The 2005 Afrobarometer survey found that while only 11 percent of Tijanis say that religious leaders affect them a lot in their electoral choices, the figure is more than double among the Mourides (23 percent).[16] The Gercop study also found that Mourides were more likely that Tijanis to follow voting orders from their religious leaders.[17]

While there is variation in the degree of religious leaders' influence in different brotherhoods and regions of Senegal, and there is debate about the exact degree of this influence, the fact that religious leaders are significant electoral players is beyond dispute. I now turn to the most striking feature of marabouts' involvement in electoral politics: the fluidity of their support. Documenting this fluidity is important because it helps understand why marabouts' engagement in electoral mobilization does not translate into religious cleavages. The changing allegiance of marabouts, and their willingness to switch support, allows Senegalese politicians to construct religiously (and ethnically) diverse electoral bases.

Fluidity of Marabout Support

Religious leaders stand to gain monetary rewards for themselves and their followers by pursuing their role of electoral intermediaries. They thus tend to follow those best positioned to offer such rewards, often those already in power or most likely to get elected, making marabout allegiance fairly fluid. Many scholars have documented how the marabouts have been very successful in securing various infrastructure projects in return for the support of their followers. The renovation of the Great Mosque in Touba and electrification and road construction are some of the most salient examples (Schaffer 1998, 112–113). At a local level, roads to villages, electricity, wells, and boreholes are some of the most frequently demanded goods (Cruise O'Brien 1971, 276). At a higher level, during the 1960 general election, the UPS contributed over 100,000 pounds to the mosque construction fund in Touba, alongside promises of loans, creation of trading centers, attribution of subsidies, and higher prices for the main cash crop, the groundnut (Cruise O'Brien 1971, 267). The government distributed roads, deep wells, dispensaries, agricultural credit, as well as staple foods—millet and rice—to communities with supportive marabouts (Cruise O'Brien 1975, 175–176).

Schaffer shows that not only were many marabouts successful in securing public goods for their communities, but also that the marabouts' followers attributed the existence of these goods directly to their leaders. One of Schaffer's interviewees, talking about the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood, describes his prowess in extracting communal benefits: "Water, electricity, paved roads—he [Abdou Ahad] got everything he wanted" (Schaffer 1998, 112). He then adds that based on the acquisition of these goods, it was right for the Khalifa to support President Diouf and urge his followers to do so.

Abdoulaye Wade has continued the tradition of promising public investment and infrastructure to the religious capitals. Even though the religious establishment in Touba did not endorse candidate Wade in 2000, immediately following his election, President Wade sought the support of the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood, offering his city important infrastructure, including an airport (Beck 2002, 541).

Yet, importantly, intermediaries also stand to gain personal goods. Apart from extracting funds for various infrastructure projects or other public goods, these prominent local leaders often receive personal benefits, both money and gifts in kind, such as sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca. Cruise O'Brien (1971, 263) argues that the flow of money from political sources made it possible for certain marabouts, the Mourides in particular, to "acquire wealth on a scale hitherto unimaginable." In fact, he goes as far as to say that politics became the greatest single source of revenue for the Mouride elite. Cash is not the only form of benefit offered to intermediaries. President Diouf, for example, gave marabouts diplomatic visas ahead of the 2000 election (Beck 2002, 541). During the 2007 election, marabouts who were heads of a lineage were receiving around 50 million francs CFA (about 100,000 USD) and a 4-by-4 car.[18] At more local level, marabouts were sometimes rewarded with a pilgrimage to Mecca, whereas the lowest-level clerics, such as village imams, were given beautifully bound editions of the Qurʾan.[19]

Because of the importance of material rewards, religious leaders are willing to switch their support when they can find a more generous patron. Over the course of political competition in Senegal, the marabouts had the tendency to support candidates on the basis of prospective material rewards, regardless of their religious affiliation, rather than candidates from their own brotherhood. Even before Senegal's independence, Muslim marabouts were courted by candidates across the political spectrum and faced choices in their political allegiance. The marabouts were ready to support a candidate that seemed to offer them the best deal. This dynamic was clear during the 1951 legislative election to the French National Assembly. In 1951, the election pitted Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Catholic, against a Muslim, Lamine Guèye. To access the substantial rural electorate, both candidates were seeking the support of powerful Muslim dignitaries. Arguably, the most important among them was Serigne Falilou Mbacké, the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood. An account of Serigne Falilou's interactions with both candidates sheds light on the decision-making process in choosing to support a political candidate. As the Senegalese historian El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao (2003) recounts, on the eve of the election both candidates went to the Mouride capital, Touba, to seek the Khalifa's support. The Khalifa told his confidants that he would support the candidate who came to him and offered resources to continue the construction of the Great Mosque of Touba. Ndao chronicles the Khalifa's meetings with both candidates:

> Lamine Guèye came to Touba during the course of his campaign. He promised to help the countryside (*le monde paysan*) achieve development, in the event of his victory. But he didn't make any reference to the construction of the mosque . . . . When Senghor arrived for the same reasons, he repeated his objectives and ambitions for Senegal. He reaffirmed his pledge (*sermon*) of never betraying Islam and above all stressed his decision to help the Khalifa complete the construction of the Great Mosque of Touba . . . . It is from that day that Serigne Falilou Mbacké took up Senghor's cause and launched his first voting order (*ndigal*) to the Mouride voters.
>
> (Ndao 2003, 132)

A similar openness to the possibility of supporting either candidate in the 1951 election is also evident in the case of the Khalifa Général of the Tijan brotherhood, Ababacar Sy. The Khalifa was initially more predisposed to his fellow Muslim Lamine Guèye, but after being courted much more by Senghor than Guèye, he decided to support the former (Ndao 2003, 132).

With the support of the two most prominent marabouts in Senegal, Senghor beat Lamine Guèye by more than a two-to-one margin (Ndao 2003, 138). In his interactions with the Muslim marabouts, it would appear that the odds of gaining their support were against him. If the marabouts were driven by affective ties they would surely support Lamine Guèye.[20] But in the contest for marabouts' support, it was Senghor who seemed more in tune with what the marabouts wanted and was able to make them more appealing promises.

Since then, during most, if not all, elections, the marabouts tended to support those already in power, including the French administration, earning this practice of legitimizing incumbents the term *vote légitimiste*. Cruise O'Brien (1971) asserts that in the 1958 referendum, the three great local brotherhoods, which had patronage ties to the French administration, sided with the French and helped postpone Senegalese independence, by convincing their followers to vote against it. After independence, the marabouts overwhelmingly supported President Senghor and his party, UPS, which subsequently became a single party. This support continued after a limited liberalization under Senghor and then after restoration of multiparty politics under Abdou Diouf. With a return to competitive politics, the marabouts could have supported different candidates, but they have thrown their weight mostly behind President Diouf. Both in 1983 and 1988, the religious leaders issued a *ndigal* to their followers to vote for Diouf (Schaffer 1998, 107). In 1993 and 2000, the main marabouts, namely heads of brotherhoods, abstained from issuing a *ndigal*, but many others did. As electoral contests became more competitive, there has been a certain diversification of voting orders, with some marabouts supporting the main opposition candidate at the time, Abdoulaye Wade. Yet the majority of marabouts involved still sided with the incumbent (Coulibaly 2006, 235–236).

The fact that some marabouts chose not to support the incumbent and abstain was most likely caused by diminished patronage flowing from the Diouf administration. Galvan (2001, 53) argues that the shrinking of the Senegalese state, due to the structural adjustment measures, reduced financial resources that could be channeled to the marabouts, thus souring Diouf's relationship with the marabouts. At the time of the 2000 election, some commentators thought that Senegalese society was no longer susceptible to voting orders from religious leaders. Yet, in the light of the increased involvement of religious leaders in the 2007 election, and to a lesser extent in the 2012 election, such analysis appears to be premature. The economic factors seem much more convincing in explaining their less fervent involvement in the two previous elections (Audrain 2004).

Intermediaries also showed a preference for the incumbent during the Wade presidency. Whereas Wade struggled to acquire intermediaries as a challenger, he found it much easier as an incumbent. When he was in opposition, Wade did not have the backing of any high-ranking religious leaders, even among his fellow Mourides. As an incumbent, during the 2007 election, Wade enjoyed the support of some of the country's most prominent religious leaders, including the Khalifa Général of the Mouride brotherhood.

However, by 2012 Wade's ability to acquire intermediaries was much diminished in comparison to the previous election, despite the fact that his campaign courted intermediaries as vigorously as ever before. Wade had the backing of many secondary marabouts,[21] but the upper echelons of the religious hierarchies in Touba and Tivaouane remained silent, despite multiple visits by the president and frequent "requests for prayers." In this respect, the differential behavior of marabouts between 2007 and 2012 mirrors their fluctuating support over time for the Diouf regime. When a president running for re-election faces strong challenges, intermediaries are much less likely to embrace him because the value of promises of post-electoral transfers is greatly diminished.

There are many instances in Senegalese politics when intermediaries switched their allegiance apparently on material grounds. For example, Serigne Mamoune Niasse used to support his fellow Tijan, Idrissa Seck, a former prime minister who later came in second in the 2007 presidential election. Yet by November 2006 Niasse abandoned Idrissa Seck for President Wade, and he was swiftly rewarded with a ministerial position (Diop 2006). True to his interests, Niasse did not remain loyal to Wade for very long. By the time of the 2012 election, he decided to support again Wade's bitter rival Seck, explaining publicly that he feared that Wade was going to lose (Naudé 2011). For this reason, most observers of Senegalese politics see marabouts' political support as highly instrumental. As the famous investigative journalist Abdou Latif Coulibaly (2006, 239) describes it, religious intermediaries are seen as "rentiers, keen on consumer goods."

In general, the behavior of the marabouts, especially the more politically involved and influential Mourides, shows great inconsistency with the instrumental importance of identity.[22] As documented, the Mourides worked as intermediaries for the French, then for a Catholic president, followed by a Tijan president, and only most recently a Mouride incumbent. Even intermediaries who share identity with their patron, such as Modou Kara Mbacké with President Wade, made their decisions based on material incentives. In Kara's case, the fact that he supported President Diouf, a Tijan, against Wade in the 2000 election before offering his support to President Wade in 2007, shows that shared identity is not driving his behavior. [23]

Another behavior that is inconsistent with religious affinity driving political support is the high frequency of split support for different candidates within maraboutic families. The phenomenon of a father and son, or a set of brothers, supporting different candidates is relatively common among Senegalese marabouts.

One explanation for this behavior is that intermediary families want to "hedge their bets." If members of the family support different candidates, they increase the chances that one of them will be on the winning side. In addition, marabouts sometimes align themselves with different politicians to play out their internal family rivalries and potential succession battles (Behrman 1970, 73, 77, 88). Supporting opposition candidates against other members of the family who back the incumbent is often a result of jockeying for status within the brotherhoods (Beck 2008, 73).

In contrast to Muslim leaders, Christian dignitaries have largely stayed out of electoral politics. Although they are shown respect by politicians, they have not issued voting orders or made pronouncements that could be seen as influencing electoral politics. There are probably multiple reasons for this largely apolitical stance of the Catholic establishment. First, Catholics are a small minority, and mobilizing Catholic voters would not be numerically significant. Representing a minority religion, the Catholic establishment was probably eager to appear politically neutral. Moreover, the Catholic Church in Senegal is connected to a transnational institution, in contrast to the Muslim brotherhoods, especially the Mouridiyya, that are centered on Senegal. Marabouts have hailed from Senegalese families, whereas around the start of mass politics, many priests were foreign.

It is this fluid allegiance of Muslim religious leaders, driven by monetary incentives, that helps explains why religious cleavages did not materialize in Senegal.

ELECTORAL PATTERNS

Despite the high salience of religion in everyday life, Senegalese politics have not been marked by religious cleavages (Diouf 1994, 44–45). This has consistently been the case since the onset of mass politics in the 1950s. Even though we do not have fine-grained data for that period, the electoral outcomes are widely inconsistent with religious cleavages. During the 1957 elections to the territorial assembly, Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Catholic Serer, gained support for his BPS throughout the country, winning seats in every constituency, even where there are no Catholics (and few co-ethnics). After independence, President Senghor actually enjoyed the highest levels of support in regions dominated by non-Serer Muslims. When political competition intensified, resulting in the first alternation in power in 2000, even that most momentous election in Senegalese political history was not affected by religious identity. Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey (2002) recorded respondents' electoral choices from the 2000 election, showing the lack of importance of identity factors, such as religion and brotherhood membership (and ethnicity), as predictors of voting. Table 14.2 shows the religious composition of the vote share for the three leading candidates, Abdoulaye Wade, Abdou Diouf, and Moustapha Niasse. These candidates' vote shares among Muslims and Catholics, as well as among the main brotherhoods, appear evenly distributed and proportional to the group size. When Wade, a Mouride, ran against Diouf, a Tijan, their levels of support among the two groups were almost indistinguishable. Diouf, a Tijan, got 39 percent of his votes from Tijanis, and 41 percent from Mourides. Wade, a Mouride, got 45 percent of his votes from Mourides and 39 percent from Tijanis.

Table 14.2: Religious and Brotherhood Composition of the Electorate of Main Presidential Candidates in Senegal

		Candidates' share of their total vote received from a given group		
Religious group	Group's share of the population	A. Wade	A. Diouf	M. Niasse
Muslims	95%	93%	91%	93%
Catholics	4%	5%	9%	5%
Muslim brotherhood				
Mouride	40%	41%	45%	37%
Tijan	39%	39%	39%	49%

Source: Afrobarometer, Round 2 (2003). N = 1147.

Table 14.3: Religious and Brotherhood Composition of the Electorate of Main Parties in Legislative Elections

		Parties		
Religious group	Group's share of the population	PDS	PS	AFP
Muslims	95%	95%	90%	91%
Catholics	4%	4%	4%	9%
Muslim brotherhood				
Mouride	40%	43%	41%	32%
Tijan	39%	38%	42%	51%

Source: Afrobarometer, Round 2 (2003).

The results of the 2001 legislative elections similarly highlight the lack of discernible religious voting patterns. The three main parties, PS, PDS, and AFP enjoyed comparable level of support among the country's Muslims and Catholics, in proportion to their overall scores in that election (see Table 14.3). The same can be said about the breakdown of their support among Mourides and Tijanis or among the main ethnic groups.

After Round 2, the Afrobarometer has not collected brotherhood affiliation data[24] that would allow similarly detailed comparisons for the 2007, 2012, and 2019 presidential elections, but the coverage of those elections has never pointed to any visible religious voting patterns. Instead, one of the more discernible patterns throughout that period has been an urban-rural cleavage, with rural areas consistently siding with the incumbent (Koter 2016, chap. 5). Indeed, one of the most striking features of Senegalese politics is that all four Senegalese presidents have constructed remarkably similar winning coalitions.

Conclusion

Religion has played a consistently influential role in Senegalese politics, but in a fairly unique way. Religion has not become a political cleavage, as in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, nor has there ever been a need to manage inclusion of different religious groups through consociationalism, as in Lebanon. Religious dynamics are essential to understanding electoral politics in Senegal, but not as a simple determinant of vote choice as might be expected through the prism of identity politics. Just as their Malian counterparts (see Bleck and Thurston, this volume), Senegalese marabouts eschew running for office directly, preferring to exercise indirect influence on political leaders. In contrast to Mali, the patterns of accommodation between religious leaders and the state have not been disrupted by the rise of a jihadist presence in West Africa.

Muslim religious leaders in Senegal have a long-standing history, originating before the country's independence from France, of mobilizing voters, but their involvement has been instrumental, fluid, and pragmatic, rather than sectarian. Marabouts have a pattern of supporting politicians across confessional lines, creating a dynamic electoral arena. Their most striking tendency has been their support of incumbents, including their willingness to switch to backing new incumbents following alternation in power. In so doing they have contributed to the political stability in Senegal and helped avoid divisive cleavages. At the same time, the marabouts' influence on Senegalese democracy is controversial. Their practice of converting social clout into political influence is open to criticism, such as the potential exploitation of vulnerable voters. The marabouts' willingness to switch support between candidates prevents hardened cleavages but it also appears to some as unscrupulous or even mercenary, especially since the marabouts enjoy considerable material benefits from their endorsements (Coulibaly 2006). Their preference for candidates with the most resources, typically incumbents, is skewing the electoral playing field and constraining democratic competition.

The marabouts' role has been consistent but not immutable. Undoubtedly, marabouts played a more crucial and influential role in the early post-independence period than they do today. Their voting orders were more explicit and they carried more weight. Yet their impact is still relevant. Scores of contemporary politicians still believe that courting marabouts is an important part of their electoral strategies. There are growing debates about the appropriateness of marabout involvement in electoral politics, especially in urban areas, with an increasing social sentiment that marabouts should stay away from politics. In addition to changing norms, rapid urbanization also plays a role, as there is evidence that marabouts exercise *on average* greater control in the countryside than in urban areas (see Koter 2013 for discussion). Changing control of material resources as larger segments of society move away from agriculture also affect disciples' economic dependence and the marabouts' clout. Even though many marabouts managed to make successful inroads into trade and urban transportation, their influence is more uneven in urban settings and it competes with other social networks. While debates about the appropriate role of marabouts in politics are vigorous and impact the style of marabout involvement, it is hard to imagine that religious leaders will cease to play a role in Senegalese electoral politics in the near future. As long as they remain influential in the lives of their followers, they will continue to be seen as appealing electoral intermediaries from the point of view of Senegalese politicians.

NOTES

1. See Koter (2016), chapter 3, which discusses the effect of French invasion and rule on the religious establishment.
2. Yet, in contrast to the Malian case, they are not doing so in the context of state failure or widespread insecurity.
3. There are important geographic differences in the repertoire and strength of intermediaries across the country, but most regions of Senegal, with a notable exception of Casamance, have influential local leaders (Beck 2008; Boone 2003; Diop and Diouf 2002) and, overall, the marabouts are by far the most influential intermediaries in Senegal.

   The most prominent works on the topic include Beck (2001, 2008); Boone (2003); Coulon (1988); Cruise O'Brien (1971, 1975); Diop, Diouf, and Diaw (2000); Galvan (2001); Villalón (1995); and Young and Kanté (1991).
4. This is not always true at the local level.
5. By non-co-religionists I also mean members of different Sufi brotherhoods.
6. The religious order *ndigal* also appears in the literature spelled *ndigel*.
7. One of the reasons behind the changing nature of *ndigal* over the years is growing social objection to voting orders. Many activists have portrayed *ndigal* as anti-democratic, making overt voting orders less socially acceptable.
8. Author interview, Dakar, February 26, 2007.
9. Author interviews, Touba, March 2007, and Palmarin, February 2007.
10. Author interview, Mbour, February 20, 2007. A similar point also finds confirmation in Riedl (2014). One of her interviewees, a constituency representative in Podor, stated that during the single party era the PS was "open to all traditional chiefly families and all (religious) brotherhoods" (123).
11. Author interview, Dakar, April 14, 2007.
12. "Etude sur le comportement électoral dans les régions de Thiès et Diourbel," May 1999. The sample size was 4877 (2900 in the department of Thiès and 1977 in Diourbel).
13. Question 88a_Sen, Round 3, 2005.
14. See Koter (2016, 107) for discussion.
15. An example of such payment is *hadiyya*, a personal gift to the leader.
16. Question 88a_Sen, Round 3, 2005.
17. Forty percent of Mourides, but only 34.9 percent of Tijanis, said that they accept voting orders from religious leaders. A previous Gercop study, conducted in Saint-Louis, also found that Tijanis are less influenced by religious leaders.

18. Author interviews with Madior Diouf, Dakar, March 1, 2007, and Madieyna Diouf, Dakar, April 2007.
19. Author interview with Semou Pathé Guèye, Dakar, March 1, 2007.
20. The 1920 election to the French Assembly provides another example of a contest pitting a Muslim against a Catholic candidate, albeit at a time of limited suffrage. The marabouts supported a Catholic, Blaise Diagne, against a Muslim, Galandou Diouf (Beck 2008, 72–3).
21. Among others, Wade gained open support from the Khalifa of Darou Mousty, Serigne Cheikh Khady Mbacké (*Le Soleil*, February 15, 2012), Cheikh Béthio Thioune, Cheikh Ndigel Fall (*Sud Quotidien*, February 21, 2012), Seigne Fallou Mbacké (*Le Soleil*, March 1, 2012), the marabout Pathé Kébé (*Le Soleil*, March 6, 2012), Serigne Bakhé Mbacké (*Le Soleil*, March 9, 2012), and several religious dignitaries and imams in the department of Kolda (*Le Soleil*, March 13, 2012).
22. For additional examples of prominent intermediaries supporting candidates from other groups see Diouf (1994) and Beck (2008, 72–73).
23. Kara's support for Diouf is discussed in Audrain (2004).
24. All major candidates in those elections were Muslim, so Muslim versus Christian cleavage is less relevant.

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CHAPTER 15

CLIENTELISM, CONSTITUENCY SERVICES, AND ELECTIONS IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

DANIEL CORSTANGE AND ERIN YORK

The stereotype of elections in the Muslim world is that they are contests between ruling parties that survive on a mixture of patronage and repression, and an Islamist opposition that thrives on appeals to religion and privatized social services. This image belies considerable variation across societies and elections, but, as with many stereotypes, it does contain a kernel of truth. Many ruling parties do dip into state resources to reward supporters and woo the uncommitted, while their hamstrung opponents make do with whatever resources they can mobilize from nonstate sources while hammering home an ideological message.

We have little to say here about the ideologies, but we have quite a lot to say about the distributive politics. What drives this emphasis on patronage and other non-ideological appeals? What forms do these appeals take, who uses them, and how do they affect distributional outcomes? Do opposition parties that lack deep pockets or access to state resources stand a chance of competing? How do Muslim societies compare to their non-Muslim counterparts elsewhere in the world?

There may be myriad ways that politicians try to cultivate voters around election time, but politicians in new democracies and competitive autocracies tend to make greater use of patronage and service-based appeals than do their counterparts in richer, more consolidated democracies (Keefer 2007). These strategies vary in a number of features, and differ in the degree to which they disrupt the idealized form of accountability we like to impute to democratic elections. Clientelism, in particular, is distinct from seemingly related appeals by making the act of voting an explicit transaction with an enforceable quid pro quo—voters and politicians both give and get something, and can punish each other for failing to live up to the agreement (Cammett 2014; Corstange 2016; Stokes et al. 2013).

Although we typically expect politicians to be accountable to voters in one form or another, clientelistic exchanges create perverse accountability: voters are now accountable to the politicians for whom they voted and from whom they extracted benefits (Stokes 2005). Accordingly, clientelism is a form of off-the-books politics that is almost always denounced as a perversion of the democratic process. It contrasts with other forms of on-the-books distributive politics that lack the quid pro quo, are perfectly legal, and are possibly even desirable from the perspective of accountability.

In this chapter, we explore the prevalence and implications of clientelism in the Muslim world, drawing on cross-national and case evidence to illustrate our central claims. We begin with context: how institutions and the quality of governance in Muslim societies compare to other parts of the world. We show that the presence of clientelism is linked more to political and economic factors than to cultural attributes. In particular, we find evidence that Muslim and Arab polities are not, in fact, more clientelistic than comparable non-Muslim states.

We next turn to the distributive implications of this strategy. We first provide a brief conceptual overview of clientelism and how it differs from seemingly similar dynamics such as pork-barrel politics and constituency services. We then illustrate the practice of service provision with evidence from Lebanon and Yemen. This reveals the conditions that favor clientelistic strategies: ruling parties are the primary beneficiaries of this approach, and poor and rural voters are the most likely to suffer the distributive consequences.

Finally, we demonstrate that there are alternatives to clientelism, even in patronage-oriented societies. We use empirical evidence from Morocco to demonstrate that opposition parliamentarians use on-the-books, institutionalized constituency service provision to counteract the off-the-books exchanges favored by regime-aligned deputies. We end with a brief discussion of accountability relationships under different forms of distributive politics: who is accountable to whom, and what this accountability means for democratic representativeness.

Clientelism is common in Muslim (and comparable non-Muslim) societies, and this has important implications for distributive politics and the quality of goods that voters receive. Yet clientelistic strategies are not the only means of attracting votes, and other linkage strategies—including those that do not require the same quid pro quo agreement—exist and are electorally successful even in settings where clientelism dominates.

Contextual Differences between the Muslim and Non-Muslim Worlds

Here, we provide a descriptive backdrop to the use of electoral clientelism and other forms of distributive politics in the Muslim world. In particular, we provide comparisons of basic institutions and governance between Muslim and non-Muslim societies in order to evaluate the degree to which there are, or are not, broad differences relevant to the use of clientelism. In other words, are Muslim societies distinct on these issues of governance? Our short answer is no. There are some contextual differences, but they appear to follow largely from mundane disparities in levels of economic development.

Cross-country comparisons of Muslim and non-Muslim countries have long been a challenge due to the lack of broadly comparable indicators about Muslim, and especially Arab, societies. This basic data problem has improved in recent years, however, which means we can make general descriptive comparisons across countries and regions that were impractical for an earlier generation of scholars. We make no claim that the measures we use are free from conceptual roughness or measurement error, only that we now have enough comparable data to make the attempt worthwhile despite the imperfections.

At a basic level, of course, we have always been able to observe differences in regime type across the world—specifically, on the broad distinction between democracies and autocracies. To the degree that clientelistic politics are more common under some institutions than others, we can gain some context from the distribution of regimes in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. Although several measures are in widespread circulation, the two most commonly used are from Freedom House and the Polity Project. Figure 15.1 shows the distribution of 2018 Freedom in the World and Polity scores across three categories: Arab Muslim, non-Arab Muslim, and non-Muslim majority states.[1]

As Stepan and Robertson (2003, 2004) once observed, and as these data confirm, there *are* distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim societies—but these differences in favor of autocratic government are especially strong in the Arab world, which has the lowest average scores on both metrics. We do not wish to dwell on the question of a "democratic deficit" here. Instead, the prevalence of autocracies and unconsolidated democracies in the Arab and Muslim worlds is relevant to the use of electoral clientelism, because these types of societies are the ones in which parties and voters find clientelistic politics to be especially helpful linkage strategies (Keefer 2007).

It is also important to note that the autocratic nature of many of these polities may also influence which parties are advantaged by this form of competition. As outlined below, the distinguishing feature of clientelism is a quid pro quo exchange, but these linkage strategies also rely on the availability of private goods to distribute. In autocratic polities, because the regime typically has the deepest pockets, regime-linked parties may have the most access to the goods used to lure in supporters—a possibility explored more fully below.



FIGURE 15.1: Political freedoms and democracy. Left panel shows distribution of aggregate "Freedom in the World" 2018 scores across Arab, non-Arab Muslim, and non-Muslim-majority states and territories. The center lines in the boxes indicate the median country score by group, and the boxes contain the middle 50 percent of the countries. Scores are out of 100, with higher scores indicating greater political freedom. Right panel shows distribution of 2018 polity scores across Arab, non-Arab Muslim, and non-Muslim-majority states and territories. Scores range from –10 to 10, with –10 indicating complete autocracy and 10 full democracy.

Differences in institutional *type* do not tell us much about institutional *quality*. Here, we draw on a recent cross-national effort by the World Bank to measure how well national institutions perform, regardless of type. As a descriptive matter, we care about quality of governance to the degree that clientelism concentrates in poorly governed societies, even as we make no causal claims about which one causes the other. The World Bank collects data on six high-level governance indicators; we generate an average quality of governance measure by averaging across these six standardized indicators at the country level.[2]

In terms of raw differences, there is a large gap in institutional quality between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds—with the former nearly a full standard deviation worse than the latter on average. Yet Table 15.1 shows that at least some of this gap can be explained by differences in country wealth. Including even a single standard control—log GDP per capita—reduces the gap significantly, especially for the non-Arab states. In short, there are some regional differences, but at least a part of the observed difference is due to prosaic differences in country wealth—wealthier countries enjoy better institutions, and Muslim countries just happen to be poorer on average than their non-Muslim counterparts. One possible explanation for the residual gap—particularly for the Arab states—is the composition of the economy or the sources of country wealth, with rentier states that depend on oil or aid inflows enjoying lower-quality institutions than their counterparts.

We next turn more directly to measures of the prevalence of clientelism as a linkage strategy. Here, we use data from a recent expert survey, the Global Party Survey, to examine linkages across a wide range of countries, including far better representation of the Muslim and Arab worlds than had previously been available to scholars.[3]

Table 15.1: Quality of Governance: Regression

	Dependent variable:	
	Average WB Quality of Governance	
	(1)	(2)
Arab Muslim	-0.938***	-0.712***
	(0.192)	(0.105)
Non-Arab Muslim	-0.807***	-0.243*
	(0.176)	(0.099)
GDP Control		✓
Observations	202	189
R^2	0.166	0.736
Adjusted R^2	0.158	0.732

* $p<0.05$;

** $p<0.01$;

*** $p<0.001$.

Note: Table 15.1 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS estimation of average quality of governance metrics on state category alone (model 1) and with a control for log per capita GDP (model 2). Data are from the World Bank country-level data for 2018. Units are standard deviations.

Table 15.2 examines the use of clientelism at the country level, with and without controls.[4] Descriptively, we find suggestive but imprecise evidence that parties in the Arab world make more use of clientelism than their counterparts in the non-Muslim world—that same difference is larger and more precisely estimated in the non-Arab Muslim world. Yet these data also suggest that, when taking into account other factors that explain clientelistic behavior, parties in Muslim countries are not detectably more likely to use clientelism than their counterparts elsewhere in the world.

What should we take away from this contextual comparison? At a basic level, Muslim societies, and especially Arab ones, are less democratic than non-Muslim societies. Though this observation is not a new one, it is relevant to the extent that clientelism is more widespread in autocracies and the new democracies that these autocracies may someday become. Second, institutional quality is lower in Muslim societies—again, relevant to the extent that clientelism concentrates in weak institutional environments. Yet a large chunk of the quality deficit is due to a very mundane difference: Muslim societies tend to be poorer than non-Muslim ones. Third, parties in Arab and Muslim societies appear to use clientelism more than their counterparts in the non-Muslim world. Yet much—perhaps even all—of this difference is due to prosaic differences such as the wealth and autocratic nature of the societies in question.

Table 15.2: 2018 Party Strategies: Regression

	Dependent variable:	
	Use of Clientelism	
	(1)	(2)
Arab Muslim	0.246	-0.021
	(0.253)	(0.270)
Non-Arab Muslim	0.677***	0.310
	(0.227)	(0.243)
Controls:		✓
Observations	161	143
R^2	0.055	0.208
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.179

* $p<0.1$;

** $p<0.05$;

*** $p<0.01$.

Note: Table 15.2 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS estimation of use of clientelistic strategies at the country level, with and without controls for economic and political characteristics (polity score, log per capita GDP, and inclusion in OECD). Data are from the Global Party Survey. The outcome variable is standardized, so units are standard deviations.

The analytic, and also normative, conclusion is therefore encouraging: there *are* some contextual differences between Muslim and non-Muslim countries for the purposes of understanding clientelism, but we need not invoke exotic or essentializing factors to explain the differences. One can, of course, ask the historically prior question of *why* these societies tend to be poorer and more autocratic in the first place (see the chapters by Chaney and Rubin in this volume). Our point is more discrete: Muslim societies do not appear to be atypically prone to clientelism much beyond what we would expect from their levels of wealth and institutional configurations. In the next sections, we clarify the concepts at hand before turning to an exploration of their implementation in practice.

CLIENTELISM AND CONSTITUENCY SERVICES AS CONCEPTS

So far, we have spoken informally about clientelism. Let us now be more precise about what we mean by that term. In the abstract, elections oblige candidates to compete for voters' support, whether by selecting one candidate over others, or simply by turning out to vote at all. Politicians have developed a variety of ways to woo voters—some normatively desirable, and some less so. An idealized version of these linkages envisions voters choosing between parties based on their proposed policies to allocate public goods and services across wide swaths of the population. On the other end of the normative spectrum, other linkage options target private inducements to supporters at the expense of the rest of the population.

The conceptual challenge is that these strategies feature different bundles of characteristics, and their individual components tend to be conflated—programmatic versus nonprogrammatic distribution, public versus private goods, targeted versus untargeted beneficiaries, and so on. Here, we untangle several of the key components in order to focus on what makes clientelism distinct from other linkage strategies. As explained below, the quid pro quo, rather than the other features that get lumped in with it, is what defines clientelism and makes it a potentially pernicious form of off-the-books politics.

Some parties rely on programmatic politics to woo supporters. The responsible party model characterizes the interaction of parties and voters over the course of the electoral cycle (Kitschelt 2000): parties package policy proposals into a platform, voters choose the party with the platform they prefer, the winning party fulfills its promises or not while in office, and then voters decide to retain the party or not at the next election. This is a stylized account of party strategies, yet it provides a normative ideal that serves as a benchmark to compare actual electioneering.

The defining characteristic of programmatic politics is not the content of the policies per se, but rather that they allocate benefits to voters via well-defined and nondiscretionary rules. Put differently, the policies pre-define a target set of beneficiaries—possibly the entire society, but often not—and everyone eligible for the benefits can access them, regardless of their political affiliations. These benefits include both public goods and more targeted private goods—consider, for example, Social Security and other state-run pension plans that provide individual payments to retirees—that retain their programmatic appeal by virtue of the formulaic and objective means to determine eligibility and access.

Programmatic redistribution is still redistribution, of course, and therefore creates winners and losers. Yet the conceptual conclusion is the same: the appeal is not a clientelistic one if political support is not a criterion for access. Consequently, geographically targeted redistribution—sometimes called pork-barrel politics, a term that is unlikely to catch on in Muslim societies—may be an appealing tool for politicians operating in geographically defined districts. Yet it is not clientelistic insofar as benefits flow to all members of the district regardless of their political leanings.

The same conceptual logic applies to constituency services: a hodgepodge of intercessions and other services that representatives provide to residents of their districts, usually on an ad hoc and individual basis. Examples include resolving pension problems, expediting passport applications, or pressuring bureaucrats to fix potholes in a road. Although the representatives serve as an intermediary between the citizen and various governmental offices, they typically offer these services to all comers. Indeed, the lack of political criteria for help is what makes them constituency services rather than clientelistic transactions. Although it may be true that supporters feel more comfortable approaching a politician for these services, support is not necessary; indeed, politicians may try to engage in *more* constituency services to cultivate nonsupporters by providing observable evidence of evenhandedness among all members of the district.

Ultimately, the core distinction between clientelism and other forms of distributive politics is not the nature of the goods offered, nor the degree to which they are targeted or untargeted. Instead, the distinguishing feature is the existence of an explicit, enforceable quid pro quo: parties trade payoffs for votes, *and* they punish voters who fail to fulfill their end of the bargain. At its core, clientelism is an exchange relationship with two-way accountability—parties may be accountable to voters at the ballot box, but voters are also accountable to parties from whom they accept inducements.

How, though, do parties enforce these quid pro quos? In order to police their bargains, parties must monitor voters, and so act more as political machines than they do as the preference aggregators in the responsible party model (Kitschelt 2000). In these settings, party functionaries and independent contractors—"brokers," in the catch-all sense—focus on distributing benefits to supporters and monitoring their behavior for evidence of compliance (Stokes et al. 2013).

Clientelism and Constituency Services in Lebanon and Yemen

There is, of course, much more to say about clientelism and distributive politics at the conceptual level. To illustrate these concepts in action, however, we now walk through a brief sketch of clientelistic politics in Lebanon and Yemen. These two Arab countries differ in their electoral institutions, but share an emphasis on distributive politics and service delivery in their elections (for in-depth treatments, see Cammett 2014 and Corstange 2016). Like Morocco, which is discussed below, and unlike the Arab Gulf states, neither country is a significant oil producer that enjoys high per capita wealth due to oil rents. In that sense, the cases we examine should have patronage environments more typical of the rest of the Muslim world—where resource scarcity, not abundance, is the norm.

Lebanon and Yemen are colorful in their political rhetoric, with a thin veneer of ideological language. Parties and candidates sometimes release electoral platforms, although these documents are often long on recitations of desirable outcomes ("reduce illiteracy by such-and-such a percent") and short on implementation details. In general, a wide array of politicians and civil society activists in both countries agree that party programs are irrelevant in elections.[5] We are not, of course, denying the existence of ideological parties; far from it, as we have interviewed leaders from many of them. Our point is that, with few exceptions, such parties are electorally marginal. Easily derided as "parties on paper," they focus their efforts on a small constituency of true believers but win few votes and fewer seats as a result.[6]

Currently, the most electorally viable parties that offer more than a token nod to an ideology are, loosely speaking, Islamist parties: Hizbullah in Lebanon and Islah in Yemen. No doubt some of their supporters are motivated by the party program or a general appeal to religious probity, and for others their main attraction is that they offer a viable alternative to the status quo. Nonetheless, such appeals are not sufficient to guarantee electoral viability. Studies of such movements are plagued by survivorship bias, as the many failed or marginal Islamist parties—such as Lebanon's al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya or Yemen's al-Haqq—attest.

Simply repeating slogans that "Islam is the solution" does not, by itself, bring in the votes, and many non-Islamist parties campaign with religious language as well. Instead, the Islamist parties that break through to electoral viability appear to owe their success to their capacity to deliver social services to voters, at least in part (Brooke 2019; Cammett and Luong 2014; Masoud 2014). Indeed, many of their detractors assert that Islamist popularity is due primarily to handouts—a well-worn critique in Lebanon and Yemen, and in many other societies with burgeoning Islamist movements.

Ruling parties, in contrast, tend to be big tents with little ideological glue holding them together. While they might be integrators of widely differing visions for the country, the more critical view derides them as "a collection of opportunists," in the words of a Yemeni opposition leader.[7] One ambivalent reformer in the Yemeni ruling party captured both of these views when he grumbled that "parties are just slogans and banners and haven't done anything for the people," but also that his party "is not really a party, but rather a mosaic of the whole country."[8] In the absence of programmatic appeals or ideological purity, ruling parties focus instead on the proverbial bread and butter issues of service delivery.

Notwithstanding cloying rhetoric to the contrary, nearly all major parties attempt to buy popular support through service delivery and other material payoffs. Despite grumbling that they should be making laws rather than providing services to voters, parliamentary deputies readily acknowledge that voters expect their deputies to focus on the latter—hence the term "service deputy" (Lust 2009). Thus, one Lebanese MP complained that "the role of an MP is to make laws. It's not to provide services. It's the role of the *state* to provide services." He then acknowledged that

> [t]here's no accountability. No one asks what I've done for the last four years. It only matters whose list I'm on, that I went to funerals, that I got someone out of jail, and so on. No one cares about my voting record.[9]

Another MP explained that the state was too weak to provide the services that people need, so they turn to their elected deputies instead:

> Here, constituents count on MPs to render them services. If they need a job they come to you, if they want to register their kids in school, if they're pregnant and need to get into a hospital. It's everything, from A to Z.[10]

Put differently, some demands are for collective services that we expect every contemporary state to provide, such as electricity, piped water, or schools. Other demands appear more idiosyncratic and personalized, such as jobs or preferential access to hospital beds. The fact that politicians address these demands idiosyncratically rather than formulaically offers an avenue for clientelistic exchange.

Despite this emphasis on service delivery, the services are not necessarily of high quality. Figure 15.2, for example, lampoons the inadequate supply of electricity in Yemen by comparing it to the reliability of the candles used in the daily blackouts, a visual motif that appears regularly in opposition-aligned newspapers (cf. Corstange 2007). Chronic shortages and low standards pose a puzzle: Who is actually satisfied with the modest services offered to them? Living in a poor country with limited resources is, of course, one partial explanation for poor services, but surely not everyone is willing to accept this excuse forever. The goal of the parties in power, in other words, is to find voters for whom modest results are enough to win support.

Service-oriented parties may patronize a wide variety of voters, but, on balance, they have strong incentives to prefer *poor* voters over their better-off counterparts. There are various explanations for this preference, including the declining marginal utility of income, shorter time horizons for poor people, and a greater distaste for selling votes



FIGURE 15.2: "Electricity in our country."

Source: Al-Sahwa (Yemen), August 25, 2005.

among richer people. The unifying theme, however, is that it is generally cheaper to buy a poor person's vote than a rich person's. Hence, one Lebanese election monitor explained that, "to buy a poor person's vote . . . [maybe] just offer them food and they'll be happy. Maybe a cellular card or fuel. For middle-class people, they might require jobs, refrigerators, and so on."[11] A member of a Lebanese electoral reform commission explained in more detail:

> Vote buying has a low impact in middle-class districts, but a big impact in the poor areas . . . poor people sell their votes. Slightly higher income groups . . . require different kinds of interventions, like getting a job. They won't sell their votes so readily. They'll do it if you provide services for the village, which is more like constituency services than direct vote buying. They require too high a price to make it economical . . . . Also, the middle class has a different discourse, and selling votes is shameful, whereas the poor can't afford that discourse.[12]

Poor voters offer appealing targets for service-oriented parties due to their relatively modest demands, but a particular type of poverty is especially attractive: that of the rural areas. This claim, no doubt, seems implausible at first, given the neglect so often documented in the countryside. The Yemeni political cartoon in Figure 15.3, for example, illustrates the problem: a smarmy-looking bureaucrat—and they are *always* smarmy in these cartoons—laughs off a complaint about the lack of services in a village


القريه بلا مشاريع.. ولا كهرباء ولا مياه وبلا طريق...
خلاص.. نعلنها محميه طبيعيه..!

FIGURE 15.3: Villager: "The village has no development projects, electricity, water, or roads . . . " Official: "All right, we'll declare it a nature preserve!"

Source: Al-Nida (Yemen), September 14, 2005.

by declaring it a nature preserve. The political paradox, of course, is that many villages that support the ruling party nonetheless lack basic services and infrastructure, and the latter that does exist often lacks “amenities” such as doors, windows, or roofs.[13]

Yet vote for the ruling party they do, and often overwhelmingly so. One reason is simply *because* of their poverty, which makes them cheaper to satisfy with minor payoffs; the introduction of even modest services where none had previously existed amounts to a significant improvement in quality of life. A second, and more pernicious, reason is that rural voters are more constrained and therefore more attractive as *clients*. Compared to their urban counterparts, they tend to be less mobile, easier to monitor, and more susceptible to peer pressure—all of which combine to make it easier for parties to enforce clientelistic quid pro quos and harder for voters to escape. Lebanese election monitors explained that “in a small village, everyone knows everyone. Someone can do a detailed report on what you did on Election Day. It’s easier to keep track of vote buying in rural areas because it’s a smaller community.”[14] Their Yemeni counterparts highlighted the same issue: “[I]n the countryside, there’s no anonymity. Everyone knows everyone, so you can expect . . . pressure to cast the ‘right’ vote.”[15]

In the abstract, any party could engage in these exchanges with rural residents. In practice, however, ruling parties are much more able to do so, since they can exploit state workers in the countryside in a way that their opponents cannot. Yemeni opposition figures reiterate the problem. “The real democracy is in the capital,” one argued. “In the outlying regions there’s no competition: everyone works for the state, so they vote [for the ruling party].”[16] Another explained that “the cities are a true reflection of political currents in the country, since in the cities it’s actually [issue] politics.” People “come to the cities, and whereas their villages are voting [for the ruling party],” they do so due to pressure from the local community. In the cities, however, people “don’t face those pressures to nearly the same degree, so they can vote their conscience.”[17] Cash-strapped opposition parties lack the resources to project themselves into the countryside, and, accordingly, they concentrate their efforts in the high population density areas of the cities and cede the rural areas to the ruling party—a huge concession when a large proportion of the population is rural.

Unsurprisingly, opposition activists complain about the partisan nature of public service provision, and there is a widespread belief that access depends on loyalty to the sitting government. One Yemeni opposition party leader explained:

> In the existing political system, everything depends on loyalty to the regime. Those regions that are loyal to the regime get more than their share. Those regions that vote for a different party—they’re done for, it’s over. People are just stuck taking patronage from the [ruling party] if they can get it.[18]

Statements such as this one capture the common belief that, notwithstanding chronic resource limitations, the government can turn services on or off at will—presumably due to political loyalties. The capacity to exploit state resources for partisan ends, in the opposition view, is what allows the party in power to win elections despite its mismanagement. As one opposition-aligned editor explained, "[W]hen we contest elections here, we're not facing the ruling party, we're facing the state . . . . If we face the state, they win. If we face the party, we win."[19]

What, then, can the opposition do to compete with the parties in power? Some reiterate their focus on principles in the hopes of overcoming the latter's advantage in service delivery, although at the risk of degenerating into a niche party in the process. Yet holding firm on principled positions is *not* the only option for the opposition seeking to cultivate its constituencies. In addition to relying on nongovernmental funding sources to pay for services, as many Islamist parties appear to do, opposition parties have another avenue to provide the services that people expect. In particular, we might expect opposition MPs to engage in prosaic, on-the-books politics: to make use of their constitutional prerogatives to help people navigate byzantine bureaucracies, prevent line ministries from overlooking their districts, and ensure that constituents can access the benefits to which they are formally entitled. Although their practical capacity to legislate may be minimal, MPs may still be able to engage in real work on behalf of their constituents. Although this option is not glamorous, it may be surprisingly effective. We take up this possibility in the next section, with novel evidence from Morocco.

Patronage and Constituency Service in Morocco

In this section, we explore alternative linkage strategies in Morocco to show that clientelism is not the only electorally successful strategy, even in an environment in which it is highly prevalent. Though the bulk of political power there is held by the unelected monarch, Morocco holds competitive elections for local, regional, and national political bodies. The elections themselves are seen as largely free and fair, and a wide range of political parties participate and win seats. But existing scholarship on Morocco stresses the overwhelming influence of patronage on political competition in this setting (Denoeux 2007). How do parties lacking access to traditional patronage networks sustain popular support?

As elsewhere in the Arab world (Lust 2009), Moroccan patronage networks have at their core the regime—in this case, the monarchy and its deep pockets. The unofficial influence of the palace on electoral competition is evidenced by the existence of several parties with personal linkages to the regime (Lust-Okar 2005; Willis 2002). Many of these "royalist" parties are dominated by local notables descended from the historical elite, who continue to play an outsize role in politics, especially in rural areas (Liddell 2010). Such actors primarily attract support through clientelistic linkages: in addition to patronage projects targeted at their supporters, there are widespread perceptions—though few direct measures—of vote-buying in national elections (Sweet 2001).

Yet not all parties in this setting use clientelism as their primary linkage strategy. In general, parties that lack palace connections should have correspondingly reduced access to patronage networks. We recap key findings from York 2020 to provide evidence that such parties can adopt an alternative linkage strategy—the use of institutionalized constituency service—to satisfy constituent expectations and compete for votes. Like deputies in more democratic contexts, Moroccan legislators are granted a set of institutional authorities that give them oversight of the bureaucracy. Opposition parties use these authorities of office to address constituent issues and provide constituency service without relying on personal networks.

One such power is the ability to submit written requests for information or bureaucratic action (queries) to ministry leadership. This is a common feature of parliamentary institutions in both democratic and autocratic states (Martin 2011). In Morocco, it allows deputies to gather detailed information about their district and pressure bureaucrats to fix local problems. In interviews, deputies stress the utility of written queries for addressing local issues and constituent concerns.[20] And the subject matter of actual queries submitted demonstrates that they are regularly used to address public goods provision within a district. In 2015, for example, a delegate from a nonroyalist party submitted a request to the Ministry of Health regarding "[p]roviding maintenance to the health center in the municipality of Mrija in Jerada." Similarly, in 2016, a deputy from the main Islamist opposition party asked the Ministry of Energy, Water, and the Environment to address the lack of drinkable water in a remote area of his home district. Content analysis reveals that a majority of queries (63 percent) reference district or subdistrict issues.[21] In other words, the evidence (from both deputy characterizations and the queries themselves) suggests that these queries function as an institutionalized mechanism for constituency service.

Moroccan deputies submit a huge number of queries each year—during the legislative term from 2011 through 2016, they generated 27,196 unique requests submitted to more than thirty ministers and delegate ministers. But deputies do not make equal use of this authority. There is substantial variation in the number of queries submitted at the individual level: 15 percent of deputies did not submit a single query throughout the five-year legislative term, while others made hundreds or even thousands of requests.

Notably, nonroyalist parties—those without regime linkages and corresponding access to patronage networks—use written queries to a much greater degree than their royalist-linked counterparts. Figure 15.4 shows the distribution of query submission at the deputy level, revealing stark variations between queries submitted by the opposition (top panel) and royalist (bottom panel) parties. No royalist deputy submitted more than ninety-seven queries; this was only in the top 40th percentile among opposition deputies.

This differential pattern across party type is statistically significant. Table 15.3 reports output from OLS regression at the deputy level of the log number of written queries submitted on an indicator for whether or not the deputy in question was a member of



FIGURE 15.4: Written query submission in Morocco: Royalist versus Nonroyalist. Figure shows distribution on a log scale of number of written queries submitted at the deputy level by affiliation with royalist (bottom panel) or nonroyalist (top panel) parties.

Table 15.3: Written Query Submission in Morocco: Royalist versus Nonroyalist

	Dependent variable:	
	Log Written Queries	
	(1)	(2)
Royalist	-2.131**	-2.183**
	(0.772)	(0.773)
Controls		✓
Observations	413	413
R^2	0.293	0.400
Adjusted R^2	0.291	0.393

* $p<0.05$;

** $p<0.01$;

*** $p<0.001$.

Note: Table 15.3 shows coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression of the log number of written queries submitted by Moroccan deputies on their status as members of royalist or nonroyalist parties. Model 1 is estimated without controls; model 2 includes controls for incumbency, committee leadership, deputies elected as part of a national list, and participation in the governing coalition. Standard errors are clustered at the party level and constructed through bootstrapping.

a royalist party, with and without controls for a range of deputy characteristics.[22] The results are striking: deputies from royalist parties submitted, on average, more than two log-units fewer queries than their nonroyalist counterparts. In other words, the average opposition deputy submitted a whopping ten times as many queries as the average royalist deputy.

So there is clear evidence that nonroyalist parties make greater use of this form of legislative activity. But does constituency service provided through institutional mechanisms constitute a successful linkage strategy? We next look at the relationship between written queries and electoral outcomes. To do so, we pool written queries submitted by party deputies within a given district to generate a measure of legislative activity at the party level.[23] We measure electoral outcomes as the change in party vote share within a district from the 2011 to the 2016 legislative elections (thereby controlling for past legislative performance) and regress this on the measure of legislative activity including region fixed effects and controls for other activity not linked to constituency service.

The results reported in Table 15.4 reveal that legislative activity is closely linked to vote share. Across the full sample of parties, a log-unit increase in the number of written queries submitted is associated with a one percentage point increase in party vote

Table 15.4: Written Queries and Vote Share in Morocco: Royalist versus Nonroyalist

	Dependent variable:		
	Change in Party Vote Share, 2011–2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log Written Queries	0.010***	0.0003	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Sample	Full	Royalist	Nonroyalist
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Mean Change in Vote Share	0.000	0.001	-0.001
Observations	263	115	148
R^2	0.136	0.164	0.261
Adjusted R^2	0.091	0.066	0.189

* $p<0.05$;

** $p<0.01$;

*** $p<0.001$.

Note: Table 15.4 shows coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression at the party-district level of the change in party vote share from 2011–2016 on the log number of written queries submitted by deputies from that party. All models include controls for region and other deputy activity (oral queries submitted).

share in the subsequent elections. But what of the difference in usage by royalist and nonroyalist parties? We subset the sample to look at effects by party type. For royalist parties, there is essentially no association between this constituency-focused legislative activity and vote share: the coefficient on written queries is insignificant and close to zero. By contrast, nonroyalist parties see an increase in vote share of 1.7 percentage points for each log unit increase in the number of queries submitted. This is both substantively and statistically significant, given that a vote share in the single digits is often sufficient to win a legislative seat in this context.

The evidence here suggests that even in an environment where patronage is highly prevalent and programmatic objectives are difficult to implement, clientelism based on patronage networks is not the only successful linkage strategy. Instead, parties can use institutionalized constituency service—the provision of district-level goods via constitutional legislative authorities—to satisfy constituents and attract electoral support. That this activity and its electoral significance vary substantially by party type suggests that it may offer a functional substitute for clientelism, allowing parties without access to regime patronage to satisfy constituent expectations.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined linkage strategies in Muslim societies to understand whether the conventional wisdom on political competition in such settings is consistent with the reality. We have shown through cross-national evidence that although there are disparities in political outcomes between Muslim and non-Muslim societies, many of these can be attributed to differences in wealth and governance that generally have little to do with social or cultural attributes.

And yet clientelistic linkage strategies are quite prevalent in electoral competition in many Muslim-majority states, though not necessarily more so than in comparable non-Muslim polities. We have characterized the specifics of such appeals and demonstrated how they are deployed in a pair of Arab states. This latter discussion reveals that it is largely ruling parties that benefit from this form of competition, and that the most vulnerable communities—poor and rural voters—suffer the consequences. In particular, the "perverse accountability" relationship created by clientelism often places voters at a disadvantage in dealing with their representatives—stuck with politicians that do the bare minimum and unable to transfer their support lest they be cut out of future goods entirely. That poor communities are most susceptible to this political strategy suggests that clientelism may exacerbate existing inequalities in goods provision.

From this perspective, then, the results from the Moroccan context present a more optimistic view of political accountability. Rather than following a clientelistic logic in which districts that show strong support for incumbents receive disproportionate attention, the electoral pattern in Morocco suggests a form of accountability that favors voters: politicians that devote attention to their constituents tend to receive their support in future elections.

But while this pattern might imply better distributive outcomes for the electorate, the findings in Morocco also reveal that it is not the only relationship we observe. Parties that rely on clientelistic strategies underwritten by regime patronage remain successful and do not seem to face the same costs for failing to provide constituency service through institutional means. These differences suggest that the two linkage strategies can substitute for one another, perhaps creating within-society discrepancies in goods provision based on the category of parties competing within a district. At the very least, the varied nature of the approaches profiled here reveals a greater complexity to electoral competition in these societies than is obvious on the surface.

NOTES

1. Here and elsewhere, we count the following states and territories as Muslim-majority, based on 2018 population data: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Northern Cyprus, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Sahrawi Republic, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Arab states and territories include Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sahrawi Republic, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.
2. The six indicators include control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability. These data are available at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-governance-indicators.
3. Global Party Survey data are accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/GlobalPartySurvey. The data set includes information on party behavior in 161 societies, including 16 of 22 Arab states and 40 out of 51 Muslim countries. Another project, the Democracy Accountability and Linkages Project, offers conceptually similar data, but are from an expert survey in 2008 and covers only 88 societies—including only 3 Arab countries, and 13 of 51 Muslim societies in total. Notwithstanding these limitations, we draw the same broad conclusions from those data as we do from the Global Party Survey data. DALP data are accessible at https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/data/.
4. The Global Party Survey data were collected at the party level and include a 10-point scale of use of clientelism ("On clientelism, where do parties currently stand on DISTRIBUTING PUBLIC GOODS, like material benefits, subsidies, construction projects, and jobs. Do they favor giving universally to all citizens or else primarily to their own supporters? Where would you place each party on the following scale? 0—universal distribution; 10—distribution only to supporters"). To generate a state-level clientelism indicator, we weight party-level clientelism estimates by party size and standardize this outcome variable for Table 15.2.

5. Interviews, Beirut and Sanaa, 2005–2006, 2008–2009.
6. Interview, opposition party MP, Sanaa, December 2005.
7. Interview, opposition party MP, Sanaa, June 2006.
8. Interview, ruling party official, Sanaa, February 2006.
9. Interview, MP, Beirut, April 2009.
10. Interview, MP, Beirut, July 2008.
11. Interview, NGO director, Beirut, July 2008.
12. Interview, electoral commission member, Beirut, July 2008.
13. Field observations, Dhamar and al-Bayda provinces, spring 2006.
14. Interview, NGO officials, Beirut, July 2008.
15. Interview, NGO officials, Sanaa, January 2006.
16. Interview, opposition newspaper editor, Sanaa, March 2006.
17. Interview, opposition-aligned independent, Sanaa, May 2006.
18. Interview, opposition party leader, Sanaa, September 2005.
19. Interviews, opposition newspaper editor, Sanaa, March 2006.
20. Deputy interviews, January 23, 2018, and January 30, 2018.
21. We define district-level references as those pertaining to the province/prefecture (the administrative unit most closely related to legislative districts) and subdistrict as those addressing communal (municipal) issues.
22. For full multivariate regression results, see York 2020.
23. Because Morocco uses a closed-list proportional representation electoral system, and incumbents are dependent on their party to renominate them, this is the most comprehensive level at which to test this prediction. Results are consistent when using deputy level outcomes (i.e., an incumbent winning the subsequent election, conditional on party nomination).

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PART III

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR BEYOND VOTING

CHAPTER 16

RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN TURKEY DURING THE AKP ERA

S. ERDEM AYTAÇ

Political attitudes and values held by ordinary citizens play an important role in the emergence and stability of democratic regimes (Inglehart 2000). Mainwaring (1999, 39), for instance, highlights that the resilience of Latin American democracies in the late twentieth century can be partly attributed to changes in political attitudes of masses "towards greater valorization of democracy." Interpersonal and institutional trust, appreciation of diversity, and ideological moderation are among the attitudes thought to foster and reinforce democratic governance (Inglehart 2000; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998).

One of the explanations to account for Muslim-majority countries being democratic under-performers focuses on such attitudes in these societies, and especially among devout Muslims. In recent cross-national surveys, Muslim-majority countries tend to occupy the lowest ranks with respect to average levels of interpersonal trust, perceived legitimacy of secular officials, and support for freedom of speech and gender equality (Inglehart et al. 2014; Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Alkalay 2010). In turn, a voluminous literature reports a positive relationship between factors associated with modernization (e.g., rising levels of education, income, urbanization) and holding pro-democratic attitudes in these countries (e.g., Çiftçi 2010, 2012; Jamal 2006; Tessler 2002). These findings suggest that lower levels of socioeconomic development might be the primary culprit for the relative dearth of pro-democratic attitudes in Muslim-majority societies.

Beyond the role of socioeconomic development in the shaping of pro-democratic attitudes, we should also note that in many Muslim-majority countries there have been severe restrictions on Islamic organizations and communities (e.g., brotherhoods, orders, etc.), as well as on public expressions of religiosity. Examples include crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan and the severe restrictions around the wearing of headscarves by women in Turkey and Tunisia in the past until recently.

And since in many of these countries there have been regular elections and party competition—that is, at least a semblance of democracy—devout Muslims' political attitudes and views on democracy might have been at least partly shaped by the regimes' distance and even outright hostility toward religiosity. Would there be a change in these attitudes when the political regime adopts a more favorable stance toward religion? For instance, would we observe devout Muslims adopting political attitudes more conducive to liberal democracy, such as ideological moderation or higher levels of interpersonal trust, if they become more satisfied with the political system?

In this chapter I focus on this question of how policies and approaches toward religion in public life affect political attitudes among Muslims by leveraging the change in the Turkish state's policies during the incumbency of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) from 2002 to 2018. Turkey is an opportune case for this task, because when the Islamist AKP came to power in 2002, debates around the role of religion in public life and politics had peaked, and there were several restrictions in place regarding the role and visibility of Islam in Turkish society. The AKP gradually lifted these restrictions, especially after its conservative turn starting around 2011 (Özbudun 2014). Islamic religiosity has become a major defining factor, not only in public life, but also in education policies and state bureaucracy, while individuals and organizations with a secular outlook increasingly face discrimination and exclusion. In the face of these developments, can one observe a change in the political attitudes of devout Muslims?

Drawing on original, nationally representative surveys fielded during the period from 2002 to 2018, we are indeed able to diagnose a sense of relief among devout Muslims in Turkey. In particular, they are much less concerned about restrictions on religious freedoms, and increasingly think that they are treated fairly by the political system. In turn, the proportion of devout Muslims favoring the establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state in Turkey dropped substantially during this period, and devout Muslims are more satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey than are less devout individuals.

There is no evidence that these changes have been accompanied by a more pluralistic understanding of democracy, however. We observe no improvement in interpersonal and institutional trust among devout individuals from 2002 to 2018, and they also have not moved toward an ideologically more centrist position. Instead, we observe that devout individuals in Turkey hold more populist attitudes than others; in particular, they are more likely to display a majoritarian view of democracy where the importance of checks on the executive are downplayed. This affinity of devout individuals for populist principles is in line with the political platform of the incumbent AKP.

In the following I first present an overview of modern Turkish politics to highlight the role of religion. This discussion also outlines how religion has become a point of contention, especially in the period immediately preceding the AKP rule, and touches upon the developments during the AKP period with respect to the public role and visibility of Islam. The analyses of religiosity and political attitudes in the AKP era follow this discussion.

Religion in Modern Turkish Politics

In a seminal article, Şerif Mardin (1973) presented a framework to understand the major contours of modern Turkish politics. Mardin argued that a sociocultural cleavage pitting the ruling elites of the "center" against a culturally heterogeneous "periphery" had been inherited by the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman polity the center was constituted by the imperial house and its ruling apparatus in the society, and the periphery consisted of various traditionalist ethnic and religious "primordial groups" that were kept out of power (174). This cleavage was first and foremost a cultural one; while the center dominated the religious establishment, justice, and education, its claim to legitimacy was bolstered by its self-ascribed cultural preeminence.

From the nineteenth century, religiosity came to be increasingly identified with the periphery, as positivism and secularism were the cornerstones of Turkish modernization (Göle 1997). Steps taken to modernize the military and administration have led to the adoption of some form of Western culture, which further alienated peripheral masses from the rulers and agents of the center. In this process, "a clinging to Islam, to its cultural patrimony, was the province's response to the center's inability to integrate it into the new cultural framework," and religiosity became a characteristic marker of the periphery (Mardin 1973, 179). Atatürk's reforms that spanned two decades following the foundation of the Republic in 1923 constituted the zenith of the Turkish modernization.[1] As Sunar and Toprak (1983) highlight, Islam had served as a connecting function between the Ottoman center and periphery, and this link was severely weakened as a result of these secular reforms, which corresponded to a revolution in cultural values (Mardin 1971). Thus, the center-periphery cleavage primarily took the form of a "cultural bifurcation that crystallized around the secular progressivism of the state and the ascriptive, religious traditionalism of local communities" (Sunar and Toprak 1983, 426).

Kalaycıoğlu (1994, 403) characterizes the center during the Republican period as the "estate of a coherent body of nationalist, centralist, laicist elite which holds the view that it represents and protects the state." The quasi-autonomous bureaucracy, especially that of the judiciary and military, the large, state-dependent businesses, and the mainstream intellectual community have been integral parts of the center. In terms of societal bases of support, the center has traditionally relied on groups with an urban presence, higher levels of education, lower levels of religiosity, and lower concentration of ethnic minorities (Çarkoğlu 2012), and the political arm of centrist constituencies was the founding party of the Republic, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP).

It was not until the introduction of multiparty elections in 1946 that the peripheral masses found an opportunity to participate in the political arena. The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) was founded after an elite split within the CHP and emerged as the representative of the periphery. Mardin (1973, 185) highlights that the DP appealed to Islam as the culture of the periphery by promising a liberalization of religious practices and "relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values." The DP won the first free and fair elections in 1950, and the CHP remained in the opposition throughout the 1950s.

The parties of the periphery, following the DP tradition, have since dominated centrist parties in elections, despite several interventions by the military, which saw itself as the guardian of the regime (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1997). These electoral successes have had little impact on the dominant status and value system of the center, however (Kalaycıoğlu 1994). The Constitution of 1961, drafted in the aftermath of the coup against the DP in 1960, built a regime with strong counter-majoritarian institutions that were able to insulate themselves from the influence of elected governments through their autonomous recruitment and promotion practices. Therefore, the elites of the center retained political power even though the society's religious and conservative majority threw support behind the parties of the periphery at the ballot box.

A number of developments in the 1980s and 1990s brought about the rise of political Islam in Turkish politics. The military junta (1980–1983), following the 1980 coup, harshly suppressed leftist movements and organizations, and a combination of religiosity (Sunni Islam) and Turkish nationalism was promoted with the hope of undermining left-wing politics against the perceived threat of communism (Akan 2012; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009). This period coincided with the significant migration of rural masses to big cities, and the formal mechanisms of the state were simply unable to cope with the accompanying socioeconomic pressures. In the absence of leftist organizations, which had a strong presence among the urban poor in the 1970s, Islamist networks and parties became the dominant actors in shantytowns of big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, inevitably carrying their conservative ideology with them (Eligür 2010). Around the same time, Islamist intellectuals became more assertive in the public domain through a number of Islamist periodicals and newspapers, and public expressions of religiosity (e.g., veiled women becoming visible on university campuses, discouragement of alcohol consumption in public) became more frequent (Göle 1997).

The "centrist" establishment took two additional blows in the 1990s. First, the intensity of the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish separatist organization PKK that started in 1984 reached its peak in the first half of 1990s. The clashes had very negative effects on the daily lives of Kurdish citizens living in the southeastern part of the country. In this context, many Kurds, already more conservative than the average Turkish citizen, were attracted to political Islam that emphasized the *umma* instead of nationalism and was critical of the Republican institutions (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009). Second, the fragmented center-right and center-left parties of the day proved to be incompetent to cope with the economic challenges, leading to a period of unstable coalition governments and successive economic crises (Öniş 1997).

A consequence of these developments has been a sharp ideological turn toward the right in the Turkish electorate, and the accompanying rise of political Islam. While in 1990 about 23 percent of Turkish voters were on the right of the ideological spectrum, just six years later, in 1996, this proportion increased to 39 percent (Çarkoğlu and Kalycıoğlu 2009).[2] And in the electoral scene, the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) first won the metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara in 1994, and then emerged as the leading party in the general election of 1995, obtaining 21 percent of the votes. In 1996 the leader of the RP, Necmettin Erbakan, became the prime minister in a coalition government.

This success of political Islam raised alarm bells among the centrist establishment, especially the military. After some controversial moves by Erbakan and RP executives that exacerbated the tension, the military declared political Islam as the primary threat to the Republic in a National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997, and demanded action by the government through a directive that they themselves prepared. The eighteen-point demands, reluctantly approved by Erbakan, included the extension of compulsory primary education from five to eight years, which would effectively close the religious Imam Hatip middle schools, transfer of private dorms and schools affiliated with Islamic brotherhoods to the Ministry of Education, strict implementation of laws related to clothing in universities and public offices, and precautions about Islamist "infiltration" of state institutions. While only one of the directive's demands was actually implemented (extension of primary education, see Eligür 2010), this intervention of the military was followed by the mobilization of the secular sectors of society, leading to the toppling of the RP-led coalition government and closure of the RP by the Constitutional Court in 1998. The broader result of this process was a narrower space for public expressions of religiosity and a retrenchment of Islamist organizations.

Thus, the second half of the 1990s has been a period of showdown between conservative, peripheral actors and the secular establishment. In the political scene, the RP was replaced by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), which was subsequently closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001. A split within the Islamist movement had been visible within the FP, and upon its closure the younger generation of Islamists, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, formed the AKP (Hale and Özbudun 2010). The coalition governments formed after the toppling of the RP proved to be short-lived, and in the aftermath of two consecutive economic crises, in 1999 and 2001, and a devastating earthquake in 1999, early elections were held in 2002. The AKP won the election with 34 percent of the votes and an unprecedented almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats (due to several parties getting votes just below the national threshold of 10 percent), allowing it to form a single-party government.

THE POST-2002 AKP ERA

The AKP pursued a different strategy than its predecessors by downplaying elements of Islamist demands and mobilization in its rhetoric and policies until the end of its second term in government in 2011 (Altınordu 2016). Instead, the party leadership defined themselves as "conservative democrats" and emphasized a politics of economic competence and democratizing reforms, with the prospect of membership in the European Union (Öniş 2015).

Starting around 2010–2011, the AKP moved ahead with a discourse and policies aimed at expanding the public role and visibility of Islam in Turkish society. By this time the AKP had successfully subdued the elites of the center, especially the military and judiciary, through a series of controversial trials involving hundreds of senior active and retired military officers, along with constitutional amendments that curbed the power of secularist groups within the high judiciary. As a result, the era of "military tutelage" in Turkish politics was effectively over, and the AKP ruled in a setting marked by severely weakened horizontal accountability (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016).

The growing conservative trend in AKP's policies manifested itself mostly in the area of education. The middle sections of the religious Imam Hatip schools that were closed in 1997 reopened in 2012, and many secular high schools were converted to religious ones. By 2018 the total number of students in these religious schools had risen fivefold since 2012, and although Imam Hatip schools made up about 11 percent of the total middle and high school population, they received close to a quarter of the budget (Butler 2018). At the same time, restrictions on the placement of Imam Hatip graduates to universities were also lifted. The conservative turn of the AKP has taken its toll in nominally secular public schools as well. Compulsory religious teaching in these schools was doubled to two hours per week, and extra optional religious courses were introduced. While these new courses were optional on paper, in many schools they were effectively the only available optional courses. References to Islam have steadily increased in the curriculum, and religious groups outside the education system are now allowed to conduct special seminars in schools (Gall 2018; Kingsley 2017).

The AKP also engaged in several policy changes with an eye toward pleasing devout Muslims beyond the realm of education. The restrictions around the religious headscarf were lifted in this period, which was one of the primary sources of resentment among the conservative majority of Turkish population (Çarkoğlu 2010). New restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages were introduced, and their advertisement or promotion of any kind were prohibited, together with substantial increases in taxation. These policies have effectively removed alcohol from public spaces and confined its consumption to mostly private settings. Changes were made to the Turkish civil code in 2017 allowing muftis, religious civil servants, to perform marriages in the same capacity as municipal officials.

While these developments raised concerns among the more secular-oriented segments of society, anecdotal accounts suggest that they brought a sense of relief to conservatives. The changes in the education system expanded the opportunities for parents who want their children to get religious education in a conservative setting without any limitations upon graduation (Lüküslü 2016). A majority of Turkish adult women are estimated to wear some kind of a headscarf (Çarkoğlu 2009); the lifting of restrictions in this area paved the way for them to attend universities and join the bureaucracy without making a change in their appearance. An interviewee for a Reuters report on Imam Hatip schools said, "Muslims have now reached a point where they can breathe more easily in their own country . . . in the last 15 years this government has shown respect to Muslims" (Butler 2018). In the following section we look at this sentiment and its consequences on political attitudes more systematically.

Religiosity and Political Attitudes in the AKP Era

In this section I track the relationship between religiosity and several political attitudes during the AKP era in Turkey. My data come from the Turkish Election Study surveys conducted around the general elections of 2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015, and 2018. These face-to-face surveys are all nationally representative, employing a similar probability sampling procedure, with sample sizes ranging from 1,642 to 2,156.[3] Not every political attitude question we analyze was asked in every survey, but whenever they were asked, the question and answer formats were identical. This comparability of the measures allows me to document the aggregate changes in attitudes over time, and the representativeness of the samples makes it possible to generalize the results to the adult population of Turkey.

To analyze whether and how political attitudes vary across individuals with different levels of religiosity, I separate respondents in the samples into three levels of religiosity that I label as *non-devout*, *devout*, and *very devout*. A standard question in all surveys asked respondents how religious they saw themselves on a 0–10 scale, where zero corresponds to "not religious at all" and ten to "very religious," irrespective of their frequency of prayer. The distributions of answers are heavily skewed toward higher values, with mean levels ranging from 6.9 in 2002 to 7.4 in 2018. I categorize respondents into the three religiosity levels such that those who gave answers between zero and six are labeled as non-devout, those with answers of seven or eight are labeled as devout, and those with answers of nine or ten are considered as very devout individuals. These values are selected such that each category roughly contains about a third of respondents over the entire period of analysis.

While this measure corresponds to the belief dimension of religiosity (Wald and Smidt 1993), it also closely reflects its behavioral dimension. In the surveys, respondents were asked how frequently they prayed (*namaz*) in the past year, with the answer option "more than once a week" being the highest indicator of religious practice. Averaging across all the surveys, only about 26 percent of subjectively defined non-devout individuals reported praying more than once a week. This figure increased to 55 percent for devout individuals and to 76 percent for very devout individuals. Thus, there is a close match between the subjective religiosity measure and reported religious practice. In the analyses I prefer to use the subjective measure, because it lends itself to a more equal distribution of individuals into three categories. The substantive results of the analyses are identical if we use the practice measure.

Figure 16.1 presents the distribution of non-devout, devout, and very devout individuals across the surveys. We observe a decrease over time in the proportion of non-devout respondents, from 44 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2018, while the proportions of devout and very devout respondents increase from 32 percent to 42 percent and from 24 percent to 30 percent, respectively, during the same period. These results point to an increase in subjective religiosity during the AKP era. On average, more devout individuals are more likely to be female, older, reside in rural areas, and have lower levels of education and income.

We begin our analyses of political attitudes by focusing on respondents' views on restrictions that devout Muslims face in Turkey with respect to their religiosity. Two related questions in this regard probe respondents about whether Muslims in Turkey are able to worship freely, and whether devout (Muslim) people face oppression. The percentages of respondents answering these questions affirmatively are presented in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 16.2, respectively. We see that across all the subgroups considered there were significant improvements from 2002 to 2018 with respect to perceptions of devout Muslim's conditions in Turkey. The change in perceptions among very devout individuals is especially stark: in 2002 about half of very devout individuals (56 percent) thought that Muslims in Turkey were able to worship freely, but this figure reached 96 percent in 2018. Similarly, in 2002 close to half of very devout individuals (47 percent) held the view that devout people in Turkey faced oppression, whereas in 2018 only 5 percent of them thought this way. It is remarkable that at the beginning of AKP's tenure a considerable segment of even non-devout individuals acknowledged the hardships devout Muslims faced, and over time we observe a convergence of views toward a more positive environment in this regard across individuals with different levels of religiosity.



FIGURE 16.1: Distribution of non-devout, devout, and very devout respondents in the surveys.



FIGURE 16.2: Views on restrictions faced by devout Muslims in Turkey.



FIGURE 16.3: *Are citizens like you treated fairly in our current political system?* "Yes" respondents.

These results suggest that devout Muslims in Turkey consider the tenure of AKP government as a period of "decompression of Islam," similar to the characterization of the 1950s by Sunar and Toprak (1983). This is also reflected in how they view the political system. Since 2007 our surveys asked respondents whether citizens like them are treated fairly in the current political system. In 2007 about 52 percent of very devout individuals responded positively to this question, and this figure steadily increased over time to 63 percent in 2018 (Figure 16.3). While non-devout individuals consistently had a more negative view of the fairness of the political system, the percentage of individuals in this group who think they are treated fairly decreased slightly over this period. Thus, the gap in positive responses between non-devout and devout respondents has widened. As of 2018 there is a clear, positive relationship between perceptions of the fairness of the political system and higher levels of religiosity.

As devout Muslims increasingly consider the political system in Turkey to be fair toward them, have their views about a shariʿa-based state changed? Figure 16.4 presents the percentage of respondents from 2002 to 2018 that favor the establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state in Turkey. We see a precipitous decline in the proportion of very devout respondents that support a shariʿa-based state in Turkey, from about 27 percent in 2002 to 14 percent in 2018. A similar decline, though less dramatic, can be observed among other groups as well: from 15 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2018 among devout respondents, and from 12 percent to 7 percent among non-devout ones. It would be wiser to focus on the trend of these figures than on their absolute values, since the word *shariʿa* has a rather ambiguous meaning for the Turkish electorate. Çarkoğlu (2004) presents evidence that when people are asked to choose between the present secular civil code regulations (about marriage, divorce, inheritance) and arrangements in accordance with Islamic law, support for Islamic law arrangements is much lower than the support for shariʿa. He concludes that a certain proportion of the electorate seems unable to voice objection to a shariʿa-based rule when asked in a generic manner or establish its implications to daily life.



FIGURE 16.4: *Would you favor establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state in Turkey?* "Yes" respondents.

The decrease in preference for the establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state among devout individuals has been accompanied by greater levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Turkey. A question in our surveys first included in 2007 asked respondents to indicate how satisfied they were with the way democracy works in Turkey on a 0–10 scale, with higher values indicating more satisfaction. In Figure 16.5 we see that the average level of satisfaction among non-devout respondents has not changed over the eleven-year period, and consistently remained lower than among more devout individuals. In contrast, we do observe an increase in satisfaction among very devout respondents that is driven by increased levels of satisfaction from 2015 to 2018. The mean level of satisfaction with democracy among very devout respondents is 5.0 in 2007, 4.9 in 2015, and 6.1 in 2018. The period from 2015 to 2018 corresponds to an increasing centralization of power by Erdoğan, embodied by the transition to a presidential system of government and a sharp conservative turn of the AKP.

The changes in political attitudes among devout Muslims in Turkey from 2002 to 2018 can be summarized as follows. Compared to 2002, devout individuals as of 2018 are much less concerned about restrictions on religious freedoms, and only a small minority of them think that they face oppression. During this period, devout individuals' perceptions of being treated fairly by the political system have gradually improved, and there is a positive association between these perceptions and levels of religiosity. A similar positive relationship exists between satisfaction with democracy in Turkey and religiosity: very devout individuals declare more satisfaction than devout or non-devout individuals. In turn, only about one in seven very devout individuals favor the establishment of a shariʿa-based religious state in Turkey as of 2018, compared to about one in four in 2002.

Have these changes in political attitudes been accompanied by a more pluralistic understanding of democracy? There are a couple of ways of approaching this important



FIGURE 16.5: *How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Turkey?* 0 corresponds to "not satisfied at all" and 10 to "very satisfied." Mean evaluation scores.

question. First, we can look at patterns of interpersonal and institutional trust (Figure 16.6). We see that there has been a slight improvement from 2002 to 2018 in levels of interpersonal trust across all categories of religiosity. During this period, the percentage of individuals who agree that most people can be trusted increased from 8 percent to 10 percent among non-devout individuals and from 9 percent to 11 percent among very devout individuals (panel a). These changes are quite small, and devout individuals do not differentiate themselves from others, however—they just follow the general trend. In panel (b) we consider trust in parliament, and again there is little change from 2002 to 2018. Together, these results suggest that there has not been a substantial improvement in levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in Turkey from 2002 to 2018.

Another way to explore whether there are signs that the increased satisfaction of devout individuals led them to adopt a more pluralistic view of democracy is to see whether they hold more ideologically moderate positions now compared to the past. Figure 16.7 presents the mean score of respondents over time on the left-right ideological scale (0 indicating extreme left, and 10 extreme right). Devout and very devout individuals consistently positioned themselves more to the right than non-devout individuals, and there has been little change in the mean positions over time. Therefore, we do not have an indication that devout individuals have shown ideological moderation during the AKP government.

In fact, there is evidence that, as of 2017, religiosity is positively associated with having more populist attitudes, and thus a majoritarian understanding of democracy. A nationally representative survey ($N = 1{,}954$) fielded in 2017 presented respondents with a list of populist statements to measure the prevalence and correlates of populist attitudes among Turkish voters.[4] The statements tapped into different dimensions of populism: a Manichean view of politics as moral struggle, anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular sovereignty (Box 16.1). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements on a five-point scale, with options ranging from "I do



FIGURE 16.6: Interpersonal and institutional trust in Turkey.

Box 16.1: Statements to Measure Populist Attitudes in Turkey

Manichean outlook

Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.

What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out one's principles.

I would stop talking to a friend who had unacceptable political opinions.

Anti-elitism

Most politicians do not care about the people.

The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.

The differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.

People-centrism

The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.

Referendums are the ultimate measure of the will of the people.

Politicians in the parliament need to follow the will of the people.

Popular sovereignty

Political leaders do not need to be checked by institutions since people make their decision in elections.

Having a strong leader in government is good for Turkey even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.

Most of the time parliaments do nothing but preventing the governments to do their jobs.



FIGURE 16.7: Self-positioning on the left-right ideological position. Mean scores on a 0–10 scale where higher values indicate more right positions.



FIGURE 16.8: Support for populism and for its different dimensions across levels of religiosity.

not agree at all" (coded −2) to "I agree completely" (coded 2), the middle position being "neither agree nor disagree" (coded 0). As agreement with the statements indicates support for populist attitudes, I created an index that takes the mean value of the answers given to these statements by a respondent; therefore, the resulting index has a range from −2 (the most anti-populist position) to 2 (the most populist position). The mean score in the sample is 0.36.

Figure 16.8 presents the mean scores of the index of populist attitudes (overall populism) and of the four different dimensions of populism for non-devout, devout, and very devout respondents in the sample. We observe a positive correlation between religiosity and populist attitudes—both the overall populism and different dimension scores are higher for more devout individuals. While support for people-centrism and anti-elitism statements are especially high across all levels of religiosity, the difference between devout and non-devout individuals is especially stark with respect to the popular sovereignty dimension of populism. The mean scores for this dimension of populism stand at −0.1, 0.27, and 0.34 for non-devout, devout, and very devout individuals, respectively. The second-largest difference in support for populist principles between devout and non-devout individuals is on the people-centrism dimension.

The popular sovereignty and people-centrism dimensions of populism emphasize the centrality of people's will in politics (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). In this view, politicians should simply respond to people's demands rather than leading them, which can be best elucidated through elections and referenda. Institutions of horizontal accountability, such as the judiciary or a strong legislature, are frowned upon by populists, since they can serve as impediments to the exercise of people's will by the executive. Our data reveals that devout Turkish individuals are closer to such a view of democracy than non-devout ones. For example, about 39 percent of non-devout respondents in our sample agree with the statement that "Having a strong leader in government is good for Turkey even if the leader bends the rules to get things done;" and this figure increases to about 50 percent among devout and very devout respondents. Similarly, while about 31 percent of non-devout respondents agree that "Most of the time parliaments do nothing but preventing the governments to do their jobs," about 43 percent of devout and very devout respondents agree with it.

These results suggest that support for populist attitudes are more prevalent among devout Turkish voters. Rather than adopting a more pluralistic view of democracy as a result of perceptions of increased religious freedoms and satisfaction with the political regime, devout individuals are more likely to display a majoritarian understanding of democratic governance. Of course, this result cannot be separated from the fact that devout individuals are more likely to support the Islamist AKP, which has been in power since 2002. This is a party that caters to the interests of devout individuals with a heavily populist platform (Aytaç and Öniş 2014), and it seems that devout individuals have opted to give the executive a blank check to rule, only to be constrained by electoral performance, in line with the "delegative democracy" characterization of O'Donnell (1994).

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I examined the relationship between religiosity and political attitudes in a Muslim-majority country during a period when the state's approach and policies toward religion in public life have fundamentally changed. The AKP in Turkey came to power in 2002 when there were several restrictions on the public role of Islam, and it not only gradually lifted these restrictions over time, but also put Islamic religiosity at the center of state bureaucracy and policies. I asked if one can observe any accompanying changes in the political attitudes of devout Muslims in response to this more favorable outlook of the state toward religion, and if yes, in which direction.

The analysis of a series of nationally representative surveys fielded over a period of sixteen years (2002 to 2018) during which the AKP has been in power reveals two sets of findings. First, the AKP governments' positive approach toward Islamic religiosity in public life seems to have led to a rapprochement of devout Muslims with the political regime. Devout Muslims no longer think that they face oppression or limitations on worship. They also display higher levels of perception of fair treatment by the regime and satisfaction with the way democracy works compared to less devout individuals. The second set of findings, however, points to a lack of ideological moderation or meaningful change in the levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among devout

Muslims. Rather than a more pluralistic understanding of democracy that might be expected to develop due to the rapprochement with the political regime, we observe that devout Muslims display higher levels of populist attitudes than their less devout compatriots. These populist attitudes emphasize a majoritarian understanding of democracy by prioritizing vertical accountability through elections and referenda at the expense of institutions of horizontal accountability.

This picture is compatible with the theories of elite-driven public opinion (e.g., Zaller 1992). As the ruling AKP elites employ a political discourse with frequent populist messages, those individuals with affinity to the party and who are satisfied with its policies, like devout Muslims, are more likely to embrace these messages. The favorable policies and approaches of the government toward religion in public life seem to have little effect on political attitudes of devout Muslims, other than making them more comfortable with the political regime. This is a rather disappointing finding, as it suggests that a sizable portion of the Turkish electorate do not feel disturbed by the populist rule that deliberately weakens institutions of horizontal accountability. This dynamic has likely played a role in the recent democratic backsliding of the country and its descent into a competitive authoritarian regime.

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NOTES

1. See Eligür (2010) and Sunar and Toprak (1983) for an overview of these reforms.
2. Turkish voters' self-placement on the ideological left-right scale has little economic basis and is strongly influenced by religiosity and attitudes like preference for the maintenance of the status quo (Çarkoğlu 2007).
3. The sampling procedure for the surveys starts with the use of Turkish Statistical Institute's (TUIK) NUTS-2 regions. The target samples were distributed according to each region's share of urban and rural population in accordance with records of the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS). Next, TUIK randomly selected blocks of four hundred addresses from each of the NUTS-2 regions according to probability-proportionate-to-size (PPS) principle, and twenty addresses were again randomly selected in each block. Selection of individuals in households is done on the basis of reported target population of eighteen years or older in each household according to a lottery method. If for any reason that individual could not respond to our questions in our first visit, then the same household is visited up to three times until a successful interview is conducted and no substitution was applied.
4. See Aytaç and Elçi (2019) for details of the survey and associated research.

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CHAPTER 17

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG SHIʿITES IN IRAN AND IRAQ

FOTINI CHRISTIA, ELIZABETH DEKEYSER, AND DEAN KNOX

ACROSS Muslim societies, the past decades have seen a resurgence in support for religion in politics (Grzymala-Busse 2012). Much work has shown that this support is often driven by the social or welfare services that religious political movements provide (Lia 1998; Amuzegar 2007; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Pepinsky et. al 2012; Cammett and Jones 2014, among others). However, much less is known about whether and how religious practice itself—either communal or individual—shapes support for religion in politics.

We examine this question among religious Shiʿa in both Iran and Iraq, two countries that differ significantly in the place of religion within their political system. In both contexts, the religious individuals surveyed represent important social groups that provide a base of support in Iran and hold significant sway within Iraq (K. Harris 2017; Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020). The data for this study is based on a geographically representative original survey of Shiʿa pilgrims traveling to Karbala, Iraq, during Arbaʿeen in 2015. This event, the world's largest annual pilgrimage, draws a demographically diverse group of religious Shiʿa from across the Muslim world, providing a unique opportunity to survey an important but understudied group. While Shiʿa make up roughly 20 percent of the world's Muslims,[1] surveys of the Middle East and North Africa have been unable to properly cover Iran due to regime restrictions and have had more limited access in Iraq because of the post-2003 conflict. The survey covered a wide range of topics; more details are provided in a separate descriptive report of the survey (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2019).

The impact of religion is often considered in terms of three constituent parts—identity, belief, and practice. In this work, we focus on how the latter dimension relates to attitudes about religion in politics in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts, given that Muslim religious identity remains largely fixed in the two populations, and the intensity of belief is difficult to both quantify and measure. Religious practice, however, can be further subdivided into two dimensions, *individual* and *communal* practice. These two dimensions would be expected to have different relationships to attitudes about religion in politics. Individual practice might influence attitudes about religion in politics if there exists *religious legitimacy*, or the existence of doctrinal or ideological support for the concept. Communal practice, on the other hand, could also shape beliefs through *religious socialization*, or the non-ideological transmission of norms through the organizational or social aspects of religious practice (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2019). The concept of religious socialization builds upon a rich literature, both from the American (F. Harris 1994; M. Harris 1998; Putnam 2000; Wald, Silverman, and Fridy 2005) and Middle Eastern (Jamal 2005; Loveland et al. 2005) contexts about the link between religious practice and political outcomes. Work on religious legitimation, however, has remained much more limited. These two mechanisms can occur simultaneously and potentially work in opposite directions; similarly, religious mechanisms operate simultaneously with other nonreligious sources of support for religious involvement in politics.

In addition to (1) an abstract belief about the proper role of religious principles and leaders in governance, we also examine a number of additional outcome variables that capture the very different implications of this belief in the Iranian and the Iraqi contexts. In Iran, the regime claims to be a theocracy—the ultimate embodiment of religion in politics—meaning that support for religious involvement in politics relates directly to (2) perceptions of regime legitimacy and (3) lower support for democracy, often viewed as contrasting with the current regime. Our results have important implications for understanding regime support and regime longevity in Iran. Even work that addresses the non-ideological sources of support for the regime highlights how "Shi'a political Islam . . . at least creates tacit acceptance of the state as legitimately acting in the population's interests" (K. Harris 2017, 26). This work also posits that this link is particularly strong among certain social groups, including the religious Iranians that we survey, who have been central to the regime's longevity. Yet whether there is in fact a link between religiosity and state support has remained unclear; here, we show that not only do individuals who engage in individual religious practice support the regime more, but that communal practice reinforces beliefs about religion in politics that further reinforces this tendency.

In Iraq, however, the link between the state and religion remains much more tenuous. Successive governments have attempted to use religious rhetoric to legitimate themselves, with limited success. Crucially, however, Iraq claims only to be an "Islamic, democratic, federal parliamentary republic," not a theocracy. Therefore, in addition to abstract beliefs about religion in politics, we examine (3) respondents' support for democracy and (4) sectarian political outlook. Understanding how religious individuals perceive Iraq's current government, as well as the broader democratic system, provides insight into the motivations for shifting bases of support in Iraq.

To measure these concepts, we use an innovative Bayesian principal component framework to aggregate batteries of questions relating to each topic. The resulting measures are used in Bayesian linear regressions in a way that captures the uncertainty from dimension reduction, missingness, and the regression itself. Overall, we find that both individual and communal religious practice are associated with greater support for religion in politics, but these aspects of religion play markedly different roles in each country. In Iraq, communal religious practice is strongly linked to abstract beliefs about religion's role in politics, and it shapes opposition to democracy as a system of government both directly and through the channel of these abstract beliefs. In Iran, communal practice is similarly linked to views on religion in politics, though to a lesser extent, and its influence on regime support is most evident through this channel. Taken together, these results on the influence of communal religious practice provide support for the socializing and organizing power of religion to garner support for the state, concurring with other work on the relationship between religious practice and political outcomes.

Yet the role of religious practice is more complex than mere socialization. In Iran, we find that individual religious practice matters much more, both for abstract beliefs and perceptions of the regime—evidence, we argue, that Iran has succeeded in religiously legitimating itself among this sector of society and in creating an ideological link between religious devotion and the regime in this national context. In contrast, the relationship between individual practice and views on religion in politics is three times weaker in Iraq, and we find no overall connection between individual practice and either support for democracy or sectarian political outlooks. These differences highlight how religious legitimation has encouraged regime longevity in Iran, while its absence allows for the continued instability of the Iraqi state.

This work presents four important findings. First, by exploring the beliefs of Shiʿites, rather than Sunnis, it helps move research on religion and politics in the Middle East beyond majority narratives, dominated largely by Sunni populations, and explore how these relationships vary within Shiʿite populations. The findings, however, do provide insight into the potential broader variation across the Middle East in the relationship between religious practice and political beliefs. Second, different types of religious practice not only have different effects on political attitudes depending on context, but they can also reinforce one another. Third, these effects are highly context-dependent, particularly on the relationship between the regime and Islam. Fourth, the fact that communal practice has an effect on political attitudes among Iraqi Shiʿites but individual practice does not highlights how the various dimensions of religiosity can influence attitudes in different and surprising ways.

Below, we briefly discuss our data collection and the measurement of individual and communal practice, as well as outcomes. We then turn to detailed analyses, examining each outcome in turn and, for concrete questions like regime legitimacy, estimate the extent to which religion works indirectly through the channel of abstract political views as opposed to directly shaping beliefs.

THE SURVEY

The primary data source used in this paper is based on an original survey conducted during the Arbaʿeen pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq. This event, the world's largest annual pilgrimage, attracted a reported 22 million Shiʿa pilgrims during that year, with Iranians and Iraqis representing the largest groups. Arbaʿeen is a collective mourning ritual involving a pilgrimage on foot to the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala. Walking is what distinguishes this particular visit, with pilgrims setting out days or weeks ahead of time, depending on their distance from Karbala, in order to walk to Imam Hussein's shrine for the celebrations. The walk involves groups walking from places as far as Basra (roughly 500 km away) and Baghdad (roughly 120 km away). In the more heavily frequented portions of the route, roadsides are dotted with clusters of service tents, known as *mawakib*, which offer food and shelter to pilgrims. Travelers stop for long periods of time, not only to dine or drink water and tea, but also to recharge cell phones, repair shoes, or even get weary feet and legs massaged by local volunteers. *Mawakib* tend to have a specific regional identity, hosting people from different governorates and provinces in Iraq and Iran, with separate tents for men and women. Because of their regional nature, these tents allowed us to target survey respondents by their region of origin.

We surveyed respondents from November 17 to December 12, 2015, a twenty-five-day window broadly associated with the 2015 Arbaʿeen celebrations. Our goal was not to survey a representative sample of pilgrims, but rather to develop a geographically representative sample that would allow us to understand how pilgrims from across Iraq and Iran perceive a wide variety of issues, and how this differed across the two country contexts. To define geographic targets for Shiʿa in Iran, we utilized the 2011 population census, which provides an accurate proxy given that the country is approximately 98 percent Shiʿa. Iraq, however, provides a greater challenge. Not only was its last census in 1997, after which there was significant population displacement, but information on sect has also remained largely restricted. In the absence of this data, we attempted to sample pilgrims according to the distribution of Shiʿa politicians in the Iraqi parliament, known as the Council of Representatives (COR).[2] We identified the sect of the parliamentarians holding these seats, and used the Shiʿa seats as a metric for the Shiʿa proportion of the population in that area. The nature of the event also allowed us to survey roughly equal numbers of male and female respondents, a rare opportunity in a region where women traditionally are excluded from the public sphere. For both genders, respondents were chosen among pilgrims between eighteen and sixty years old, with roughly half below the age of thirty-five. In total, we surveyed 2,410 Iraqis and 1,668 Iranians.

This geographically representative sample of religious individuals from the two countries provides a central insight into a vital but vastly understudied population. In Iran, recent work has highlighted the importance of this particular social group to the endurance of the revolutionary system (K. Harris 2017). In Iraq, religious Shiʿites have provided an important constituency in the ebbs and flows of political power in the post-invasion period (Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020).

THE SAMPLE

The Iranians and Iraqis surveyed represented a demographically, socioeconomically, and ideologically diverse sample. Comparison to the full national population is challenging in both contexts, particularly for Iraq, given the limited availability of representative data. Triangulating with alternate data sources, however, allows us to situate our sample within the range of other surveys conducted in these contexts.

The Iranians surveyed followed the census age distribution closely; were slightly wealthier and more likely to own a car; and were more likely to have a high school education, but less likely to have a college education. Despite these averages, however, the survey includes a wide range of individuals from across the educational and economic spectrum that mirrors the diversity in Iran more broadly.

While data limitations in Iraq do not allow a comparison to the census, we compared the population to two large-scale and geographically diverse surveys in the country, the Arab Barometer and the World Bank's Living Standards surveys. A weakness of both, however, is that they do not distinguish Sunni respondents from the Shiʿa group that we examine here. Our population is poorer and less educated than the Arab Barometer sample, and wealthier and more educated than the World Bank sample, indicating that our sample lies within the general range of well-designed survey pools. More comparisons and general descriptives can be found in the survey report (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2016), *To Karbala: Surveying Religious Shiʿa from Iran and Iraq*.

ANALYSIS

We use a range of detailed survey questions to measure both religious practice and political outcomes.

Measuring Practice

We measure individual and communal practice using a cluster of questions about religiosity from the survey. To measure communal practice, we examine the frequencies with which respondents reported attending Friday prayer, religious lessons, and mosque.[3] To measure individual practice, we use private religious behaviors. Specifically, we examine whether individuals pray daily, watch or listen to religious programs, and read the Qurʾan or Duʾa.[4] These questions can be seen in detail in Tables 17.1 and 17.2.

We then aggregated each cluster of questions using Bayesian principal component analysis (BPCA), which measures latent constructs by aggregating groups of related survey questions into overall indices with data-driven weights. (Unlike traditional principal components analysis, BPCA simultaneously addresses missingness on the component questions, allowing us to derive more robust results than standard principal component approaches that drop individuals who do not respond on any component question.) We find that our measure of communal practice weights each of its constituent religious practices virtually identically. In contrast, the first principal component of individual practice assigns indistinguishable weights to religious programs and reading of Qurʾan/Duʾa, but downweights prayer by roughly 25 percent.[5]

Measuring Outcomes

We identified one abstract outcome of interest—views about the role of religion in politics—and three concrete political attitudes—perceptions of democracy, regime legitimacy (in Iran only), and sectarian politics (Iraq only). Due to differing political systems, interpretations of these outcomes vary across national contexts, even though questions are worded identically. In Iran, the perceived legitimacy of a regime that claims to be theocratic is closely related to an individual's beliefs about religion in politics, while support for democracy in Iraq more loosely tied—while many Iraqi Shiʿites are dissatisfied with their government because they would prefer a more directly religious governing system, other sources of discontent also exist. We combined groups of questions relating to each of these latent concepts using BPCA, focusing on the first principal component. (Details about constituent questions are reported in the Appendix.)

Analysis and Findings

We begin by noting basic demographic differences that should be kept in mind when interpreting results, though we include controls for these characteristics in all analyses. Communal practicing Iraqis are more likely to be poor, unemployed, over fifty, and male than nonreligious Iraqis. Those who have higher levels of individual practice are more likely to be educated, less likely to be wealthy, more likely to be over thirty, and less likely to be male than their less pious compatriots. Communal practicing Iranians are more likely than nonreligious Iranians to have a primary or middle school education, be over fifty, and less likely to be male. Iranians who engage in more individual practice are less likely to be employed and more likely to be over thirty.

Table 17.1: Variables in Individual Practice Principal Component

Question	Responses	Iraq Proportion	Iran Proportion
Do you pray every day?	Yes	0.02	0.04
	No	0.98	0.96
How often do you . . . Watch or listen to religious programs/sermons	At least once a day	0.45	0.47
	At least once a week	0.34	0.29
	A few times a month	0.06	0.05
	At most once a month	0.1	0.1
	Never	0.05	0.08
How often do you . . . Read or listen to the Qurʾan or Duʿa	At least once a day	0.64	0.63
	At least once a week	0.23	0.21
	A few times a month	0.03	0.04
	At most once a month	0.07	0.07
	Never	0.04	0.04

Table 17.2: Variables in Communal Practice Principal Component

Question	Responses	Iraq Proportion	Iran Proportion
How often do you . . . Attend Friday prayers/women's prayer	At least once a day	0.06	0.25
	At least once a week	0.18	0.16
	A few times a month	0.13	0.11
	At most once a month	0.12	0.28
	Never	0.5	0.2
How often do you . . . Attend religious lessons in the Mosque	At least once a day	0.09	0.47
	At least once a week	0.12	0.29
	A few times a month	0.12	0.05
	At most once a month	0.09	0.1
	Never	0.57	0.08
How often do you . . . Visit a mosque	At least once a day	0.17	0.63
	At least once a week	0.25	0.21
	A few times a month	0.17	0.04
	At most once a month	0.15	0.07
	Never	0.26	0.04

For each outcome of interest, we then run a linear regression, controlling for years of education,[6] income sufficiency,[7] paid work,[8] age,[9] gender, news interest,[10] conservatism as proxied by gender attitudes,[11] civil society involvement,[12], and province fixed effects. In addition to these controls, we also include our variables of interest, individual and communal practice; uncertainty in the measurement of these BPCA-based explanatory variables and outcomes are incorporated by repeatedly sampling, then combined with the uncertainty of the regression.

Results can be seen in Figure 17.1.

In Iraq, we find that communal practicing individuals are dramatically more likely to support a strong role for religion in politics ($p < 0.001$). In practical terms, these individuals are more opposed to democracy as a system of government ($p < 0.001$), and they are more likely to hold sectarian political outlooks ($p < 0.038$)—for example, believing that out-group politicians cannot represent their interests. In supplemental mediation analyses, we find that a significant portion of communal practice's overall contribution to these practical political views flows through the channel of abstract religion-in-politics attitudes ($p < 0.001$ for both outcomes), but we also find evidence of a strong direct relationship between communal practice and anti-democracy positions ($p < 0.008$). These results are consistent with the transmission of nonreligious norms through religious practice. While more individual practicing individuals are also more supportive of religious involvement in politics, this attitude is more weakly linked than communal practice, and we find null—perhaps even negative—associations between individual practice and our practical political outcomes. Unsurprisingly, we find that neither form of religious practice is significantly associated with the legitimacy of the nonreligious government.

In Iran, we find that the relationship between communal practice and an individual's support for religion in politics is much weaker. In the Iranian context, individual practice is far more important. By the same token, more individual practicing individuals are much more likely to view the regime as legitimate, and also to oppose democratic systems of governance; a significant portion of individual practice's contribution to these practical attitudes appears to be mediated through abstract views about the proper role of religious principles and leaders. Given Iran's self-positioning as a theocracy, these correlations highlight how Iran has succeeded in gaining *religious legitimacy* among the highly devout. Communal practice has no discernible connection to regime support in our sample, though other work on religious legitimation has highlighted its importance as a conduit for information sharing, organization, and social pressure that can lead to greater support for a political regime (Ludden 2005, Wilkenson 2005, Mitchell 2017). (Indeed, we find participation in these group religious activities still seems to transmit other views, like anti-democratic beliefs, which are less directly tied to the regime.) While we do not dispute the importance of these channels, our findings highlight how religious ideology is a perhaps even more potent source of support both for religion in politics and for its manifestation in the current regime.



FIGURE 17.1: The relationship between religious practice and political outcomes.

Note: Each panel reports the relationship between religious practice and a political attitude. Points (error bars) correspond to posterior means (95 percent intervals) of Bayesian regressions incorporating uncertainty from BPCA measurement. All models include adjustment for years of education, income sufficiency, paid work, age, gender, news interest, conservatism as proxied by gender attitudes, civil society involvement, and province fixed effects.

Alternate Explanations

We identify four alternate explanations for correlations between religiosity and political views: sociability, conservatism, economic interests, and intergroup contact. We do not argue that these potential confounders and sources of heterogeneity are unimportant; rather, our results suggest that, even holding these other factors constant, individual and communal practice can shape political attitudes across both country contexts.

One key concern is that the apparent importance of communal practice is an artifact of confounding—that "sociable" individuals are both more likely to be involved in communal activities in general, and also that this type of person has particular political attitudes. We alleviate this concern by controlling for participation in a variety of other types of civil society organizations in all reported models; this does not change the relationship between communal practice and any of our outcomes of interest.

A second concern is that conservativism drives both individual practice and support for religion in politics. To test for this, we include a control for gender conservativeness—based on questions about gender roles and gender stereotypes—a proxy for overall socially conservative beliefs. Again, we include this variable in all reported specifications, and results are unchanged by its inclusion.

Third, it is possible that economic hardship is correlated with individual practice, thus confounding our results. The ability of the Iranian regime (and Islamist parties more generally) to provide economic benefits is a well-documented source of support for both (Mujani and Liddle 2009; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014, among others). Yet holding this constant, does ideology still play a role? We control for a range of economic variables in our results, roughly capturing demand for welfare. Yet again, our results hold, minimizing concerns about this possible link.

Finally, it is possible that the Iran-Iraq difference is due to the sectarian heterogeneity in Iraq, which leads to different expectations about what religious involvement in politics might look like and whose interests it might serve. In particular, Iraqi respondents might be concerned that democracy advances *Sunni* interests in Iraq, rather than secular interests, and this crucial difference might account for the difference in patterns from Iran. Yet even Shiʿa-dominated provinces, which mirror the sectarian homogeneity of Iran, show similar correlations to the rest of Iraq, indicating that sectarian homogeneity alone is not the primary determinant of this relationship.

Taken together, these findings provide additional support to the potential for ideology to influence religious legitimacy, and thus the relationship between religiosity and beliefs about religion in politics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This research provides a uniquely rich glimpse into the relationship between religiosity and religion in politics among devout Shiʿites in Iran and Iraq. Using an original survey of Shiʿite pilgrims during the Arbaʾeen pilgrimage, we find that communal practice, in both contexts, plays an important role in reinforcing desire for religious principles and religious leaders in governance. Moreover, this desire manifests in specific and consequential political attitudes, particularly opposition to or support for the government. We argue that this process occurs largely through religious socialization, or the transmission of potentially nonreligious norms through religious practice. However, individual religious practice also plays a role in shaping beliefs about politics. Here, we find that it operates more strongly in Iran, where we argue that the regime's success in *religious legitimation* has led religious individuals to link regime support to religious devotion.

These findings concur with work that argues communal practice can play an important role in influencing political outcomes as a result of its organizing potential, information-spreading ability, and capacity to socially sanction its congregants (Ludden 2005; Wilkenson 2005; Mitchell 2017). This is what we find in the dynamic Iraqi environment—more communal religious practice is associated with greater support for Islamic systems of governance, but not with support for the (insufficiently religious) regime. Similarly, in Iran, more communal practice is associated with greater support.

Yet in Iran, however, we also see the result of nearly forty years of theocracy, where even individual practice is associated with greater support for Islamic systems of governance, and specifically the Iranian regime, highlighting how Iran has successfully legitimated its theocracy among devout individuals. We thus find that communal and individual practice function differently in Iran and Iraq, driven by how their governments relate to religion. This provides unique insight into the relationship between individual religiosity and the state in authoritarian and unstable democratic contexts.

We examine factors that could potentially confound the relationship between individual and communal practice and support for religion in politics. Our results hold even outside of self-selection into communal practice, conservatism, economic interests, and sectarian heterogeneity. While we do not argue that these cannot be drivers of support for religion in politics, both hypothetical and applied, we demonstrate that even outside their influence, piety and practice can play an important role.

More work must be done to better understand the avenues through which religious legitimation occurs, as in the Iranian context. This religious legitimation could occur through a variety of channels, whether religious leaders, political elites, historical factors, or constitutional factors. For instance, religious leaders could speak about the regime, thus validating it in the eyes of their members. Alternately, political and government elites could use religious rhetoric, which serves to religiously validate their position outside the influence of religious leaders. History could also play a role, with the revolution providing a symbolic background for the integration of religious and political life. Finally, constitutional factors—the fact that Iran is a self-identified theocracy—could also play a role in convincing its citizens of its religious legitimacy.

Our work has certain limitations. First, the nature of the data gathered makes causal analysis difficult. While we cannot randomly assign individual or communal practice, one can imagine a design that looks at how the ease of access to communal places of worship, for instance, influences religious outcomes, to disaggregate whether the relationship between religious practice and political beliefs is being driven by individuals who have the *desire* to practice more in community, or if it is the practice itself. Second, and relatedly, our work cannot distinguish the direction of the influence. In all likelihood, religious practice influences political beliefs, yet political beliefs also influence religious practice. Additional work should disaggregate the relative strength of these different causal directions.

Taken together, these findings provide vital insight into how religion can strengthen or weaken the state, either through religious legitimation or socialization, with important implications for the relationship between religion and the state in Muslim societies.

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NOTES

1. For more, see "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population," Pew Research Center, October 2009.

2. The COR has a total of 328 seats across Iraq's eighteen governorates. The allocation of seats is based on each governorate's estimated population size.
3. For religious lessons and mosque, respondents were given the choice of "at least once a day," "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never." For attending Friday prayer, respondents were divided into those who responded "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never."
4. Respondents were given the choice of "Yes" and "No" to the daily prayer, and the choice of "at least once a day," "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never" for religious programs and reading the Qurʾan or Duʾa.
5. The difference in weighting reflects the fact that self-reported prayer frequency may be driven by other unobserved factors (such as social desirability) that are captured by the additional, discarded principal components.
6. Education is treated as a categorical variable with five levels: none, primary, middle school, high school, and college and above.
7. Income sufficiency is a categorical variable indicating whether or not individuals felt that their income was sufficient to meet their daily needs. Using this, rather than an absolute measure of income, allows us to account for differences in purchasing power parity across the two countries. Possible responses were as follows: "Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced significant difficulties meeting our needs," "Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced some difficulties meeting our needs," "Our household income covered our expenses without notable difficulties," and "Our household income covered our expenses well and we were able to save."
8. "Paid work" refers to whether a respondent is currently employed. This is an important control variable, as individuals who do not have a job are more likely to participate in collective religious practice during the work week, and some of the variation we see between men and women is in fact due to differential employment statuses.
9. We discretize self-reported age into ranges 18–30, 30–50, and 50+.
10. We define an additive index of self-reported news consumption frequencies from television, radio, newspapers or magazines, the Internet, or friends and family.
11. The first principal component extracted from BPCA measure on questions about gender stereotypes and women's rights.
12. A binary variable indicating participation in humanitarian or professional organizations, unions, sports associations, tribal groups, cooperatives, or any other civil society groups.

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CHAPTER 18

REPRESSIVE RELIGIOUS REGULATION AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Why Muslims (Don't) Rebel

DUSTIN GAMZA AND PAULINE JONES

Much of the literature on political mobilization in the Islamic world has emphasized religion as a primary factor in explaining why Muslim citizens take to the streets (Cammett and Jones 2014). Similarly, much of the literature on religious regulation implies that state regulation of religion indirectly reduces the degree of religiously motivated political mobilization because it decreases religiosity (e.g., Finke and Stark 1988; Finke 1990; Iannaccone 1991). In this chapter, we bridge these two literatures to explore the relationship between religious regulation and political mobilization in Muslim-majority states (MMS). We argue that, controlling for religiosity, state religious repression influences whether Muslims rebel against the government, and that the effect is both direct and positive. More specifically, we argue that religious repression has a conditional effect on political mobilization: the first condition concerns the degree of enforcement; the second concerns the type of religious practice that is being repressed. In sum, Muslims are more likely to support political action against the state when (1) the degree of enforcement is high[1] and (2) the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal rather than individualistic religious practices.[2] When enforcement is high, Muslims expect state persecution of their religious community to increase. When the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal religious practice, Muslims expect state persecution to extract a much greater toll. They are thus more likely to support taking political action against the state in order to protect their community from this perceived harm.

We utilize two novel experiments embedded in a mass survey that we conducted in Kyrgyzstan (a MMS in Central Asia) to test our hypotheses concerning the direct and positive relationship between religious repression and political mobilization. Our results are mixed. First, although we find strong support for our contention that enforcement of repressive regulation has a significant effect on attitudes toward political mobilization, the effect is negative—that is, in the opposite direction that we expected. Second, we find support for our argument that it is not only *whether* repressive regulations are enforced, but also the *degree* of enforcement, that matters. The results of our experiments demonstrate that the threat of arrest and imprisonment has a significant effect in a number of cases where fines alone do not have an effect. Yet again, contrary to our expectations, the effect on attitudes toward political mobilization is negative. Third, we find support for our contention that the effect of enforcement is stronger—and more consistent across different types of political action—for communal religious practice (here, Qurʾan study groups in private homes) than it is for individualistic religious practice (here, wearing the hijab in public places). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find that these results are not being driven by the primary alternative explanation—the level of religiosity.

In sum, we find that, controlling for level of religiosity, enforcement has a significant but negative effect on attitudes toward political mobilization, particularly when it comes to restrictions on communal religious practice. These findings have important implications for the literatures on religious regulation, political mobilization, and repression. First, they contribute to our knowledge concerning the effects of religious regulation on political behavior, which remains limited. Second, they suggest that enforcement of religious regulation—particularly repressive regulation—has a direct effect on political behavior. Third, our research provides individual-level data regarding the effects of repression that contributes to the divide in the repression literature concerning whether repression has an effect, and, if so, whether it increases or decreases political mobilization (Davenport and Inman 2012). Contrary to our expectations, it suggests that, under certain conditions, repression can dampen support for mobilization. The negative effect that repression has on attitudes toward political mobilization, moreover, holds even among those who would be classified as the most devout and committed to the principles of their faith.

RELIGIOUS REGULATION AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Religious market theory posits an indirect causal link between religious regulation and political behavior via the level of religiosity in a society. Utilizing a political economy framework, scholars argue that unrestricted religious markets will foster a high level of religious belief and participation because they promote competition, which encourages religious leaders to innovate to meet the demands of extant and potential adherents (e.g., Finke and Stark 1988; Finke 1990; Chaves and Cann 1992, Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). Conversely, restricted religious markets will depress religious belief and participation because they eliminate competition, which discourages religious leaders from innovating in order to maintain or attract adherents. In sum, religious regulation disrupts religious markets, and thus lowers the level of religiosity. The resulting shifts in religious belief and participation, in turn, have an effect on individual political behavior (Wald and Martinez 2001; Nicolet and Tresch 2009).

This literature provides limited insight concerning the relationship between repressive religious regulation and political mobilization, particularly in a predominantly Muslim context, for several reasons. First, the tendency of this literature is to conceptualize regulation as synonymous with state *subsidies*—i.e., institutional, fiscal, or political benefits to particular religious organizations—and to ignore the role of state *repression*—i.e., restrictions on the selection or profession of certain religious beliefs and practices. They have thus examined only one of the two dimensions that make up any state effort to regulate religion (Grzymala-Busse 2012; Fox 2013). Instead, we reconceptualize religious regulation as two-dimensional, consisting of both subsidy, which can be further disaggregated into general and selective, and repression, which can range from low to high concerning the severity of restrictions, punishment, and enforcement (Gamza and Jones 2016). Although our larger project examines the effects of both subsidy and repression, here we focus only on repression—specifically, the enforcement of regulations that restrict religious expression.

Second, this literature implies that religiosity is the key factor that mediates the causal relationship between religious regulation and individual political behavior. We argue instead that state regulation of religion has a direct effect on individual political behavior; irrespective of the level of religiosity, it influences both whether individuals engage in political action and the form that action takes. This is not because we do not take religion seriously, but rather because we approach religion as a collective good that is a fundamental part of one's daily social life in a predominantly Muslim community, regardless of how devout one is according to conventional (and unconventional) measures that only consider individual beliefs and behavior. Thus, one's willingness to respond to religious repression by mobilizing against the state is at least partly based on the broader social impact of this repression. In other words, as part of a broader religious community, an individual is more likely to take into consideration not only the extent to which repression impedes one's own freedom of religious expression, but also the extent to which it impedes the ability of others to freely practice their faith.

Third, the hypothesized relationship between religion and political behavior often focuses on political participation, such as voting or joining an organization, in a democratic context in which there is little risk to such activities (e.g., Esmer and Pettersson 2007; McTague and Layman 2009). We focus instead on various forms of political mobilization in the context of a hybrid regime in which the risk is greater but not fully known.[3] This enables us to investigate both whether citizens are more willing to engage in some types of political action than others and whether their willingness to mobilize despite some risk depends on the degree of enforcement. It also enables us to disentangle political mobilization in MMS from Islamist mobilization, and thus to avoid the common tendency to conflate them (Cammett and Jones 2014). Moreover, by limiting the type of repression to restrictions on religious practices, we can better isolate the effects of *religious* repression on political behavior.

We argue that religious repression motivates Muslim citizens to rebel under two conditions. First, they will be more likely to support political action against the state when the degree of enforcement is high. In other words, what matters is not only that repressive regulations are enforced, but also the severity of the penalty associated with enforcement, which ranges from low (e.g., fines) to high (e.g., arrest and imprisonment). There are two main reasons for this. The first is that average citizens are often unaware of formal legislation until they have some knowledge of or experience with this legislation being enforced. In many developing countries, moreover, laws often go unenforced or are unevenly enforced due to weak state capacity or the central government's limited inability to monitor local governments. The second is that enforcement sends a stronger signal about the state's intentions than legislation alone. The enforcement of religious regulations in particular indicates that threats against the freedom of religious expression are likely to increase. In sum, we expect that Muslims rebel in order to prevent or mitigate the escalation of state repression—that is, to protect themselves and, more critically, their community from a perceived increase in the likelihood of religious persecution. The adoption of a law that restricts some aspect of belief or practice in and of itself may not signal such a likelihood, especially given that both the awareness and enforcement of such legislation is likely to be low. When repressive laws are enforced, however, and as the penalty for violating them becomes more severe, these repressive regulations can indicate that the state is moving in a draconian direction when it comes to controlling religion.

Second, Muslims will be more likely to support political action against the state when the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal religious practices rather than individualistic religious practices. As Emile Durkheim recognized over a century ago, the purpose of exercising religious beliefs and practices is not merely to express individual piety, but also to "unite in one single community . . . all those who adhere to them" (Thompson 1982, 129). In other words, religion plays a key social function in creating and sustaining a moral community among adherents. Religious consumption can play an important role in "attracting individuals to the community, socializing them to the communal ethos, and drawing symbolic boundaries between community members and outsiders" (Karatas and Sandikci 2013, 465). Religion can also serve to bind members of communities together, through the provision of subsidies to their members and the opportunities that community members sacrifice to maintain their membership in the religious community (Berman 1999). Individuals within these communities, therefore, place a higher value on practices that bring members of the community together and serve to enhance the community (i.e., communal practices) than on practices that display or are associated with individual piety (i.e., individualistic practices). They may therefore also be more willing to take risks to prevent or oppose government restrictions on these communal practices in order to prevent or mitigate policies they perceive to extract a heavier toll on their moral community. As others have argued in a variety of contexts, communal religious practice plays a prominent role in shaping political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Lim and Putnam 2010; Khan et al. 2016; see also the chapter by Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox in this volume). Defending communal practices and the community, moreover, makes mobilization more likely, because it lowers barriers to collective action via its ability to organize, spread information, and socially sanction (e.g., Campbell 2004; Hoffman and Nugent 2017; Lussier 2019).

Thus, under each of these conditions, religious repression should have a positive effect on attitudes toward political mobilization in MMS. Taken together, the effect should be even stronger. When enforcement is high and the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal religious practices, Muslims not only expect state persecution of their religious community to increase, but also that its negative impact on their community will be greater. They are even more likely, therefore, to support taking political action against the state in order to protect their community from this perceived harm.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND EVIDENCE

To explore the relationship between religious regulation and political mobilization in predominantly Muslim countries, we conducted a nationally representative survey of citizens in Kyrgyzstan (N = 2,631, including 2,400 Muslims). As part of the survey, we randomly assigned roughly 1,800 Muslim respondents to a series of vignettes about repressive regulations that varied the degree of enforcement. In each experimental arm, after respondents read the vignette, they were asked whether they supported various forms of political mobilization—such as writing a letter or participating in a protest—as appropriate responses. (See Appendix 18.1 for full text.) Specifically, we designed a unique survey experiment to test three main hypotheses concerning the direct and positive relationship that we posit between religious repression and political mobilization, irrespective of the level of religiosity:

- *H1: Support for political mobilization will be greater when repressive legislation is enforced.*
- *H2: Support for political mobilization will be greater when the degree of enforcement, defined as the severity of penalty, increases.*
- *H3: The effect of repressive regulation on support for political mobilization will be more significant when the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal (rather than individualistic) religious practices.*

In the control group vignette, respondents are informed that the government has adopted a law that prohibits the religious practice in question, but that the repressive law is not yet being enforced. To test H1 and H2, our treatment vignettes both indicate that the repressive law is being enforced, and we vary the degree of enforcement from fines (low) to arrests and imprisonment (high). We estimate a linear probability model to test each hypothesis.

To test H3, we vary the type of religious practice that is being targeted by repressive regulations. Experiment 1 concerns repression of an individualistic religious practice: restrictions on wearing the hijab in public places.[4] Experiment 2 concerns repression of a communal religious practice: restrictions on Qurʾan study groups in private homes.[5]

These particular examples of an individualistic and communal practice were selected for two main reasons. First, they are contextually appropriate examples of individualistic and communal religious practices, respectively. Wearing the hijab in Kyrgyzstan, as in other parts of the Muslim world, is a personal choice that is made by women themselves and their families (see, e.g., Carkoglu 2009). Also similar to many other Muslim contexts, there are state and social pressures not to wear the hijab in Kyrgyzstan. Because the hijab is not ubiquitous and has only recently grown in popularity among young women, choosing to wear the hijab may actually alienate the wearer from some other members of the Muslim community who perceive the hijab as incompatible with being Kyrgyz (McBrien 2017)—a discourse that is supported by the state (Suyarkulova 2016, 258).[6] Factor analysis also produced two clear dimensions, corresponding to individualistic and communal religious practices, with wearing the hijab and Qurʾan study groups loading onto separate dimensions. Wearing the hijab loaded onto the same factor as access to printed religious materials and religious websites, whereas Qurʾan study groups loaded onto the same factor as attending mosque and celebrating religious holidays such as Ramadan.[7]

Our survey results also offer strong evidence to suggest that there is greater opposition to placing government restrictions on convening Qurʾan study groups in one's home than on wearing the hijab in public places—regardless of an individual's self-assessment of how important religion is in their life (see Table 18.1). In other words, no matter how religious a respondent considers themself, they are more likely to oppose restrictions on

Table 18.1 Opposition to Restrictions on Individual/Communal Practices by Religiosity

Degree of Religiosity[15]	Determining Whether the Hijab Can Be Worn in Public is a Bad or Very Bad Idea	Prohibiting Qurʾan Group Study in Private Homes is a Bad or Very Bad Idea
High	17%	55%
Low	26%	36%

Note: Data is weighted. Questions concerning support for religious restrictions also included a neutral response: "neither a good idea nor a bad idea."

religious practices that are deemed to be communal than to oppose restrictions on religious practices that are deemed to be individualistic.

The second reason for selecting wearing the hijab and Qurʾan study groups as examples of individualistic and communal practices, respectively, is that restrictions on them are very plausible. Although neither wearing the hijab in public or convening Qurʾan study groups at home was illegal in Kyrgyzstan at the time we fielded the survey, in recent years both topics have become politically salient issues, with the government increasingly discouraging wearing the hijab and opposing some forms of informal religious teaching (Toursunof 2009; Nasritdinov and Esenamanova 2017).[8] Additionally, in neighboring Central Asian states, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, there have been severe crackdowns on both these practices, suggesting that Kyrgyzstani respondents will be more likely to interpret the hypothetical scenario as a real possibility.[9]

The use of a survey experiment enabled us to reduce the politically sensitive nature of the questions concerning political mobilization and to mitigate social desirability bias. We did not ask respondents whether they would engage in political action, but whether they would support the decision of others to engage in political action[10]—specifically, those who believed that the religious practice being repressed was "a manifestation of piety." The design of the survey experiment also enabled us to avoid the assumption that citizens have complete knowledge of repressive regulations without directly experiencing repression. It thus controls for an important alternative explanation: that awareness of repression reduces the likelihood that an individual will engage in dissent due to greater perception of personal risk (Honari 2018, 957).

Why Kyrgyzstan?

Kyrgyzstan is one of the five Muslim countries in Central Asia that became an independent state when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. As in the other four MMS that comprise the region, Kyrgyzstan underwent what many scholars have characterized as an "Islamic revival" analogous to what occurred throughout the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s (Haghayeghi 1994; Olcott 1994; Lipovsky, 1996). In actuality, Islam in Central Asia has undergone a transformation (Jones 2016). In other words, what we have witnessed in Kyrgyzstan and throughout the region is not simply the reemergence of beliefs and practices that were suppressed under Soviet rule, but rather their alteration in form, nature, and appearance, as individuals and communities have gained direct access to ideas and information about Islam via a variety of new and newly accessible sources. Re-characterizing Central Asia's Islamic revival as a transformation is not only more accurate but also more consistent with the notion that Islamic beliefs and practices throughout the region should be viewed on a continuum from scriptural/textual to mystical/traditional, with most people not located firmly at either end (Tucker 2013). Although these "competing discourses" have existed in Central Asia for centuries, they manifest themselves in different ways both at the individual and the community level, and reflect what appears to be a "pluralization of Islam" in both beliefs and practices since independence (Khalid 2007, 123; see also Ro'i and Wainer 2009).

Kyrgyzstan has also experienced a political transformation since independent statehood. Once heralded for being the only democratic regime in Central Asia (Anderson 1999), it is now widely considered to be a hybrid regime.[11] This transformation has happened gradually and has paralleled the change over time in the state's approach to religious regulation. All five Central Asian states inherited a similarly restrictive regulatory framework over religion due to their common experience under Soviet rule (for details, see Tasar 2017). After independence, however, the governments of each country responded differently to what seemed to be Islam's growing political potential (for details, see Gamza and Jones 2020). Kyrgyzstan proceeded gradually to establish a state infrastructure to regulate religion and initially limited the scope of these regulatory bodies, consistent with the principles of individual religious freedom and state secularism codified in its first (1993) constitution. In contrast, neighboring Uzbekistan moved quickly to criminalize religion and to expand the authority of its regulatory bodies to enforce expansive restrictions on religious belief and practice. By the late 2000s, however, Kyrgyzstan's regulatory strategy appeared to be gradually converging toward Uzbekistan's, as the government began to endorse a singular interpretation of Islam and to expand restrictions on unsanctioned religious beliefs and practices. Yet, unlike its neighbor, although religious repression has increased, it has not yet become normalized.

Finally, Kyrgyzstan shares several features with MMS around the world. It is considered to be highly religious according to standard measures. The level of religiosity has been growing, moreover, since independence, according to these same commonly used measures.[12] Kyrgyzstan is also similar to other MMS in that its citizens have an extremely low baseline level of participating in and supporting political mobilization as a catalyst for political change (Livny, this volume). Based on our survey, less than 1 percent claim to have participated in a protest in the last three years, only 7 percent believe that protest is very effective in getting the attention of politicians, and 82 percent believe participating in a protest is somewhat or very risky behavior. And yet, also similar to their counterparts in MMS, in recent years Kyrgyzstanis have mounted successful mass protests against unpopular or corrupt regimes, suggesting they are willing and capable of overcoming obstacles to collective action.[13]

Summary of Findings

In sum, we find that, controlling for level of religiosity, enforcement of repressive regulations has a significant but negative effect on attitudes toward political mobilization, particularly when it comes to restrictions on communal religious practice. (See Appendix 18.2 for figures summarizing these results.)

> *H1: Support for political mobilization will be greater when repressive legislation is enforced*

We find that enforcement of repressive regulation has a significant effect, but in the opposite direction. Respondents are less, not more, likely to have positive attitudes toward political mobilization when repressive regulations are enforced. This suggests that the enforcement of repressive regulations decreases, rather than increases, the likelihood that Muslim citizens will support political mobilization in response. It may be that fear of repercussions, or a sense of law-abidingness, overrides any political will to mobilize; however, we do not find support for this proposition. Alternatively, it may be that political mobilization in the face of potential fines or arrests is perceived as ineffective or costly in the Kyrgyz context, resulting in a cost-benefit analysis that discourages mobilization in the face of repression. As discussed above, there is a low baseline level of positive feelings toward political mobilization in Kyrgyzstan in general, and it appears that religious repression does not elevate this baseline. At the same time, however, in the context of the experiments, Kyrgyzstanis were broadly supportive of mobilization in the face of religious repression; even in the treatment groups, consistently more than 32 percent of respondents considered each form of mobilization to be appropriate.[14]

> *H2: Support for political mobilization will be greater when the degree of enforcement, defined as the severity of penalty, increases*

We also find some support for our hypothesis that as the degree of enforcement increases, the effect on attitudes toward political mobilization will also increase. Contrary to our expectations, however, the effect is negative rather than positive. Point estimates are lower for the more severe penalty (high enforcement) in Experiment 1 (individual practice), and in some cases (protest action, contacting local authorities to change policy, and signing or writing a public letter), the degree of enforcement only has a significant effect on attitudes toward political mobilization when it is high. However, this pattern does not hold in Experiment 2 (communal practice), where the effect of both low and high degrees of enforcement on support for mobilization is nearly identical. These findings suggest that, in the case of communal practices (here: Qurʾan study groups), respondents do not differentiate among types or levels of penalty for violating the repressive regulation. Instead, they interpret any penalty as effectively marking the religious adherents who received this punishment as criminals. This would have longer-term repercussions beyond the initial penalty. In other words, a fine today may lead to greater scrutiny and potential punishments tomorrow.

> *H3: The effect of repressive regulation on support for political mobilization will be more significant when the repressive regulation being enforced targets communal (rather than individualistic) religious practices*

Finally, we find that restrictions targeting communal religious practices do have a stronger effect on attitudes toward political mobilization than restrictions targeting individual practices. Yet, once again, this effect is in the opposite direction than expected. In Experiment 1 (individualistic), enforcement decreases support for political action, but less significantly than in Experiment 2 (communal). In Experiment 1 (individualistic), a low degree of enforcement is significant only for two types of political action (continuing to wear the hijab and criticizing the policy online), while a high degree of enforcement is significant for all forms of political mobilization, with the exception of moving abroad. In Experiment 2 (communal), both low and high enforcement are significant and have a negative effect on attitudes toward all forms of political mobilization, with the exception of moving abroad and participating in protest.

Although our results suggest that the relationship between religious repression and political mobilization is inverse to our hypothesis, they nonetheless support our claim that Muslims react differently to restrictions that target communal religious practices than they do to those that target individualistic ones. Instead of an increased desire to protect the religious community's right to engage in the communal practice, however, what may be driving the results is the desire to avoid communal punishment. In other words, Muslims may be deterred from mobilizing against the enforcement of repression targeting communal practices because it increases the risk of collective punishment by bringing the entire community into the state's spotlight for potential retaliation or crackdowns. In contrast, enforcement of restrictions on an individualistic practice would focus the state's wrath on a subset of individuals within the community who choose to engage in or mobilize in defense of this practice.

In sum, we find strong support for the contention that enforcement of repressive regulation has a greater effect than repressive regulation alone; however, the effect is negative—that is, in the opposite direction that we expected. Moreover, in the experiment on individualistic practices, a high degree of enforcement is more broadly effective for reducing support for political mobilization than a low degree of enforcement, which has no significant effect in most cases. This suggests that the bar may be lower for supporting mobilization against restrictions on individualistic practices, because the potential costs to the community as a whole are lower. Recall that both low and high enforcement are effective in reducing support when it comes to restrictions on communal practices. We also find support for our contention that the effect of enforcement is stronger—and more consistent across different types of political action—for communal religious practice than it is for individualistic religious practice. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find that these results are not being driven by the level of religiosity.

SUBGROUP ANALYSIS

To better understand these results, we also conducted several subgroup analyses to observe heterogeneous effects, including the following subgroups: (1) women, (2) the most faith-abiding (i.e., respondents who agree with the sentiment that faith must take precedence over law), (3) the most devout, (4) the most opposed to regulation (i.e., those who responded that government regulation was a bad or very bad idea for each type of restriction), and (5) respondents from the Osh region, where ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan are heavily concentrated. Overall, these results provide more evidence to support our conclusions.

Two subgroups are of particular interest: the faith-abiding and the most devout. (See Appendix 18.3 for figures summarizing these results.) The faith-abiding subgroup is based on a question asked earlier in the survey: *Which of the following three statements do you agree with most: (1) A person must follow the principles of his/her faith, regardless of any legal consequences; (2) A person must take into account the legal consequences while following the principles of his faith; (3) A person should always follow the law, even if it contradicts their religious principles*. Considering only members of the subgroup that believes a person must follow the principles of their faith regardless of legal consequences, in Experiment 1 (individualistic), only fines in the case of wearing the hijab in public places has a significant negative effect. In Experiment 2 (communal), results are similar to the full sample, with a high degree of enforcement (i.e., arrests and imprisonment) having a significant and negative effect on support for all forms of political action, except for moving abroad and protest. However, a low degree of enforcement (i.e., fines) does not have a significant effect on support for political mobilization. Importantly, this suggests that in the case of communal practices, individuals who believe they must follow religious principles even when they oppose the law may have a higher threshold for repression before it discourages a political response.

The most devout subgroup is also based on a question asked earlier in the survey: *How religious do you consider yourself to be?* The response options included: *Very religious*; *Somewhat religious*; *Not very religious*; and *Not at all religious*. Considering only members of the subgroup that consider themselves to be "very religious," in Experiment 1 (individualistic), enforcement only has a significant effect, which is again negative rather than positive, on whether respondents support one political action: continuing to wear the hijab in public. In Experiment 2 (communal), the results are again similar to the full sample, with at least one form of enforcement having a significant negative effect on all forms of mobilization, except moving abroad and participating in a protest.

WHY MUSLIM'S (DON'T) REBEL: IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

Our findings have important implications for the literatures on religious regulation, political mobilization, and repression. Not only do we find that the enforcement of repressive religious regulation has a direct effect on attitudes toward political mobilization, but also that the effect is both significant and negative across various forms of political action. This effect is present even when controlling for religiosity and commitment to religious principles, suggesting that repression reduces support for political action against the state even among the most devout citizens. Further, the reductive effect is particularly pronounced when the repression is targeted at communal religious practices as opposed to individualistic ones.

Why does enforcement of repressive regulations—particularly those that target communal practices—appear to reduce rather than increase support for taking political action against the state? Several alternative explanations are possible, including the social desirability and perceived effectiveness of mobilization, as well as the inability to overcome collective action problems. Yet we find no support for any of these in the context of our experiments. Instead, we argue that the fear of collective punishment increases as the degree of enforcement increases—and that this fear is greatest when the restrictions being enforced target communal practices. In other words, our initial theory may be wrong for the right reasons: Muslims are motivated to protect their community from harm, but the certainty of financial and physical harm outweighs the expectation of increasing religious persecution. Religion, not religiosity, thus plays an important role in shaping attitudes toward political mobilization in that it forms the sense of community that needs protection. Contra the existing literature linking the defense of communal practices to increased mobilization, our findings suggest that when enforcement is high, defending communal practices makes mobilization less desirable because it raises the perceived cost (financial and physical) to the community itself.

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Notes

1. We measure the degree of enforcement by the harshness of penalties that are imposed on those who violate the regulation in question. These penalties range from low (fines) to high (arrest and imprisonment).
2. We define *communal* religious practices as those that bring together and serve to enhance the local community, such as attending mosque or celebrating Eid al-Fitr, and *individualistic* religious practices as those that display or are associated with individual piety, such as wearing a hijab or performing salat.

3. The risk is also much lower than, for example, in a highly repressive autocratic regime, where the expectation of citizen compliance is much greater (see, e.g., Blaydes 2018).
4. Experiment 1 included a total of 1,787 respondents; 597 individuals were assigned the control group, 616 were assigned the first treatment (fines), and 574 were assigned the second treatment (arrest and imprisonment). Nonresponses were dropped for the analysis.
5. Experiment 2 included a total of 1,780 respondents; 583 individuals were assigned the control group, 605 were assigned the first treatment (fines), and 592 individuals were assigned the second treatment (arrest and imprisonment). Nonresponses were dropped for the analysis.
6. Nonetheless, recent survey research suggests that almost half the population has a positive opinion toward women who wear hijab, while less than a quarter has a negative opinion (Jalil 2016).
7. In a separate question on the survey, we ask respondents about their level of support for restrictions on multiple types of religious practices that correspond to communal and individualistic. Factor loadings were 0.7 or greater.
8. When conducted under the auspices of state authorities, however, Qurʾan study groups at home are encouraged as a bulwark against radicalization and a way to empower women, particularly in the South (Djanibekova 2017).
9. Authorities in Tajikistan have been cracking down on wearing the hijab in public for years, and in 2017 the state passed an amendment to the law on traditions restricting the hijab. In August 2017 the authorities approached more than eight thousand women wearing the hijab in Dushanbe and ordered them to wear their headscarves in the Tajik style (Agerholm 2017). In Uzbekistan, private religious education is punished, and holding unauthorized religious meetings can carry lengthy prison sentences (Bayram 2010).
10. The use of proxy subjects is one of many common approaches for mitigating social desirability bias (for details, see, e.g., Nederhof 1985).
11. For example, Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties scores, which rank countries from 1-7 where 7 means the smallest degree of freedom, rated Kyrgyzstan 7 in political rights and 5 in civil liberties in 2020. Compare this to 1992, the first full year of independence, for which Kyrgyzstan received a 4 in political rights and 2 in civil liberties. For details, see: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world.
12. In 2003, 74% of Kyrgyzstanis described themselves as a religious person, while in 2011, 92% described themselves as religious. When asked, "How important is God in your life?," where 1 represents not at all important and 10 represents very important, 63% selected 8, 9, or 10 in 2003, compared to 73% in 2011 (Inglehart et al. 2014).
13. Analogous to the wave of mass protests throughout the Middle East in 2010–2011, commonly known as the Arab Spring, Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian state to have experienced mass uprisings that toppled incumbent regimes. For details, see, e.g., Temirkulov 2010.
14. Approval for various types of political mobilization across experiments ranges from 33% to 68%, while disapproval ranges from 28% to 59%. Where each experimental group falls within this range is driven, in part, by the treatment it received—that is, the presence and degree of enforcement.
15. Here we use one of the standard survey questions (from the World Values Survey) to measure religiosity: *How important is religion in your life*? A high degree of religiosity includes only those who answered, "*Religion is very important in my life.*" A low degree of religiosity includes those who answered, "*Religion is fairly/not very/not at all important in my life.*"

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APPENDIX 18.1 SURVEY EXPERIMENTS FULL TEXT

Survey Experiment no. 1: Wearing Hijab in Public

Control: No Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting women from wearing the hijab outside their homes in public places, **but this law is not being enforced**. What do you think are appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that wearing the hijab is a manifestation of piety for women to take in response?

Treatment #1: Regulation with Low Degree of Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting women from wearing the hijab outside their homes in public places. **Authorities are issuing fines to women wearing the hijab in public places**. What do you think are appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that wearing the hijab is a manifestation of piety for women to take in response?

Treatment #2: Regulation with High Degree of Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims make up the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting women from wearing the hijab outside their homes in public places. **Authorities are arresting and imprisoning women wearing the hijab in public places**. What do you think are

Table 18.2: Hijab Repression Experiment Response Options

	Yes, this is appropriate (1)	No, this is not appropriate (0)	I don't know (98)	Refuse to answer (99)
Keep wearing hijab in public places	1	0	98	99
Criticize this policy on the Internet or through social networks	1	0	98	99
Sign or write a public letter to the newspaper to draw attention to this policy	1	0	98	99
Contact local authorities to change this policy	1	0	98	99
Participate in a protest action to demand changes to this policy	1	0	98	99
Move abroad to a country where you can freely practice your faith	1	0	98	99

appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that wearing the hijab is a manifestation of piety for women to take in response?

Survey Experiment no. 2: Gathering in Private Home for Qurʾan Study

Control: No Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting people from gathering in groups at home to study the Qurʾan together, **but this law is not being enforced**. What do you think are appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that co-studying the Qurʾan at home is a manifestation of piety to take in response?

Treatment #1: Regulation with Low Degree of Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting people from gathering in groups at home to study the Qurʾan together. **Authorities are issuing fines to people gathering in groups at home to study the Qurʾan**. What do you think are appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that co-studying the Qurʾan at home is a manifestation of piety to take in response?

Treatment #2: Regulation with High Degree of Enforcement

Please consider the following situation: In another country where Muslims make up the majority of the population, the government recently passed a law prohibiting people from gathering in groups at home to study the Qurʾan together. **Authorities are arresting and imprisoning people gathering in groups at home to study the Qurʾan**. What do you think are appropriate actions for Muslims who believe that co-studying the Qurʾan at home is a manifestation of piety to take in response?

Table 18.3: Qurʾan Repression Experiment Response Options

	Yes, this is appropriate (1)	No, this is not appropriate (0)	I don't know (98)	Refuse to answer (99)
Keep gathering at home to study the Qurʾan	1	0	98	99
Criticize this policy on the Internet or through social networks	1	0	98	99
Sign or write a public letter to the newspaper to draw attention to this policy	1	0	98	99
Contact local authorities to change this policy	1	0	98	99
Participate in a protest action to demand changes to this policy	1	0	98	99
Move abroad to a country where you can freely practice your faith	1	0	98	99

APPENDIX 18.2 SURVEY EXPERIMENTS RESULTS



FIGURE 18.1. Experiment 1, Wearing Hijab in Public (full sample, N=1787). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.



FIGURE 18.2. Experiment 2, Gathering in Private Home for Qurʾan Study (full sample, N=1780). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.

APPENDIX 18. 3 SELECTED SUBGROUP ANALYSIS

Faith-Abiding Subgroup



FIGURE 18.3. Experiment 1, Wearing Hijab in Public (sample includes only those who think that a person must follow the principles of his or her faith, regardless of any legal consequences, N=362). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.



FIGURE 18.4. Experiment 2, Gathering in Private Home for Qurʾan Study (sample includes only those who think that a person must follow the principles of his/her faith, regardless of any legal consequences, N=344). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.

Most Devout Subgroup



FIGURE 18.5. Experiment 1, Wearing Hijab in Public (sample includes only those who identified themselves as "very religious", N=476). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.



FIGURE 18.6. Experiment 2, Gathering in Private Home for Qur᾿an Study (sample includes only those who identified themselves as "very religious", N=459). Bold line indicates 95% confidence interval, thin line indicates 99% confidence interval. The hollow dot represents the point estimate.

CHAPTER 19

HOW EXTRAORDINARY WAS THE ARAB SPRING?

Examining "Protest Potential" in the Muslim World

AVITAL LIVNY

In the months following Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia, the mass demonstrations of the Arab Spring captivated public attention. In the years since, scholars have sought to understand their immediate causes and consequences, identifying who participated and why, with a special focus on the role of economic grievances (Campante and Chor 2012; Costello, Jenkins, and Aly 2015), social media (Clarke and Kocak 2020; Lynch 2011), and Islam (Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Kurzman and Türkoğlu 2015). But the Arab Spring has rarely been placed in a broader, comparative perspective. As such, we do not yet have a clear understanding of whether these mass political mobilizations were really as extraordinary as they appeared to be. Understanding how the Arab Spring fits into patterns of political participation, more broadly, can help us assess whether this type of large-scale political movement is likely to happen again.

Before 2010, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was singled out for low levels of mass political mobilization. In explaining the absence of democracy in the region, Eva Bellin noted that it had ben devoid of "mammoth, cross-class coalitions mobiliz[ing] on the streets to push for reform, as in South Korea" (2004, 150). In this view, the mass demonstrations of the Arab Spring were doubly remarkable—not just for successfully overthrowing two autocratic regimes, but also for effectively reversing a long history of political passivity. As Bellin herself has admitted, "it was an enormous empirical surprise to see tens if not hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens of diverse social original joining in the protests for political change across the Arab world" in

2010–2011 (2012, 135). Alternatively, the events may have simply proven the earlier view incorrect: the peoples of the Muslim Middle East may have been ripe for political mobilization all along,—or large-scale protest may have been taking place without capturing international attention.

To disentangle these interpretations and contextualize the Arab Spring appropriately—vis-à-vis the past, as well as the future—it helps to explore the nature of "protest potential" in MENA, and in the Muslim world more broadly. By "protest potential" I mean the willingness, among average citizens, to participate in mass politics, shoulder-to-shoulder with their compatriots, especially in activities that are considered to be less "conventional" than voting and joining a political party. These activities can range from signing petitions and organizing boycotts to joining strikes and demonstrations. Political scientists have invested considerable energy in assessing variation in these types of political activities, both within countries and across them. But none have yet examined how MENA and other Muslim countries compare to the non-Muslim world.

Comprehensive studies of Muslim politics (e.g., Fish 2011) have yet to examine political participation, and most regional studies of activism (e.g., Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008; Stockemer and Khazaeli 2014) focus on conventional politics only. Otherwise, we are left with studies of single cases (e.g., Chrona and Capelos 2017; Lussier 2019; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah 2018) or particular organizations (e.g., El-Said and Rauch 2015); ones confined to the Muslim world alone (e.g., Sarkissian 2012); or broad examinations of religion and politics that assess the role of Islam, among other faiths (e.g., Arikan and Bloom 2018), or participation of Muslims in exclusively non-Muslim contexts (e.g., Peucker 2018).

In contrast to these extant studies, my goal here is to undertake a comparative inquiry, asking how citizens in the Middle East and other Muslim countries fare in terms of their potential to engage in large-scale political activism. Across a number of measures and specifications, I find a dramatic participation gap in the Muslim world, similar to the one hypothesized by Bellin (2004). The deficit I find is statistically and substantively significant, and it holds across demographic groups and in a wide variety of political and economic contexts. As such, it transcends differences in opportunities, risks, and resources between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Moreover, it does not appear to be driven by bias in the ways that Muslim respondents report their willingness to participate, whether prospectively or retrospectively.

Although the protest gap is not driven by Islam itself, the relationship between participation and religiosity among Muslims offers an important clue as to its source: while personal religious beliefs and private practices tend to depress individuals' willingness to become politically active, investments in one's religious community—including regular attendance at mosque and membership in religious associations—spur activism. I suggest that the latter, but not the former, speaks to a salient Islamic identity, which supports political participation by addressing concerns about social trust among individual activists. While generalized interpersonal trust tends to be low in Muslim countries, and while this distrust tends to undermine protest potential, the effect is entirely ameliorated for those with salient Islamic identities, who tend to trust other Muslims. As such, social trust may be the root cause of the region's participation gap as well as the source of a mobilization advantage among Islamic-based political groups.

Defining and Measuring Protest Potential

Beyond voter turnout and party preferences, political scientists have examined participation in so-called "unconventional" or "unorthodox" politics (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Marsh 1974). These varied forms of political activism are common to democracies and autocracies alike. In the former, grass-roots movements regularly hold elected officials accountable, acting as a counterbalance to the moneyed interests of the elite; in the latter, large-scale protests are capable of bringing about regime change. In both contexts, these types of activities are a "mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 1). Traditionally, scholarly emphasis was placed on conventional politics because it was thought to be the only form of activity that engaged large numbers of citizens (Norris 2007). But as the Arab Spring proved, mass politics can also take unconventional forms. Similarly, while unconventional politics were once dismissed as anti-systemic and violent, most now recognize the important role they play in accountability and representation (Stockemer 2014).

In addition to caring about participation in these types of activity for their own sake, social scientists are invested in understanding protest potential because the willingness of individuals to become politically active speaks to a collective quality that is valuable for other outcomes. Because most mainstream political movements are massive in scale and largely anonymous, their success does not depend on the specific contribution of any one participant; and since their success results in policy changes that are enjoyed by all citizens, individuals benefit from these activities irrespective of their actual contribution. As a result, large-scale political participation represents a quintessential collective action problem: even if all citizens support a movement and its objectives, there is an incentive for each to opt out and simply free-ride off of others' efforts; and without sufficient numbers, a political movement cannot succeed, leaving everyone worse off (Chong 1991; Hardin 1971; Olson 2002).

Like the successful provision of public goods, mass politics requires that this free-rider problem be effectively addressed. The solution rests in the heterogeneity of individual preferences: while some (~20 percent) seem to have rational egoist preferences, including the incentive to free-ride, the majority (~40–60 percent) are "conditional cooperators," who prefer to do their part as long as others do the same (Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker 2003; Ostrom 2000). Collective action—whether political or otherwise—critically depends on these cooperators identifying one another and working together. Ultimately, it hinges on whether cooperators expect to be working with others like them, who want to do right by those who do right by them. This expectation of reciprocal cooperation, despite incentives to defect, is a common definition of a trust (Hardin 2002; Nannestad 2008). For this reason, protest potential is closely connected to trust and trustworthiness among average citizens, as well as their ability to work collectively to solve problems—the same features that bolster economic development (Knack and Keefer 1997), health (Kawachi, Subramanian, and Kim 2008), and happiness (Helliwell and Putnam 2004).

To assess variation in protest potential, scholars have typically relied on self-reports from survey respondents who describe whether they have taken part or would take part in a number of activities, from signing petitions and attending lawful demonstrations to joining boycotts and strikes and occupying buildings.[1] These activities vary in their degree of "acceptability," which parallels their perceived costliness, both of which exacerbate the underlying collective action problem. And by asking which of these actions respondents "have done," which they "would do," and which they would "never, under any circumstances do," both retrospective and prospective activism can be assessed. Prospective activism fits squarely into the concept of "protest potential" and, like actual participation, it indicates a capacity to solve the collective action problem.

Using responses from a number of cross-national survey projects, I am able to estimate protest potential among 871,674 respondents from 141 countries,[2] including 31 where Muslims constitute a majority of the population.[3] In these contexts, Muslims constitute the largest subgroup and are therefore most likely to lead (or at least populate) any mass mobilization effort. Of course, not every Muslim-majority country is covered by the surveys, including some particularly repressive regimes, but any sampling bias should produce a lower bound on the gap between the Muslim and non-Muslim world.

As with all large-scale surveys, there are important questions to ask about the representativeness of the data. While each of the surveys is designed to be nationally representative, since the number of activists in each country might be quite small, even small biases in respondent selection or response could impact how we assess protest potential. Luckily, when combining retrospective and prospective participation, the number of would-be activists is not all that tiny. For the activity with the lowest cost—signing a petition—protest potential is well over 60 percent, on average, ranging from 100 percent to just under 5 percent (μ=0.962, σ=0.213); and nearly 15 percent of respondents, on average, say that they have done or would consider doing the highest-cost activity, occupying a building. Other measurement concerns are likely to be ameliorated by the number of surveys per country (4.8 on average). While estimates of protest potential from surveys within each country tend to cluster together, averaging across these observations will help to address sampling or response biases in any particular survey.

ASSESSING PROTEST POTENTIAL IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Across all respondents, patterns follow existing expectations: the largest share have signed a petition (28.8 percent) or might consider doing so (32.7 percent), followed by the share that have taken part in a demonstration (17.6 percent) or might do so (31.9 percent). Smaller numbers have boycotted (8.2 percent) or would (29.9 percent), joined a strike (5.7 percent, 21.4 percent), or occupied a building (2.2 percent, 12.7 percent). Self-reported participation across activities is significantly intercorrelated, particularly when distinguishing those who have or would participate in each from those who would never consider doing so. As such, it seems plausible to collapse protest potential across multiple activities into a single index, reflecting whether respondents have done or would do any of them.

To assess protest potential in the Muslim world, I begin with the raw data, calculating rates of retrospective and prospective participation in the five separate activities within each country. Arranging these according to the Muslim population-share, a dramatic pattern emerges (Figure 19.1)—in each case, protest potential declines with the



FIGURE 19.1: Protest Potential, by Muslim Population-Share

Notes: Average rates of retrospective ("have participated") and prospective ("would participate") participation across surveys within 141 countries, for each of five separate political activities: signing a petition, attending a lawful demonstration, participating in a boycott, joining a strike, and occupying a building. Retrospective participation indicated in the light gray and prospective participation in the medium gray. Across the share of the country's population that is Muslim, with lines indicating the lowess trends for both types of participation.

share of Muslims in the country, with the strongest effects for prospective participation (whether respondents would consider participating). Dividing the set of countries into two groups—Muslim-majority versus non-Muslim—I find that the differences are almost always statistically significant: respondents in Muslim countries have and would petition, demonstrate, boycott, and occupy less; and while they are no less likely to have joined a strike, if they have not done so before, they are significantly less likely to consider doing so in the future.

Of course, there are important differences between Muslim and non-Muslim countries that could be driving this pattern. To begin, a range of factors at the individual-level, known to correlate with political participation, could be different (or operate differently) in Muslim-majority settings. For example, women tend to be less politically active, on average (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997), and this could be even more pronounced in Muslim societies, where some gender inequities are higher, on average (Fish 2011). Similarly, participation tends to increase with age (Quintelier and Blais 2016), and Muslim countries have tended to have younger populations (Groth and Sousa-Poza 2012). And while education tends to bolster participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), Muslim countries have historically had lower graduation rates (Papagapitos and Riley 2009).

Obviously, political activism also requires some baseline interest in politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and one possible explanation for the absence of popular mobilization in MENA (and the broader Muslim world) could be widespread apathy (Mednicoff 1998). Alongside interest, expectations about the responsiveness of the political system to citizen demands also tends to explain variation in participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013), and although political trust has not been found to be consistently lower in Muslim countries, it may operate quite differently there, strengthening support for autocratic regimes (Jamal 2007). Individual income is also often taken as an indicator of both grievances—pushing low-income citizens to become political—and resources—boosting participation among the wealthy (Gallego 2007). Income inequality could also be higher in the Muslim world (El-Ghonemy 1998), increasing the relative share of both political classes.

Beyond differences across individuals, variation at the national level could also explain why protest potential is lower in Muslim countries. State institutions create both opportunities and risks for would-be activists. On the one hand, democracy creates openings for citizen demands (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009), and the Muslim world (especially MENA) is known for its democratic deficit (Fish 2002). On the other hand, state repression closes off opportunities for activism, raising the costs of pushing for change, and some Muslim countries are known to limit political competition (Lust-Okar 2004). Meanwhile, natural resources are thought to restrict participation even further, both in the Muslim world and beyond (Bellin 2004; Smith 2004). Similarly, national income can both support and depress protest (Gurr 1968; Inglehart 1990), and many Muslim countries are said to be historically underdeveloped (Kuran 2004).

To understand how these variables might impact the participation gap in the Muslim world, I begin by creating an index of protest potential, coded one (1) if a respondent has done or would do any activity, and zero (0) otherwise. To maximize coverage, I focus on participation in petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts alone. Using this index, I calculate the percent of protest potential across different groups of respondents, comparing those living in Muslim countries to those living elsewhere. For example, to assess whether the difference between the two regions is driven by gender dynamics, I compare levels of protest potential among men and among women, inside and outside of the Muslim world, checking to see whether the gap is driven by only one of the two genders.

Gender roughly bifurcates the sample, and I use age categories that divide the sample into four roughly equal groups: 25 and under, 26–40, 41–55, and 56 and older. For education, I distinguish those who have at least a university degree from those who completed high school and those who completed their primary education, coding the rest as having no formal education. To capture variation in apathy, I use a survey question about respondents' interest in politics, creating a binary indicator of being either "very" or "somewhat" interested in politics. Political trust is another binary indicator of having either "a lot" or "some" confidence in one's national government. To create income groups of roughly equal size, I combine those in the bottom two quintiles and those in the top two.

Across countries, I define democracies as those with a Polity score of six or above in the survey-year, with the remaining country-years classified as autocracies.[4] To assess state control of political opposition, I use the Freedom of Assembly and Association index from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset in the country-year (see Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Countries are coded as resource-dependent if they are above the global average in terms of the percentage of their GDP that comes from resource rents (roughly 6 percent). Similarly, in terms of overall income, I code countries as high-income if they are above the global average in terms of logged GDP per capita (roughly 8.75).

The results of these comparisons are displayed in Figure 19.2, showing the averages in each group within Muslim and non-Muslim countries as well as the gap between the two. Across all demographic groups—men and women, within every age and education level—a statistically significant gap remains. While levels of retrospective and prospective participation are significantly lower in Muslim countries for each group, the patterns across groups on each dimension are generally the same in Muslim and non-Muslim countries: women participate less than men, participation is decreasing in age and increasing in education and income, and it is lower for those who are apathetic and who trust their government.

Still, some noteworthy patterns are worth mentioning. The participation gap is slightly larger for women than it is for men, perhaps reflecting religious-based norms against Muslim women's participation in politics. Meanwhile, the gap is considerably smaller for the undereducated, which could indicate that a lack of education creates grievances that propel participation in the Muslim world, while signifying a lack of resources that depress participation elsewhere. A similar story can be told about the relationship between income and participation at the individual level, with a weaker



FIGURE 19.2: Participation Gap in Muslim World, across Covariates

Notes: Retrospective and prospective participation in any of three political activities—petitions, demonstrations, boycotts—in Muslim-plurality countries (indicated by darker gray) and non-Muslim countries (in light gray), with the gap indicated by dashed lines.

correlation between the two in Muslim countries. I also find a smaller gap among those who trust the current government, which would seem to indicate that Jamal's (2009) observations about Palestine hold more broadly.

Similarly, examining variation at the national level, I find the gap remains among democracies and autocracies alike, although participation rates are relatively higher in both Muslim and non-Muslim democracies. The gap remains when Freedom of Assembly and Association is severely restricted and limited, although it is substantively smaller for those Muslim countries where the political opposition is largely unrestricted. This pattern—combined with a larger gap among democracies—is difficult to interpret—it could point to an interaction between regime and restrictions, whereby participation is limited by either in the Muslim world.

I also find that protest potential is significantly lower among Muslim countries that are resource-dependent and among those that have few natural resources, with a slightly smaller gap among resource-rich countries. This would seem to indicate that rentierism cannot explain the participation gap in the Muslim world. The gap holds among both high- and low-income countries, with a larger gap among higher-income countries. Interestingly, national income has no effect on protest potential in the Muslim world. While national income bolsters participation in non-Muslim countries—ostensibly due to citizen resources—it may generate acquiescence and apathy in Muslim countries.

Can Retrospective and Prospective Responses Be Trusted?

Further work should explore some of the patterns I have identified between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, but for my purposes here, it is sufficient to note that there is a persistent gap in protest potential between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, one that is both statistically significant and substantive in magnitude. That retrospective and prospective participation follows similar patterns across groups, inside and outside of the Muslim world, attenuates some concerns that there is something different about the nature or quality of self-reports from the region. But given that, on average, Muslim-majority countries tend to be less democratic, with more severe restrictions on political activities, respondents living there may feel less comfortable freely admitting that they are politically active. So, while self-reports of retrospective and prospective participation are generally valid (Quintelier and Blais 2016), they may be systematically less so in the Muslim world.

That the gap in protest potential persists in both democracies and autocracies challenges this suggestion. So does the fact that the participation gap between Muslim and non-Muslim countries remains in self-reported voter turnout, an activity where there is pressure to overreport rather than underreport (Selb and Munzert 2013).[5] But neither of these directly assess the validity of self-reports among Muslim respondents. To do so, we need to be able compare retrospective and prospective self-reports to *actual* participation, and it is rare that we know anything systematic about participants in a real-world political event.

Luckily, a unique survey was conducted among participants in the protest activities in and around Istanbul's Gezi Park in June 2013. In addition to demographic indicators, the survey asks participants whether this was their first time participating in a large-scale political activity. In combination with two representative surveys I conducted in Turkey—one in 2012, which happened to ask respondents whether they had participated or would participate in a mass demonstration, and another in 2015, which asked about their participation in the Gezi Park events—I am able to assess the validity of both prospective and retrospective self-reports from the Gezi survey.[6] Although

Turkey was—until recently—one of the most liberal democracies in the Muslim world, its recent autocratic turn can be said to have started with the Gezi Park events. As such, even if prospective participation in 2012 would have been self-reported in a relatively liberal environment, retrospective participation in 2015 would not have been, making the Turkish case more similar to other Muslim settings.

Figure 19.3 displays the demographic characteristics of eight different groups of respondents: those who said, prospectively, that they would never participate in a demonstration, and those who said, retrospectively, that they did not participate in the Gezi events; those who said, prospectively, that they had never participated but would consider doing so, and those who said, retrospectively, that they had not taken part in the Gezi events, but know those who did; those who said, prospectively, that they had participated in a demonstration before, and those who said, retrospectively, that they were at Gezi; and those who were surveyed at Gezi Park—both those who said it was their first time participating in a large-scale demonstration and those who self-reported participating before. For each group, I assess the proportion that is female, the distribution of ages, and the average level of education (whether respondents had completed primary, secondary, or tertiary education).



FIGURE 19.3: Retrospective and Prospective Participants in the Gezi Park Protests
Notes: Groups of respondents from three representative surveys are compared in terms of gender balance, age distribution, and completion of primary (dark gray), secondary (medium gray), and tertiary education (light gray). *Ex ante* participation—"have" *vs.* "would" *vs.* "would never"—in any political demonstration in 2012 compared to participants surveyed during the 2013 Gezi Park protests.

I find some evidence that women may be less likely to honestly report their participation, especially *ex post*: while those surveyed at Gezi were slightly more female than male, the group that later admitted participating in the Gezi events was overwhelmingly male. Otherwise, the results are roughly consistent: participants at Gezi were younger and better educated, and that can be seen in the retrospective self-reports—those that said they took part are the youngest and best educated of the prospective and retrospective respondents, including those who admitted to being politically active in the 2012 survey, well before the Gezi Park events took place. It is also interesting to see just how similar the Gezi Park participants were, as a group: it is difficult to distinguish demographically those who were participating in their first demonstration from those who had participated before, indicating that it might be right to combine survey respondents who have participated and those who would into a single set of potential protesters.

The Role of Islam in the Muslim Participation Gap

Given the participation gap in the Muslim world, it is important to understand the role that Islam itself might play in undermining protest potential in the region. Generally speaking, religion can enter into political decision-making in a number of ways: nominal denomination can effect activism if a particular religious doctrine encourages or discourages political involvement; religious institutions and their relationship to the state can foment or suppress political activity; and, across members of the same faith, the level of religiosity can influence levels of political engagement. In other words, participation could be lower in the Muslim world because Islam discourages activism, because institutions in Muslim-majority countries do, and/or because religiosity among individual Muslims discourages participation.

Political science has a long history of examining the role of religion and religiosity in political activity, although the great majority of existing research has focused on Christians in the Western world (Wald and Wilcox 2006). Those studies that have focused on Islam, in particular, have found that the impact of religion in politics is roughly similar for Christians and Muslims, although a direct comparison has not yet been made (Jamal 2005; Sarkissian 2012). The few that have assessed the impact of denomination and institutions examine Islam as one of the world's many faiths, so we do not yet know if it is particularly distinctive (Arikan and Bloom 2018).

To assess the impact of both denomination and institutions, I can leverage variation at the individual-level—between self-identified Muslims and non-Muslims—and at the country-level—between Muslim-majority and non-Muslim contexts. If Islam, as a denomination, is the source of the participation gap, then Muslims should have lower rates of protest potential across both sets of countries; if context is more to blame, then the participation gap might extend to non-Muslims living in the Muslim world.

The results of this two-by-two comparison are illustrated in Figure 19.4. They show that Islam, as a doctrine, is unlikely to be depressing protest potential, as Muslims in non-Muslim countries participate at rates equal to or greater than their compatriots.[7] Meanwhile, context does seem to matter, as participation rates are lower for both Christians and Muslims living in the Muslim world. That rates are comparatively lower for Muslims in the region would seem to indicate that faith—in some form, beyond doctrine—is playing an additional role in suppressing protest potential there.

If religious doctrine cannot explain the participation gap for Muslims in the Muslim world, how else might religion suppress protest potential? Increasingly, scholars of religion and politics have distinguished between two dimensions of religiosity, each with a different impact on political engagement. The first—private religious belief—seems to suppress political activism, while the latter—collective religious engagement—seems to support it (Arikan and Bloom 2018; Livny 2020; Wilcox, Wald, and Jelen 2008). Could the same findings hold among Muslims in the Muslim world?

To directly compare the two dimensions, and their impact on protest potential, I gathered multiple markers of each from the cross-national survey dataset, focusing on self-identified Muslims in Muslim-majority countries. Private religious beliefs can be captured with responses to the following questions: whether religion is important in respondents' lives, whether God is important in their lives, and whether they self-identify as a religious person. Collective engagement can be assessed using the frequency of mosque attendance and membership in a religious association. Sitting



FIGURE 19.4: Islam and Protest Potential, Inside and Outside of the Muslim World
Notes: Rates of retrospective and prospective participation among Muslims and non-Muslims, distinguished by whether they live in Muslim-plurality or non-Muslim countries.

between the two—capturing private religious engagement—is an indicator of whether respondents self-report private moments of prayer and reflection. Using principal component factor analysis, I confirm the difference between these indicators: while all six load onto a single "religiosity" factor, only mosque attendance and associational membership load onto a second factor, one that picks up religion's more collective aspects.

Rates of protest potential across each measure of religiosity are displayed in Figure 19.5. As elsewhere, among other faiths, a familiar pattern emerges: rates of retrospective and prospective participation are declining across levels of personal religiosity but increasing across levels of collective religious engagement. In regression analysis with demographic controls and country fixed-effects, I find that each of these effects is statistically significant.

But why the difference? Clearly, religious beliefs—as preferences—and religious practices—as behavior—could have different impacts on political engagement, but to understand the crux of the difference, it is useful to focus on the impact of private prayer on participation. The negative effect highlights that what is distinctive about mosque attendance and associational membership is not that they are behaviors but that they are *collective*. If we remember that political participation is a quintessential collective action, then the connection between the two starts to sharpen. Perhaps those who engage in religious group-activities are better able to address the underlying collective action problem, supporting participation in both religious and political activities.



FIGURE 19.5: Religiosity and Protest Potential among Muslims in the Muslim World
Notes: Retrospective ("have done," in light gray) and prospective ("would do," in medium gray) participation in any of three political activities, across levels of religiosity: importance of religion and God in respondents' lives, self-identified religiosity, a binary indicator of private prayer, frequency of mosque attendance, and a binary indicator of membership in a religious association.

I can capture this dynamic empirically by focusing on a key obstacle to collective action—interpersonal distrust. Recall that participation in group activities, whether religious or political, depends on trustworthy "conditional cooperators" successfully locating each other and working together. Even if they are individually motivated to participate, if these cooperators believe that most people in their communities cannot be trusted to do right by them, they will opt out of group activities. As such, generalized interpersonal distrust—the belief that most people cannot be trusted—limits protest potential (Benson and Rochon 2004). But if religious group-activities help to overcome this collective action problem, either by building social capital that can be applied elsewhere (Kwak, Shah, and Holbert 2004) or by developing group-based trust that can substitute for more generalized trust-expectations (Livny 2020), then the link between distrust and participation would be severed for those who are invested in their religious communities.

To assess this possibility, I estimate a model of protest potential where the direct effects of generalized distrust and religiosity are assessed, along with their interaction. Combining the direct and interaction terms, I am able to define the effect of distrust on participation, conditional on the level of religiosity. To compare the two dimensions of religiosity, I use the markers with the broadest coverage: the importance of religion in respondents' lives, as a measure of private religiosity, and frequency of mosque attendance, to capture collective religious engagement. The key results of this model are displayed in Figure 19.6. While generalized distrust tends to depress protest potential,



FIGURE 19.6: Personal and Collective Religion and the Trust Problem
Notes: OLS models of "protest potential," combining retrospective and prospective participation in any of three activities. Collective religion measured using frequency of mosque attendance; private religion measured as self-reported importance of religion, in the first model (dark gray), and private prayer, in the second (light gray). Distrust is a binary indicator of the feeling that most people cannot be trusted. All models include demographic controls (age, gender, education) and country fixed-effects with standard errors clustered within countries. Bars indicate statistical significance at 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent levels.

the effect is entirely ameliorated for those who attend mosque with some frequency—at least once per month. Meanwhile, the interaction between distrust and private religiosity is statistically indistinguishable from zero, meaning that it does not address the underlying distrust problem.

I find the same patterns when I use more comparable measures of private and collective religiosity—private prayer compared to prayer at mosque. Even with a more limited sample size, I continue to find that collective engagement solves the trust problem while private practices do not. Of course, there are many plausible interpretations of these results. Those who attend mosque may simply be more trusting than average, or they may gain practical or psychic resources through attending that make them more likely to engage in politics. But I find little evidence of either of these. On the one hand, frequent mosque attendees are statistically indistinguishable from others in terms of their level of trust. And the direct effect of mosque attendance on political participation is null, if not negative, indicating that the impact of religious engagement runs only through those who generally distrust.

Conclusion

In this survey of protest potential across the Muslim world, I have found a substantive and significant participation gap: individuals living in Muslim-majority countries are less likely to engage in politics. This is especially true for those who are Muslims themselves, and who engage in religious practices privately or hold strong personal religious beliefs. The participation gap between Muslim and non-Muslim countries holds across demographic categories and in all types of countries. Within the Muslim world, only engagement in collective religious activities bolsters political participation. While I have focused my analysis here on communal prayer and formal associations, participation in Qurʾanic reading circles and enrollment in religious schools are likely to have a similar positive effect on political activity.

I have argued that the distinguishing feature of these all religious group-activities is their ability to address the collective action problem underlying the decision to become politically active. Elsewhere, I have made a more specific claim that different forms of collective religious engagement help to develop a sense of Islamic group identity among those who take part, building trust among them (Livny 2020). This group-based trust can effectively substitute for more generalized trust-expectations, supporting cooperation and coordination in both politics and economics. Ultimately, this also helps to address the initial puzzle of the participation gap in the Muslim world: because collective political action rests so heavily on trust, and because generalized interpersonal trust tends to be lower in Muslim-majority countries, individuals opt out of most any political activity that does not tap into their Muslim identity and the group-based trust it fosters. The result is lower levels of political (and economic) participation overall.

Given this, how are we to understand the remarkable events of the Arab Spring, including the mass demonstrations that followed in and around Istanbul's Gezi Park in 2012? I believe we should indeed define them as extraordinary. They were indicative of overwhelming frustration among the masses which, when mixed with their courage and tenacity, was able to overcome a pervasive trust problem and a lack of underlying "protest potential" in the region. Unfortunately, these types of spontaneous (and extraordinary) events are often short-lived. When it comes to keeping the momentum going—coordinating and cooperating over the longer term to build long-lasting change—the trust problem will undoubtedly creep back in. Islamic-based identity politics may help, in this respect, as could other forces that evoke group-based trust. Without a solution to the collective action problem, extraordinary demonstrations, powered by anger and hope, may punctuate history but are unlikely to change the course of events.

NOTES

1. The set of now-standard questions first appeared in Marsh (1974) and were developed further by Kaase and Marsh (1979).
2. Between the World Values Survey 2018, European Values Study 2011, Afrobarometer 2000, Afrobarometer 2007, Afrobarometer 2014, Asian Barometer 2009, East Asian Barometer 2017, and Latinobarometer 2018, I have the most information about individuals' propensity to demonstrate ($N = 848{,}332$), but also their willingness to sign a petition ($N = 661{,}455$) and join a boycott ($N = 479{,}702$).
3. As defined by Pew Research Center (2015), the Muslim countries in the dataset are Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Northern Cyprus, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.
4. I prefer to measure all country-level variables in the survey-year—as opposed to the year or years before—to capture current dynamics, more likely to impact prospective participation.
5. In Muslim-plurality countries, just over 60 percent of respondents self-report voting in the last election, while the self-reported turnout rate in non-Muslim countries is more than 72 percent.
6. To maximize my chances of comparing like with like, I focus only on those respondents from Istanbul, with easy access to Gezi Park.
7. That there is a difference in the participation index, but not any of the three individual activities, indicates that Muslims in non-Muslim countries tend to participate in more than one activity, while non-Muslims will specialize in one or two, increasing the number of non-Muslims who participate in any of the three.

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CHAPTER 20

ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA

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THE spread of terrorism as a mode of violence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has generated a rich literature on this form of violent political behavior. Yet post-9/11 studies of terrorism have tended to place Islam within a "securitization" paradigm (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), viewing the relationship between religion and violence through the narrow lens of security, and thereby overpredicting the extent of terrorist violence across societies. This trend has led empirical studies of terrorism to center on countries in the Middle East and North Africa, while the relationship between religion and violence in Muslim-majority countries in other parts of the world remains understudied. There are also few studies of "negative" cases, where significant episodes of violence are possible but have failed to materialize (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). What accounts for these cases with such low levels of terrorism?

Long viewed as harboring an underlying potential for large-scale violence, Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) has largely defied this depiction. Despite features of underdevelopment—crumbling infrastructure, state repression, remittance economies, organized crime, and widespread corruption—that should make the region vulnerable to nonstate violence, Central Asia has experienced surprisingly low levels of terrorism since the late-1990s. In fact, out of 112,252 terrorist incidents registered by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) between 1994 and 2016 worldwide, only 211 terrorist attacks took place in the five Central Asian republics, which constitutes about 0.19 percent of the global total. This is surprising, given that most of the extremist and violent terrorist incidents identified in the GTD during this period occurred in Muslim-majority countries (Cordesman 2017). Between 2013 and 2017, a significant number of Central

Asians were recruited into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but the preponderance of recruits came not from the region but from Central Asian labor migrants in Russia, where isolation from family and local communities, frequent discrimination, and ghettoization within Russian society have been important drivers of extremism (Tucker 2015). As such, Central Asia constitutes a useful site to examine (a) how theories of terrorism extend to understudied parts of the Muslim world, and (b) what underlying conditions explain why some of these regions are characterized by low levels of terrorist violence.

After reviewing the various explanations of terrorist violence, and applying them to Central Asia, this chapter explores the conditions under which a state's involvement in illicit economies—specifically its collusion in the drug trade—can dampen levels of terrorist violence. While the state often enters into the comparative study of terrorism, our approach emphasizes the complex political economy of security that defines infrastructurally weak states, where political and security apparatuses are often immersed in informal and illicit economies (Omelicheva and Markowitz 2019). Since studying politics (of violence) in nondemocratic contexts, where relevant data is often unavailable or inaccurate, brings particular challenges, we combine quantitative analysis (including GIS-enabled tools) with a series of in-depth expert interviews conducted in Central Asia. This approach helps us uncover the complex links between religion and organized violence, where state apparatuses are often drawn into collaborative relationships with nonstate actors.

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE

Defined as a form of political violence intended to promote intimidation or incite fear in a larger audience beyond the immediate victims (Hoffman 2006, 3), terrorism usually involves small, secretive, nonstate actors operating outside of state control (Crenshaw 2011). Despite the small number of perpetrators, however, terrorism remains one of the most politically significant forms of violent behavior in Muslim-majority societies, in part due to the potentially broad-based appeal of ideologies and incentives driving this premeditated use of violence. As a result, the comparative study of terrorism often centers on accounts of political behavior, such as motive and incentive. *Motive* refers to a range of individual-level considerations—grievances or psychological needs—that causes a person to act. *Incentive* describes a range of strategic considerations that make violence possible when an individual concludes that violence promises greater reward compared to the risks and costs. Such incentives are commonly promised by terrorist organizations, and are often seen as a necessary link in the mobilization process for terrorist behavior. Scholars have increasingly sought to bridge the social movement and political violence literatures in their study of terrorism. A focus on opportunity structure and mobilization, for instance, examines how terrorism arises when certain political, social, and even geographic conditions are ripe for successful violent political contention. Indeed, while some early accounts linking religion to terrorist violence fastened upon its internal drivers or opportunistic leaders (Juergensmeyer 2000; Stern 2004; Pape 2005), it is now well established that this relationship is best understood in a broader social, historical, economic, and political context. To this end, this chapter examines the political behaviors underlying terrorism (and the public fear and government response it elicits) as a form of political violence more broadly, considering an array of potential causal factors. Though some have surveyed these by analytical approach (e.g., Chenoweth and Moore 2018), a more limited range of relevant propellants of terrorist violence can be identified at the micro (individual), meso (group or organization), and macro (societal or national) levels.

At the individual level, a variety of personality characteristics, psychological factors, and grievances may lead a person to carry out or participate in terrorist attacks. One micro-level constraint is familiarity with victims, as most perpetrators do not wish to target their own communities. While exceptions exist, extremists in Western Europe have tended to carry out attacks in foreign theaters, not domestically (Hegghammer 2013). Another individual-level cause is the absence (or loss) of personal ties, social networks, or family relationships. Most of the ETA's early recruits into its terrorist organizations in Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, were young (teenagers), single, and urban (Reinares 2004). Similar patterns have been found among those inspired by ISIS to carry out attacks in Western Europe (Clarke 2019). Psychological well-being and health is also a factor: some individuals' exposure to violence or personal trauma may make involvement in violent political acts more likely, while others' low ego or dependent personality can make them more amenable to group or leader influence (Zhirkov, Verkuyten, and Weesie 2014). Local drivers of violence (e.g., rivalry, denunciation, revenge) that attend high-conflict contexts may also influence an individuals' willingness carry out violence (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017).

Recent empirical findings from studies of Central Asian societies have found some support for many of these arguments. Persons surveyed who were young, male, unmarried, had experienced state repression or discrimination, and had links to crime, were more likely to look favorably toward extremist views and the use of violence for religious ends (Search for Common Ground 2016; Nasritdinov et al. 2019). Lingering psychological effects of exposure to violence during Tajikistan's civil war, however, are indirect, and often shaped by the contested narratives between the government and opposition groups over how the conflict is remembered (Epkenhans 2018). In short, micro-level factors point to important fine-grained differences within and across countries, but they are strongly influenced by an individual's interaction with the state.

At the meso level, groups and organizations in society also have important influences on terrorist violence. As in other forms of violence, those groups with greater organizational resources are more lethal and effective (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Kilberg 2012; Horowitz and Potter 2014) and tend to last longer (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013; Phillips 2014). Additionally, institutional supports in society for moderation, compromise, and nonviolence, such as religious institutions (mosques, temples, churches), union or workplace structures, party organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, are seen as influential in mitigating violence (Varshney 2002; Schwedler 2007).

These meso-level features help explain generally lower levels of violence across Central Asia, where groups struggle to overcome the challenges of a weak organizational base, insufficient funding, and lack of leadership. The two groups designated as terrorist organizations by the US government with a definite Central Asia connection—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union—have had to repeatedly relocate and redefine themselves, engage in illicit entrepreneurial activity to stay afloat, and remain focused on local targets in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Central Asia has not seen the emergence of well-organized and deeply rooted violent Islamist organizations that exist in other Muslim-majority regions. Evidence does not support, however, those arguments pointing to the moderating influence of political and social institutions in Central Asia. Civil society has been historically weak in post-Soviet Eurasia generally (Howard 2003), as have political parties and formal religious organizations. In their stead, informal mechanisms of dispute resolution have emerged in Central Asian societies that are localized and rooted in the independent authority of community religious leaders (Khamidov 2017). Moreover, many of these groups and organizations are either monitored or controlled by government authorities, raising questions about their degree of autonomy and their ability to reduce levels of terrorist violence.

At the macro level, particular socioeconomic characteristics are often seen as drivers of terrorism. One set of explanations focuses on geography as a predictor of terrorism—the size of the territory; the length, remoteness, and topography of its shared borders with other countries; and mountainous topography. The expectation is that physically large, mountainous areas with poor transportation infrastructures experience higher levels of terrorism (Asal, Brinton, and Schoon 2015). Another set of arguments holds that territories with higher levels of socioeconomic disparity, poverty, and illiteracy will experience more terrorist activity. Socioeconomic inequality, injustice, and unmet expectations can push individuals toward taking drastic action (e.g., joining an insurgency or committing a crime) to alter the sources of their discontent (Ehrlich 2002; Frevtag et al. 2011), although some studies have shown no direct relationship between poverty, unemployment, and terrorist activity (Krueger 2008; Piazza 2009).

These broader conditions add another layer of analysis, but they also have mixed results when applied to Central Asia. To examine those in Central Asia, we ran two sets of statistical tests. First, we analyzed spatial (time-invariant) determinants of terrorist violence, and then regressed it on a number of socioeconomic predictors. All analyses were performed at the provincial level separately on three Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), from 2008 to 2016. To measure terrorist violence, we used an index of terrorism that captures its intensity by assigning weights to the counts of domestic terrorist incidents (each is multiplied by 1), the total number of fatalities caused by terrorist incidents (each fatality is multiplied by 3), and the total number of injuries caused by terrorism (each injury is multiplied by 0.5) in a province/

year (*Terror Index*) (Hyslop and Morgan 2014). The data on terrorist events come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. Topographic predictors include urban land coverage, distance to the nearest contiguous country, distance to the capital, mountainous area coverage, and the number of border crossings in a province (Blyth et al. 2002; Weidmann et al. 2010; Meiyappan et al. 2012).

We also separately examined socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables that were suggested as determinants of terrorist and criminal activity, including measures of economic performance, education, unemployment, poverty, and population. Because of the differences in the data available across the subregions used in the study, we relied on different empirical indicators as proxies for some of the conceptual variables. Our expectation was that more populous and economically under-developed territories with higher mortality and unemployment rates will experience higher rates of terrorism. Territories with educational opportunities will have lesser rate of terrorist incidents. Our assumption is that the greater the number of people employed in these sectors of economy, the more people in the province will be *de facto* above the official levels of poverty. This, in turn, will be associated with the lower levels of terrorism.

The results of a series of negative binomial regressions with errors clustered over the province are reported in Table 20.1, which displays coefficients (and clustered errors) for several socioeconomic and demographic determinants (Model 1) and topographic variables (Model 2). As with explanations at the micro and meso levels, the results are mixed (particularly in analyses of socioeconomic factors). On the one hand, all the geographic predictors turned out in the expected direction and were statistically significant. Urban areas and less mountainous provinces are more likely to experience terrorism. Distance to border and distance to capital are inversely related to terrorism. Put differently, territories that are more urban, less mountainous, and in proximity to the capital and national borders are more likely to experience terrorist incidents. On the other hand, only some socioeconomic variables provide support for existing explanations. Contrary to the expectation, infant mortality, a proxy for poverty, returned statistically significant coefficients with a negative impact on terrorism in Central Asia (i.e., poorer territories suffer fewer terrorist incidents). However, higher levels of employment contribute to lesser terrorist violence, as well as the volume of cargo turnover (a proxy for transportation infrastructure, but also signifying the level of economic development). Interpreted this way, regions with higher levels of economic development are less likely to experience terrorism, a finding consistent with the outcomes on the "poverty" variable. Other socioeconomic factors, such as crime, population density, and gender, however, were not statistically significant predictors of terrorist violence. Finally, both models found that higher volumes of opioid seizures are associated with a higher level of terrorism, a relationship we explore in the next section.

Existing explanations provide important insights into the factors that promote increased incidence of terrorist attacks in Central Asia, but the results are uneven. Common causes such as individuals' social isolation, groups' organizational resources, and certain topographical and socioeconomic conditions certainly apply to the region.

Table 20.1: Socioeconomic and Topographic Determinants of Terrorism in Eurasia

	Central Asia	
	Model 1	Model 2
Opioid Seizures	0.012** (0.006)	0.0018*** (0.00045)
Infant Mortality	-0.23** (0.09)	
Employment	-29.79*** (10.19)	
Cargo Turnover by Automobile Transport	-0.002** (0.001)	
Education (Students)	0.042 (0.04)	
Population density	1.21 (3.39)	
Sex Ratio	-0.126 (0.132)	
Crime Rate	-0.00006 (0.001)	
Urban Coverage		0.21* (0.282)
Distance to Border		-0.0007*** (0.002)
Distance to Capital		-0.009*** (0.003)
Mountain Coverage		-0.067*** (0.024)
Constant	16.04 (14.6)	0.282 (0.757)
N	239	36
Wald Chi2	23.06	400.08
Prob >chi2	0.0033	(0.00)
Pseudo R-sq	0.06	0.55

***$p<0.01$

**$p<0.05$

*$p<0.01$

However, others, such as the moderating effect of civil society or exposure to crime, do not. These arguments, moreover, fall short of explaining the surprisingly low levels of terrorist violence more broadly across the region. To address this, we turn to the state.

How Illicit Economies Reduce Terrorist Violence

Uniquely situated at the interstices of security, politics, and the market, many infrastructurally weak states are often deeply immersed in illicit economic relationships. Whether it is human trafficking, arms trafficking, the illegal wildlife trade, or counterfeiting or money laundering, the proceeds of illicit trade are highly lucrative and often linked to organized crime. In states such as those in Central Asia, the same political and security apparatuses that are mandated to combat these economies are instead often drawn into them, forging complex ties with a range of nonstate violent actors—including insurgents, erstwhile regime opponents, local criminal bosses, and transnational groups. These relationships erode state capacity, but they also can have the surprising effect of diminishing terrorist activity by redirecting these actors into other spheres and forms of violence (such as center-periphery conflicts, disputes over territorial control, or criminal violence).

This dynamic varies, however, depending on the state's involvement in illicit trade, and specifically on the nature of the revenue bargain struck between the state and leaders in the illicit economy (Easter 2012). Such bargains are critical in Central Asia, a region through which most of the world's opiates transit from Afghanistan to the global market. Drawing on thirty-five in-depth expert interviews conducted in Central Asia in 2016 and 2017, we identify four state-trafficker revenue bargains that direct how the state addresses nonstate organized violence generally (and threats of terrorism in particular). These were individual, semi-structured interviews with a wide range of security experts—including government officials, members of civil society, independent security analysts, journalists, and local scholars—selected for their specialized knowledge of these topics. While not used here, an additional sixty expert interviews conducted in Georgia (in 2017), Armenia (in 2018), and Russia's North Caucasus (in 2017) provide comparative perspective.

First, a state can play an integrative role when its security services' deep involvement in drug trafficking supports and incentivizes the rapid buildup of coercive capabilities and absorbs potential terrorist actors into this complex illicit political economy. In states with predatory capacity, administrative and security institutions become corrupt to the point of their active participation in and facilitation of organized crime, rather than simply allowing it to occur. In short, the government's preoccupation with rent-seeking, including taxing the drug trade and amassing personal wealth through other forms of corruption and crime, turns the rest of society into prey. Under these conditions, state involvement in drug trafficking can dampen levels of terrorism in several ways. For one, corrupt security institutions can provide protection for organized crime and trafficking that enables the proliferation of illegal activities but keeps them "in-house" and limits potential militants' access to funding or criminal support. Also, state control over drug trafficking spheres can be used as an instrument of co-optation and control of local elites, thereby limiting unruly elites from allying with or aiding emergent militant groups. Finally, the state's integrative role shifts points of conflict between state and nonstate actors to center-periphery disputes linked to controlling territory, illicit trafficking routes, and access to markets. For all these reasons, an integrative role of the state tends to absorb potential militant activity into larger pyramids of drug trafficking under national and regional elites, thereby diminishing levels of terrorist violence.

Second, a state can play a mitigating role when its limited involvement in the drug trade undermines its institutional coherence and coercive capacity, but it retains sufficient capabilities to mitigate terrorism while permitting criminal violence to grow.

A state's weakened security capabilities encourages criminal organizations to pursue lucrative sources of revenue in illicit economic spheres (such as drug trafficking), but this does not spill over into heightened levels of terrorism. Far from spawning breeding grounds for extremist recruitment, the appropriation of criminal activities by extremist groups, or the shift to political violence by criminal groups, is rare and sporadic. In fact, while criminals may become ideologically radicalized, the opportunities afforded by a fragmented criminal economy (including the drug trade) with weakened state capabilities diverts potential recruits into militant groups. Moreover, without guidance from leaders, criminal organizations' rank-and-file members do not peel off and attach themselves to insurgent militants, even if led by influential local religious leaders. While pockets of autonomy from the state open the door to potential terrorists' violent opposition to the state or their vulnerability to extremist groups, we expect that advantages will tilt toward drug traffickers. Criminal violence, not terrorist violence, tends to predominate in such contexts.

Third, a state can play a hegemonic role when the removal of its security agencies from the region's drug trafficking economy enables the independent growth of its coercive capabilities and the broad use of repression to substantially reduce levels of terrorism. While the high demand for illicit goods and services may fuel organized crime, countries with robust law-enforcement and intelligence institutions and the political resolve to fight crime will experience less drug trafficking. Comprehensive counterterrorism policies will have greater effect in denying potential militant groups access to sources of funding and will harden the targets that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Low-level corruption may cause a breach in the state's security capability to prevent and respond to trafficking operations, but it hardly constitutes a threat to state security. Consequently, the state's ability to keep trafficking and terrorist networks separate will enable it to preserve a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and diminish the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks.

Finally, we introduce an exception—an outcome in which state failure and civil conflict provide the context in which state offices' unrestrained involvement in drug trafficking open the door to a fleeting convergence of traffickers and militants and briefly increase levels of terrorist violence. In such states that are characterized by extremely weak—or even failing—administrative, judicial, law-enforcement, and security institutions, organized criminal actors can gain control over state institutions. While wholesale state capture (termed "narcostatization," when drug trafficking penetrates state institutions) is extremely rare, it is more common for politicians to cede control over states and set up informal power-sharing deals with the leadership of organized crime. Under these conditions, state involvement in drug trafficking can lead to increased terrorism in several ways. State officials become overtaken and subsumed by organized crime and trafficking groups, which enables the explosive proliferation of a wide range of terrorism and drug trafficking activities that morph into a single web of activity. Additionally, the state's loss of control over local elites leads those elites to become immersed in the fully intersecting spheres of terrorism and trafficking. And the state's loss of a monopoly of violence entails the fragmentation of its state security agencies, many of which separate from the state and join terrorist and criminal organizations. In this context of a breakdown of state authority, the convergence of terrorist and criminal activity, and its fusion with coercive agents of the state, will escalate terrorist violence. We explore the empirical implications of these revenue bargains in our cases below.

Illicit Economies and Low Levels of Terrorism in Central Asia

Since the late 2000s, Tajikistan has exemplified an integrative role of the state, in which terrorist violence is absorbed into the country's illicit political economy. Following civil war in the 1990s, Tajikistan's central government struggled to reestablish control over many parts of the country. One regime strategy for stabilizing postwar Tajikistan was to cede control over key institutions (including parts of the security apparatus) to former commanders and prominent politicians and allow them to establish ties to organized criminal groups (Heathershaw 2009; Markowitz 2013; Driscoll 2015). One of the most significant features of Tajikistan's post-conflict state-building has been the regime's revenue bargain with traffickers, which has enabled it to consolidate and exploit its control over the drug trade. The drug trade in Tajikistan in the 1990s was somewhat fractured, constituted by several competing medium-sized groups that were residual formations of warlord militias from the civil war period. The heads of drug trafficking operations were also former commanders of militias during the civil war (Paoli et al. 2007). As part of the post-conflict power-sharing and reintegration process, these commanders were appointed to senior positions in government, which enabled them to conduct the drug trade from within state structures. While these political elites used their positions to influence counter-trafficking efforts, eliminate rivals, and centralize the drug trade, this also enabled President Emomali Rahmon to concentrate the central leadership's control over the drug trade by replacing senior officials with persons beholden to him (De Danieli 2014).

As a consequence, the drug trade was effectively centralized under the control of the ruling elite (with ties extending into the presidential administration). By the early 2000s, it was widely believed that drug trafficking was supported and protected by a range of officials, including border officers, customs officials, and those in the Drug Control Agency and Ministry of Internal Affairs. As one security official noted, there are many "hidden hands" aiding the drug trade that serve as intermediaries, enabling former warlords and others in this illegal activity. It is generally believed that politically connected traffickers are protected, and in return smaller dealers and sellers are turned over to keep up an image of regular seizures and arrests. Thus, larger organized syndicates remained untouched, allowing the central government to continue to benefit from large profits.

The central government's use of co-optation and coercion against former opposition politicians and senior officials (nationally and regionally) has led to several center-periphery conflicts. Many who might have moved toward insurgent or terrorist groups were drawn into these arrangements through their wartime ties to local and regional leaders. In eastern Tajikistan (in the Rasht Valley and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast), many local officials were believed to be heavily involved in the drug trade, and collaborations between drug traffickers, criminal groups, and militants evolved under the protection and patronage of those figures. As these were dismissed, or as they preemptively broke from the regime, they mobilized networks of supporters (often former militants). These conflicts predominated in Tajikistan, absorbing most of the nonstate militant activity and minimizing the frequency and intensity of religiously inspired terrorist violence. As a result, very few terrorist incidents have emerged in Tajikistan over the past two decades, and most of these have been disconnected, small-scale attacks. Two attacks (in 2008 and 2009) in northern Tajikistan, attributed to the IMU, were individual shootings of police officers, while a third (in 2010), claimed by a previously unknown group (Jamaat-e Ansurallah), involved a car bombing of a regional police headquarters.

The case of Kyrgyzstan exemplifies a mitigating role of the state, in which relatively weak government influence over illicit economic activity partially reduces threats of terrorist violence while allowing a rise in criminality. Marked by intra-elite divisions, state paralysis, and twice overwhelmed by elite-led protests (2005 and 2010), Kyrgyzstan has emerged as an intersection of organized criminal organizations and drug trafficking. Having initiated political liberalization in the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan's national and regional elite remained influential actors, particularly in parliament, where they were in frequent contestation with President Askar Akaev. Moreover, elites' frequent rotations in and out of political positions have undermined the state's overall capacity during much of the 1990s (McGlinchey 2011).

Seeking to implement political and economic reform at the time, Kyrgyzstan's government struck a bargain over illicit revenues with traffickers that kept the latter excluded from positions within the central government apparatus. However, the trafficking of opium and heroin through southern Kyrgyzstan has been fragmented and difficult to control since the early 1990s, when much of it was divided between Uzbek and Tajik criminal groups. During this period, a number of criminal groups who were initially working under "ruling family representatives" linked to President Akaev became more independent of their patrons—a development that further fragmented the drug trade. Even though "there was open approval for drug trafficking" at the highest levels of the presidential administration under Akaev's successor, the state's revenue bargain with traffickers continued to exclude them from key posts in government. Between 2005 and 2010 there were reportedly thirty-one different criminal groups (relatively small, between five and fifteen members) in the country, many of which were operating under the patronage and protection of their own regional and local elites. Many of these criminal groups were able to operate without seeking political protection from weakened law enforcement authorities (UNODC 2007). While Tajikistan is deemed to be closer to a "narco-state," in which large portions of the state apparatus are involved in the drug trade, there are only "key persons" within Kyrgyzstan's state—mostly within its law enforcement and security agencies—that are believed to provide protection over disparate parts of this economy.

Despite their institutional weaknesses, Kyrgyzstan's state offices remained free of trafficker influence, and criminal groups did not acquire influence over coercive institutions of state. Although some individual political elites provided patronage and protection for criminal activity in exchange for payments, criminal organizations—including those with operational linkages to extremists—could not access coercive resources (arms, ammunition, personnel) as they could in Tajikistan. At the same time, the space for criminal organizations in the informal economy grew, pulling in those who might have gravitated to insurgent or terrorist activities. This has limited nonstate violence in the country to a relatively few, small-scale attacks. Despite the many arrests related to terrorism and religious extremism in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the south of the country (Osh, Batken, and Jalal-Abad regions), much of the violence has been low-intensity and involved criminal groups (settling scores or competing for resources with their rivals), politicians, or individuals spanning the two spheres.

There have been several small incidents alleged to have been carried out by extremist groups in Kyrgyzstan. However, most of these were either perpetrated by groups coming from outside the country, limited to individual attacks (such as political assassinations), or larger attacks inaccurately attributed to extremist groups. In 1999 and 2000, two separate incidents of hostage-taking in rural areas of the country were carried out by IMU incursions from Tajikistan. Approximately two or three bombings of police stations and other government buildings were carried out each year over the 2000s, though in most cases these were not claimed by any extremist groups. In 2010 an explosion took place outside the Bishkek Sports Palace, which was the venue for a trial of those accused of ordering and carrying out violence during the April 2010 anti-Bakiev protests. While the government attributed the attack (and another attack on a police station) to a newly created group, Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of the Redeemer), ultimately none of those arrested were convicted, suggesting political motives rather than religious extremism (Zenn and Kuehnast 2014). Lastly, the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement was believed to have carried out a bombing at the front gate of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek in August 2016, although the group has not claimed responsibility (Roberts 2012, 20–21). In short, there have been only a few, scattered, small-scale terrorist attacks. Instead, the majority of violent incidents in Kyrgyzstan have involved attacks involving organized criminal organizations, politicians (often linked to criminal activities), and law enforcement officials/offices.

Finally, the case of Uzbekistan exemplifies the hegemonic role of the state in reducing terrorist violence. Uzbekistan embarked on a program of state-building in the 1990s designed to rein in regional power centers and construct a large and robust coercive apparatus. While its immersion in other economic sectors fostered patterns of coercive rent-seeking (Markowitz 2013), the regime removed its newly empowered security apparatus from the drug trade and applied extensive repression against any organized actors—criminal or extremist—operating independent of the state.

Uzbekistan's presidential administration, confronting disturbances in the late 1980s, invested early on in strengthening its security apparatus, devoting resources to its National Security Service (SNB), police, and the military. Initially, the central government had determined that it needed a well-trained and well-equipped security apparatus capable of exercising public control. Over time, however, the leadership under President Islam Karimov utilized this security apparatus to extend its reach into the different regions and check the growing power of regional elites who controlled important industries, ran the agricultural sector, and delivered public services to the broader population. In addition, post-independence Uzbekistan inherited an ambition for regional dominance and used its security and military forces to carry out limited interventions in the sovereign affairs of its neighbors (Omelicheva 2011). Consequently, Uzbekistan embarked on a state-building trajectory that centered on political control and social stability, underpinned by powerful security services.

At the same time, extensive state intervention in the domestic economy drew on these coercive offices to retain government control. Concessions granted to police, prosecutors, the SNB, and the tax inspectorate (among others)—in exchange for their loyalty to Karimov—gave them license to exploit rent-seeking opportunities in these local economies and commodity exports. Using (formal and informal) taxes, customs, and border controls, law enforcement and security offices became deeply involved in the country's lucrative agricultural, industrial, and resource extractive sectors. The government of Uzbekistan, therefore, was able to strike a revenue bargain that minimized the security apparatus' involvement in drug trafficking, compartmentalized rents from the drug trade, and forged hegemonic capacities that separated and effectively combated trafficking and terrorism.

As a result, there have been some terrorist activities in Uzbekistan, but these have remained largely independent, sporadic attacks. On February 16, 1999, six bombs exploded in the center of Tashkent city, targeting several government buildings, but there is no evidence of these attacks being linked to a terrorist-trafficking connection. In 2004 there was a short wave of violence, starting with a series of explosions and shootouts over three days in late March and early April, and followed by three suicide bombings outside the US and Israeli embassies and the national prosecutor-generals' office in June. While these attacks were attributed to Hizb ut-Tahrir and the IMU, these attacks were perpetrated by ordinary citizens organized into local semi-autonomous cells of resistance to the country's increasingly authoritarian regime. The attackers lacked coordination and training, used primitive explosive devices (some of which malfunctioned) made from materials widely available in Uzbekistan, and mostly targeted government and security officials (likely in retaliation for abuses by police and security services). A third event occurred in May 2009, when a suicide bomber killed a police officer, and, the same day, several assailants fired rocket-propelled grenades and small arms at a police station. Both attacks were later claimed by Islamic Jihad Group (a group with alleged ties to the al-Qaʿida hierarchy), though there is little evidence that transnational groups had any substantial presence in the heavily monitored Andijan Province where the attacks took place.

Overall, Uzbekistan has experienced little conflict between its political elites (as in Tajikistan) or nonstate criminal violence (as in Kyrgyzstan). Instead, Uzbekistan's trajectory, and the separate coexistence of trafficking and terrorism within its borders, has led to sporadic terrorist violence and enabled state repression to predominate far more than any other forms of nonstate violence. Indeed, repression is consistently perpetrated by the regime for political purposes against independent opposition figures, civil society groups, and occasional local protests. This reached a peak on May 13–14, 2005, when Uzbekistan's state security forces suppressed an uprising in Andijan city, resulting in the deaths of hundreds—possibly seven hundred—civilians (including many women and children). Its use of repression against society notwithstanding, Uzbekistan's authorities have remained sufficiently strong to suppress most of activities of the IMU and other potential extremists, and stamp out other forms of dissent. The government's counterterrorism and anti-drug efforts, in short, have succeeded in removing its security apparatus from the drug trade and keeping levels of terrorism low.

The sole exception to these patterns of low terrorist violence in Central Asia is the case of Tajikistan during the 1990s. As this case shows, when the state immerses itself in the drug trade, it generates higher rates of nonstate violence and enables—for relatively short periods of time—significantly increased terrorist violence as well. This exception is important to note, since it demonstrates that low levels of terrorism in Central Asia overall is not the result of broad-based, region-wide developments. Cultural explanatory accounts of Islam in Central Asia that suggest it is less amenable to radicalization or path-dependent arguments contending that Soviet legacies had diminished the capacity of Islamist mobilization, therefore, provide inadequate accounts of this variation within the region.

In the wake of state failure in 1992, Tajikistan's five-year civil war greatly fragmented its security apparatus, destroyed many foundations of its economy, and left its population traumatized by a conflict that had led to 50,000 deaths and over a million people displaced. For much of the mid-1990s, its postwar government remained internally divided, with the central government's ministries (as well as Tajikistan's provinces) run as the personal fiefdoms of powerful political figures who operated independent of a figurehead president. The ministerial appointees of the central government often competed with the local formal and informal authorities for control of the regions. Under these conditions, these figures ran Tajikistan's provinces yet operated in a vortex of organized criminal activity, drug trafficking, and corruption that occasionally integrated members of militant groups with ties to terrorist organizations.

As the fledgling Rahmon government appointed former commanders from pro-government and opposition forces to establish its nominal control over the rest of the country, many of these leaders had already become involved in the drug trade. According to a witness and a former member of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a fatwa issued by Islamist religious leadership permitted the fighters to smoke hemp and partake in the trafficking of drugs. Subsequently, the majority of field commanders and fighters engaged in the drug trade with Afghan smugglers (Izzatullo 2017).

Foremost among them was Yaqub Salimov, Tajikistan's first postwar minister of the interior. As head of the national police force, Salimov allegedly controlled much of the drug trade in the early 1990s (reportedly utilizing trains and military airplanes to transport it to Russia). Another pro-government commander, Gaffor Mirzoev, was believed to run an extensive drug-trafficking operation while commanding Tajikistan's elite Presidential Guard (and later as the head of the Drug Control Agency). Some observers speculate that opposition commanders, who had neither Uzbekistani nor Russian support, had turned to drug trafficking to finance their war efforts. During and after the war, Mirzo Ziyoev, military chief of the UTO, was believed to be deeply engaged in heroin smuggling. Likewise, an opposition leader during the war, Habib Sanginov, who had risen to be deputy minister of the interior in the postwar government, was reportedly killed in a drug operation gone awry. As one in-depth analysis has concluded, these examples of central political figures are not merely a few "bad apples," but instead represent an emerging "narco-state" in which high-ranking government officials used their position to conduct a majority of the country's drug trade (Paoli et al. 2007). According to a senior law enforcement official in Dushanbe, these warlords-turned-officials were often directly engaged in the drug trade and other illicit activities, in contrast to the regime's more careful use of intermediaries after the 2000s, such as officials in the military or border control officers. The profits of unrestrained drug trafficking, moreover, fueled the large patronage networks and patrimony of these senior officials, who commanded the support of lower-level officials, regional politicians, and local strongmen who controlled key resources in their *jamoats* (rural municipalities). In many cases, these patronage networks enabled government officials to straddle licit and illicit economic spheres.

The convergence of traffickers and militants in Tajikistan had several features. While the state's pervasive involvement in the drug trade was the key driver for this nexus, the convergence, although widespread, was relatively short-lived, occurring only at certain phases during the 1990s. These groups, however, led to increased terrorist violence. In Tajikistan, 44 terrorist incidents registered by the GTD took place between June 1997 (when the peace agreement was signed) and the end of 2001. More than 70 people were killed and over 130 were injured in these terrorist incidents. By contrast, the following decade (2002–2016) saw only 14 terrorist attacks that took lives of 22 people.

The most prominent group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, operated in Tajikistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s as militant and criminal actors that had the capacity to subordinate or take advantage of a fragmented state apparatus to their ends. After belatedly and reluctantly acceding to the 1997 peace agreement that ended Tajikistan's civil war, the IMU spent the following five years oscillating between bases of operations in northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan, strengthened by the Uzbek recruits. During this period, the military formations that preceded the IMU continued their involvement in the drug trade, and the organization grew to become extensively involved in the opiate transport business under the leadership of Juma Namangani (Fredholm 2003; Madi 2004). By leveraging its involvement in the drug trade, and the strategic location of its camps along trafficking routes, the IMU established ties to both the Taliban in Afghanistan and key traffickers Tajikistan (with some, like Ziyoev, holding key positions in the Tajik government).

In short, the IMU was well situated to take advantage of its cross-border contacts with Taliban suppliers, its camps and operations in the same mountain passes used to transport opiates, and its good relations with former UTO comrades-in-arms (who were now commanding border posts, police units, and regional governments) (Levi-Sanchez 2017). While these relationships interweaving criminal and terrorist networks were relatively short-lived, they proved useful in organizing the IMU's 1999 and 2000 incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Under Namangani, this faction of the IMU had become habituated to criminal activities and reportedly began pursuing drug trafficking as an end in itself, even as it continued its role as one of the region's transnational terrorist organizations. At the same time, the IMU was at the center of one of the most sustained episodes of terrorist violence in Central Asia, having participated in Tajikistan's civil conflict (from 1992 to 1997), armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan (1999 and 2000) and Uzbekistan (2000), and several suicide bombings in Uzbekistan in 2004 (which were carried out by the IMU's splinter group, Islamic Jihad Union). Ultimately, however, the IMU was driven out of Central Asia as the state reasserted its monopoly of violence in postwar Tajikistan and exerted increasing control over Tajikistan's drug trafficking and organized crime (effectively absorbing these activities into the criminal spheres of key government and security elites.

Areas of Future Research

Three areas of future research arise from this survey of Central Asia. First, some of the causal factors associated with varying levels of political violence (and of terrorism in particular) in the literature are borne out in the Central Asia context. Yet more empirical work needs to be done to accumulate reliable findings on the political, economic, and societal factors that explain patterns of terrorist violence in this and other understudied Muslim-majority regions. Second, our inquiry suggests that the lack of terrorist violence in the region as a whole may be overly attributed to the use of state repression, which is not surprising given the political and financial benefits that flow from this perception. Future research also needs to examine the political economy of security and its implications for understanding political violence, especially in low- and middle-income countries where states lack an effective institutional presence. Third, it suggests that keeping terrorist violence at low levels has come at the cost of facilitating higher levels of other forms of violent political behavior (such as enhanced state violence or rising criminal violence). While much attention is paid to the link between Islam and terrorism, more studies of the relationship between terrorism and other forms of violence will better situate this in a broader political context.

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CHAPTER 21

PIETY, DEVOTION, AND SUPPORT FOR SHARIʿA

Examining the Link between Religiosity and Political Attitudes in Pakistan

NILOUFER A. SIDDIQUI

As scholarly and policy attention has shifted to global Islam and its various manifestations in recent years, there has been a renewed focus on the link between individual levels of religiosity and piety, on the one hand, and political behavior and attitudes, on the other. A wide range of literature, spanning a number of disciplines, has sought to assess the impact of Islamic religiosity on a host of dependent variables—from voting patterns (Esmer and Pettersson 2007; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Kalin and Siddiqui 2016) and political participation (Sobolewska et al. 2015) to foreign policy, international conflict (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998), and support for terrorism and militancy (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan 2009; Kaltenthaler et al. 2010; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012; Fair 2015). Findings have varied, depending on the particular context of the study, the specific outcome of interest, and, perhaps most importantly, how religiosity has been defined and measured. While religiosity is a difficult concept to measure in any context—both because the term encompasses many different dimensions and because it tends to rely on self-reports that may be distorted by social desirability bias—Islam poses particular analytical challenges because, as Cammett and Jones Luong put it, "there is a tendency to conflate both religiosity with the rise of Islamism . . . and the emergence of Islamists with popular support for Islamism" (2014, p. 10.4).

In this chapter, I present a conceptualization of religiosity that distinguishes between three distinct but related components: "piety," measured as participation in religious ritual or behavior; "devotion," measured as the self-professed importance of religion in one's life; and "dogmatism," measured as belief in laws being made in accordance with

Islam (i.e., support for shariʿa).[1] I explore the link between each of these dimensions of religiosity and various forms of political behavior in Pakistan, including support for democracy, concern with religious extremism, support for government restrictions on blasphemous speech, and attitudes toward neighboring non-Muslim states. Existing literature on religion and politics in Muslim-majority countries has theorized a link between religiosity, broadly defined, and these key political behaviors, but has found inconsistent and often contradictory results. This chapter shows that much of this literature suffers from two distinct problems: (1) inconsistent definitions and measures of religiosity, including a conflation of personal piety or religious practice with support for shariʿa law and, in some cases, even Islamic political movements and political Islam; and (2) conceptual overlap between support for political Islam and various political outcomes of interest. This chapter uses the case of Pakistan to refine existing measures of religiosity to improve our analysis of the relationship between religion and politics. It does so by offering original empirical analysis that demonstrates that religiosity does matter in shaping opinions in Pakistan, but not in the way that much of the literature expects. Using data collected among 1,200 Pakistanis by the Pew Research Center in 2015, the most recent such survey carried out by Pew, this chapter finds that religiosity is not a predictor of increasing conservativism in all aspects of politics. To the extent that religiosity matters, it appears to be positively correlated with pro-democracy sentiment. Religiosity measured as devotion and belief in Islamic law is also negatively correlated with the belief that violence can be justified on religious grounds; however, personally pious individuals are neither more nor less likely than the less pious to justify religious violence. Similarly, for outcomes such as attitudes toward India, Pakistan's Hindu-majority neighbor and historic enemy, and preferences for government restrictions on blasphemous speech, the precise measure of religiosity being employed matters in determining the strength and direction of the relationship. While the more pious and devoted are more likely to support restrictions on blasphemous speech, support for shariʿa is—surprisingly—not a predictive factor.

As the second-largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and one that was founded on the basis of religious identity following its violent partition from India, Pakistan is an important case study through which to explore the relationship between the various dimensions of religiosity and political attitudes. Over the last two decades, Pakistan has seen the increasing influence of "piety movements" and faith-based institutions that aim to transform their followers—often middle-class women—into more "pious" and "pure" subjects (Ahmed 2009; Zia 2009). At the same time, hostilities along religious and sectarian lines have increased in the country (Ispahani 2015; South Asia Terrorism Portal 2018). Numerous incidents of mass violence motivated by the archaic blasphemy laws have also resulted in a spate of killings, with angry mobs mobilized through rumors spread by word of mouth or on social media platforms (Amnesty International 2016), and sometimes organized by religious parties or movements.[2] Despite the demonstrated ability of Islamist political parties to amass considerable street power, however, they have historically fared poorly in national elections, leading some to believe that there is little support for the mixing of politics and religion in the country. These overlapping trends have led scholars, journalists, and analysts alike to question the exact role played by religiosity in society.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide an overview of literature examining the link between religiosity and political attitudes in various Islamic settings, focusing in particular on the ways in which these studies conceptualize and measure religiosity. I then outline my hypotheses, motivated both by this literature and the particular case of Pakistan. Next, I use Pew data to test these hypotheses, using a broad definition of religiosity that encompasses three distinct dimensions: piety, devotion, and dogmatism. My final sections outline my primary findings, focusing on support for democracy, religious extremism, relations with India, and restrictions on blasphemous content as the key outcome measures, and outline future avenues for research. The results discussed in this paper are intended to be descriptive and exploratory. Further work remains to be done to assess the causality behind any relationships we observe.

Religiosity and Political Attitudes: Problems of Conceptual Clarity and Measurement

A rich literature has sought to uncover the links between religiosity and political attitudes on a wide array of outcomes across many different settings. In Islamic contexts, however, individual religiosity has been far from a clean predictor of partisanship and other political outcomes of interest. Two factors can help explain these inconsistent findings that make it difficult to draw many overarching conclusions about these relationships. First, existing studies use distinct definitions and measures of religiosity. Second, where studies distinguish between personal and political dimensions of religiosity, the outcome measures are often too close to measures of political Islam to be analytically useful.

The absence of a clear or consistent conceptualization of religiosity means that studies that speak of "religiosity" are actually comparing different concepts. Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2018) rightly point out, for example, that much existing literature has relied on a single indicator to capture religiosity, and that this indicator varies from one study to the next. Scholars have conceptualized religiosity as the level of attendance of religious services (Jamal 2006), support for shariʿa law (Benstead 2014), or participation in religious ritual such as praying five times a day (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998), to name just a few examples. More recent studies have sought to incorporate different dimensions of religiosity into one composite variable or index, arguing that single indicators are unable to capture the diversity of behaviors inherent to religiosity (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018).

Yet different dimensions of religiosity likely affect political attitudes through different pathways. For example, some scholars have pointed to the direct political mobilization opportunities and coordination points provided by frequenting a place of worship as one potential mechanism (Djupe and Gilbert 2006). Others have highlighted the role of churches (or mosques) in providing political information and participatory opportunities to the religious citizenry (Greenberg 2013; Butt 2016). Through sermons in mosques and churches, or in religious schools, religious clerics have unique opportunities and regular platforms from which to propagate particular narratives (Kalin and Siddiqui 2014). Omelicheva and Ahmed (2018) further find that, on its own, religiosity actually serves as a deterrent to political engagement; rather, it is membership in religious *organizations* that make individuals more likely to engage in political activity. Similarly, Chhibber and Shastri (2014) find that the social equivalence accorded by attending religious festivals or places of worship makes individuals more likely to be trusting of democracy. Individual religiosity may also have an impact on political attitudes or behavior though other mechanisms. Religious ideals may provide, for example, the "criteria by which to judge governmental authority and . . . to criticize decisions or policies deemed inconsistent with divine purposes" (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998, 620), or they may provide answers and ethical prescriptions in unpredictable environs (Wald 1992; Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Thus, there is a case to be made that the link between political attitudes and individual dimensions and measures of religiosity should be assessed independently.

Studies have also differed in how they analyze support for political Islam (such as support for shariʿa or Islamic political parties), with some treating it primarily as an outcome variable and others including it in their conceptualization of religiosity. Where support for Islamic law has been identified as a dimension of religiosity, most studies have nonetheless—rightly—sought to distinguish it from personal religiosity. Indeed, an individual can choose to abide by all tenants of Islam, including, for example, praying daily or fasting during the month of Ramadan, but not necessarily believe in the implementation of facets of shariʿa law. Similarly, individuals may support Islamic political parties for any number of reasons (see, for example, Cammett and Jones Luong 2014; Masoud 2014), but not partake in the daily rituals of Islam. Tessler and Nachtwey find, for example, that those individuals who report high levels of religious devotion in their personal lives do not have different opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict than those that don't, but that political aspects of Islam are correlated negatively with support for Arab-Israeli peace. They conclude, "Attachment to Islam, defined in terms of piety, observance, and an inclination to seek guidance from religious sources, bears no relationship to attitudes about the most important interstate conflict in the Middle East" (1998, 631) but find that respondents who believe in having religion play a larger role in political life and support Islamic political movements are less likely to support a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hadad (2003), too, finds that personal religiosity among Lebanese survey respondents is not a predictor of attitudes toward US policy in the Middle East, but support for political Islam is associated with unfavorable attitudes.

While important to distinguish between these two dimensions of religiosity, studies may suffer from conceptual overlap if their measures of political religiosity are too close to their outcomes of interest. For example, Fair, Littman, and Nugent have suggested that the ways in which people interpret shariʿa is key to whether they support its implementation, and indeed, whether it determines their political attitudes. They write, "More than 95 percent of respondents believed a shariʿa government is one that provides services, justice, personal security, and is free of corruption. In contrast, 55 percent believed that a shariʿa government is one that uses physical punishments" (2017, 5). They find that Pakistani respondents who understand shariʿa to be consistent with transparency and justice will be more likely to support democracy, while those who perceive shariʿa as restricting the role of women or implementing harsh, physical punishments will be more likely to support Islamist militant groups. While there is certainly a need to unpack the various components that make up shari'a support, describing shariʿa in such illiberal terms as restricting women's rights when the dependent variable is "support for democratic values" appears to be an example of the independent and dependent variables being too close together to offer much analytical traction. Similarly, Haddad (2003) creates a composite indicator of political Islam that relies on such survey measures as support for militant violence, support for religious leaders in public office, and perception of an Islamic state as the most viable political model. The author finds that support for political Islam is correlated with anti-American attitudes, an unsurprising finding insofar as militant violence is often targeted at American audiences or groups perceived as pro-American. That is, because most Islamic militants are overtly anti-American in their ideology and targeting, we should expect that support for militant violence and anti-American attitudes be correlated, almost by definition. Contrasting personal and political religiosity, in this way, is not particularly helpful, as the latter is too close to the outcome measures to be informative. The authors may simply be capturing something rather intuitive, and effectively tautological (see Vreeland 2008 for another example of such findings).

In this chapter, I posit three distinct dimensions of religiosity that capture different aspects of the concept. These are "piety," by which I mean participation in religious ritual; self-professed "devotion," or an assessment of the role of religion in one's life; and, "dogmatism," or support for Islamic law in governance. While these may be related, they ultimately affect political behavior and attitudes through different mechanisms and must be assessed separately. Using survey data from Balochistan, Pakistan, Kalin and Siddiqui (2016), for example, find that respondents are generally skeptical of the mixing of religion and politics even with very high levels of respondent piety as measured by adherence to daily rituals such as prayer. Specifically, the majority of respondents—irrespective of self-reported levels of individual piety—felt that Islamic leaders lose credibility when they join politics, and that Islamist parties are worse alternatives than non-Islamist parties. While some work (e.g., Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018) chooses to exclude any measures of political Islam from a conceptualization of piety, I include support for shariʿa as one of my dimensions because it captures an important aspect of belief in Islamic scripture and dogma.

The next section provides an overview of the role of religion in Pakistan, outlining a series of hypotheses involving these three measures of religiosity.

CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICS

The relationship between religion and politics was ambiguous at the very founding of Pakistan.[3] Although formed as a state for Muslims, Pakistan's founder and leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was avowedly secular and sought to establish a secular, multi-confessional state.[4] Since those early days, however, the role of Islam in the country's legal and sociopolitical life has steadily expanded (Haqqani 2005). The late 1970s and early 1980s under the military dictator Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, in particular, saw greater space being accorded to religious political parties and the promulgation of laws privileging particular schools of Sunni thought. International developments also played a central role. Pakistan became one of several arenas involved in a broader geopolitical competition between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This proxy war brought into Pakistan a funding stream that strengthened and armed Sunni groups in the country and helped establish a network of *madaris* (religious schools) following the Deobandi, Wahhabi, and Ahle Hadith subsects of Sunni Islam. In turn, Iran provided funding to Pakistani Shiʿa clerics in order to establish their own religious seminaries in Punjab (International Crisis Group 2011). The anti-Soviet Afghan jihad further contributed to the spread of Islamic militancy in Pakistan, with arms and militant groups proliferating. Some groups—supported by the Pakistan state in their proxy wars against their neighbors—focused outward and directed their ire toward Indian-occupied Kashmir or targeted the United States and its allies in their war in Afghanistan. Others, most notably the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), targeted the Pakistan state itself, while still others, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, attacked religious minorities in the country.

Is religiosity a predictor of political attitudes and behaviors in Pakistan? And if so, which ones? I identify four outcomes of interest: attitudes toward democracy, religious extremism, foreign relations, and restrictions on blasphemous speech. I outline my theoretical priors for each relationship in turn.

First, a rich literature has theorized a link between religiosity, broadly defined, and support for democracy. Some scholars (Huntington 1996; Fish 2002) have argued that there is an intrinsic link between Islam and disdain for such liberal ideals as democracy and pluralism. As such, it would follow that at the individual level, we should expect that those Muslims who have greater ties to Islam and are personally religious feel differently about such varied outcomes as support for violence or democracy than those who are more "liberal" or "Western" in their approach. However, despite theoretical predictions, empirical data on the link between religiosity and support for democracy tends to show that the two are either unrelated or positively correlated. Survey data from Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon, for example, demonstrates a weak relationship between religiosity and political preferences, in general, and support for Islamic political movements, in particular (Harik 1996; Tessler 1997; Tessler and Nachtwey 1998), while survey work in Bangladesh shows that respondents who want more shari'a prefer more democracy (Fair and Patel 2019).

In Pakistan, which has historically oscillated between military rule and democracy since its independence in 1947, and where the military continues to hold influence over many aspects of foreign policy and national security (Fair 2014; Shah 2014), this relationship is all the more significant. Military leaders in Pakistan have long used Islam as a rallying cry to justify their foreign policies and to promote national unity in an ethnically heterogeneous society (Cohen 2004; Fair 2014). The military has also engaged in strategic alliances with Islamist actors over the years. For example, under General Musharraf's tenure, a coalition of religious political parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (2002–2008), in what were widely believed to be rigged elections. Haqqani writes, "Islamist groups have been sponsored and supported by the state machinery at different times to influence politics and support the military's political dominance" (2005, 3). As such, we may expect that there is an inverse relationship between support for political Islam and support for democracy.

Hypothesis 1a: Individuals demonstrating greater levels of support for shariʿa will be less likely to support democracy.

Is there a relationship between religious practice and pro-democracy sentiment? One possible mechanism explaining such a relationship, if it exists, is the role played by religious places of worship as a forum through which religious leaders can propagate certain narratives and viewpoints. In this reading, personally religious people frequent the mosque or attend *dars* (Qurʾanic study group) more often or otherwise interact frequently with religious individuals and religious leaders. They may therefore be mobilized by these leaders or provided information by the similarly religiously inclined, which shapes their attitudes toward democracy. However, it is unclear whether clerics or places of worship in Pakistan would necessarily be anti-democratic, especially given that local religious leaders are likely to themselves support particular political parties or politicians at the polls, and indeed a number of religious political parties themselves contest elections. Additionally, following Chhibber and Shastri (2014), it is possible that the social aspect of religious practice makes individuals more pro-democracy because it serves as an "equalizer," bringing people into contact with individuals belonging to other social classes, or indeed, even political figures.

Hypothesis 1b: Individuals demonstrating greater levels of personal piety and devotion will be no more or less likely to support democracy than less pious or less devoted individuals.

Religious individuals may also have distinct approaches to the issue of extremist violence, which, in the Pakistani context, has been predominantly religiously motivated.

Such individuals may be more sympathetic to the groups orchestrating the attacks, because they do so in the name of *jihad* and ostensibly for Islamist goals—whether the creation of an Islamic shariʿa state or to privilege particular Sunni interpretations. Or they may attend mosques or religious gatherings that are sympathetic to militant groups. However, even if one were to accept this reasoning, the proposed relationship remains too simplistic. First, a Shiʿa individual may be pious but, because he or she is more likely to be a target of extremist attacks in the country, may still be more likely to be concerned with extremism in the country than either pious or less pious Sunnis. If we assume that religious Shiʿas attend the mosque or other religious gatherings more frequently, these individuals may be privy to more anti-extremist rhetoric than less pious Shiʿas. In this case, then, an individual's sectarian affiliation should be a greater predictor of concern with extremism than adherence to particular religious rituals. Indeed, studies have produced inconclusive results about the link between religiosity and support for militancy. Wiktorowicz (2005), in his qualitative study of the militant British Islamist group al-Muhajiroun, demonstrated that religious individuals were less susceptible to the group's messages than the less religiously inclined. Fair (2015) finds, in contrast, that when piety is measured as intensity of religious practice, pious individuals in Pakistan are more likely to support sectarian violence. However, this result is much less significant than a respondent's sectarian identity (or *maslak)*. Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) find a positive link between attendance at religious services and support for militant attacks.

Hypothesis 2: Religious Sunni Pakistanis (across all three measures) will be less likely to be concerned with religious extremism than less religious Sunnis, but religious Shiʿas will be more likely to be concerned than less religious Shiʿas.

Given the role of religion in the acrimonious history between Pakistan and neighboring India, we may also expect that individual religiosity affects attitudes toward India. In particular, we may expect that individuals who are more pious or devoted would be more suspicious of India and less likely to want to pursue peaceful relations with it, because they frequent mosques/religious gatherings and interact more with local clerics who are likely to espouse anti-Indian rhetoric, or because they value the role of Islam more highly in their lives. In contrast, those individuals who believe that Islam should have a greater say in the way the country is run may be no more or less likely to view India as a threat. On the one hand, such dogmatic individuals may harbor resentment against India for the violent events of Partition; on the other hand, they may be more likely to believe in the concept of a Muslim *umma* (community of believers), which suggests that Muslims everywhere, regardless of ethnicity or nationality, are part of the same community.

Hypothesis 3: Pious and devoted individuals will be more likely to consider India a threat, but more dogmatic individuals will be no more or less likely to do so.

Finally, we would expect personally religious individuals to be more likely to believe in strict restrictions on blasphemous speech, as this may be considered antithetical to their religious values. Politically religious individuals may similarly believe in such restrictions, as they believe that Islamic law should play a more central role in government. To be clear, this relationship doesn't necessarily suggest that individuals would want blasphemers to be *punished*, merely that their speech be regulated by the government.

Hypothesis 4: Religious individuals (across all measures) will be more likely to support restrictions on blasphemous speech than the less religious.

Measuring Religiosity in Pakistan

Following Marshall's (2002) theory of ritual practice, which emphasizes behavior, belonging, and belief, I conceive of religiosity as comprising three different dimensions: piety, devotion, and dogmatism. The first is measured by how often people offer their daily prayers—a fundamental tenant of Islam. The second, devotion, is measured by how important an individual considers religion in their life. The third, dogmatism, is measured by the extent to which an individual believes a country's laws should follow the teachings of the Qurʾan. All three of these measures are correlated with one another in the 2015 Pew data used here: each is a significant predictor of the other, in the expected direction. As with all survey questions, however, we should be aware of the possibility of social desirability bias, which is perhaps all the more pronounced when it comes to matters related to religion. Given that Pakistan is generally perceived as a religious society, we should expect each of the measures to be biased upward.

Table 21.1 depicts the descriptive statistics for each of these three measures. Daily prayer sees a considerable level of variation, with about 43 percent of Pakistanis saying that they pray the mandated five times a day, and another 12 percent praying once a week. Only 11 percent admitted to praying "hardly ever" or only on religious holidays. In contrast, self-reports about religion show that the overwhelming majority of Muslim respondents (92.5 percent) consider themselves to be very religious. Belief in how shariʿa should be implemented, meanwhile, showed some degree of variation, but with a clear majority: 76.5 percent of the respondents believe in the importance of shariʿa as a guide for political and legal life, agreeing with the statement that "laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Qurʾan." Only approximately 3 percent believe that the country's laws should not be influenced by the teachings of Islam at all.

These results suggest that Pakistanis are generally a religious people. How do they compare to Muslims in other Islamic countries? With the exception of Turkey, the other eight countries with sizeable Muslim populations included in this round of Pew surveys appeared more pious when looking solely at daily prayer. The average number of Muslim respondents who said that they prayed five times a day across all nine countries was 69 percent, compared to 43 percent in Pakistani (see Figure 21.1).

How important respondents considered religion in their lives was generally high across the nine countries, ranging from a low of approximately 58 percent in Turkey to a high of 97 percent in Senegal, for an average of 83 percent (see Figure 21.2). However, the overwhelming Pakistani support for shariʿa, or specifically for laws to follow the

Table 21.1: Descriptive Statistics

Measures of Individual Religiosity among Muslims in Pakistan

How often, if at all, do you pray?	Hardly ever: 9.13% Only during religious holidays: 2.24% Only on Fridays: 11.71% Only on Fridays and religious holidays: 3.10% More than once a week: 9.39% Every day at least once: 20.41% Every day five times: 43.07%
How important is religion in your life?	Very important: 92.50% Somewhat important: 5.92% Not too important: 1.08% Not at all important: 0.17%
Which of the following three statements comes closer to your view?	Laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Qur'an: 76.5% Laws should follow the values and principles of Islam but not strictly follow the teachings of the Qur'an: 15.17% Laws should not be influenced by the teachings of the Qur'an: 2.92%

Source: Pew Data, 2015.



FIGURE 21.1: Percentage of Muslim respondents who report that they pray five times a day across Pakistan and nine other Muslim-majority countries.



FIGURE 21.2: Percentage of respondents who report that religion is very important in their lives across Pakistan and nine other Muslim-majority countries.

teachings of Islam, appears all the more stark when compared to the data from other countries. Indeed, compared to nearly 77 percent in Pakistan, the average number of Muslim respondents who expressed their agreement that laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Qurʾan was only 42 percent in the other nine countries. This ranged from a low of 13.4 percent in Turkey to 77.4 percent in Malaysia (see Figure 21.3). We should be careful when assessing these results, because social desirability concerns with questions about shariʿa are high. Respondents may also generally respond that they believe laws need to be in accordance with Islam, but that does not imply that they necessarily believe in specific scriptures being invoked. Nonetheless, these comparisons are interesting insofar as they show that Pakistani personal piety, as measured through daily practice, is much lower than that observed in other Muslim countries, but that support for the mixing of politics and religion is much higher.

RESULTS

Do religious respondents in Pakistan hold different attitudes toward democracy, religious extremism, foreign policy, and blasphemy compared to the less religiously inclined? This section analyzes data from a Pew survey from 2015 to address these questions.



FIGURE 21.3: Percentage of respondents who report that laws should strictly follow the teaching of the Qurʾan across Pakistan and nine other Muslim-majority countries.

Attitudes toward Democracy

Respondents in Pakistan were asked which of the following three statements were closest to their view: first, *democracy is preferable to any other kind of government*; second, *in some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be preferable*; or, third, *for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have*. Approximately 46 percent of the 1,200 respondents chose the first option, what I refer to as a *pro-democracy* sentiment.

The Pew data show that, across all three religiosity measures and consistent with findings from other parts of the Muslim world, religious individuals were *more* likely to be pro-democracy. Those individuals who believed in strict enforcement of shariʿa were significantly more likely to hold pro-democracy sentiments ($p < 0.001$). Similarly, those individuals who prayed more often were also significantly more likely to believe that democracy was preferable to other forms of government ($p < 0.001$), as were those for whom religion was very important in their lives ($p < 0.1$). When controlling for the other religiosity measures, as well as such demographic variables as gender, age, whether they belonged to the Sunni sect, and schooling, support for shariʿa appeared as the strongest predictor of pro-democracy sentiment ($p < 0.001$), but piety and devotion remained significantly correlated with higher support for democracy along all three measures (see Table 21.2).

Deciphering why these relationships exist requires further study. Chhibber and Shastri's (2014) account of religious practice in India offers some useful insight. They argue that, in the relatively hierarchy-free realm of religious practice in India, those who partake in its social aspects, such as visiting places of worship or attending religious festivals, may engage in social contact with fellow citizens with whom they otherwise have little in common. Such religious social space may also provide individuals the chance to interact with their political representatives, in the process reducing the social distance between them and making the former more likely to view democracy favorably. Why support for Islamic law is related to pro-democracy sentiment, however, remains an open question, one which could be addressed at least partly by unpacking what respondents believe encompasses Islamic law (as in Fair, Littman, and Nugent 2017).

Attitudes toward India

Respondents were asked which of three possible options they considered the greatest threat to their country: India, the Taliban, or al-Qaʿida. The wording of this question was such that the respondent would have to choose India *instead* of an Islamic militant group as the most significant threat to Pakistan. While the question does not specify whether it is referring to the Afghan Taliban or the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—the latter a more obvious threat to Pakistanis—it nonetheless pits India against Islamist groups. Among the three religiosity measures, increased prayer is the only measure that is statistically significantly related to believing that India is the greatest threat faced by Pakistan. This relationship remains significant ($p < 0.03$) even with the inclusion of demographic controls (see Table 21.2). Given that the other religiosity measures remain insignificant, this relationship could perhaps best be explained by the role of mosques and religious gatherings in disseminating information or narratives by religious leaders, where anti-India rhetoric would be common.

Attitudes toward Religious Extremism

Religious extremism in Pakistan remains an issue of great import. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis have died in attacks carried out by militant outfits, many purporting to be acting in the name of Islam. The Pew data asks two questions that can be used to measure support for religious extremism. First, respondents were asked, "Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?" Respondents were also asked, "How concerned, if at all, are you about Islamic extremism in our country these days? Are you very concerned, somewhat

Table 21.2: Religiosity and Political Attitudes in Pakistan (Multivariate OLS Regressions)

	Pro-Democracy	Belief that India Is Greatest Threat	Concerned with Extremism	Belief that Violence Is Justified	Support Restrictions On Blasphemy
Prayer	0.013+	0.015+	0.006	-0.004	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Self-Report Religiosity	0.083+	0.044	0.219**	-0.437***	0.162***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.098)	(0.044)
Follow Shariʿa	0.153***	0.046	0.049	-0.276***	-0.014
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.029)
Age	0.001	0.002*	0.003+	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female	-0.135***	-0.134***	-0.012	-0.138*	-0.147***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.029)
Schooling	0.012***	0.006*	0.022***	-0.007	0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Shiʿa	-0.023	-0.131+	-0.162	-0.099	0.045
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.113)	(0.153)	(0.066)
Constant	-0.248	0.191	2.188***	0.6362***	0.017
	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.299)	(0.412)	(0.186)
Observations	1,067	1,067	1,009	971	1,067
R-squared	0.069	0.042	0.041	0.054	0.083

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001,
** p<0.01,
* p<0.05, + p<0.1

concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned about Islamic extremism in our country these days?"

In bivariate regressions on each measure of religiosity, we find that pious, devoted, and dogmatic respondents were all significantly more likely to be concerned with extremism, with those self-identifying as religious being the strongest predictor. When controlling for the other measures of religiosity and demographic variables, however, only self-professed devotion remains significant. Because such a large percentage of Pakistani respondents self-reported as religious, we should be cautious about reading too much into this finding, particularly coupled with the lack of findings associated with the two other measures of religiosity.

When examining whether respondents believed that Islamist violence could ever be justified, we find that those individuals who are more likely to express that the laws be governed by Islam and who self-identify as religious are also significantly less likely to believe that violence is justified, while those who pray more often are neither more or less likely to do so. How do these results hold up when taking into account the sectarian affiliation of the respondents? Here we are faced with a challenge of a small sample size, with only 54 of the 1,200 respondents identifying as Shiʿa. For Shiʿas, we find that those individuals who prayed frequently were less likely to believe that violence was ever justified—a distinct finding from Sunnis in our sample. There was no significant finding for any of the other relationships, but this is likely related to small sample size. Nonetheless, collectively, these findings depict some noteworthy trends. Both religious Sunnis and religious Shiʿas, to the extent that they were different from the less religious, were more likely to be concerned with violent extremism. That Shiʿas who prayed more were less likely than similar Sunnis to believe that violence was justified may indeed be a function of attending mosques or religious gatherings, which were more likely to condemn religious violence targeted against the Shiʿa community than Sunni mosques.

Restrictions on Blasphemous Speech

The Pew survey asked a question gauging support for the government preventing "statements that are offensive to your religion or beliefs."[5] Approximately 65 percent agreed with this statement, while 23 percent said that people should be able to say these sorts of things publicly. Of our three measures of religiosity, prayer and self-reported religiosity are positive predictors of such restrictions on blasphemous speech. Along both measures, as expected, greater levels of religiosity are linked with beliefs that the government should restrict offensive statements. Whether the respondents support strict enforcement of shariʿa, however, does not appear independently correlated with this variable—an interesting finding given that one would expect government restrictions on blasphemy to be linked to support for Islamic law.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter makes two contributions to a burgeoning literature on the link between Islamic religiosity and various political attitudes. First, it provides an overview of existing studies seeking to measure religiosity in the context of Islam, all of which use distinct measures of religiosity, and some of which have sought to distinguish between personal and political religiosity. It suggests that many of these studies suffer from conceptual overlap between dependent and independent variables. In particular, in their attempt at providing nuance to a conceptually gray topic such as religiosity, many measurements of political religiosity have been stretched conceptually to the point that they appear to be describing something quite distinct from the concept of religiosity as commonly understood. Any relationships that are uncovered between political religiosity and political outcomes such as support for democratic values or support for militancy may be fundamentally tautological. That is, the manner in which we choose to measure support for political Islam poses analytical challenges, in large part because there is often insufficient conceptual separation between the dependent and independent variables being studied.

Second, this chapter uses survey data collected by the Pew Research Center to examine the relationship between religiosity in Pakistan and attitudes toward democracy, religious extremism, relations with India, and blasphemous speech. Using three distinct, but related, measures of religiosity, the data shows that higher levels of religiosity are linked to greater support for democracy across the board. While personal piety was found to have no relationship with support for violent extremism, devotion and dogmatism were negatively correlated. These relationships are noteworthy because they go against many theoretical expectations, even as they find empirical support in other contexts. More frequent prayer was associated with the belief that India is the greatest threat faced by Pakistan, consistent with the mechanism that mosques serve an important function in propagating particular ideologies and perspectives. While increased piety and devotion was associated with belief in restricting blasphemous speech, increased dogmatism was not. More research remains to be done on uncovering the mechanisms underlying these results.

Future research should continue to focus on the best ways to define and measure Islamic religiosity, particularly to take into account the importance of support for political Islam and shariʿa, expansive concepts that can capture quite different political visions. Similarly, while it remains interesting and necessary to assess the linkages between religiosity and such variables as militancy and support for democracy, research agendas should be expanded to include such topics as how changing political beliefs can lead to changing religious ones (as Margolis 2018 does so well in her study in the United States), whether liberal religious leaders can lead to more liberal political beliefs (as in Tuñón 2018), and the ways in which individual religiosity interact with other cleavages, such as socioeconomic status and partisan affiliation.

NOTES

1. If unspecified, the terms *religiosity* or *religious* will be used in this chapter as general terms to refer to all three of these dimensions.
2. Under the law, individuals are prohibited from saying anything that may hurt the sensibilities of a recognized religion (in practice, Sunni Islam), with punishment ranging from fines to death. In recent years, this law has been subject to abuse, particularly against religious minorities who are frequently the targets of false accusations.
3. The vast majority (96.4 percent) of Pakistan's nearly 200 million people identify as Muslims, with approximately 85–90 percent of these identifying as Sunni and 10–15 percent

identifying as Shiʿa. Exact percentages are unknown because the census does not collect information about sectarian affiliation.

4. For more on the creation of Pakistan, see Jalal 1985; Jalal 1990; and Cohen 2004.
5. The complete wording of the question was: "Do you think that people should be able to say these types of things publicly OR that the government should be able to prevent people from saying these types of things in some circumstances."

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CHAPTER 22

MAPPING AND EXPLAINING ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ISLAMIC STATE

Findings from an Arab Barometer Survey and Embedded Experiment

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To what extent do ordinary Sunni Muslim citizens in Arab countries sympathize with the Islamic State? And among those who do support the organization, albeit passively, are they attracted primarily by the organization's Islamist message and objectives, or are they motivated largely by material and political considerations? This chapter uses data from an Arab Barometer survey and embedded experiment to address these questions. It considers the explanatory power of both religious and nonreligious factors in accounting for variance in attitudes toward the goals and tactics of the Islamic State. It also maps and seeks to explain the views of ordinary citizens about whether the organization's actions are compatible with the teachings of Islam.

INTRODUCTION

The recruitment of tens of thousands of foreign fighters who have joined the forces of the Islamic State might suggest that its support is wide-ranging. This is not the case. Daesh—a transliteration of the acronym of the Islamic State's name in Arabic by which the organization is frequently known—has brutally killed or executed thousands of civilians, both non-Muslim and Muslim, throughout its territory and beyond. Yet public opinion surveys report that the vast majority of Muslims reject the use of violence against civilians. Even more important, surveys also indicate that the vast majority of Muslims in the Arab world and in other Muslim-majority countries are opposed to the organization (ACRPS 2015, 2018; Lipka 2017; Poushter 2015). Nevertheless, as the number of foreign fighters who have joined the organization in Syria and elsewhere implies, there is at least a small minority of ordinary citizens across the Arab world who sympathize with Daesh.

The Islamic State is an insurgent group that is characterized not only by its use of violence in pursuit of political objectives, but also by its espousal of an extremist ideology in the name of Islam that at least some ordinary citizens apparently find persuasive. The existing literature offers relatively few insights into why Daesh has been able to achieve greater relative success than most other extremist groups. In recent years, the literature on insurgent groups has downplayed the importance of ideological attachment compared to the provision of tangible material benefits to the population within its territory (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Berman 2003; Berman and Laitin 2008; Bhattacharya 2013; Davis and Cragin 2009; Flanigan 2006; Flanigan and O'Brien 2015; Simon and Martini 2004; Weinstein 2007). But whatever its relevance in other cases, the provision of material benefits cannot help to explain why Daesh activities in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps now to some extent in Libya and Yemen, lead some individuals in other Arab countries to passively support the organization.

With respect to support for insurgent groups that operate in an external environment, many existing accounts have limited explanatory power in the case of the Islamic State. Some studies emphasize converging political interests (see Byman et al. 2001). This finding most often applies to diaspora or refugee populations, which are groups that are likely to perceive a specific link between their own preferences and the actions of the insurgent group (Barber 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cordovez and Harrison 1995; Ranetunge 2000; Shain and Sherman 1998; Sheffer, 1994; Urban 1987). Among the small percentage of Muslim Arab populations that sympathize with the Islamic State, there is no indication that support is concentrated among either refugees or a diaspora population.

A more plausible explanation is either that the organization has been successful in converting some ordinary Muslims to its extremist worldview, or that it has activated support among previously radicalized individuals. In either case, a critical factor may be the content of the Islamic State's message and ideology and the way that these are received and understood by Muslim men and women living elsewhere.[1] However, if ideological outreach is a key variable leading external populations to support the Islamic State, questions remain about the kind and content of the outreach efforts that are most effective—and most in need of being countered by those who oppose the Islamic State; and then about the sectors of the population in which these messages are most likely to have the impact that Daesh intends.

Against this background, we first develop and test with Arab Barometer survey data a series of hypotheses about the attributes of those ordinary citizens who express support for the Islamic State, or who at least decline to express opposition to the organization. These hypotheses and the causal stories they represent consider the explanatory power of personal religiosity, demographic profile, and political trust. Second, we describe and consider the results of a survey experiment designed to assess the impact of different messages about Daesh's objectives and actions. Finally, we explore the interaction between the independent variables in our hypotheses and the treatments in the survey experiment. More specifically, we consider whether the personal characteristics considered in the hypotheses are also conditionalities that specify whether, and for individuals characterized by what attributes, the information conveyed in the experimental treatments has a significant impact on attitudes toward the Islamic State.

Arab Barometer Survey Data

Data from the fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys permit a deeper look at the views about the Islamic State, or Daesh, held by ordinary citizens across the Arab world.[2] These surveys were carried out in 2016–2017 in eight countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Qatar. A total of 9,518 men and women were interviewed. Egypt is not included in the present analysis, however, because questions about the Islamic State were not asked in the Egyptian survey, and only Sunni Muslims and citizens in the remaining countries are included. This reduces the N to 7323.[3]

Fourth-wave surveys also contained an embedded survey experiment pertaining to the Islamic State. The experiment, described and discussed later in this chapter, involved random assignment to either a control group or one of four treatment groups. Each treatment provided respondents with information about the Islamic State, with the kind and amount of information varying across the four treatments.

The following three questions from the fourth-wave interview schedule are considered in the present analysis. Responses to these questions are the dependent variables in our analyses.

To what extent do you agree with the goals of the Islamic State?

1: Agree to a large extent; 2: Somewhat agree; 3: Somewhat disagree; 4: Disagree to a large extent.

To what extent do you agree with the Islamic State's use of violence?

1: Agree to a large extent; 2: Somewhat agree; 3: Somewhat disagree; 4: Disagree to a large extent.

To what extent do you believe Daesh's tactics are compatible with the teachings of Islam?

1: Definitely compatible; 2: Somewhat compatible; 3: Somewhat not compatible; 4: Definitely not compatible.

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Table 22.1 presents the distribution of responses to each of the three questions that measure attitudes toward the Islamic State. Since the three questions were asked after the treatments of the survey experiment, Table 22.1 is based only on respondents assigned to the control group. Should these treatments affect attitudes, which is what the experiment sought to determine and measure, the attitudes of respondents in any or all of the treatment groups would not be representative of Sunni Arab attitudes.

A question of potential significance emerges with respect to respondents who did not express an opinion, either giving a "Don't know" response or declining to answer. The number of respondents in this category is not high, but it is high enough to warrant attention. The question to be answered is whether the possible sensitivity of questions about Daesh led individuals who *do* have opinions about the group to choose one of these nonresponse options. It is impossible to know with certainty, of course, but it is plausible enough to suggest that these respondents had at least somewhat positive attitudes toward Daesh that they were reluctant to express, particularly in a face-to-face survey. We consider it instructive, therefore, that these respondents refrained from criticizing Daesh, and for this reason we include them as a separate category in Table 22.1. They are not otherwise included in the present analysis.

Based on the response distributions in Table 22.1, a general takeaway is that very few respondents have positive attitudes toward the Islamic State, and that support for Daesh is extremely low in some countries.[4]

HYPOTHESES AND CAUSAL STORIES

The move from description to explanation in the present section will assess the explanatory power of three possible drivers: personal religiosity, demographic category, and political trust.

Personal Religiosity

Turning first to personal religiosity, the following three survey items were used to capture the variance and rate respondents along a continuum ranging from very religious to not religious at all. The validity and reliability of these items were assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, the logic being that high loadings on a single factor establishes unidimensionality, which in turn offers evidence of reliability and provides a strong basis for inferring validity. The loadings, shown along with the items, range from .779 to

Table 22.1: Attitudes toward the Islamic State in Seven Arab Countries in 2016–2017

To what extent do you agree with the goals of the Islamic State?

	Agree to a large extent	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree to a large extent	Don't know	Decline to answer
Algeria	1.7	5.2	9.6	83.5		
Algeria					2.1	2.1
Jordan	0.0	0.0	.04	99.6		
Jordan					1.1	0.0
Lebanon	0.9	0.9	14.7	83.5		
Lebanon					0.9	0.0
Morocco	0.0	0.4	2.4	97.2		
Morocco					2.3	0.4
Palestine	1.7	6.5	12.1	79.7		
Palestine					2.1	0.0
Qatar	0.0	2.1	7.2	90.7		
Qatar					2.8	6.5
Tunisia	1.3	0.9	0.0	97.8		
Tunisia					1.3	0.4

To what extent do you agree with the Islamic State's use of violence?

	Agree to a large extent	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree to a large extent	Don't know	Decline to answer
Algeria	3.9	3.0	7.8	85.2		
Algeria					2.9	1.3
Jordan	0.4	0.0	0.0	99.6		
Jordan					0.7	0.0
Lebanon	0.0	0.0	5.5	94.5		
Lebanon					0.0	0.0
Morocco	0.0	0.0	1.2	98.8		
Morocco					0.0	0.0
Palestine	3.5	3.5	10.6	82.4		
Palestine					3.4	0.4
Qatar	2.1	1.0	4.2	92.7		
Qatar					3.7	6.5
Tunisia	1.8	0.4	0.9	96.9		
Tunisia					0.9	0.9

(continued)

Table 22.1: Continued

To what extent do you believe Daesh's tactics are compatible with the teachings of Islam?

	Certainly represents true Islam	Represents true Islam	Does not represent true Islam	Certainly does not represent true Islam	Don't know	Decline to answer
Algeria	3.9	7.9	7.5	80.7		
Algeria					2.9	2.1
Jordan	0.4	0.4	0.7	98.5		
Jordan					1.4	0.0
Lebanon	0.9	2.8	13.9	82.4		
Lebanon					1.8	0.0
Morocco	0.4	0.4	4.9	94.3		
Morocco					3.9	0.4
Palestine	3.1	6.6	15.4	75.0		
Palestine					3.4	0.0
Qatar	2.1	2.1	7.3	85.5		
Qatar					3.7	6.5
Tunisia	4.1	2.3	1.8	91.8		
Tunisia					4.7	0.4

.806.[5] With high loadings on a single factor, and hence unidimensionality, the analysis then combined the items, weighted on the basis of their factor loadings, and generated an index based on factor scores. The factor scores range from −1.21454 to 3.23202, with higher values indicating a lower level of personal religiosity.

In general, would you describe yourself as religious, somewhat religious, or not religious?

- Factor Loading: .794

Do you pray daily?

- Always, Most of the time, Sometimes, Rarely, Never
- Factor Loading: .806

Do you listen to or read the Qurʾan or other religious programs?

- Always, Most of the time, Sometimes, Rarely, Never
- Factor Loading: .779

Hypotheses about the explanatory power of personal religiosity are suggested by the centrality and salience of Islam with respect to both the dependent variable and the independent variable. More specifically, a plausible and perhaps persuasive causal story posits that more religious men and women are more likely to hold positive views about Daesh, or, conversely, less likely to hold negative views about Daesh, because their stronger attachment to Islam makes them more receptive to Daesh's claims and declared objectives than their less religious counterparts. This includes, presumably, Daesh's insistence that it is leading a struggle to establish a Muslim caliphate, a community of believers in which life will be governed by Islamic law, properly understood. Accordingly, the caliphate would not only unify Muslims and make them better able to oppose their enemies, but it would also, and just as importantly, enable Muslims to purge from their ranks the deviant or secular elements that are present in many Muslim-majority countries. The latter is given tangible expression in Daesh's denunciation of those, particularly Shiʿi Muslims, whom it claims have deviated from the true and proper path of the religion. The possibility that greater personal religiosity increases the likelihood that Sunni Muslim Arabs will look more favorably on the claims and actions of the Islamic State is expressed in Hypothesis 1a (H1a).

H1a postulates and tests the assumption that a shared connection to Islam, albeit a very different kind of connection, predisposes Sunni Muslim Arabs to believe that Daesh's actions are in the interest of the religion. But there is also another hypothesis, H1b, to consider. H1b postulates that Sunni Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa who are more religious are disproportionately likely to have negative views about the Islamic State.

It should be evident that H1b differs from Ho, the null hypothesis. Ho posits that personal religiosity has no impact on attitudes toward Daesh. But Ho is not the only alternative to H1a. Rather, it is possible that personal religiosity does have an impact on views about the Islamic State, but that this relationship is not the one represented by H1a. H1b, in this case, advances the possibility that personal religiosity pushes toward an unfavorable view of Daesh among Sunni Muslims in the Arab world. The underlying causal story to which H1b calls for consideration is that more religious individuals are more knowledgeable about Islam, and this in turn leads them to recognize, or at least believe, that the interpretations of Islam that animate the Islamic State deviate very significantly from the proper and true understanding of what Islam teaches and what it enjoins upon believers. Indeed, for these men and women, these understandings may well be seen as grotesque distortions. Thus, whereas H1a says that personal religiosity and a deeper connection to the religion pushes toward the view that the actions of the Islamic State are in the interest of Islam, H1b states the opposite, that Daesh's message and actions are harmful and detrimental to the religion.

> H1a: Men and women who are more religious are less likely than those who are less religious to have positive views about the Islamic State.
>
> H1b: Men and women who are more religious are more likely than those who are less religious to have negative views about the Islamic State.

Key Demographic

Personal attributes, or demographic features, are another factor that may account for some of the variance in attitudes toward the Islamic State held by Sunni Muslims in the Arab world. The focus here is not on the potential explanatory power of any single demographic variable, but rather on a particular concatenation of three personal attributes: gender, education, and age. More specifically, the possibility to be considered is that positive attitudes toward the Islamic State are more likely to be held by younger poorly educated men than by individuals in other subpopulations defined by personal attributes. For purposes of the present inquiry, poorly educated younger men constitute, and may be described as, a key demographic.

This proposition is made plausible by Daesh messaging, which targets this key demographic more than other personal attribute groupings, and by the fact that Sunni Muslim Arabs who have left their countries to join the Islamic State have disproportionately been members of this demographic. At the heart of both Daesh's messaging strategy and key demographic departures is an assumption of relatively greater frustration, and possibly anger, among poorly educated younger men than among other demographic categories.

For men more than women, there is an expectation of employment in order to provide for their families; but with low levels of education, their employment prospects are limited. And their circumstance also differs from that of poorly educated older men, who to at least some degree have left behind the uncertainty of young adulthood and accepted their situation. They also passed through these years at a time when aggregate levels of education were lower, such that a secondary school education was less likely to be considered a relatively low level of education. Faced with this situation, poorly educated younger men are, presumably, more discontent with the status quo and receptive to ideologies that claim to offer a different, better future. For the same reason, the thought that Daesh is engaged in a noble struggle, indeed a godly one, may add a measure to the appeal of the organization's message.

Until Hypothesis 2 (H2) is tested and confirmed, this causal story rests on a foundation of theorizing rather than one of data and evidence. Nevertheless, to the extent H2 expresses a causal story that is plausible and very possibly even persuasive, a test of H2 will yield valuable insights even if the hypothesis is not confirmed. Should H2 not be confirmed, it will still be useful to know that a driver of Sunni Muslim Arab attitudes toward Daesh that appears to be important does not, in fact, have explanatory power. For purposes of the analysis to follow, members of the key demographic are men who are 30 years of age or younger and have had no more than a secondary school education.

> H2: Men who are 30 years of age or younger and have had no more than a secondary school education are more likely than individuals who do not share this combination of personal attributes to have positive views about the Islamic State.

Political Trust

Political trust is a third possible driver shaping attitudes toward the Islamic State. More specifically, it is proposed that having positive attitudes toward the Islamic State is inversely related to level of political trust, which is defined as confidence, or high confidence, in the country's various national political institutions, such as the cabinet, the parliament, the military, and the courts. The relationship between attitudes toward Daesh and political trust is expressed in Hypothesis 3.

> H3: Individuals who have lower levels of trust in their country's political institutions are more likely than individuals who have higher levels of political trust to have positive attitudes toward the Islamic State.

The causal story that assigns explanatory power to political trust is similar to the one proposed in connection with the key demographic. It states that discontent, perhaps deep discontent, with the way their country is governed is disproportionately likely to lead those who are unhappy with the status quo to find alternative political formulae appealing. In addition, Daesh not only offers a different, and what it claims is a much better, political future, it also condemns the present political system of virtually every Arab country in a way that resonates with those individuals who have little or no trust in their country's political institutions. But while discontent with the status quo is central to the causal stories that underlie both H2 and H3, they differ in a very important way. H3 is focused on discontent with the country's political system, the important elements being not only that it concerns political rather than socioeconomic factors, as does H2, but also that it pertains to the polity, not to the individual.

Political trust has been measured with a battery of items in the Arab Barometer interview schedule that begins by telling respondents, "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them." It then names the institution and asks respondents if they have a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all in that institution. For present purposes, political trust has been measured by the degree of trust in four political institutions: The government (Council of Ministers), the elected council of representatives (Parliament), the political parties, and the courts and the legal system. Responses to the questions about trust in these items have been factor-analyzed following the logic and procedures discussed with respect to the measurement of personal religiosity.

These items and their factor loadings are listed below.[6] As in the case of personal religiosity, high loadings on a single factor establishes unidimensionality, which in turn demonstrates reliability and provides an empirical foundation for inferring validity. Factor loadings vary from .659 to .843. The factor scores, to be employed when H3 is tested, range from –2.64862 to 1.31206, How much trust do you have in the government (Council of Ministers)?

- Factor Loading: .838

How much trust do you have in the courts and legal system?

- Factor Loading: .787

How much trust do you have in the elected council of representatives (Parliament)?

- Factor Loading: .843

How much trust do you have in political parties?

- Factor Loading: .659

Analysis and Findings

Table 22.2 presents the result of an OLS regression analysis that tests the three hypotheses. Each of the three questions pertaining to the Islamic State is a dependent variable.[7] The independent variables are the three possible drivers presented in H1a, H1b, H2, and H3. These are personal religiosity, membership in a key demographic category composed of poorly educated younger men, and political trust.

Table 22.2 shows that personal religiosity has a strong and statistically significant relationship to attitudes toward the Islamic state for only one of the three questions about Daesh, the question that asks respondents whether they believe Daesh's tactics are compatible with the teachings of Islam. In this instance, interestingly, the findings do not provide evidence in support of H1a, but instead provide evidence in support of H1b: greater personal religiosity pushes toward disagreement that the actions of the Islamic State are compatible with the teachings of Islam. With respect to the key demographic, belonging to this demographic category is not related to any of the three questions about Daesh, and this remains the case when three different cutting points related to age are used—25 and younger, 30 and younger, and 35 and younger. Finally, political trust has a strong and statistically significant relationship to all three of the items about the Islamic State. More specifically, contrary to the inverse relationship posited in H3, lower levels of political trust push toward more negative views about the Islamic State, including stronger disagreement with both Daesh's goals and methods and that the group's actions and religious interpretations are compatible with the teachings of Islam.

Table 22.2: Results of an OLS Regression Testing Hypotheses about Personal Religiosity, Demographic Attributes, and Political Trust

Stronger disagreement with Daesh's goals						
Constant	3.890 (.005)	3.891 (.005)	3.890 (.005)	3.890 (.005)	3.875 (.006)	3.887 (.006)
Weaker level of personal religiosity	-.002 (.005)					-.002 (.005)
Belongs to key demographic: 18–25		-.022 (.019)				
Belongs to key demographic: 18–30			-.005 (.015)			.000[a] (.017)
Belongs to key demographic: 18–35				-.005 (.014)		
Lower political trust					.017*** (.006)	.015*** (.006)
Stronger disagreement with Daesh's methods						
Constant	3.905 (.005)	3.907 (.005)	3.905 (.005)	3.904 (.005)	3.890 (.006)	3.900 (.006)
Weaker level of personal religiosity	.000 (.005)					-001 (.005)
Belongs to key demographic: 18–25		-.028 (.018)				
Belongs to key demographic: 18–30			-.004 (.015)			-.001[a] (.017)
Belongs to key demographic: 18–35				.004 (.013)		
Lower political trust					.010* (.006)	.018*** (.005)
Stronger disagreement that Daesh represents the true Islam						
Constant	3.822 (.007)	3.823 (.007)	3.821 (.007)	3.823 (.007)	3.797 (.008)	3.801 (.009)
Weaker level of personal religiosity	-.028*** (.007)					-.029*** (.008)
Belongs to key demographic: 18–25		.040* (.025)				
Belongs to key demographic: 18–30			-.008 (.020)			-.021[a] (.031)

(continued)

Table 22.1: Continued

	Stronger disagreement with Daesh's goals		
Belongs to key demographic: 18–35	-.015 (.018)		
Lower political trust		.033*** (.009)	.038*** (.009)

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

The finding about personal religiosity deserves emphasis. Whereas it might be assumed that Muslims who are more devout are disproportionately likely to look with favor on social and political movements that organize under the banner of Islam, our data show that this is not the case, at least with respect to the Islamic State. Indeed, the data show that precisely the opposite is true. More religious Sunni Muslims in the MENA countries for which we have data are disproportionately likely say that the actions and religious interpretations of the Islamic State are not compatible with the teachings of Islam.

The causal story that offers an explanation for this is probably that more religious individuals are more knowledgeable about the religion, and are therefore better able to have an informed opinion about what is and is not within the range of legitimate Islamic interpretation. Along the same lines, more religious individuals are probably more likely to care about who claims to speak for Islam and whether the sayings and actions of those who do contribute to a correct public perception of the religion. For more religious individuals, therefore, Daesh's proclaimed connection to Islam is not only incorrect and unjustified, it is also harmful and probably dangerous.

Findings about the explanatory power of political trust also merit elaboration. H3 proposed that individuals who have *lower* levels of trust in their country's political institutions are more likely than individuals who have higher levels of political trust to have more *positive* attitudes toward the Islamic State. This hypothesis is not confirmed. There are statistically significant relationships between political trust and views about the Islamic State. Indeed, these are the strongest and most consistent relationships of those proposed in the three hypotheses under consideration. But the direction of these relationships is not the one described in H3. Rather, individuals who have *lower* levels of trust in their country's political institutions are more likely to have more *negative* attitudes toward the Islamic State.

The logic on which H3 is based is evidently flawed. But political trust does have a very strong and significant relationship to views about the Islamic State, so there is clearly a story to be discovered. One possibility is that a broader conceptualization of political trust is needed. Whereas H3 rested on the assumption that trust was low in the political institutions *of the respondent's country*, our data suggest that trust is actually low in political institutions, and probably also political processes, in general. It therefore does not tell us, primarily, how well and fairly or how poorly and unfairly the country is being governed in the judgment of the respondent. It instead tells us something about the respondent's own perspective and worldview with respect to political affairs. Thus, as the data show, this person has unfavorable opinions about the Islamic state's political project as well as about political institutions closer to home.

This is an intriguing possibility that appears to offer a plausible explanation for findings that were not expected. It may not be correct, of course, and at the very least its serious consideration requires further reflection and additional analysis. But it does offer a line of inquiry with the potential to be instructive. It also offers an example of the way to respond to findings that are obviously strong and significant but, at the same time, are also unexpected—findings, it might be said, that arrive without a foundation of theory.

The Experiment

The experiment embedded in the fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys randomly assigned respondents to one of five groups, a control group and four treatment groups. This was done in seven of the eight countries included in the fourth wave: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, and Tunisia. Taking these countries together, it means that each of the experiment's five groups contained approximately 1,450 respondents.

The four treatments were statements about the Islamic State that were read to respondents before they were asked the three questions about Daesh's goals, methods, and Islamic interpretation. Selection of these treatments was not based on an overarching theory or with a view toward testing specific hypotheses in pursuit of generalizable causal stories. Rather, the primary goal of the experiment was to shed light on a real-world and important question confronting the Arab region, and other regions: to what extent were Daesh's actions and messaging building passive support for the Islamic State among ordinary Sunni Muslim Arabs. Accordingly, the experiment's four treatments asked about Daesh's use of violence and its declared objectives as communicated in its social media messaging.[8]

The first treatment, Treatment A, told respondents about Daesh's claim to be establishing an Islamic caliphate and then stated that the group had killed many non-Muslims, and also Muslims, in pursuit of this goal. The three remaining treatments, Treatments B, C, and D, included the text of Treatment A and then added additional text about one of Daesh's declared objectives: confronting Iran and Shiʿi Islam, confronting Arab leaders with a secular orientation, and confronting Western imperialism in the Arab world. The exact language of the four treatments is presented in Appendix A.

TREATMENT EFFECTS

Table 22.3 shows the degree to which views about the Islamic State are positive, based on responses to the questions about Daesh's goals, methods, and Islamic interpretation. All respondents, whether in the control group or one of the treatment groups, were asked to answer these questions. The percentages shown in the table are based on two different dichotomizations of the responses to each treatment question. In the first case, in the left-side column in each cell of the table, the comparison is between those who either to a large extent agree or somewhat agree with Daesh and those who either somewhat disagree or to a large extent disagree with Daesh. The table in each case gives the percentage of those who either somewhat agree or to a large extent agree with the Islamic State's goals, methods, or interpretation of Islam.

In the second case, in the right-side column in each cell of the table, the comparison is between those who to a large extent disagree with Daesh and those who do not hold this view, including in the latter category not only those who either to a large extent agree or somewhat agree, but also those who somewhat *disagree* with Daesh. The figures in these right-side columns are the percentages of respondents who gave one of the three responses in the latter category, which is to say those who do not to a large extent disagree with Daesh. Given the very small proportion of respondents with positive attitudes toward the Islamic State, having two dichotomizations increases our chances to discern any treatment impact that might otherwise be missed.

The table also presents response distributions for individuals in either treatment groups B or C or D and for those in either treatment groups A or B or C or D. These two treatment group combinations are included to facilitate cross-group comparison. The BCD combination is included to see whether there is a treatment impact that is not related to any particular one of Daesh's stated objectives. The ABCD combination is included to see whether there is a treatment impact irrespective of the content of the treatment.

The impact of the various treatments, or combinations of treatments, can be assessed by comparing the attitudes of respondents in any treatment group to the attitudes of respondents in the control group. Since group assignments were random, the control group differs from each treatment group only with respect to the treatment, and that difference thus expresses the treatment's impact.

Table 22.3 shows, somewhat surprisingly, that in very few of the treatment groups do respondent attitudes toward the Islamic State differ significantly from respondent attitudes toward the Islamic State in the control group. There is rarely a difference of more than 1 percent between the control group and a treatment group, and in not one of the thirty-six treatment cells in Table 22.3 is there a 2 percent difference. As a broad and general takeaway, these findings thus suggest that not only are positive attitudes toward the Islamic State few and far between, but also that for the most part they are not pushed even lower by the receipt of information about Daesh's actions and objectives.

Some additions to this broad and general takeaway are needed. There are a few treatment group–control group differences large enough to merit attention, and large enough to be statistically significant. A chi square statistic was computed to determine whether the attitudinal difference between respondents in the control group and respondents in each individual treatment group, though small, might nonetheless be large enough to be statistically significant and therefor worthy of attention. Toward this end, chi square values were computed for each cell in Table 22.3, and the resulting probability values are given in parentheses. There are eight instances of a treatment group–control group difference large enough to be statistically significant at the more tolerant .10 level, and of these, four are significant at the .05 level of confidence. The figures are in bold in each of the eight statistically significant instances.

These findings suggest several addenda to the previously reported general conclusion—that attitudes toward the Islamic State are not influenced in meaningful measure by information about the actions and social media messages of the Islamist group. It is possible, of course, and perhaps likely, that many respondents have little prior knowledge about the Islamic State. But in this case, the conclusion remains the same: the acquisition of information and knowledge about Daesh's actions and goals does not change people's attitudes toward the group, at least not in the short run.

The first addendum is a refinement of this general conclusion. More specifically, it concerns the particular questions and issues to which this general conclusion does and does not apply. Interestingly, and to some extent surprisingly, none of the experimental treatments, or combination of treatments, has a significant impact on the question of whether Daesh's actions and religious interpretations are compatible with the teachings of Islam. This is somewhat surprising given the centrality of Islam in the lives of both citizens and societies in the Arab world. The expectation, therefore, was that it would be in response to this question that treatment primes would be most likely to have an impact. Nevertheless, this is not the case. The judgments about religious matters of ordinary citizens are, apparently, sufficiently strong and stable to withstand whatever impetus for change is provided by the experimental treatments.

Table 22.3: Impact of Experimental Treatments on Attitudes toward the Islamic State

	Attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State		Attitudes toward the methods of the Islamic State		Daesh actions compatible with the teachings of Islam	
	Percent agree to a large extent or somewhat agree	Percent not disagree to a large extent	Percent agree to a large extent or somewhat agree	Percent not disagree to a large extent	Percent agree to a large extent or somewhat agree	Percent not disagree to a large extent
Control Group	3.1	8.7	2.9	6.9	5.3	11.9
Treatment A: Caliphate and killings	2.1**(.081)**	6.8**(.044)**	2.3 (.340)	6.3 (.533)	4.3 (.206)	11.2 (.558)
Treatment B: Oppose Iran and Shiʿa	3.1 (.893)	8.6 (.806)	2.0 (.138)	6.3 (.561)	5.1 (.749)	12.2 (.853)
Treatment C: Oppose secular Arab leaders	2.3 (.129)	7.1**(.078)**	1.8 **(.047)**	5.7 (.170)	4.8 (.504)	11.1 (.465)
Treatment D: Oppose Western interference	2.6 (.363)	7.4 (.185)	1.9 **(.085)**	6.3 (.493)	4.3 (.211)	10.1 (.139)
Treatment BCD	2.6 (.293)	7.6 (.170)	1.9 **(.026)**	6.1 (.275)	4.8 (.359)	11.1 (.414)
Treatment ABCD	2.5 (.167)	7.4**(.086)**	2.0 **(.041)**	6.1 (.295)	4.6 (.263)	11.1 (.412)
	N = 7,149		N = 7,177		N =7,079	

Note: Cells of the table contain percentages and, in parentheses, probability values.

Probability values of .10 or lower are in bold.

A second addendum concerns the questions and issues for which the general conclusion advanced above appears not to apply, and this involves, in particular, the question about Daesh's methods. Treatment C and Treatment D both impact respondent attitudes about the Islamic State's methods, particularly the killing it has done. Treatment C references Daesh's opposition to secular Arab leaders, and Treatment D references the group's opposition to Western interference in the Arab region. Upon hearing about each of these two Daesh objectives, respondents in treatment group C and respondents in treatment group D express attitudes toward the Islamic State's methods that are significantly more critical than respondents in the control group.

Similarities in the content of Treatments C and D and the way that each differs from the content of Treatment B suggest what might be an underlying mechanism.

Treatments C and D are both about politics. They reference political actors and focus on those that represent a particular agenda. Both Arab leaders and the Western powers with which they often cooperate support and seek to maintain the political status quo. Treatment B, by contrast, invites reflection on issues of religion, identity, culture, and perhaps nationalism. It is only possible to speculate about the reason that treatments with political content increase disagreement with Daesh's methods while treatments with cultural content do not. A possible and plausible causal story is that respondents concerned with security and political stability, and to that extent support the status quo, whatever its problems, will be more fearful of the violence and destruction that the Islamic State has wrought and less inclined to agree with Daesh's opposition to either secular Arab leaders or the involvement of Western powers in Arab political affairs. Put differently, Daesh's actions and methods represent political disorder in the larger Arab arena, and when primed to think about Daesh's opposition to political actors that represent and seek to maintain the existing political order, however unsatisfactory that order might be in other respects, these respondents become significantly more critical of the Islamic State.

A final addendum is suggested by views about the Islamic State's goals. The treatments that have a statistically significant impact in this instance are, first, Treatment A, which talks about Daesh's commitment to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and the killing of both non-Muslims and Muslims in pursuit of this end; and second, Treatment C, which restates the content of Treatment A and then adds a reference to Daesh's opposition to secular Arab leaders. The significant difference between treatment group attitudes and control group attitudes is most notable when the comparison is among respondents whose views do and do not fall outside the "disagree to a large extent" category, which is reported in the right-side columns in Table 22.3. The probabilities associated with Treatment A are much lower in the right-side column, and the probabilities associated with Treatment C are only significant in the right-side column. The finding, then, is that Treatments A and C have moved a significant proportion of respondents from less determined opposition to Daesh's goals, or perhaps even a measure of support for these goals, to a more determined opposition to the Islamic State and its objectives.

It is notable that Treatment A had this impact. This suggests that what might be called "basic" information about Daesh and its goals is enough to move some respondents from weak disagreement with Daesh's goals, or perhaps even weak agreement in some instances, to very strong disagreement with the Islamic State's objectives. The experiment thus offers evidence that exposure to even limited or basic information about the Islamic State is sufficient to move some Sunni Muslim Arabs who previously were not strongly opposed to Daesh's goals to views, having acquired this information, that are more strongly negative. A possible policy implication is that leaders seeking to reduce passive support or even weak opposition to the Islamic State will find that a better-informed public will, in the aggregate, have more negative attitudes toward the Islamist project.

The finding that Treatment C also significantly reduces the proportion of respondents who do *not* strongly disagree with Daesh's goals, and thus increases the proportion who *do* strongly disagree, invites speculation about why being told that Daesh opposes secular Arab leaders makes a difference, particularly when being told that Daesh opposes Iran and Shiʿa, or that it opposes Western interference does not. One possibility is that opposition to Arab leaders is closer to home for most ordinary citizens than are the oppositions referenced in Treatments B and D. Closer to home in this case means that major Islamic State victories would be more likely to affect these respondents directly.

This also suggests, as noted previously with respect to other findings, that a concern for security and stability may be motivating many individuals and shaping the way they think about the various Daesh goals that are referenced in Treatments B, C, and D. With intense fighting in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya at the time of the Arab Barometer fourth-wave survey, and with the failure of Islamist governments in Egypt and to some extent Tunisia only a few years before, secular Arab leaders may represent political order and stability in the minds of ordinary citizens. These individuals may complain about widespread corruption and serious violations of human rights at the hands of these leaders, but they nonetheless want leaders who will keep them safe and keep their country secure. To the extent that the Daesh objective referenced in Treatment C constitutes more of a threat to security and stability than do the Daesh objectives referenced in Treatment B and, to some extent, Treatment D, the takeaway is that a concern for political order, or a fear of political disorder, influences the way people think about Daesh's goals and assess the potential danger associated with each of them.

These various takeaways are informed by our data and analyses. They are also presumably plausible, and perhaps even persuasive. Nevertheless, they remain informed speculations that suggest rather than demonstrate the meaning and significance of observed variable relationships and underlying causal mechanisms.

TREATMENTS AND DRIVERS

The independent variables in the three hypotheses presented and tested earlier—personal religiosity, membership in a key demographic, and political trust—may condition the impact of some experimental treatments. Findings about conditioning effects are reported in the four parts of Table 22.B1 in the appendix, one part for each of the four experimental treatments. A brief summary of the analysis and findings is presented here. The appendix offers a fuller discussion.

Table 22.B1 presents the results of OLS regression analyses in which the independent variable in each of the three hypotheses and also each of the four experimental treatments are included as nondependent variables, with the dependent variables again being the three questions about the Islamic State in the Arab Barometer survey. The table does not reveal a broad array of instances in which the impact of an experimental treatment varies according to whether or not one or more of the three independent variables is included in the regression analyses.

The relatively few cases where the statistical significance of an experimental treatment does change in response to the inclusion of an independent variable are consistent with previous findings and offer additional evidence of where statistically significant relationships are to be found. Among the independent variables in the hypotheses offered earlier, it is clearly political trust that has explanatory power. And among experimental treatments, it is Treatment A and Treatment C that most often both have explanatory power and have that power diminish when examined in tandem with political trust.

Discussion and Conclusion

The fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys was carried out in eight countries in 2016–2017. The interview schedule in seven of these countries contained questions and an embedded experiment pertaining to the Islamic State: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, and Tunisia. The questions and experiment pertaining to the Islamic State were not included in an eighth Wave IV country, Egypt. The descriptive information presented earlier, in Table 22.1, makes clear that support for the objectives and actions of the Islamic State is generally very low, as is the proportion of Sunni Muslim Arabs who believe that these objective and actions are compatible with the teachings of Islam. There is, nevertheless, a small proportion of individuals who hold positive views about the Islamic State, there being, therefore, some variance to be explained.

It is worth reflecting briefly on the question of whether the findings reported here shed any light on the opinions and attitudes of Sunni Muslim Arab populations in other countries, or perhaps even non-Arab Muslim populations outside the MENA region. Strictly speaking, the answer is negative. There is no way to know for sure whether attitudinal patterns and distributions observed in some locations describe patterns and distributions in other locations without replicating the research in these other locations. At the same time, findings from the research reported here may, with some caution, productively inform thinking about the attitudes toward the Islamic State held by Sunni Muslim Arabs in countries not included in the fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys. With Qatar being the only GCC country to be surveyed, generalization to other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council is unlikely to be productive. By contrast, with four Wave IV countries in North Africa, one of which is Egypt, and three Wave IV countries in the Mashreq, the possibilities for cautious generalization, particularly if attentive to scope conditions, should not be arbitrarily and completely dismissed.

The case for thinking about the applicability of findings beyond the Wave IV countries that were surveyed is further strengthened by the fact that the structure of our analyses, including those pertaining to the survey experiment, do not consider the country of which the respondent is a citizen. Rather, focusing on personal religiosity, for example, or on level of political trust, the analyses do not include country as a variable, and findings are thus based on a large multi-country pool of data drawn from careful surveys conducted across the MENA region. Accordingly, it would appear to be appropriate, while awaiting additional data-based investigations, of course, to entertain strongly the possibility, if not the likelihood, that Wave IV findings about the explanatory power of personal religiosity, political trust, or other variables are similar to those that would be found among populations, among Sunni Muslim Arab populations in this case, in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa—and perhaps elsewhere as well.

A number of the specific findings offered in the present research report were unexpected. To an extent, this makes these findings more interesting and instructive, but it also places some limits on the degree to which the objectives of the study have been achieved. Turning first to the hypotheses, it is surprising that personal religiosity does not account for significant variance in views about Daesh's goals and methods. And although the possibility is expressed in H1b, the fact that more religious individuals are more likely than less religious individuals to believe that Daesh's actions and pronouncements are incompatible with the teachings of Islam is at least somewhat surprising. It is also a finding of considerable significance, and one for which the possibilities for generalization would appear to deserve serious attention.

It is also somewhat surprising that we did not succeed in identifying a demographic subset of the population that is disproportionately likely to be receptive to Daesh's message and to have more positive, or less negative, attitudes toward the Islamic State. The logic being tested in Hypothesis 2 is that respondents who belong to the modal demographic profile of individuals who have left their home countries and joined the Islamic State—less well-educated younger men, whom we have called the "key demographic," would be more likely than their countrymen with different demographic attributes to have more positive attitudes toward the Islamic State. This logic, however persuasive it might be in the abstract, does not appear to describe the facts on the ground, and this is the case even though different cutting points for age were considered. The absence of positive findings about a key demographic does provide useful information, but it probably falls short of our goal of identifying and shedding light on factors that predispose some Sunni Muslim Arabs to hold positive views about the Islamic State.

The relationship between political trust and attitudes toward Daesh is strong and statistically significant, but the direction of the relationship is not that proposed in Hypothesis 3. H3 posited an inverse relationship: individuals with lower levels of political trust are more likely to have positive attitudes about the Islamic State, presumably because Daesh criticizes the system of government by which they are ruled and with which they are discontent, and because Daesh then offers an alternative. But this is not the case; individuals with lower levels of political trust have negative views about both their government and about Daesh. Even if the direction of the relationship is not that expected, this finding does identify and shed some light on factors that play a role in shaping attitudes toward the Islamic State. Of potentially equal or even greater value are the questions this finding raises about how political trust should be conceptualized and about what is actually being measured by questions that ask about specific political institutions.

Proposed for consideration is the possibility that this finding says as much about a person's worldview and general perspective on politics as it does about his or her judgment of the specific political institutions of the person's country. As in the case of personal religiosity and the incompatibility of Daesh actions with the teachings of Islam, the finding about political trust points to an attitude-shaping dynamic that had not been expected but does have significant explanatory power and merits additional consideration.

Our survey experiment has produced several interesting findings, but, overall, its contribution is not as significant as we had hoped. None of the four experimental treatments has a significant impact on all three of the questions about Daesh; no treatment has an impact on the question about the teachings of Islam; one of the treatments, the one about Daesh's opposition to Iran and Shiʿi Muslims, has no impact on any of the three questions about the Islamic State; and only one of the four treatments, the one about Daesh's opposition to secular Arab leaders, has a significant impact on both of the two remaining questions, one about Daesh's goals and one about its methods. Accordingly, we learn that knowing more about the Islamic state's objectives and actions and the content of its messaging on social media for the most part does not impact attitudes about the extremist group.

But findings of no relationship are not necessarily without value. They help to rule out plausible patterns that might otherwise be thought to have explanatory power. And this being the case, they more clearly identify and call attention to the small number of relationships that are both statistically significant and substantively and analytically important. In this category are the impact of Treatments A and C on views about Daesh's goals, and of Treatments C and D on views about Daesh's methods. These findings, including findings of no significant relationship, also provide a foundation for considering whether the impact of the experimental treatments changes when the independent variables in the hypotheses are included in the analysis. There are very few such changes, however, and so it may be concluded that findings about the impact of the experimental treatments is the same, or at least very similar, for both more religious and less religious individuals, for both less well-educated younger men and those who do not fit this demographic profile, and for both individuals with a higher level and individuals with a lower level of political trust.

In sum, the value of our findings often lies in the doubt they cast on causal stories that would otherwise be persuasive. Such findings are not without value. But there are also some unexpected findings about significant and instructive relationships that might otherwise have been missed. Among these are the relationship between personal religiosity and the view that Daesh's actions and religious interpretations are not compatible with the teachings of Islam. So, too, is the finding that lower political trust pushes toward negative views of the Islamic State.

When the fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys was conducted, in 2016–2017, and even more in 2015, when the instrument for Wave IV was being constructed and pretested, the Islamic State was much stronger and more frightening than it is at the time of this writing. It was only one year earlier, in June 2014, that the group's leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, announced the formation of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq and gave the group he led the name the Islamic State. The US carried out airstrikes on the Islamic state during this period and had some success. But the group made gains on the ground in Syria and remained firmly in control of its territory there. Daesh also demonstrated its ability to hit overseas targets. In June 2015, for example, Daesh claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on a tourist resort in Sousse, Tunisia. Thirty-eight people were killed, thirty of whom were British tourists. This picture helps to explain the Arab Barometer's interest in asking questions about the Islamic State. But it also raises questions about the possibility of scope conditions that specify when particular attitudes about Daesh and their determinants do and do not characterize Sunni Muslim Arab populations. The present study thus provides baseline data for subsequent investigations—investigations that will shed light on the prospects for generalization over time and offer thoughts about the temporal conditionalities that need to be made part of causal stories about the way the Islamic State is seen and evaluated by ordinary Sunni Muslim Arab citizens.

NOTES

1. This is not to claim that ideological convergence is the *only* relevant factor, but simply that it represents an important factor in winning sympathizers in Arab countries outside of those in which the Islamic State is actively operating.
2. Arab Barometer surveys are based on face-to-face interviews with probability-based and nationally representative samples of men and women aged 18 or older. To date, there have been five waves of Barometer surveys, more than 75,000 individuals have been interviewed, and at least one survey has been conducted in fifteen different Arab countries. Data from all Arab Barometer surveys are available for downloading from the Barometer's website. The website also contains an online analysis tool, through which can be observed the distribution of responses to any survey question in any country in any wave and across any one of various demographic categories.
3. Extensive general and country-specific methodological information is available on the Arab Barometer website (arabbarometer.org).
4. Attention is not given to the possible reasons that support for Daesh is not as low in some countries as it is in others. Some ideas about the determinants of cross-country variance might suggest themselves, but without controls to significantly reduce over-determination, it is impossible to assess the accuracy of these ideas.
5. These factor loadings are very comfortably beyond the generally accepted minimum of +.60 or −.60 that is needed to establish that an item measures, at least approximately, what the factor itself measures.
6. Trust in the army and in the police were initially included in the factor analysis. They both had low loadings on the political trust factor and high loading on a second factor, indicating that we have indeed measured *political* trust and not trust in governance more generally.
7. Responses to each question is a 4-point scale. For the questions about Daesh's goals and methods, this ranges from agree to a large extent to disagree to a large extent. For the

question about the compatibility of Daesh's actions with the teachings of Islam, the 4-point scale ranges from definitely compatible to definitely not compatible.

8. Additionally, as with all Arab Barometer surveys, the fourth-wave questionnaire containing the experiment was reviewed by the Barometer's in-country partners and if necessary revised before beginning the survey.

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APPENDIX A

EMBEDDED EXPERIMENT

The interview schedule used in the fourth wave of Arab Barometer surveys included an embedded experiment that randomly assigned respondents to one of five groups: a control group and four treatment groups. The four treatments, shown below, were statements about the Islamic State that were read to respondents before they were asked questions about Daesh's goals, its methods, and the compatibility of its tactics with the teachings of Islam. As can be seen, Treatment A references Daesh's claims about establishing an Islamic caliphate and then states that the group had killed many non-Muslims, and also Muslims, in pursuit of this goal. The three remaining treatments include the text of Treatment A and then add text about one of Daesh's declared objectives: confronting Iran and Shiʿi Islam, confronting Arab leaders with a secular orientation, and confronting Western imperialism in the Arab world.

Treatment A: As you may know, Daesh has emerged as a potent force in the region and the world. In 2014 it declared a caliphate based in Raqqa, Syria. Daesh's goal is to extend the caliphate across the Muslim world and it has killed many Muslims and non-Muslims in pursuit of this aim.

Treatment B: As you may know, Daesh has emerged as a potent force in the region and the world. In 2014 it declared a caliphate based in Raqqa, Syria. Daesh's goal is to extend the caliphate across the Muslim world and it has killed many Muslims and non-Muslims in pursuit of this aim. Another of Daesh's stated objectives is to limit Shiʿa influence across the Muslim world as well as opposing Iranian-led Shiʿa forces in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere.

Treatment C: As you may know, Daesh has emerged as a potent force in the region and the world. In 2014 it declared a caliphate based in Raqqa, Syria. Daesh's goal is to extend the caliphate across the Muslim world and it has killed many Muslims and non-Muslims in pursuit of this aim. Another of Daesh's stated objectives is to defend Islam from attacks by secular leaders and other elites whose goal is to limit the role of Islam in government and public life.

Treatment D: As you may know, Daesh has emerged as a potent force in the region and the world. In 2014 it declared a caliphate based in Raqqa, Syria. Daesh's goal is to extend the caliphate across the Muslim world and it has killed many Muslims and non-Muslims in pursuit of this aim. Another of Daesh's stated objectives is to counter intervention in the region by the United States and other Western powers who have engaged in military attacks against it.

APPENDIX B

Treatments and Drivers

The independent variables in the hypotheses and causal stories presented and tested earlier may condition the impact of some experimental treatments. The three variables are personal religiosity, membership in what we have called a key demographic, and political trust. H1a and H1b are the hypotheses pertaining to personal religiosity. H2 deals with membership in a particular demographic category: poorly educated younger men. The independent variable in H3 is political trust. Findings about conditioning effects are reported in the four parts of Table 22.B1, one part for each of the four experimental treatments.

To recall earlier findings, hypotheses about the influence of personal religiosity are confirmed in only one instance, when the dependent variable is the compatibility of Daesh's actions with the teachings of Islam. In this case, there is a statistically significant relationship between greater personal religiosity and the view that the organization's tactics, meaning its use of violence, are not compatible with the teachings of the religion. Hypotheses about the significance of membership in the key demographic category are not confirmed. A statistically significant relationship between political trust and attitudes toward the Islamic State has been observed, but it is not in the inverse direction proposed in H3. Rather, respondents with a lower level of political trust have more negative attitudes toward the Islamic State.

Tables 22.B1a, 22.B1b, 22.B1c, and 22.B1d present the results of an OLS regression analysis in which each of these three variables and also each of the four experimental treatments are included as nondependent variables, with the dependent variables being the three questions about the Islamic State in the Arab Barometer surveys: Daesh's goals, its methods, and whether its tactics are compatible with the teachings of Islam. The principal objective of the analysis reported in Table 22.B1 is to determine whether the statistical significance, and hence the explanatory power of each experimental treatment, changes, becoming either stronger or weaker, when any one or all of the three independent variables is included in the regression. Thus, for example, the first finding in Table 22.B1a, excluding the constant, shows that the impact of Treatment A on attitudes

Table 22.B1a: Impact of Treatment A with Other Variables in the Models

Attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State					
Constant	3.872 (.011)	3.871 (.012)	3.875 (.012)	3.867 (.014)	3.869 (.014)
Treatment A: Caliphate and killings	**.032**** **(.016)**	**.032**** **(.016)**	**.031**** **(.016)**	.017 (.019)	.017 (.019)
Lower level of religiosity		-.003 (.008)			-.014 (.010)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.025 (.024)		-.010 (.029)
Lower level of political trust				**.022**** **(.010)**	**.025**** **(.010)**
Attitudes toward the methods of the Islamic State					
Constant	3.885 (.12)	3.884 (.012)	3.889 (.013)	3.878 (.015)	.3877 (.016)
Treatment A: Caliphate and killings	.014 (.017	.014 (.017	.014 (.017	-.001 (.021)	-.001 (.021)
Lower level of religiosity		-.001 (.009)			-.005 (.011)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.026 (.025)		.006 (.033)
Lower level of political trust				.010 (.011)	.011 (.01)
Daesh actions compatible with teachings of Islam					
Constant	3.806 (.015)	3.807 (.015)	3.806 (.016)	3.788 (.019)	3.790 (.020)
Treatment A: Caliphate and killings	.020 (.022)	.019 (.022)	.020 (.022)	.007 (.026)	.006 (.013)
Lower level of religiosity		**-.018*** **(.011)**			**-.029**** **(.013)**
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.007 (.032)		.012 (.040)
Lower level of political trust				**.043***** **(.014)**	**.047***** **(.014)**

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

Table 22.B1b: Impact of Treatment B with Other Variables in the Models

	Attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State				
Constant	3.872 (.012)	3.871 (.017)	3.875 (.012)	3.869 (.014)	3.871 (.015)
Treatment B: Oppose Iran and Shiʿa	.005 (.017)	.006 (.017)	.004 (.017)	-009 (0.20)	**-.010*** **(.020)**
Lower level of religiosity		-.010 (.008)			-.017 (.010)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.028 (.026)		-.003 (.032)
Lower level of political trust				.005 (.011)	.007 (.011)
	Attitudes toward the methods of the Islamic State				
Constant	3.885 (.011)	3.884 (.012)	3.891 (.012)		3.881 (.015)
Treatment B: Oppose Iran and Shiʿa	.025 (.016)	.026 (.016)	.024 (.016)		.016 (.020)
Lower level of religiosity		-.005 (.008)			-.009 (.010)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			**-.043*** **(.025)**		-.014 (.031)
Lower level of political trust				-4.41E-5 (.010)	.002 (.011)
	Daesh actions compatible with teachings of Islam				
Constant	3.806 (.016)	3.808 (.016)	3.810 (.016)	3.792 (.019)	3.797 (.019)
Treatment B: Oppose Iran and Shiʿa	.004 (.022)	.003 (.022)	.003 (.022)	.001 (.026)	-.003 (.026)
Lower level of religiosity		**-.039***** **(.011)**			**-.042***** **(.013)**
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.032 (.033)		-.003 (.041)
Lower level of political trust				.018 (.014)	**.023*** **(.014)**

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

Table 22.B1c: Impact of Treatment C with Other Variables in the Models

Attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State					
Constant	3.872 (.011)	3.871 (.011)	3.875 (.012)	3.869 (.014)	3.870 (.014)
Treatment C: Oppose secular Arab leaders	**.031**** **(.016)**	**.033**** **(.016)**	**.030**** **(.016)**	.011 (.019)	.014 (.019)
Lower level of religiosity		-.008 (.008)			-.012 (.009)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.026 (.024)		.001 (.029)
Lower level of political trust				.005 (.010)	.007 (.010)
Attitudes toward the methods of the Islamic State					
Constant	3.885 (.011)	3.885 (.011)	3.890 (.012)	3.878 (.014)	3.879 (.014)
Treatment C: Oppose secular Arab leaders	**.034**** **(.016)**	**.037**** **(.016)**	**.034**** **(.016)**	.023 (.019)	.026 (.019)
Lower level of religiosity		**-.013*** **(.008)**			**-.017*** **(.009)**
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.037 (.024)		-.001 (.030)
Lower level of political trust				.012 (.010)	.015 (.010)
Daesh actions compatible with teachings of Islam					
Constant	3.806 (.015)	3.807 (.015)	3.812 (.016)	3.789 (.019)	3.795 (.019)
Treatment C: Oppose secular Arab leaders	.019 (.021)	.021 (.021)	.019 (.021)	.009 (.026)	.011 (.026)
Lower level of religiosity		**-.024**** **(.010)**			**-.024*** **(.013)**
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.047 (.032)		-.026 (.040)
Lower level of political trust				**.036***** **(.013)**	**.042***** **(.014)**

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

Table B1d: Impact of Treatment D with Other Variables in the Models

	Attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State				
Constant	3.872	3.871	3.874	3.868	3.869
	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.014)	(.014)
Treatment D: Oppose Western interference	.021	.021	.022	.014	.013
	(.016)	(.017)	(.016)	(.019)	(.019)
Lower level of religiosity		-.002			-.006
		(.008)			(.009)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			-.020		-.006
			(.024)		(.030)
Lower level of political trust				.013	0.014
				(.010)	(.010)
	Attitudes toward the methods of the Islamic State				
Constant	3.885	3.884	3.892	3.879	3.881
	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.014)	(.015)
Treatment D: Oppose Western interference	.023	.024	.032	.020	.021
	(.016)	(.017)	(.016)	(.020)	(.020)
Lower level of religiosity		.002			-.002
		(.008)			(.010)
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			**–.048***		-.017
			(.024)		(.030)
Lower level of political trust				.004	.005
				(.010)	(.011)
	Daesh actions compatible with teachings of Islam				
Constant	3.806	3.807	3.805	3.789	3.790
	(.015)	(.015)	(.016)	(.019)	(.019)
Treatment D: Oppose Western interference	.030	.028	.030	.020	.019
	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)	(.026)	(.026)
Lower level of religiosity		**–.029*****			**–.038*****
		(.010)			**(.013)**
Key demographic: Age 30 or younger			.002		.026
			(.032)		(.040)
Lower level of political trust				**.036*****	**.040*****
				(.014)	**(.014)**

[a] Models with personal religiosity and political trust were run with each of the two other age groups defining the key demographic. The results were the same.

* p<.1

** p<.05

*** p<.01

toward the Islamic State's goals is statistically significant when none of the independent variables is included in the model, and that it remains significant when either personal religiosity or membership in the key demographic is included in a model but then loses statistical significance when political trust is included. Political trust apparently overrides the impact of the treatment. More specifically, when political trust is low, meaning among individuals with a lower level of political trust, receiving Treatment A does not significantly alter a person's attitudes toward the goals of the Islamic State.

Table 22.B1 shows that the inclusion of the independent variables in most cases does not affect the relationship between an experimental treatment and attitudes toward the Islamic State. The pattern reported above, however, about the relationship between Treatment A and attitudes about Daesh's goals, is also found in two other instances: when the treatment is Treatment C and the dependent variable is attitudes toward either Daesh's goals or the organization's tactics. As shown in Table 22.B1c, the impact of Treatment C is statistically significant when political trust is not included in the analysis, but ceases to be significant when it is included. The only other instance of a change in the impact of an experimental treatment is shown in Table 22.B1b. Treatment B does not have a statistically significant impact when there is no independent variable in the analysis, and this remains the case when any one of the independent variables is included. But Treatment B becomes significant, though only at the $p < .10$ level, when the dependent variable is Daesh's goals and the model includes all three of the independent variables.

Table 22.B1 does not reveal a broad array of instances in which the impact of an experimental treatment varies according to whether or not one or more of the three independent variables is included in the regression analysis. As noted above, the inclusion of the independent variables in most cases does not affect the relationship between an experimental treatment and attitudes toward the Islamic State. In other words, the impact of the treatment, whether statistically significant or not, is not different for a subset of the population based on personal religiosity, demographic profile, or level of political trust than it is for the population as a whole. There are a few cases where the statistical significance of an experimental treatment does change in response to the inclusion of an independent variable, and these are consistent with previous findings and offer additional evidence of where statistically significant relationships are to be found. Among the independent variables in the hypotheses offered earlier, it is clearly political trust that has explanatory power. And among experimental treatments, it is Treatment A and Treatment C that most often both have explanatory power and have that power diminish when examined in tandem with political trust.

PART IV

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

CHAPTER 23

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PARTIES, AND POLITICAL CLEAVAGES IN MOROCCO

A Religious Divide?

ADRIA LAWRENCE

How do religious cleavages work in states that are predominantly Muslim? In states that include adherents to multiple world religions, religion marks off different communities of belief. In predominantly Muslim societies that are relatively homogenous with respect to religion, the question that sets opposition groups apart is the degree to which religion should influence politics. Adherents of political Islam seek a greater role for religion in the political life of the country, while secular groups do not (Ayoob 2004, 1; Schwedler 2013). Specified in this way, religious and secular ideologies are alternatives to one another. Organizations orient themselves in the political landscape according to their views on the appropriate role of religion in politics: they may self-identify as Islamist or draw on secular frames such as class, nationalism, and regionalism.

This understanding of political cleavages as dimensions along which political organizations' ideologies can be plotted originated in the study of political party formation in democracies.[1] These studies focused on the relationship between voters and political parties, analyzing how parties established programmatic identities that allowed them to appeal to supporters on the basis of their ideological commitments—on where they stood on questions such as what role religion should play in state laws and policies.

Yet the logic of political cleavages in non-democracies is different. This chapter focuses on predominantly Muslim states ruled by electoral authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarian regimes are the most common type of authoritarianism in the contemporary world. They have institutional features of representative democracies, such as elections and political parties, but these institutions do not provide the opposition with the opportunity to lead (Schedler 2015). Unlike democracies or hybrid regimes, political authority under electoral authoritarianism resides in a regime that does not alternate in power.[2]

This chapter makes three main claims about political cleavages under electoral authoritarianism. First, it argues that programmatic differences such as secular versus religious ideologies matter less than the stance an opposition group takes toward the ruling regime. In a democracy, parties are primarily concerned with capturing votes and winning elections, but in an authoritarian regime, opposition groups must contend with the regime itself. The primary political question in these settings is whether to adopt a more cooperative or confrontational approach to the regime; this cleavage divides the opposition, with some actors opting to participate in the pseudo-democratic institutions in place, while others criticize from outside those institutions.

This cleavage is only apparent if both political parties and groups engaged in contentious politics are included in the analysis. Thus, the second claim this chapter makes is that studying both formal and contentious politics is useful for understanding how opposition works under electoral authoritarianism. A study that includes both political parties and social movements is better able to show the range of political opposition in an authoritarian country than one that focuses exclusively on either formal or informal politics. For instance, a study that examined only political parties might overemphasize ideological differences among the parties because it omits, by design, opposition groups that have not formed political parties. In this chapter, I show that social movement organizations (SMOs) have common goals even when they differ ideologically. Likewise, an Islamist political party can have more in common with a leftist political party than it does with an Islamist SMO.

The third, related claim I make in this chapter is that political parties and SMOs do not have to choose to be either religious or secular; they can be both. In a predominantly Muslim country, religious and secular frames are not mutually exclusive alternatives—they do not exist at opposite ends of a spectrum. The lines between religious and secular political aims are frequently blurred. Denoeux (2002, 6) defines political Islam as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives." In a predominantly Muslim country, all political parties and SMOs may seek to use religion instrumentally, regardless of whether they are explicitly identify as Islamist or not. Secular opposition groups can draw on Islam to justify their policy platforms, recruit followers, or criticize the regime. Their main concern is not always limiting the role of religion in politics. Further, Islamist organizations do not solely or consistently advocate for deepening the role of religion in the political sphere. They have secular goals that they may share with some non-Islamist groups.

The difference between explicitly Islamist-oriented groups and other groups is not reducible to their respective positions on the desirable role of religion in politics. For this reason, as Pepinsky writes in this volume, "voting for an Islamic party is not always a vote for Islam, and voting for a non-Islamic party sometimes is." Similarly, secular goals, such as reducing unemployment or poverty, can lead a person to support an Islamist SMO, just as religious reasons can lead to support for SMOs that are considered secular in orientation.

This essay draws on the case of Morocco to illustrate these claims. Morocco is an electoral authoritarian state; it is headed by a hereditary monarch and has a parliament with limited powers to which parties are elected.[3] The population is 99 percent Sunni Muslim, and over 90 percent of Moroccans self-describe as either religious or somewhat religious (Arab Barometer 2017). Morocco has had both secular and Islamist political actors, making it a good exploratory case for investigating the role of religion in political cleavages.

The next section begins with a historical overview of political opposition in Morocco that sets up the empirical questions to be addressed. It then discusses political opposition in three different time periods. I begin with the anti-colonial movement and show how activists relied on religion to advance an ostensibly secular nationalist cause. Next I discuss the postcolonial period, considering the leftists and the two most prominent Islamist organizations, al-ʿAdala wa Tanmiya (the Party of Justice and Development, or PJD) and al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (the Justice and Charity Group, or JCG). I show that Islamist organizations do not consistently seek to change the religious orientation of the political system, and they share some political goals with leftists. I then discuss the 2011 protests, describing how political actors attempted to align their goals with religious principles.

As Ayoob (2004, 1–2) writes, "the political manifestations of Islam, like the practice of Islam itself, are to a great extent context specific, the result of the interpenetration of religious precepts and local culture, including political culture." Yet though context shapes the role of Islam in politics, we can and do observe commonalities across different cases. The arguments in this chapter are stated in general terms and may be assessed in other settings. In principle, the arguments apply to any predominantly Muslim state with an electoral authoritarian regime.[4] In my empirical section, I consider whether it is reasonable to treat Morocco as comparable to other states with electoral authoritarian regimes. A hereditary monarchy is one type of electoral authoritarianism. If Islamism is different in monarchies than other types of authoritarian regimes, the argument may not generalize. I consider whether the Islamist opposition is exceptionally weak in Morocco because of the king's religious legitimacy, and I argue that the presence of a religious head of state has not foreclosed opposition on religious grounds. I argue against the view that there is an *ex ante* reason to dismiss the potential wider applicability of the insights I derive from the Moroccan case, and I draw on new scholarship on other electoral authoritarian regimes that suggests the ability of these claims to travel elsewhere. The conclusion situates the theoretical points made here in the growing literature on the rise of political Islam.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN MOROCCO

The role of Islam in Moroccan politics initially appears to conform well to the ideas that (a) the main difference between Islamist and non-Islamist organizations lies in their opposing views on the extent to which Islam should inform politics, and (b) secular and religious frames are alternatives to one another, with some frames more prominent in particular periods than others. Indeed, when I began to study the role of Islamist frames in Moroccan politics, my initial thought was to conceptualize religious and secular frames in this way—as alternatives that resonate more in some periods than others—and to trace the appeal of Islamist versus secular ideologies over time.

This approach made sense because a quick overview of political opposition over the last century suggests that the importance of religion in Morocco has waxed and waned over time. Secular and Islamist movements and parties have been dominant at different points in time. A loose periodization of opposition activity in Morocco starting from the French conquest to the present day could easily be described in terms of the rise, fall, and rise again of Islamist frames for collective action. The French conquest prompted a *salafiyya* movement that saw the calamity of conquest as a punishment for departing from the correct practice of Islam (Eickelman 1985; Munson 1993). This movement evolved into a reform movement seeking rights within the framework of the French protectorate; when reform efforts failed, the movement became a nationalist one seeking independence (Lawrence 2012, 2013). Nationalism dominated starting from the Second World War, lasting into the postcolonial era, with the Istiqlal (Independence) Party forming an alliance with the new king. Then, starting in the 1970s, leftist groups mounted a challenge that culminated in the formation of a political party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which eventually won elections in 1998. The shift from contentious politics to inclusion in formal politics as a political party resulted in co-optation (on this process, see Lust 2006). With the waning of the leftist opposition, Islamist groups gained in popularity. Abdesssalam Yassine founded al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (JCG), an Islamist/Sufi social movement group, in 1987 (Daadaoui 2016). The Islamist political party al-ʿAdala wa Tanmiya *(*PJD) also benefited from the cooptation of the leftists, increasing its electoral gains starting in 2002. In 2011, protests spread across Morocco, organized by a coalition of human rights groups, leftists, and Islamists that resulted in a new constitution and the victory of the PJD in the 2011 parliamentary elections.

It is possible to recount this history as one in which secular and Islamist frames have competed with one another over time, with arguments for or against an increased role for Islam in the political life of the country resonating more in some periods than in others. This section seeks to complicate this narrative. The ideologies that have been invoked by Moroccan social movements and political parties—nationalism, regionalism, socialism, human rights, and Islamism—are not a menu of options from which only one must be chosen. I suggest that religion often plays an important role, regardless of whether an SMO's or party's dominant frame is secular or religious. To some extent, almost all political activists in Morocco are Islamist, because they invoke Islam to justify their platforms, and because they rely on mosques and religious networks to mobilize.

Religious arguments and counterarguments are pervasive among political organizations in Morocco. The differences between them are differences of emphasis and degree, not a clash between religious and secular positions. The main cleavage in Morocco is not a religious one, despite the presence of groups that self-define as Islamist or secular. The primary question that divides opposition groups in Morocco is whether to challenge the authoritarian regime or work within the limitations it imposes.

Islam and Anti-Colonialism

An examination of political opposition during the protectorate era offers the opportunity to look at political cleavages under a different authoritarian system than the one that was established at independence. The French protectorate was declared in 1912. It left the sultan in place; he worked with the colonial administration and acted as a figurehead. During the period, the French created some electoral institutions, holding local elections in 1947 and 1951 for chambers that served an advisory purpose (Lawrence 2013, 198–200).[5]

One initial reaction to the French conquest resembles responses to colonial incursions elsewhere in the Muslim world: a group of Moroccan elites, influenced by the Egyptian thinkers Djamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Sheikh Mohamed Abdou, saw the conquest as an indicator that the country had become vulnerable to external domination because it had departed from the true practice of Islam (Halstead 1964, 437). Accordingly, these elites, who were largely educated at the Qarawiyyin Mosque in Fes, were inspired by Salafist thought to promote religious reforms (Ait Mous 2013, 744; Joffé 1985, 290). They focused their efforts not on the French invaders, but on opposing the worship of *marabouts* (saints) and the religious brotherhoods that they argued had distorted and corrupted the religious faith (Halstead 1964, 440).

Members of this group shifted toward a stance of heightened confrontation with the French when the "Berber Dahir" crisis erupted in 1930. The *dahir* (decree) issued by the French was intended to codify existing customary laws in the Amazigh (called Berber at the time) areas of Morocco; it was a short document, not intended to alter the law but to preserve the status quo (Hoisington 1978, 434). A group of urban elite activists, including former members of the *salafiyya* movement such as Allal al-Fasi, politicized the *dahir*, arguing that it was an attempt to divide Berbers and Arabs and limit the sultan's sovereignty in Amazigh areas. They depicted the decree as a threat to the umma (Muslim community) because it removed the Berbers from the jurisdiction of shariʿa. Rumors circulated that the intention was to convert Berbers to Catholicism (Lawrence 2012, 477; Wyrtzen 2015, 2). The crisis gained international attention when Chakib Arslan, a Geneva-based pan-Islamic activist, took up the cause and began to publicize it across the Muslim world as a French effort aimed at the de-Islamization of the Berber population (Wyrtzen 2015, 2).

Protests erupted in multiple towns, and the prayer of *latif* (said in times of calamity) was recited in mosques throughout the country (see Hoisington 1978; LaFuente 1999; Pennell 2000). The French authorities, in partnership with local leaders, suppressed the protests and had the sultan send a letter to be read in mosques in Fes, Meknes, Salé, Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakech. In the letter, the sultan described the decree as a simple administrative measure, and he forbade the use of mosques for political discussions (Hoisington 1978, 437).

Though protests subsided, the crisis had two important lasting effects. First, as Wyrtzen (2015) argues, it served to shape Moroccan national identity in ways that have persisted into the contemporary era, politicizing categories such as "Arab" and "Berber," which produced, over the course of the colonial period, a dominant identity centered on Arab-Islamic high culture.

Second, the protests prompted ongoing mobilization, as the (primarily) Arab elites who had politicized the *dahir* established a reformist group, the Kutlah al-Amal al-Watani, composed of religious and literary groups seeking reforms from the protectorate administration. These religious leaders made secular demands; the reforms they sought were inspired by leftist platforms in France and by the promises of the protectorate treaty itself. Some of their demands included the appointment and promotion of Moroccans in all branches of the administration, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, improvements to the educational system, and the establishment of municipal councils and a national council elected by the population.[6]

The movement for reform was not a mass-based social movement, but an elite effort with limited popular support. Mass action began during World War II, after the leaders of the reform movement formed the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) and began organizing protests in favor of independence. The independence movement was broad-based and relied on protests, strikes, boycotts, petitions, elections, and, at the close of the colonial period, rural insurgency and urban violence.[7]

The shift from a religious revivalist movement, to a reformist effort, to an explicitly nationalist mass movement could be interpreted as suggesting a decline in the centrality of religion to politics over the course of the colonial period. Yet neither the reformist movement nor the nationalist movement can accurately be coded as secular. While the reformists advocated for changes that drew upon the democratic principles that the French claimed to be importing to North Africa, they were not secular in orientation. The majority were learned elites trained at the Qarawiyyin or at the other great institutions of learning in the Islamic world, such as al-Azhar. Many were religious scholars. While some of their goals may be described as secular, they also sought to increase the number of Arabic schools, and they stressed Islam as a core part of Moroccan identity. This was not a secularist effort.

The nationalist movement initially appears to be a better candidate for coding as secular. Nationalism is a flexible ideology: it is the straightforward principle that the nation has the right to exist.[8] This flexibility helps explain its widespread appeal; at the time of the Moroccan independence movement, nationalism was salient across the globe. The principle of nationalism does not require that the nation have any particular characteristic; the nation's identity could be based on religion, language, ethnicity, shared history, or any experience that generates a sense of solidarity (Renan 1996 [1882]).

Yet in Morocco, both the content of the movement and its strategies reflected the centrality of Islam to political mobilization. Religion was an important part of the claim to nationhood. The protectorate officials had, since their arrival, coded the population by religion, crafting their reports around the European, Muslim, and Jewish communities. Moroccans, too, saw Islam as an important part of national identity; and in their speeches, nationalist leaders suggested that defending the nation was a religious duty.[9] Some scholars have suggested that members understood the national party as a type of religious brotherhood (Halstead 1969, 252; Rivet 1999, 369–371). Moroccans also relied upon religious sites and holidays to mobilize effectively. Nationalist demonstrations often began at the mosque; after prayer, a group would gather and march through the streets. Mosques also provided meeting places and places of refuge when repression occurred. Demonstrations also occurred with greater frequency during religious holidays, such as *Aïd es-Seghir, Aïd al-Kebir*, and *Aïd Mouloud* (Lawrence 2013, 203–204). Moroccan nationalists were not secularists. In important ways, the Moroccan nationalist movement was also a religious movement.

Mobilization throughout the colonial period incorporated both religious and secular appeals and goals. Religious and secular claims were not in competition with one another, but were complementary—both secular and religious reasons could be marshaled to oppose French policies and ultimately the French presence. What did change over the course of the period was the stance that Moroccan leaders took toward the protectorate. Initially, reformers focused on religious advocacy that did not challenge the French regime.[10] During the reform period, they directly criticized French policy, pointing to discrepancies between colonial aims and their actual practices. During World War II, the movement changed. Instead of seeking reform within the context of the protectorate, the nationalist movement rejected French rule altogether and fought to end it.

Moroccans drew on both religious and secular ideologies to protest colonial rule. This makes sense, since the French were foreigners who were not co-religionists. The next section turns to the post-independence period, when secular and religious objectives might be expected to come into conflict more than they did under colonial rule. In the postcolonial era, the ability of political groups to combine religious and secular rationales is less intuitive.

POSTCOLONIAL POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

In the years following independence, social movement actors and political parties in Morocco primarily identified as either Islamist or leftist, which suggests that the secular-religious divide was the main political cleavage. Yet a focus on self-definitions is misleading. The primary cleavage that has defined Moroccan politics in the postcolonial period is not a religious one. Instead, it is the divide between royalists and those who have opposed the monarchy's move to monopolize political power.

In support of this claim, this section considers the orientation of both social movement organizations and political parties. Both Islamist and leftist groups are divided in their stances toward the monarchy. Further, conditional on their orientation toward the monarchy, leftists and Islamists have taken similar positions on questions of political participation and policy. Their goals are not reducible to claims about the extent to which religion should play a role in politics in the kingdom.

Leftist Opposition in the Postcolonial Era

With the arrival of independence in 1956, King Mohammed V sought to limit the power of the Hizb al-Istiqlal and gain control over other groups that had sprung up during the final years of the anti-colonial struggle.[11] In 1959 a leftist party was created when Mehdi Ben Barka, Abbderrahim Bouabid, and Abderrahmane Youssoufi split with the Istiqlal to form the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, or UNFP). Its platform included agrarian reform and democracy. The UNFP took a more confrontational stance toward the monarchy than the Istiqlal party, led by Allal al-Fasi. With the death of the king in 1961, al-Fasi supported the new king, Hassan II, calling for national unity (Miller 2013, 163). Yet in creating the 1962 constitution, the king sought to ensure that the *Istiqlal* would not retain its dominance. The constitution prohibited a single ruling party (Buehler 2018, 46; Waterbury 1970, 256). The king also built loyalist parties led by palace insiders to offset opposition parties, a strategy that has continued to the present day (Buehler 2018, 47).

While the Istiqlal accepted the new constitution, the UNFP opposed it, with Ben Barka declaring that “the primary task of the Moroccan people is to battle this totally feudal regime” (quoted in Miller 2013, 167). Ben Barka’s (1966) essay, *The Revolutionary Option in Morocco*, laid out his confrontational strategy, and led to widespread arrests of UNFP militants and the declaration of a state of emergency, which lasted from 1965 to 1970. Ben Barka himself was kidnapped on the streets of Paris in 1965 and never seen again, presumably assassinated.

The UNFP was not the only organization confronting the regime; during the late 1960s and early 1970s, protests and strikes occurred on university campuses, organized by the Moroccan National Students Union. High school students also carried out demonstrations (Miller 2013, 168). On the far left, an organization called Ila al-Amam (To the Forefront) opposed the monarchy and faced severe repression in the early 1970s. One of its founders, Abraham Sefarty, was condemned to life imprisonment in 1977, an event that some suggest marks the beginning of what is known as the “years of lead” (approximately 1975–1990) during which the regime imprisoned and tortured political opponents (Miller 2013, 170).

Not all leftists agreed with these groups’ confrontational stance toward the monarchy. Bouabid, formerly of the UNFP, established the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, or USFP) in Rabat; it renounced violence and announced that it would participate in electoral politics (Buehler 2018, 61–62). The USFP advocated agrarian reform and state economic planning. Its secularist stance included refusing to wear djellabas for a royal speech on the grounds that these cloaks were associated with Islamic symbols of monarchy. This move was not so much a rejection of religion as a rejection of the monarchy’s appropriation of traditional and religious symbols.

The monarchy prevented the USFP from gaining too much electoral power after the state of emergency ended and through the 1980s by fielding loyalist candidates running as "independents" and creating royalist parties. The monarchy also controlled most ministry appointments. In the 1980s, as Lust (2006, 130) writes, political contestation remained primarily between the king and the parties, although bread riots and other contentious strikes and protests occurred during the decade in response to neoliberal reforms. In 1996, constitutional reform reduced the number of king-appointed ministers, which motivated the USFP to enter the government. In 1998 the USFP, led by the former political prisoner and founder of the UNFP Abderrahman al-Youssoufi, formed the *Alternance* government, leading the parliament for the first time. Al-Youssoufi's appointment as prime minister prompted hopes that a genuine democratic transition had begun. The USFP, however, lacked a majority and had to share power with rural loyalist parties. It did not control important ministries and could not implement deep reforms. Ultimately, the USFP came to be seen as a party that had been co-opted by the monarchy, and it faced competition from Islamist opponents.

Islamist Opposition in the Postcolonial Era

In 1969 ʿAbd al-Karim Moutiʾ, a former UNFP member, founded the al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth) organization, which focused on clandestine activities, as well as public and educational initiatives (Clark and Dalmasso 2015; Miller 2013, 188). A dozen members of this group withdrew to create the Islamic Group, which focused solely on social and educational activities, renounced the use of violence, and recognized the monarchy as legitimate. This group created At-Tawhid wa al-Islah (the Unity and Reform Movement) in the 1980s, which sought official recognition and the right to form a political party (Willis 2004, 55). They entered electoral politics in 1996, in partnership with an existing political party. In 1998, they renamed their organization the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), keeping the Unity and Reform Movement as a social movement organization (Clark and Dalmasso 2015, 194–95).

The PJD won nine seats in parliament in 1997, and was invited to join the coalition government led by the USFP. The party declined, preferring not to associate itself with a government whose chances of success were uncertain. It adopted a position of "critical support" for the new government in the hope that this would allow the party to back al-Youssoufi's reformist agenda while maintaining the flexibility to distance itself from the new government's failures (Willis 2004, 56).

The PJD's political aims differed from the USFP's in several respects. While the leftists opposed the regime's neoliberal reforms, resisting budget austerity and privatization, the PJD offered moderate support for the regime's agenda. PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane stated, "We believe in the free market, but we think the state needs to take up its role to restore economic balance and justice in society. We support pro-social neoliberalism" (quoted in Buehler 2018, 65). The PJD also differed in its stance on reforming the *Moudawana*, the law governing the family, opposing proposals to ban polygamy, raise the minimum age for marriage, and alter the right of husbands to repudiate their wives (Willis 2004, 56). While the PJD's religious orientation shaped the latter stance, its economic policies had little to do with religion.

The PJD and the USFP's *Alternance* government also converged in important areas. Both had opposed Morocco's pro-Western stance during the 1991 US war in Iraq; their pro-Palestinian views were shared by most parties in parliament, and they opposed the creation of a palace-sponsored political party (Buehler 2018, 68; Willis 2004, 56). Further, their overall stance toward the royal palace and the system of government was the same: while pushing for moderate reforms, neither the USFP nor the PJD has ever challenged the monarchy's political dominance. In contrast to both leftist and Islamist groups that operate outside the party structure, the USFP and the PJD accept the institutional rules set in place by the monarchy.

The other major Islamist force in Moroccan politics is the JCG, an association that operates outside formal institutional channels and reportedly has more supporters than the PJD, although its actual membership is unknown. The JCG differs from other Islamist social movements in the wider Muslim world, largely because it was organized by a charismatic individual, the former high school teacher and Sufi mystic Abdessalam Yassine (Willis 2004, 58). Yassine gained notoriety when he sent a public letter to Hassan II in 1974 in which he questioned the king's religious legitimacy and called upon him to repent and "return to God" (Miller 2013, 189). In response, Yassine was sent to a mental hospital for three years. When he was released, he was placed under house arrest, but he continued to build his movement, creating the JCG in 1987.

Since its inception, the JCG has operated as a social movement, with a strong base among university students and in the cities, despite the fact that it was outlawed in 1990. The association's success has depended upon its ability to provide a range of social services, such as healthcare, basic welfare, blood banks, and literacy courses (Daadaoui 2016; Lust 2006, 139). It has elected to remain outside institutional party structures. After his release from house arrest in 2000, Yassine told the press that his association "is a movement focused on spiritual education, not a political party . . . but we are partly interested in politics" (quoted in Daadaoui 2016). Yassine continued to confront the king when Mohammad VI took the throne after his father's death in 1999, criticizing the monarchy's accumulation of wealth, and directly attacking the king's religious legitimacy by calling the traditional ceremony in which elites pledge their allegiance, "a sacrilegious ceremony in which the king is worshipped" (quoted in Daadaoui 2016).

The association's political stance has had more in common with the banned leftist parties like the UNFP or Sefarty's Ila al-Amam than with the PJD, despite sharing an explicitly religious orientation.[12] Yassine, like Ben Barka and Sefarty, explicitly criticized the king's monopolization of wealth and power. His concern, like theirs, was with the system of rule in Morocco, and he too was repressed for directly confronting the king. As Lust (2006) has argued, a key feature of the Moroccan opposition lies in the distinction between groups that operate within the formal political system and those that exist outside it. Yassine's association, like the leftist organizations that preceded it, is anti-royalist and concerned with social justice and economic redistribution. The difference between the leftists and the JCG is that Yassine, in his publications and texts, marshals religious arguments to defend these goals.

Islamists and Leftists in Morocco's 2011 Uprising

In February 2011, as popular uprisings spread across the Arab world, Moroccans took to the streets in approximately sixty cities and towns.[13] Buehler (2018), seeking to explain why these protests failed to produce the same unity of purpose that occurred in Tunisia, stresses the failure of Islamists and leftists to ally in support of the protests. He writes that "whereas many of Morocco's Islamists participated in the protests, its leftists did not" (Buehler 2018, 166). From this perspective, the Islamist-secular divide was a critical determinant of participation in this mass wave of protest. Buehler, however, focuses exclusively on the realm of formal politics; by Islamists, he means the PJD, whose members participated at high levels early on in the protests, and by leftists, he means the USFP, which did not endorse the protest movement.

Broadening the analysis to include social movement organizations produces a different picture. The February 20th movement was largely made up of human rights activists and leftist groups that were not associated with the USFP. It also included activists seeking Amazigh rights and student union groups, and it relied on the trade union for meeting space. Only one small group, the Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertés Individuelles (MALI), was openly anti-religious.[14] The majority focused on corruption, economic problems, and authoritarianism. Leftists were among the first movers that organized the initial protests, but they were not aligned with the USFP.

Islamists were a part of a coalition that participated in the 2011 protests. PJD leaders and members participated in the protests up until March 2011, although Benkirane refrained from officially endorsing them. A more important role was played by the JCG, which formed an alliance with the February 20th movement and participated in protests until December 2011. A coalition that included Islamists, leftists, and a small number of atheists and republicans was not easy to maintain, though the activists were committed to a broad tent strategy that they argued would maximize the chances of gaining real movement toward "a king who reigns but does not rule."[15] When progress toward that goal appeared stalled, Yassine withdrew his organization from the protests and resumed a rejectionist stance toward the monarchy until his death one year later.

In response to the protests, the king authorized changes to the constitution and called for new legislative elections. In November the PJD came first in the elections, winning more seats than the royalist Party of Authenticity and Modernity or the USFP, now widely seen as having failed to implement meaningful change during its years leading the parliament. Upon the PDJ's victory, Benkirane immediately reached out to leftists to form a coalition government, but they rejected his invitation, and Benkirane was forced to cooperate with centrist and royalist parties (Buehler 2018, 170–172).

The PJD's electoral triumph mimics the victories that occurred in the wake of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet the reasons for the PJD's victory have little to do with its religious orientation, or the desire to deepen the role of religion in the state. In the run-up to the election, Moroccans who voted for the PJD reported that they did so not because they supported a religious platform, but because the other parties running had already tried and failed to address the country's pressing economic woes. By this logic, it was the PJD's "turn" to take the reins, and voters hoped that the PJD's Islamist orientation, and particularly Benkirane's reputation as an upright and moral character, meant that they would be less corrupt and more honest than their predecessors had been.[16]

Hereditary Monarchy and the Religious-Secular Cleavage

Morocco is a religiously homogenous country led by a king who is a descendent of the Prophet and holds the title "Commander of the Faithful." The monarchy in Morocco has a "quasi-divine" aura (Daadaoui 2011, 6). Religion is a central component of the regime's identity; the state's motto is "God, the King, the Nation," and these three words are engraved on hills throughout Morocco. The king's religious legitimacy sets him apart from other leaders of electoral authoritarian regimes. Some scholars have suggested that religious legitimacy explains the regime's longevity (see Daadaoui 2011; Hammoudi 1997). If these claims are right, we might expect to see less opposition in Morocco than we do in other kinds of authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the amount of critical opposition described above may seem surprising if the monarchy's characteristics truly shelter it from challenge.

This chapter, however, is not aimed at addressing regime duration or the overall strength of the opposition.[17] For the purpose of this analysis, the relevant question is whether the monarchy's religious authority affects the religious-secular cleavage in such a way that this chapter's arguments are unlikely to hold elsewhere. The king's religious role may mean that the religious cleavage is less pronounced in Morocco than in countries where the political leader is not also a religious leader. The fusion of religious and political authority in the person of the king may leave fewer openings to politicize religion, or to argue about the role of religion in the state.

Yet while the salience of the cleavage in Morocco may differ from other cases, it is worth exploring these arguments elsewhere. The religious authority of the monarchy has not prevented Islamist challenges that resemble those that have occurred in other places. As Miller (2013, 188) writes, "[t]he monarch, despite all of his galvanizing potential, has never held absolute control over the definition of Islam, leaving an open space for other contenders."

During the colonial period, Allal al-Fasi envisioned an independent state in which religious authority would be exercised by an educated and essentially apolitical ulama (Miller 2013, 188). In the 1970s, the Islamic Youth adopted an anti-royalist stance, questioning the monarchy's religious authority. As described above, the JCG has questioned the king's religious legitimacy since the late 1980s. Opposition leaders can and do question royal plans and policies by arguing that they deviate from Islamic principles and practices.

Even when they do not question the regime, SMOs and political parties take positions on religious questions. Heated debates over the rights of women to divorce or inherit, for instance, have occurred during periods of monarchy-initiated legal reform. Religion remains salient for politics. My claim is not that religious questions are not contentious, but that the religious cleavage does not differentiate SMOs and political parties as clearly as their stance toward the regime does.

Three other historical episodes illustrate the ways that the king's religious authority is not automatic, but requires active work on the part of the palace and is subject to contestation from below. The first is King Hassan II's reaction to the series of coup attempts that occurred in the early 1970s. In addition to reorganizing the armed forces, he revitalized ties to the conservative Islamic establishment in order to create a counterweight to the military and political parties (Miller 2013, 175). His efforts to build those ties show that the king is not the only important source of religious authority in Morocco. The support of the religious leadership did not automatically follow from his religious credentials.

The second episode occurred in 1975, when the king organized the Green March, a 350,000-person march of volunteers armed only with Qurʾans and Moroccan flags to take back the Spanish-occupied region of the Sahara. With this event, the king sought to shore up flagging popular and military support by acquiring Morocco's "lost territory," not via military action, but by wielding the word of God. This move worked to unify the country behind the king, but by the 1980s, that unity had again fragmented and the king faced new domestic challenges in the form of strikes, protests, and the formation of Islamist and other civil society organizations.

The third episode was the construction of the Hassan II Mosque, completed in Casablanca in 1993. The king commissioned the mosque to demonstrate his piety, but the project provoked intense public criticism over the size and cost of the mosque. Critics argued that the king's initial plan to build the second-largest mosque in the world was ostentatious and impious, an inappropriate use of resources in a highly impoverished country.[18] Cartoons, jokes, and articles pointed to corruption in the collection of funds; the poor were said to be repeatedly taxed for the project.

The king's religious role has not foreclosed contestation in Morocco. While few among the opposition, or the wider public, question his religious role as a descendent of the Prophet and the Commander of the Faithful, religious and political authority are not the same. The SMOs that have adopted a more confrontational stance toward the regime have argued that the king's religious role does not confer the right to consolidate political control. Members of the February 20th movement and the JCG have pushed for a genuine constitutional democracy that retains the king in a symbolic and religious role, echoing the calls for a limited monarchy made in the early twentieth century. These claims are part of the national conversation, suggesting that vibrant debate exists even in a hereditary monarchy with religious legitimacy.

Further research on other cases can help to clarify whether the king's role has deflected religious opposition in Morocco, making this case markedly different from other places in the Muslim world. In fact, recent work points to similar dynamics elsewhere. In this volume, Pepinksky studies the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia from the perspective of voters, and argues that "voting for Islam is a more complicated and conditional phenomenon than the assumption of Islam as a programmatic identity implies." Like this chapter, he suggests the need to look beyond party labels to the policies driving identification with Islamist platforms. In his study of Tunisia, Grubman (2020) is directly concerned with the same outcome I address here: the formation of political cleavages. In electoral authoritarian regimes, Grubman argues, parties have difficulty developing distinctive ideological platforms. Before the 2011 revolution, parties under Ben Ali were shaped by their relationship to the regime:

> Faced with a highly repressive and exclusive regime cloaking itself in the rhetoric of liberalism and pragmatism, opposition parties had little opportunity or incentive to organize around shared platforms for governing—let alone to communicate them to the public. Instead, they built their "brands" primarily by navigating their distance from the regime, earning formal recognition or not, participating in elections or not, and ganging up with each other or not (Grubman 2020, 86).

Grubman's focus is on economic cleavages, but it is encouraging that in a non-monarchical authoritarian regime, he too found that the key factor shaping opposition groups was how they handled the regime, a question that parties and SMOs in a democracy do not face.

Conclusion

Opposition groups in Morocco, both institutional and extra-institutional, identify with religious or secular frames. But a focus on the ideologies that opposition groups have used to situate themselves in the political spectrum obscures the primary political cleavage that has divided Morocco since the colonial era: the division between those who are critical of the monarchy's political dominance, and those who accept it. Paraphrasing Rémy Leveau, Miller (2013, 214) writes that "the crux of the political struggle in Morocco is not over ideology in all its competing forms, but rather over tactics and accommodation of interests." Leveau (2000, 122–123) states, "Morocco's most important institutional problems . . . concern the interaction and power-sharing between the monarchy and Morocco's political parties." These insights are reflected in work that focuses on the importance of co-optation for regime stability (see Buehler 2018; Lust 2006).

Scholars writing on Moroccan politics often focus either on political parties or on social movements, but considering both kinds of opposition is important for understanding how attitudes toward the palace affect opposition strategies. Antagonistic stances toward the monarchy are largely expressed outside the realm of formal politics. These stances have been taken by both religious and secular actors, including leftists, civil society organizations such as human rights and women's rights groups, and Islamist movements such the JCG, as well smaller underground Islamist organizations. Formal political parties, whether they are leftist or Islamist in orientation, adopt cooperative stances toward the monarchy.

Through discussing opposition groups in Morocco, I have sought to advance three general claims. First, I have stressed that political cleavages should not be expected to work similarly in democracies and autocracies. The logic of political cleavages in democracies is that they reflect an underlying distribution of preferences for policies—they reflect what people want their government to do. Since people do not all support the same policies, cleavages mark off programmatic differences. In autocracies, policy preferences cannot be translated into policy outcomes without approval by a regime whose power is not constrained by free-and-fair competitive elections, as in functioning democracies. Parties and SMOs in electoral authoritarian regimes have to decide how to contend with a regime, not just how to win support. It is principally their stance toward the regime that situates them in the political arena. That stance also matters for how and whether they are able to gain support from different segments of the broader public.

Second, this analysis has called attention to the need to consider both formal political parties and informal political groups when attempting to understand opposition politics under electoral authoritarianism. The most critical actors are typically not political parties who have accepted the authoritarian rules of the game, and by focusing solely on political parties, it can be easy to overstate regime stability, as many who follow the Middle East learned after the 2011 protests. In this chapter, including both SMOs and political parties made it possible to see the platforms that are shared by organizations with different ideological identities. SMOs often shared a similar stance toward the regime and espoused the same economic and political goals, regardless of whether they were Islamist or leftist. Political parties also differed less than a focus on ideology might lead us to expect.

Third, I argued that actors do not need to choose between religious and secular frames, but can incorporate elements of both. In a predominantly Muslim society, secular organizations may justify and propose policies on religious grounds, and Islamist groups can support secular aims. Indeed, key issues such as poverty alleviation, education, and corruption are not easily classifiable as either secular or religious. The PJD in recent years has focused on economic problems, prioritizing those over issues such as prostitution, alcohol consumption, or women's rights, areas that are often key components of Islamist platforms. The USFP has supported pan-Arab and pan-Muslim causes such as the plight of Palestinians or Iraqis. Social movement actors also have both secular and religious goals, and they draw on religious justifications to make claims about social justice, welfare, and development. Opposition groups are more diverse than a focus on the secular-religious cleavage would suggest. In seeking to build support and carve out a position toward the regime, they can adopt a variety of different policy platforms.

In making these claims, this chapter seeks to contribute to a growing body of work that has questioned the causal role of religiosity in producing Islamist success at the ballot box (see Grubman 2020; Masoud 2014; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). I extend this insight from parties and voting to social movement organizing, adding to work that suggests that religiosity may not be the variable that sets opposition groups apart. This chapter also aimed to contribute to understanding the logic of cleavages in electoral authoritarian settings, advising caution when important insights from the study of cleavages in democracies to non-democracies. Much of the existing work on political Islam has been concerned with the question of whether Islamists, or even Muslims more generally, would be able to abide by democratic rules once democracy was attained.[19] But not all regimes are democratizing, and political cleavages are not the same in places where there is a regime that seeks to weaken and co-opt critical voices. In making this point, I join scholars like Schwedler (2006) and Yadav (2013) who study how Islamist parties act within authoritarian regimes.

This chapter has set aside some important questions for future study, such as how a regime's use of repression affects which political groups survive and even thrive under authoritarianism, or why some ideologies are more popular and resonant at particular points in time. These are worthy topics to address. This chapter's aim was to think through the nature of the secular and religious cleavage in predominantly Muslim countries under electoral authoritarianism, and to suggest that cleavages are not always what they seem to be.

NOTES

1. See Boix (2009); Downs (1957); Lipset and Rokkan (1967).
2. For a discussion of hybrid regimes, see Levitsky and Way (2010). On the role of democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, see Gandhi (2008).
3. On the monarchy's power and the limited role provided for parliament by the constitution, see Maghraoui (2011); Waterbury (1970).
4. Electoral authoritarian regimes include monarchies, military regimes, personalistic regimes, and single-party regimes. In single-party regimes, in which the ruling regime is a party that participates in the electoral institutions, some modifications to the theory may be required, though the claim that the stance toward the regime is the opposition's primary concern still holds. In single-party regimes, the cleavage structure may look different than it does in a personalistic regime or hereditary monarchy because the ruling party's ideology may shape the ideologies available to the opposition. On these subtypes of authoritarianism, see Geddes et al. (2014) and Smith (2005).
5. Questions about how to classify colonial regimes are not settled in the literature; French colonial rule was clearly undemocratic and sometimes had features of modern electoral

authoritarianism, though inconsistently. This chapter does not assume that French rule is the same type of rule as the postcolonial monarchy; including it allows for consideration of cleavages in a different context.

6. For more on the plan of reforms, see Abun-Nasr (1975); al-Fasi (1970); Lawrence (2013, chap. 2); Rézette (1955); Waterbury (1970).
7. On these tactics, see Lawrence (2010, 2013).
8. On the definition, see Gellner (1983); on its flexibility, see Kocher et al. (2018, 124).
9. These claims did not go uncontested; in one instance, a reformist leader was ejected from the mosque by prayer-goers who argued that he was using the mosque for political, not religious purposes (Lawrence 2013, 202).
10. French rule was challenged directly during the early years of the protectorate in the areas that had not been conquered; in mountainous areas, tribes fought French rule until 1934 (Porch 1982).
11. On the splintering of the nationalist movement into multiple groups, see Lawrence (2010). On the king's consolidation of power in the early years of independence, see Waterbury (1970) and Zartman (1964).
12. In contrast, Daadaoui (2011, 11) sees both the PJD and the JCG as sharing the goal of mitigating the authoritarian effects of the regime; I would suggest that the JCG is far more confrontational about this goal than the PJD is, and the former's participation in the 2011 protests supports this view.
13. On the organization, goals, and mobilization processes of the uprising in Morocco, see Benchemsi (2014) and Lawrence (2017).
14. This group was known for holding picnics in public during Ramadan in protest of a law prohibiting the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The group is also pro–gay rights. See http://www.manifeste.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=93.
15. Author field notes from the February 20th movement's General Assembly, November 2011.
16. See Cammett and Jones Luong (2014) for a broader discussion of how Islamists' reputation for trustworthiness can be an advantage at the ballot box.
17. On the question of hereditary monarchy and regime longevity, see Brownlee et al. (2013); Lawrence (2014); Menaldo (2012); Yom and Gause (2012).
18. Building a mosque that would rival the ones in Mecca and Medina was criticized as disrespectful of Muslim holy sites. Today, the mosque is the largest in Africa, and the fifth largest in the world.
19. For a sample of work in this vein, see Grewal (2020); Kalyvas (2000); Langohr (2001); March (2009).

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CHAPTER 24

THE RISE AND IMPACT OF MUSLIM WOMEN PREACHING ONLINE

RICHARD A. NIELSEN

FEMALE religious authority is on the rise in many Muslim societies (Bano and Kalmbach 2012). Women now occupy official positions in the state-run religious hierarchies in Morocco (Rausch 2012), Turkey (Hassan 2011), and elsewhere in the Muslim world. This transformation of Islamic authority is also happening in transnational communities of Muslims, such as the Salafi social movement. Salafi Islam is a global revivalist movement that seeks to return Islam to what it believes were the practices and beliefs of the *salaf*, the first few generations of Muslims during and after Muhammad's lifetime. Doctrinally, the Salafi movement espouses patriarchal values and appears to have very little space for women's religious authority. Yet recent research documents the rise of female preachers among the Salafi movement's ranks (Al-Rasheed 2013; Le Renard 2012; Nielsen 2020).

The prevailing view is that religion is the key factor explaining the increase and impact of women's preaching. According to this view, women's preaching follows a logic based on religious norms. Religious ideas about appropriate gender relations, such as doctrines forbidding public cross-gender interactions, create a need for female preachers who preach about "women's issues" to exclusively female audiences (Al-Rasheed, 2013; Le Renard, 2012). In this chapter, I argue instead that the rise and impact of female preachers in conservative Islamic settings follows a social movement logic. In this view, female preachers help Islamic social movements reach new audiences of both women and men, potentially enlarging the movement. Therefore, religious ideas prohibiting gender mixing are not the cause of women's preaching, but rather a normative constraint that female preachers circumvent by preaching online.

In this chapter, I investigate the impact these female preachers are having on their online audiences, and, by extension, on society and politics. Assessing the impact of female preachers is complicated by the difficulty of surveying Muslim publics about potentially sensitive gender issues in many of the countries where these female authorities are finding audiences. Instead, I look at patterns of voluntary online engagement with female preachers using digital trace data. Some of the websites where these women publish their writing allow users to interact with the writing through comments. I collect and compare these reactions to examine how reader engagement differs depending on the gender of the author. My statistical tests answer this question: If a reader encounters online preaching by a woman, do they respond differently than if they had encountered similar preaching by a man?

First, I examine *who* is engaging with the online writing of female preachers. I test whether female preachers get more or less engagement relative to their male counterparts. I collect data on the gender makeup of those who respond to writing by female preachers. Previous scholarship has concluded in other Islamic contexts that "women are confined to female audiences . . . because believers by and large still prefer male religious authorities" (Kloos and Künkler 2016, 488). If at least some men are paying attention to online preaching by women, this represents an important shift.

Second, I examine *how* lay Muslims are engaging with the preaching of female preachers. Using the content of online comments, I test whether there is any indication that female preachers are changing readers' perceptions about the role of women in religion and society by looking for evidence of admiration and criticism.

My results show that many lay Muslims are responding positively to the online preaching of female preachers. I find that writing by women garners more comments from website readers, and that the majority of these commenters are men. Compared to comments on a similar set of documents by men, the writings of women elicit more praise, although some commenters do become critical when female preachers challenge patriarchal norms. The comments on women's writing also come from more diverse geographic locations than comments on comparable writing by men. Taken together, these findings support the argument that social movements might selectively promote female authorities in contravention of their patriarchal norms because they engage new audiences.

More broadly, my findings have implications for the acceptance of female authorities in Muslim societies, though my conclusions on this point are necessarily speculative. Religious authority in Islam has generally been held by men, so the rise of female Muslim preachers on the Internet may be fundamentally changing the nature and impact of religious authority in Muslim societies. Although these women would likely claim they are not political actors, when women gain authority in society, it is necessarily political. The trends I document in this chapter have the potential to fundamentally change the gender politics of many Muslim societies.

Female Authority in Islam

Although there have always been some female authorities in Islam (Bano and Kalmbach 2012; Nadwī 2007), Islamic authority has historically been dominated by men. Yet women are gaining authority, both in state-sponsored "official Islam" and in Islamic social movements such as Salafism.

Why is this rise in female authority happening? It is likely that there are several root causes that may vary from one context to another. To explain the existence of female Salafi preachers, Al-Rasheed (2013) argues that religiously based gender norms created demand for gender-segregated preaching, and rising levels of religious education among women have produced a supply of capable female preachers. I agree that this is part of the story, but in my own work, I argue that male Salafi movement leaders are increasingly promoting female authorities because they attract new audiences that men cannot reach (Nielsen 2020). The spread of the Internet has created the conditions for this to happen. As Le Renard (2014, 38) points out, the Internet allows women to preach while technically following conservative social norms prohibiting "gender mixing." It also creates conditions where a movement faces a lower cost of rapidly expanding its audience through mass communication. My contention is that male leaders of the Salafi movement remain skeptical about women's authority in principle, but they have accepted it in practice because it increases the influence of their movement.

How are these women carving out space for their exercise of authority in domains that are not always permissive? Le Renard (2012, 113–116) argues that scholarly expertise and charisma are important features of the preaching she observes in the study circles of female clerics. If these factors help women gain authority, then perhaps the "how?" of women's preaching is not particularly distinctive from men, because men also rely on expert training and charisma to preach. Other accounts emphasize aspects that are unique to women's preaching. Ben Shitrit's (2016) account emphasizes *frames of exception* that women deploy to justify behaviors that would ordinarily be transgressions. By casting their activism as a temporary necessity to meet the needs of exceptional times, the women she studies in several religions carve out space to exercise greater authority than before. My own research shows that female preachers rely on *identity authority* when establishing their authority (Nielsen 2020). While male Salafi preachers typically use citations to establish the authority of their arguments, female preachers use citations far less, even when writing on the same topics as men. Instead, they are more likely to support their arguments by appealing to their identities as women, a finding that echoes Ben Shitrit's observations about the "motherhood" frames women use to justify certain forms of activism.

Less is known about the impact of increasing women's authority in Islam, either for those exposed to their preaching or to society more generally. Ethnographers describe a certain awe and respect among the participants in face-to-face preaching (Ben Shitrit 2016; Le Renard 2012). However, the reception of online preaching by women could be very different from the face-to-face reception of their devoted followers. As far as I know, my recent analysis of Twitter reactions to the writing of female Salafi preachers on the website saaid.net is the only systematic analysis of the effects of women's online preaching in Islam (Nielsen 2020). I find that writing by women prompts more engagement from women. It also brings in more individuals who otherwise have never engaged with the content of the website, suggesting that women reach new audiences. At the same time, I find that women are not only preaching to women. In fact, almost 75 percent of the Twitter reactions to female preachers' writings come from men. However, these Twitter reactions— "retweets" and "favorites"— reveal very little about what impact this preaching is having.

Online Engagement with the Writing of Female Preachers

In this chapter, I look at a more substantive form of engagement: online comments by readers of women's preaching. Many of the major Islamic websites permit users to interact with the content posted on the website in various ways: "likes," ratings, and, in some cases, comments. The major benefit of studying comments is that they are genuine, natural, in situ reactions to women's preaching. There are no concerns about respondents giving responses that they think will please researchers. Yet although comments are a very immediate indicator of impact, the data cannot speak directly to many of the pressing questions around women's preaching. Does experiencing female religious authority change people's attitudes about the appropriateness of women having religious authority? Might this spill over to affect their attitudes about the suitability of women for political office? Their attitudes about the roles of women in society writ large? I cannot answer these questions, because I am not able to survey respondents about their attitudes after exposing them to women's preaching. Such a survey would be fascinating, but is challenging in the places where these women's preaching is primarily consumed: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco.

There are other forms of engagement, such as page view counts, that I examine briefly but do not emphasize. I focus on comments because they are the richest form of engagement I can find. In some cases, I find examples of dialogue between preachers and their followers in the comments section. Likes and other thin indicators of engagement do not convey as much information about how the teaching is received.

What do I expect to find? The religious norms logic, exemplified by Al-Rasheed (2013), argues that female preachers are writing almost exclusively on women's issues to female audiences. Kloos and Künkler (2016, 488) conclude that Muslims by and large still prefer male authorities. These prevailing arguments in Islamic studies suggest the expectation that female preachers will be less popular than men and that they will exclusively serve female audiences. This would suggest that documents written by female preachers will receive fewer page views than similar documents written by men. Women's documents should also receive fewer comments if readers are more interested in male authorities. And when female preachers do receive comments, they will be almost exclusively from women. Men will be largely ignore women's preaching, or perhaps express hostility.

The social movement logic I espouse makes contrasting predictions. If the strategic considerations of social movements explain the rise and impact of female preachers, I expect to find that women get as many page views as men, or perhaps more on subjects for which women might be viewed as particularly authoritative because of their gender identity. I expect that female preachers will get more comments than their male counterparts, and that these comments will come from a more diverse set of people, because the role of these female preachers is partly to attract new audiences. I expect that the writing of female preachers will garner comments from more women than similar writing by male preachers. Nevertheless, I also expect that female preachers will get a substantial portion of their comments from male readers and that these comments will be positive.

To summarize, the key empirical question that distinguishes the social movement logic from the logic of religious norms is this: Is there is a receptive male audience for female preachers?

Data and Design

My prior work examined the writing of 43 female Salafi preachers and 172 of their male counterparts on the Salafi missionary website saaid.net (Nielsen 2020). In that research, I sought to understand the impact of these specific female preachers because they are members of a patriarchal social movement in Islam that is suspicious of women's authority. But saaid.net does not permit the types of engagement I would like to study; I cannot tell from the website who is engaging with the texts beyond some basic information about who interacts with the website's official Twitter feed. From my earlier analysis, I know that these female Salafi preachers are reaching new audiences of both men and women. However, these Twitter users don't tend to comment as they like or repost writings from saaid.net, so it is difficult to tell whether these reactions indicate a positive or negative reception.

To find reactions with more substance, I turn to the website alukah.net, a large Islamic aggregator site in Arabic that allows users to comment on writings, with moderation from the website managers. The website gets a lot of traffic: I record over 1.55 billion page views over the life of the website (since October 2006). Although the website is not focused exclusively on Salafism, it contains writings by about half of the female Salafi preachers on saaid.net. It also contains writing by many other female authors, though not all of these authors are preachers. The process by which writing appears on the website is opaque, but the website welcomes submissions, and I expect that this is the primary way that articles come to be on the website.[1] Submissions must be made by the author, must be in modern standard Arabic, must be not previously published elsewhere online (but this is frequently violated), and must be "sensitive to the teachings of our true religion and Sunni doctrine."

Website visitors can leave comments on any document on the website using a standard web form at the bottom of each page. This form requires that readers enter an e-mail address (though it need not be a valid one), a name, and a title for their comment. It also permits readers to specify their country (open response) and to write as much as they want in the text of the comment. After submitting a comment, a message reads "Thank you. We will publish your comment after a review by the administration. You may comment again by returning to this page." The nature of this review is unclear, and my request for clarification from the website administrators went unanswered. I found that my comments were generally posted within ten minutes, but I only tested with short positive, comments reading "Thank you," because I did not want to disturb this religious training environment (Nielsen 2015).[2] In my reading of thousands of comments from hundreds of articles, I found critical comments but never crude or openly derogatory comments. It appears that a combination of moderation and social norms keeps the comments on this website more civil than many Internet forums.

I collected all of the Arabic-language writings from the website, resulting in an initial data set of 114,892 documents by 11,677 authors. Along with these texts, I got the number of times each document had been viewed (median = 3,917 views), the time it was posted, the text of the document, the number of comments (31,020 total comments), and the first page of comments for each document.[3]

The gender of authors is not indicated on the website, except through their name, and in some cases through a biography as well. I coded my perception of the gender of the author based on Arabic naming conventions. Of the 11,677 authors, I code 671 (5.7 percent) as women and 7,013 (60 percent) as men. The remaining 3,993 (34 percent) are ambiguous, difficult to code, or entities that are not individual authors. I discard the documents by these 3,993 from the data set because the effort to determine the gender of each far outstrips the usefulness of additional data. The documents for which I can readily code the gender of the author provide plenty of data to observe how readers respond to men's and women's writing, and I do not believe there are serious threats to my inferences below by omitting the more ambiguous cases. My coding procedures retain the authors in the data that are most readily classified as men and women based solely on names, which is ideal for testing my arguments. However, I should note that I can't provide evidence about the effect of ambiguous perceptions of author gender.

I exclude documents that must be downloaded because extracting text from them is difficult and website visitors engage them differently than documents which render in a web browser. I also exclude any documents that have fewer than thirty characters. These exclusions leave 49,192 documents by 442 female authors and 4,386 male authors.

My goal is to estimate the how readers' perceptions of an author's gender change their reactions while holding the writing constant. My strategy for doing so is to find female and male authors who write similar documents, and then compare the comments they receive. This strategy is inspired by experimental audit studies, in which respondents react to comparable documents (often resumes), where the name is randomized to convey information about gender, race, or some other characteristic. Because of the challenges of surveying the target population for this preaching, it is not feasible to carry out an audit study in this context, but my aim is to design an observational study that that mimics the logic of an audit design. I assume that if I can compare documents in which male and female authors write very similarly, any differences in the comments are due to the perceived gender of the author rather than differences in the content of the writing.

Prior qualitative and quantitative research shows that female preachers generally write on different topics than men (Al-Rasheed 2013; Nielsen 2020). Because of this, I cannot simply compare the comments on all documents by women to the comments on all documents by men; differences in the content are likely to be the cause of most of the differences in the comments. Instead, I identify documents by women and men that have similar content using a combination of matching procedures and regression adjustment. The strength of this design is that any cross-gender differences in the comments on these documents are more likely to be the effect of perceived author gender, rather than spurious correlation from differences in content. But the design has weaknesses, too. Not all documents by female authors have comparable documents by men, and vice versa. This means my results cannot answer questions such as how readers would react if women were to write on topics that are currently only discussed by men.

To identify comparable documents by female and male preachers, I use text matching, introduced by Roberts, Stewart, and Nielsen (2020). I condition on the text to find subsets of documents in which men and women write on similar topics. Specifically, I estimate a structural topic model (Roberts et al, 2014) with the author gender as a covariate. This produces fifteen estimated topics that I use to match documents with similar topical content to each other.

In addition to facilitating my efforts to match similar documents to each other, this topic model gives a sense of the general themes of documents on alukah.net. Figure 24.1 summarizes the fifteen topics using topic numbers randomly assigned by the model, labels I assign, and key words generated by the model. On the right, I plot the proportion of women's and men's writing devoted to each topic using black and white disks.[4] These estimates show that women heavily favor the three topics at the top, which I have labeled Family, Lived Experience, and Children. Men favor the remaining topics, especially those at the bottom relating to Islamic law, doctrine, and sacred texts. To reiterate, the reason for comparing documents with similar topic proportions is that I anticipate an article primarily about lived experience and family problems to draw different reactions from readers than an article primarily about sin and Islamic law.

I also match on other variables that are likely to influence reader engagement, such as the number of years since a document was posted (measured in fractions) and the category of the document listed in the website.[5] For analyses where some aspect of the comments are the outcome variable, I also condition on the number of page views because these strongly predict the number of comments.

I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) to construct two sets of matched documents.[6] In the first set, I limit the female authors to the seventeen authors (with 443 documents) that also appear on the saaid.net website. This matched data set allows me to analyze the impact of the set of female authors that is most directly



FIGURE 24.1: Male and female authors on alukah.net focus on different topic.
Note: Estimated topic proportions for female and male authors in the alukah.net corpus. Topics are ranked by the difference in proportions between women and men. I match documents on these topics to improve comparability in my analysis below.

comparable to my prior analysis (Nielsen, 2020) and who I am certain are preachers. The matched data set contains 242 documents by women and 993 matched documents by men. The vast majority of the 44,000 men's documents in the full data set are dropped in the matching procedure, indicating that relatively few men's documents are similar to women's documents on all dimensions. Most of my analysis below concentrates on this matched data set.

The estimated topics show that men's and women's writing is quite different on average. Approximately 21 percent of writing by the seventeen female preachers from saaid.net is devoted to a topic on family (keywords: marriage, young woman, husband, blessings, wife, youth, divorce, sister, problem), while only 3 percent of men's writing is devoted to this topic. In the matched sample, I am able to make the portions of this topic roughly equal: 40 percent for women and 37 percent for men. On the other end, only 2 percent of these women's writing is devoted to a topic on hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, while 8.5 percent of men's writing is on this topic (keywords: hadith attribution, al-Safi, al-Nawawi, Fath al-Bari, Hanbali, Shafi'i). In the matched sample, I am able to find comparison documents by men that devote only

1.8 percent of words to this hadith topic. No two texts are identical, so this text matching is only approximate. However, I find that the matching results in pairs of relatively similar texts. For example, when I sample pairs of matched texts, I cannot reliably predict which was authored by a woman without seeing the authors' names.

In the second matched sample, I attempt to find matches for all of the female authors appearing on alukah.net. This set of individuals is more varied and includes many authors who are unlikely to consider themselves preachers. I am able to match 2,264 documents by women with 7,754 suitably similar documents by men. Again, there are predictable differences between the topics that men and women emphasize. I am able to reduce those differences for all topics and eliminate the differences for some topics.

Matching improves balance substantially, but significant imbalances remain in both data sets when I examine the mean differences between men and women in the matched samples. Because of these remaining imbalances I adjust for each of the matching covariates using parametric models (Ho et al. 2007).

The matching approach helps with another challenge of using data from alukah.net: collecting the full set of comments for each article. Comments appear in reverse chronological order, ten at a time. When there are ten comments or less, they all are rendered in the html of the website, but if there are more, then they are only accessible through JavaScript and I can only download them by hand. Matching restricts the sample so that collecting the complete set of comments by hand is feasible.

In addition to collecting some comments by hand, I also have to hand-code my perception of the commenter gender, their self-reported location, and whether they identify themselves as the author of the article. Again, by limiting the sample, a matching strategy makes this herculean task feasible. However, it commits me to the particular matches I choose—I can't just change the matching strategy to see how the results might change. This is a strength of my analysis, rather than a weakness. There are fears that flexibility to select matched samples after looking at the results allows for p-hacking (Miller 2013), but I have no such flexibility because I only collect many of the outcome variables after deciding on matched set.

FINDINGS

Before turning to the findings, I reiterate what I expect to find and how it contrasts with the predictions of alternative explanations for the rise and roles of female Muslim preachers. I argue that a social movement logic dominates. Female preachers serve a particular role in the Salafi movement: to engage new audiences online that male preachers are unable to reach. This theory predicts that women are likely to garner more engagement from a more diverse audience of both men and women, and that this engagement will be positive. In contrast, the prevailing view of these female preachers follows a religious norms logic in which women preach primarily to women, and male lay Muslims strongly prefer male preachers instead. If this view is correct, then I expect to see less



FIGURE 24.2: Summary of findings: Female authors get fewer page views but deeper engagement. *Note*: Each panel summarizes the result of a regression model in the following sections. I find that female authors get fewer page views (panel 1), get more comments (panel 2), get the majority of their comments from men (panel 3), draw comments from a more geographically diverse audience (panel 4), and receive more praise in comments (panel 5). Bar heights indicate regression predictions and dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All result are based on the first matched sample of women from saaid.net, containing 242 documents by women and 993 matched documents by men, that collectively receive 983 comments.

engagement with women's writing, and that what engagement there is will be almost exclusively from female readers. If men react to women's preaching, their reactions may be negative. However, because the website I examine moderates comments, an absence of negative comments may simply reflect the choices of website moderators to screen criticism. Even with comment moderation, this alternative theory would not predict that women should get more positive comments than men.

I summarize the key findings in Figure 24.2; the details of each calculation follow in the sections below. I find that female authors get fewer page views (panel 1), get more comments (panel 2), get the majority of their comments from men (panel 3), draw comments from a more geographically diverse audience (panel 4), and receive more praise in comments (panel 5). This pattern of results shows that writings by women are viewed less frequently than comparable writing by men, but women's writing elicits more engagement and praise from readers. These results largely align with my expectations based on a social movement logic.

Women Get Fewer Page Views

I find that articles by women get fewer page views than similar articles by men. This is true for both the matched sample of saaid.net women and the larger matched sample of all the women on alukah.net. It is also true in the unmatched samples, so matching does not make much of a difference in this analysis. The outcome variable in this analysis, page views, is highly skewed, so I also estimate models using the natural log of page views as the outcome variable. If I use the untransformed page view variable, the estimates indicate that the saaid.net women received over 5,000 fewer page views than comparable documents by men, but this is likely influenced by the extreme skewness. Using log transformed page views as the outcome variable, I estimate that the saaid.net women got 23 percent fewer page views than their male counterparts. These same estimates are roughly comparable when comparing all of the women on alukah.net to the matched men: they receive 4,400 fewer page views, or about a 7 percent decrease.

This finding contradicts my expectations from the social movement logic and offers preliminary evidence in support of the religious norms logic. However, the results below suggest that once I look at substantive engagement through comments, rather than thin engagement through page views, the social movement logic finds more support.

Women Get More Comments

Although women get fewer page views, I find that they get more comments. Documents by the female preachers from saaid.net get on average 0.6 more comments than comparable documents by make preachers; this estimate remains statistically significant if I use a quasi-poisson generalized linear model to account for the over-dispersed counts in the outcome variable.[7] In the full sample of women, the effect is not as large, but it is still statistically detectable. On the whole, women on alukah.net get 0.3 more comments on average than men. I find no statistically detectable difference in the length of comments left on documents by men and women.

These numbers may sound small, but they are large relative to the baseline number of comments. The modal number of comments in both matched samples is zero, and the mean number of comments for articles by men is around 0.3. My best estimate is that women are getting at least 100 percent more comments on average than comparable documents by men.

What drives this deeper engagement with writing by women? At first, I assumed that comments would increase proportionally with the number of page views, and indeed I find that page views are a very strong predictor of the number of comments a document will get. This makes sense: the more people who read a document, the more people who will comment on it. A model fit to the unmatched data suggests that the base rate of comments is low, and increases approximately linearly. The average document gets 1.6 additional comments for every 100,000 page views. However, this can't explain why women get more comments than men, because women are getting fewer page views on average.

If women get fewer views, but more comments, it suggests that women are more efficient at converting thin engagement (page views) into thick engagement (comments). How? My investigation of the data suggests that female authors are more likely to engage with visitors that leave comments, and this interaction increase the number of comments. Both male and female authors can leave comments on their own documents, but I find that women are more likely to do so. My data only allow me to quantify this trend for the female preachers from saaid.net and the male authors matched to them, because this is the only set for which I have extracted the names of commenters to determine which comments are from the authors themselves. Commenting by authors is common; out of 983 comments in this matched sample, 136 are from the authors. Sixty-seven percent of these author comments are by women, even though women authors make up only 20 percent of this matched sample. I find that these author comments are an important predictor of reader engagement. When I account for author comments in my statistical model, I find that each author comment is associated with 1.7 additional comments from website visitors, and author gender no longer predicts the number of comments.

These results suggest that female authors get deeper engagement from readers because they offer deeper engagement as authors. To get a sense of how these engagements unfold, I read thirty-five exchanges between female authors and their readers, and a handful of exchanges with male authors for comparison. Most of these exchanges are complimentary to the authors. In many cases, commenters simply offer their congratulations and praise for publishing the piece, and the authors respond with short expressions of gratitude. In some cases, commenters seek specific advice from the authors on topics related to the article, or seek clarification on some aspect of the writing. In six of the thirty-five exchanges, the commenter adopts a critical tone, either criticizing the ideas or writing of the author. In some cases, these critical commenters claim some authority and offer advice for how the female author might improve her writing for the future.

A particularly interesting exchange happens in the comment section of Sara Bint Muhammad Hassan's article "Diary of an Exemplary Husband and a Grumpy Wife," which recounts the feelings of Amal, a Muslim wife whose neglectful husband announces to her that he has decided to take another wife.[8] The social commentary in this article is biting and could be read as indirect criticism of the institution of polygamy. There are forty-six comments on this article, many of them critical. For example, a comment left by Abu Abd Allah from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, accuses the wife of jealousy and says, "In order to judge, we need to hear the other side," to which the author retorts, "I see that you are very biased against the sister."[9] A more ambiguous commenter thanks her for her "impartial and objective" treatment of the issue, in a statement that appears complimentary but could be deeply sarcastic.[10] Bint Muhammad Hassan replies "Brother Hisham, may God bless you, I did not think that I was objective, I thought I was biased towards women!"[11]

Female Preachers Get Substantial Engagement from Men

I code the gender of commenters by hand using the self-reported names they list when leaving comments. I am able to code the gender of 82 percent of the names commenters list for themselves (170 women and 421 men). The remaining 128 "names" are not strongly associated with one gender or are not proper names (e.g., "student of life"). Because this process is time-consuming, I only do this for the matched sample of women from saaid.net.

I expected to find that female authors would get more comments from women, because I found previously that these same female authors got more responses from female users of the social media platform Twitter (Nielsen 2020). I find only weak evidence of a difference. On average, the matched articles by men get approximately 23 percent of their comments from women, which is similar to the percentage of women's comments on men's documents in the unmatched sample (between 19 percent and 39 percent based on a random sample of fifty articles). Articles by women get an estimated 10 percentage points more comments from women, meaning that roughly 33 percent of their comments come from women. However, this increase is imprecisely estimated ($p = 0.176$), so this difference is not statistically different from zero according to conventional thresholds. I cannot conclude from these results that female authors get more comments from women.

Substantively, these results show that the majority of commenters on women's posts are men, corroborating my finding (in Nielsen 2020) that female preachers are garnering reactions from male audiences, too. The willingness of female authors to engage in debates with male commenters undermines the notion that female Muslim authorities are writing solely for women.

Commenters on Women's Documents Are More Geographically Diverse

The comments on women's writing comes from more diverse locations, even for the female preachers from saaid.net, who themselves are mostly from Saudi Arabia. To show this, I match the location listed by each commenter to a country, which is possible for 914 of the 983 comments. Sixty-eight percent of commenters come from four countries: 25 percent from Saudi Arabia, 22 percent from Egypt, 13 percent from Algeria, and 8 percent from Morocco. The remaining 31 percent come from thirty-two other countries, with Iraq (4.7 percent) and the UAE (3.9 percent) at the top, and Sweden, Senegal, Russia, Australia, Mauritania, Kenya, and Israel at the bottom, with one comment each.

I measure the diversity of commenter locations in two ways. First, for each document, I count the total number of countries from which comments come. Second, I count the number of comments on each document that came from commenters not in the top four countries. Documents by male authors typically get comments from 1.8 countries, while documents by female authors get comments from 2.5 countries on average. The fact that a woman is the author doubles the average number of comments from outside of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco from 0.8 to 1.6. These results support the argument that a major role female preachers play is to reach out to new audiences who are more diverse.

Women Get More Positive Comments Than Men

I examine the content of comments in two ways. First, I test whether the substance of the comments on women's and men's documents are different, using a structural topic



FIGURE 24.3: Comments on documents by male and female authors differ.
Note: Estimated topic proportions for comments left on documents by female and male authors on the alukah.net website. Topics are ranked by the difference in proportions between women and men.

model. I find that there are notable differences, shown in Figure 24.3. The comments on women's documents discuss issues relating to relationships more, and use terms related to other aspects of Islamic doctrine and hadith citation less. Recall that all of the articles in this sample have been matched topically, so there are just as many articles devoted to family relationships by men. This suggests that religious norms are still influential. Commenters engage female authors more on "women's issues," (family, children, and relationships), presumably because they are considered to have natural expertise in these areas by virtue of their gender.

The topic model produces two topics expressing positive sentiment. Topic 3 (Compliments) places high probability on words expressing positive sentiment in secular terms: "thank you for your article; what wonderful style." Commenters use these terms equally when reacting to the writing of men and women. Topic 1 (Praise) emphasizes words that express positive sentiment religiously, such as "May god reward you." Women's writing receives detectably more of this religious style of praise; 26 percent of words in comments on women's writing are praise, compared to only 22 percent for men's writing.

To further examine the tone of the comments, I use a dictionary-based approach. I look at the 179 words in the document-term matrix for the comments and classify fifteen of them as praise words.[12] I then count the number of times these praise words are used in the comments on each article. I find that female preachers get more positive comments than male preachers, measured either as the number of praise words per comment or the proportion of each comment that is praise. Intriguingly, when I analyze comments by men and women separately, I find that this praise for female authors appears to come especially from men, although the statistical models do not give enough precision to be confident of this conclusion at traditional statistical significance thresholds.

From my reading of exchanges between commenters and authors, the vast majority of this praise is sincere, and is accepted sincerely by the authors. The only example of sarcastic or patronizing praise I have come across is the ambiguous comment on the article "Diary of an Exemplary Husband and a Grumpy Wife," discussed above.

I find little evidence of backlash negativity from men (or women) on this platform. I do find critical comments, but these tend to be substantive rather than insulting or derogatory. This is presumably because comments are moderated for negativity, though I received no response when I tried to confirm this with the website administrators.

Discussion

Taken together, my findings paint a picture of how lay Muslims are responding to the rise of online female preachers. Users of a major Islamic aggregator website are somewhat less likely to click on the writings of female authors, suggesting that Arabic-speaking Muslim audiences worldwide are less interested in women than men as religious authorities. Despite this lower level of general interest, it is worth noting the sheer quantity of people who read the writings of these women: 83.6 million page views for all of the women on the website. Even if many Muslims still prefer male authorities, it is hardly plausible that these women have no influence.

Although female preachers have lower readership numbers, once website users click on the writings of women, they are often more engaged. Readers leave more comments on documents by women, and those comments contain more praise. This increase in comments appears to be driven by the propensity of female authors to engage more with their readers in the comment section. Especially notable is the fact that men differentially praise female authors more in their comments. Presumably, selection effects are at play—that is, the type of man who would criticize a female authority in the comments is opting simply not to click. But this is very different from many open forums on the Internet where women claiming some authority or expertise are heaped with sexist abuse. And it suggests that there is a large segment of the male Muslim population worldwide that views female religious authority in a positive light.

There is no way to be sure that the gender ratio in the comments matches the gender ratio of page views, but if it does, then the writings of these women have reached upwards of 40 million men since 2006, and it is truly remarkable that almost none of them have taken to the comments to complain. Comments on the website are moderated, so I am not surprised that there is no name-calling that I can find, but there is certainly criticism, especially when women articulate views that challenge patriarchal norms. The fact that this criticism remains a minority of comments, and that, on the whole, men are more likely to praise female authors than male authors, is remarkable. Further research might investigate reactions to women's Islamic writing on unmoderated websites and forums to see if they elicit significant backlash there.

All of this matters because attitudes about the appropriate roles for women in society remain very conservative in the Arab world. The Arab Barometer surveys from 2018–2019 show ostensible support for the idea that a woman can be a head of state, with every country surveyed agreeing at 50 percent or more except Algeria.[13] But this agreement masks a stark difference in men's and women's attitudes. Among men, support for women's access to the highest office is reliably 15 points lower than among women, and falls below 50 percent in about half of countries surveyed. Moreover, these numbers do not fully capture the depth of patriarchal attitudes, which becomes apparent when Arab Barometer respondents answer other questions about gender (Benstead 2020).

My findings lead me to wonder whether Muslims interacting with authoritative preaching by women online might begin to change their views about women in positions of authority, even if the content of the preaching itself supports patriarchal values. These results show that some men may be interested in women's religious writing, hinting that the preconditions may be in place for large shifts in the gender norms of Muslim societies. My results also suggest that the Internet might contribute to shifting ideas about the proper roles of women in society, which could have far-reaching effects. However, while these trends could presage increasing space for women's authority in the Arab Muslim world, they may represent an evolution of patriarchal norms, rather than the abandonment of those norms. Patriarchy can come in many flavors. As Benstead (2020) shows, different measures of gender attitudes in the Arab Barometer produce markedly different pictures of patriarchy in the region. There are "varieties of patriarchy" across contexts (Blaydes and Platas 2019; Kandiyoti 1988), and these results may signal a shift from a patriarchy that forbids women from entering the religious sphere to one that allows certain women to have authority while pedastalizing and constraining them. Male support for women's writing may be conditional on whether women present "acceptable" messages. Although I find that female authors get significantly more praise on average, it is revealing that the most critical, negative comments I found are in response to a female author, Sara Bint Muhammad Hassan, who implicitly criticizes patriarchal practices.[14]

Yet even if the online environment I study in this chapter is patriarchal in many ways, it allows significant space for women's agency. My assessment from reading some of these articles and the exchanges between readers and authors in the comments is that female authors generally find publishing Islamic writing to be an empowering experience. Female authors appear to take pleasure in sharing their writing with an engaged, mixed-gender audience. While reading through the comments, I find that female authors often thank their readers for commenting, which in turn further increases reader engagement. Even when comments become critical, I find that female authors feel empowered to push back against aggressive disagreement from male readers. The tone is always civil, with frequent references to shared Islamic values of respect between fellow Muslims, but these women do not generally acquiesce when a male reader tells them they are wrong. This corroborates previous findings that women can enjoy increased autonomy, agency, and pleasure while participating in and supporting patriarchal social organizations (Ben Shitrit 2016; Deeb 2011; Inge 2017; Kandiyoti 1988; Mahmood 2005; Ulrich 2017).

It is important to begin to understand the effects of visible female preachers on Muslim societies. Female preachers are already working in various official capacities in a number of other countries, including Morocco and Turkey, and Saudi Arabia has flirted with employing official female muftis, potentially hiring some of the women I study here. Unfortunately, the evidence in this chapter is not sufficient to say with confidence how these societies might respond when these governments appoint women to positions of religious authority. All of the preaching I study here is mediated through the Internet, as are the comments, which are moderated. Would the same reactions prevail if these women were preaching in person to mixed-gender audiences? Is moderation of some sort necessary to induce positive reactions to women's preaching? Will women garner positive reactions no matter what topics they preach on, or is audience praise conditional on women confining their preaching to "women's issues?" I cannot yet definitively answer any of these questions, and further research is needed. However, my analysis of reactions to women's preaching online suggests reasons for optimism. If a significant number of lay Muslims react positively to female preachers on the Internet, female Muslim authorities may eventually enjoy a wide and positive reception in other spheres.

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NOTES

1. Submissions can be made through https://www.alukah.net/contribute.aspx or https://www.alukah.net/researches/contribute.aspx, depending on whether the submission is "scholarly."
2. Authors would be rightfully annoyed if I randomly left profane and critical comments on their articles in my attempts to probe the limits of the comment moderation.
3. Subsequent pages of comments must be collected by hand, a feature of the website that shapes my analysis strategy.

4. I also plot 95 percent confidence intervals, but these are so narrow that they are obscured by the disks showing the point estimates.
5. These categories are sharia (18,701), culture (6,767), library (5,462), literature_language (5,089), fatawa_counsels (3,704), social (3,694), spotlight (2,627), web (2265), world_muslims (417), publications_competitions (73), and translations (27).
6. Coarsened exact matching requires analyst-defined cut-points. For the fifteen topics, I use breakpoints of 10 percent and 50 percent. I use three evenly spaced cut-points for years since posting (0 to 3.25 years, 6.5 years, 9.75 to 13 years) and, when relevant, the number of page views (0 to 2226, 5282, and 13,132 to 4,562,169).
7. I remove comments by the authors themselves from this analysis.
8. https://www.alukah.net/social/0/9510, accessed April 1, 2020.
9. Comments made at 13-03-2010, 06:24 a.m., and 18-07-2010, 11:46 p.m., on https://www.alukah.net/social/0/9510, accessed April 1, 2020.
10. Comment made at 19-02-2010, 03:23 a.m. on https://www.alukah.net/social/0/9510, accessed April 1, 2020.
11. Comment made at 18-07-2010, 11:46 p.m., on https://www.alukah.net/social/0/9510, accessed April 1, 2020.
12. The fifteen praise words are: thank, thank, good, good luck, wonderful, benefit, good, good, beautiful, reward, reward, bless, blessings, most beautiful. Duplicates are due to translation from Arabic to English.
13. https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB_Women_August2019_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer.pdf and https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB_WomenFinal-version05122018.pdf, accessed October 25, 2019.
14. See my discussion above of Sara Bint Muhammad Hassan's article "Diary of an Exemplary Husband and a Grumpy Wife," available at https://www.alukah.net/social/0/9510.

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CHAPTER 25

RELIGION AND MOBILIZATION IN THE SYRIAN UPRISING AND WAR

WENDY PEARLMAN

MANY popular commentaries on the Syrian uprising and war emphasize the role of religion, or of animosities related to religious difference, in propelling conflict (Reuters 2012; Council on Foreign Relations 2013; Vallely 2014). Many Syria experts critique this view, suggesting that violence has fueled Syria's sectarianization more than sectarianism has fueled violence (Droz-Vincent 2014; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015; Pinto 2017).

This chapter affirms the second view and builds on it in three ways. First, it addresses these questions with a unique and extensive data source: open-ended interviews that I have conducted with more than four hundred displaced Syrians in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, the UAE, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States from 2012 to 2018. Second, it brings together in one analysis two dimensions of religion: as a set of beliefs and practices with political implications for ideology, public piety, and state policies (religion); and as a collective identity, social structure, and marker of difference within a heterogeneous society (sect). Third, it sharpens the focus on changes over time by reviewing the role of religion and sect in Syria's pre-2011 politics and asking four questions pertaining to successive stages of the uprising: (1) What was the role of religion in the *motivations* driving protest? (2) What was its role in the processes generating *collective action*? (3) What was its role in the initial *escalation* of mobilization to militarized means and radicalized ends? (4) What was its role in *transforming* mobilization from uprising to war?

I argue that while religion came to occupy an increasingly prominent place in mobilization over time, its role in the Syrian conflict has been less attributable to religion per se than to the ways religion is entwined with power, privilege, and the dynamics of violent conflict itself. Where religion has sometimes appeared significant, such as in the tendency of demonstrations to begin at mosques, its power lay not in piety but in structural constraints. Religion and sect became increasingly important in mobilization as the conflict escalated and transformed into war. Yet this too was largely an outgrowth of contentious dynamics not particular to Islam, including state repression, regime strategies of divide and conquer, and the impact of horrific violence in reshaping actors and understandings.

The chapter illustrates these arguments with a focus on the conflict's first two years. The first section offers brief historical background on the nexus between religion and politics in Syria. The next four sections examine, respectively, how religion relates to protest motivations, collective action processes, the escalation of contention, and the transformation of conflict. The final section concludes with a discussion of the value of viewing religion in political mobilization in Muslim countries primarily as a variable that interacts with other variables, rather than as an independent driver in it is own right.

Historical Context

On the eve of the Arab Spring, an estimated 69 percent of Syria's population was Sunni Muslim, and 14 percent was Christian. About 11.5 percent was Alawite, a historically persecuted and marginalized offshoot of Shiʿi Islam. The remainder pertained mostly to other Muslim sects, primarily Druze or Ismaʿili (van Dam, 2011, 1).

While most of modern Syria was distinguished by coexistence, different religious groups historically had different statuses and rights. Ruling Syria as a Mandate from 1920 to 1946, France encouraged sectarian identities in order to counter the nationalism of the Arab-Sunni majority, and also recruited minorities into the military (van Dam 2011, 4). Marginalized communities' receptiveness to that avenue of social mobility, as well as the tendency of the urban Sunni bourgeoisie to shun military careers, increased minorities' disproportionate representation in the armed forces.

In the decades following independence, military interventions overthrew several governments. A faction of the Baʿth Party seized control of the state in 1963. Baʿth officers' origins in peripheral communities alienated them from urban folk and the Sunni majority (Batatu 1999, 171), while the party's secular pan-Arabism offended many pious Muslims. In 1970 General Hafez al-Assad sidelined competitors and seized power. Over the next three decades, he established a durable authoritarian regime based on a well-organized ruling party, populist welfare policies, alliances across society, and extensive employment in a bloated public sector (Hinnebusch 1990; Perthes 1997; Batatu 1999). A far-reaching coercive apparatus monitored the population, restricted speech, detained people at will, and tortured political prisoners (Middle East Watch 1991).

Against a backdrop of accumulating grievances regarding inflation, corruption, and security force abuses, civic and professional associations agitated for human rights in the late 1970s. A breakaway faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, the country's strongest opposition movement, began a campaign of violent attacks against the regime. Assad retaliated against the Brotherhood, spurring the group's radicalization and 1982 insurrection in Hama (Lefèvre 2013). The regime responded with a scorched-earth assault that killed tens of thousands, effectively eradicating the Brotherhood's domestic presence.

Assad's rule crystalized complex, even contradictory, relations between religion, sect, and politics. With regard to religion as belief, the regime constructed an image of itself as the protector of the country's religious minorities. It demonized the Muslim Brotherhood, painting it as the treacherous "them" against which the regime was "us" (Khatib 2018). Apprehensive of any regrouping of Islam-inspired opposition, regime intelligence monitored imams and mosques and suspended the licenses of many religious charitable associations (Abboud 2018, 45). It banned even nonpolitical expressions of Islamic practice and piety, such as wearing headscarves in schools (Pierret 2013, 70–71).

Yet the regime was at least as repressive toward secular dissidents (Khatib 2018). It also courted Islam as an expedient to co-opt, placate, and maintain control of society. Saleh (2017, 215–217) notes that the regime thus preserved Sunni Islam's dominant position as Syria's "public religion," allowing it to have "nearly universal jurisdiction" over religious education, civil status, and public festivities. In addition, Assad undertook symbolic acts such as public prayer and quoting from the Qurʾan (van Dam 2011, p.142). He built alliances with ʿulamaʾ, granting favors to religious leaders deemed loyal while marginalizing or eliminating those who were not (Pierret 2013).

The regime's relationship to religion as a social structure and collective identity was no less complicated than its relationship to religion as faith. On the one hand, Baʿth Party ideology was not sectarian. The political dominance of Alawite officers after 1963 was due primarily to the "ruralization of the armed forces" and splits among Sunni officers (Batatu 1999, 156–159). Assad placed members from his own family, region, and sect at the helm of the military and security services. Nonetheless, many of Assad's confidants were not Alawite. Perthes (1997, 182) was adamant: "Confession as such . . . is not the criterion for membership in this circle; loyalty to the President is." Furthermore, the regime built a decisive partnership with Sunni Damascene merchants (Ismail 2010, 23).

Throughout the 1970s, Assad created predominantly Alawite military units and officer corps for the purpose of regime protection and "coup-proofing" (Quinlivan 1999, 147). These units were part of larger Alawite trust networks, in Tilly's (2004, 12) sense of strong ties, "within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others." Nevertheless the lynchpin of this strategy was not religious identity as much as the structuring of relations of inclusion and exclusion through "special loyalties" and interests (Quinlivan 1999, 141). Indeed, some of Assad's fiercest challengers—the Baʿth Party rival from whom he seized power in 1970, and his own brother, who attempted a coup in 1983—were also Alawite.

Thus, sect alone cannot explain political allegiance. Most Alawites did not directly benefit from Assad's rule, and some opposed it. Nevertheless, these policies allowed this once under-represented community to profit "over-proportionally" from public sector employment (Perthes 1997, 183) and in turn discriminate against others (van Dam 2011, 139–140). Farouk-Alli (2014, 217) observes that "the bitter compromise that was struck by the Alawi community with the Assad regime was the acceptance of dictatorship in return for social mobility." At the same time, a totalizing discourse of national unity prevented frank conversation about interconnections of sect, power, and privilege. Instead, Saleh (2017, 279) lamented that "to bring up the phenomenon of sectarianism was to find oneself accused of sectarianism."

Tensions in the interplay between religion and politics took new forms after 2000, when Hafez al-Assad died and his son Bashar assumed the presidency. Tightening its alliance with Iran, the regime increased the visibility of Shiʿism through such measures as reconfiguring mosques and permitting Iranian Shiʿi missionary activity (Sindawi 2009; Pinto 2011, 2017). Simultaneously, the regime fused Islamic and national idioms in new ways, from billboards imploring God to protect Syria to the celebration of Aleppo as the "Capital of Islamic Culture" (Pinto 2011). Bashar also embarked on what Lister (2015, chap. 3) called a "flirtation with Jihadism." Following the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein, the regime facilitated fighters' passage into Iraq to join the insurgency against American forces. As some Jihadists returned to Syria in 2006, the government imprisoned them, lest they target the Assad regime as another "apostate enemy." That turn of policy added another layer of complexity to Syria's complex history of religion and politics.

MOTIVATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN DRIVING PROTEST

After four decades, many Syrians were fed up with authoritarian rule. However, few dared to voice their criticism publicly until the wave of popular protest known as the "Arab Spring." Syrians joined in a few tentative demonstrations in March 2011 that slowly spread over space, were sustained over time, and launched a nationwide uprising. The main drivers of protest were the calls for greater political freedoms, accountability, and good governance, as well as frustration with corruption, everyday indignities, and deteriorating livelihoods (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015; Abboud 2018; Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018). These grievances and aspirations were overwhelmingly civic, political, liberal, and unconnected to religion. For most Syrians, where religion did emerge as a motivator for protest, it was not related to religion per se, but rather to the ways that religious identities were infused with unequal power and the denial of basic liberties.

In my interviews, ostensibly religious aspects of fundamentally nonreligious grievances came to light in three ways. First, many invoked sect in their criticism of unfairness and discrimination. "You can find people from different sects living together, and we don't have any problem with this," a woman said. "Our dispute is with favoritism" (Interview in Irbid, Jordan, September 27, 2013). Resentment of this sort often focused on public-sector employment, which employed at least a quarter of Syrian workers and usually offered greater benefits than private-sector jobs (Abboud 2013, 166). A Sunni man from Homs, where Alawite residents worked for the state in disproportionate numbers (Nakkash 2013, 1), expressed his frustration:

> We go into the branches of the government, and 95 percent of the employees are from the Alawite sect, which is his sect. Here is how you get a job: by having connections to his sect. After they occupied the country, they gave the country to his sect to rule. It's all about his possessions and interests. I studied. But if your father is an officer in the army from the Alawite sect, there is no need for education. This is what made the young [rise up]. (Interview in Zarqa, Jordan, September 24, 2012)

Second, some who invoked religion as grounds for protest insisted that they were not calling upon the state to expand the role of Islam in the public sphere, but rather to withdraw policies inhibiting Muslims from practicing their faith. A man from the Damascus suburbs explained such religious grievances as a matter of rights and dignity:

> One of my friends is a Muslim and prays five times a day. Then he did his military service in Syria and wasn't allowed to do his prayers. The only place that he could pray was in the bathroom. This is not right in Islam, but if you can't pray in the right place, you do it in wherever you can any time. (Interview in Amman, Jordan, October 16, 2012)

A married couple echoed these views:

> **Wife:** Some people say that our revolution is an Islamic revolution, but that is not true. Yes, it's not a religious revolution but we want to be free to practice our religion because they refuse to let us pray. A Saudi company built Tishreen Hospital. They built a small room inside the hospital to be a prayer room, because it's part of any Saudi design. But the hospital made it into a storage room instead. Because it's a military hospital, we aren't allowed to have congregational prayer. We accept that, but on top of that, they don't allow us to pray individually, either. Also, it's not allowed for men to have beards.
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> **Husband:** In Aleppo University, our prayer room was in the basement. We didn't have a problem with that, but whenever we finished praying, the security people would write down our names.
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> **Wife:** One time, the security officer . . . asked our friend why he was praying during his shift inside the hospital. He answered that he was working 24 hours a day, which means he had to pray at the hospital. The officer told him, "You will not pray here. Go pray in your house as much as you want, and pray for us." They even mock religion.

Third, some referred to Bashar's enlargement of space for Shiʿi Islam, which far outpaced the approximately 1 or 2 percent of the population that was Shiʿi. One of my interlocutors expressed such discontent, clarifying that it was not related to ideas about heresy, but rather a sense that the government privileged foreigners at the expense of its own citizens:

> During the rule of Bashar al-Assad there was a kind of sectarian provocation, and especially toward Sunni Muslims. He began to promote the Shiʿi school of thought and build Shiʿi mosques . . . . It contributed to a strong feeling inside people. A feeling that there was a war in the country on one particular sect. This contributed to a sense of psychological submission among people. There was a sense that Shiʿa are expanding in the country, but Sunnis can't expand. I tell you this to show you that people's psychological situation was one of being strangulated, in sectarian terms. (Interview in Amman, Jordan on September 16, 2012)

For many Syrians who supported the uprising, therefore, religion factored into their motivations not as a primary grievance, but as an outgrowth of their frustration with authoritarianism. They were not moved by a call for a greater role of religion as much as for a state that approached religion with a fairer, or even a neutral, stance.

Processes of Mobilization: The Role of Religion in Collective Action

Once protest was under way, initial protest was not propelled or structured by religion, or even ideology, broadly speaking. The tendency of popular demonstrations to form at mosques at the conclusion of Friday prayers, often perceived as religiously motivated, was in fact the outcome of collective action logistics. Due to decades of the stifling of civil society (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015; Abboud 2018; Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018), Syrian dissenters lacked a preexisting infrastructure of autonomous organizations, free social spaces, and robust networks of trust that could serve as the "mobilizing structures" that social movement scholars find crucial for organizing challenges to authority (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

In addition, pervasive security forces ready to crush dissent rendered mosques the only space from which a crowd could get a demonstration off the ground. Although mosques were state-monitored and informants could be clandestine among worshippers, the ritual of weekly collective prayer provided one of the few intersections of time and place that permitted a critical mass to form (Pearlman 2020). Repression severely constrained opportunities to gather in other spaces. For example, Homs's attempt at a Tahrir-like peaceful occupation of a public square lasted only hours before security forces opened fire, killing at least seventeen protestors (Human Rights Watch 2011).

The utilitarian, rather than religious, function of mosques came to light in my interviews with participants in the uprising's first large-scale demonstration in the southern province of Daraa on March 18, 2011 (Pearlman 2018). Activists explained that they had planned to hold a demonstration in front of the central court building on March 15, in conjunction with the call on Facebook for a nationwide "Day of Rage." Though they circulated word as secretly as possible, security forces were waiting on the scene and quashed the demonstration before it began. A small group of activists decided to try again after Friday prayers. "Why Friday prayers?" one Daraa resident asked rhetorically. "Because, in Syria, it is prohibited for more than five people to assemble without prior security approval . . . . Prayer inside the mosque is the only opportunity people have to gather" (Interview in Amman, Jordan, September 16, 2012).

Had these oppositionists selected a mosque on the basis of religious significance, they might have chosen the city's main religious institution, al-Omari. Yet they knew that this would attract a large security presence, and instead chose to demonstrate from a new and scarcely known mosque in a peripheral neighborhood. This offered the best conditions for a demonstration to gather participants before it could be suppressed. The oppositionists' plan succeeded; they launched a demonstration that gathered hundreds and became the most sustained street protest to date. Ending when security forces killed two protestors, it was also a turning-point in launching the uprising (Pearlman 2020). The following Friday, tens of thousands joined in demonstrations across the country, most of them likewise gathering inside mosques and pouring forth from there (Slackman 2011).

Friday protests became a regularized expectation for protestors and security forces, each taking on a unique name through a weekly process of online deliberation (Friedman 2011). Many people I interviewed insisted that both non-Muslims and non-practicing Muslims came to mosques for the purposes of protesting. One worshipper recalled a young man at Friday prayers with a necklace tucked inside his shirt:

> He lined up and prayed with everyone else. And when he bowed, the necklace fell out. The pendant was a cross. People said to him, "Either you're wearing that necklace by mistake, or you came to the mosque by mistake." And the Christian young man said, "I came here to go out in the demonstration with all of you." (Interviewed in Marj al-Hamam, Jordan, October 2, 2012)

Similar dynamics took place on Muslim religious holidays that, like Friday prayers, brought people together with potential for protest. A Damascene described Laylat al-Qadr (Night of Power), the holiest night of the Islamic calendar, in August 2011:

> Everybody said that the regime would collapse during the month of Ramadan, because instead of gathering at the mosque for prayer only on Fridays, people gathered every night. The atmosphere was pumped with energy.
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> The twenty-seventh of Ramadan is a holy day, and people stay up all night praying and reading the Qurʾan. Every year over five thousand people gathered at the mosque near our house. Volunteers from the neighborhood helped prepare a meal for people to eat before sunrise. I don't pray, but I always participated in preparing the meal, because I thought it was a beautiful social event.

> People started arriving. There were a lot of old people, but also guys with body piercings and strange haircuts. You could see that they had no idea what to do. Some guys were wearing shorts, which you aren't supposed to do at a mosque. Out of respect, they were trying to pull their shorts down toward their ankles. But then you could saw their backsides exposed. It was a beautiful scene of the complex social fabric that we had in Damascus. (Interview in Copenhagen, Denmark, June 12, 2016)

Like holy places and days, religious language also served mobilizational functions. While the most common shout was simply the word "freedom," protests also included chants such as "God is Great" and "There is no god but God." Many of my interviewees explained that these statements of devotion carried a religious power for Muslims specifically because they helped invigorate them with the courage to "break the barrier of fear" and face the high risk of protest. The language of Islam was thus a "meta-political" umbrella that could encompass Islamist and secular leftist discourses (Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018, 179), in part because it mirrored the religious nationalism that Bashar himself had promoted during the prior decade (Pinto 2017, 126). A powerful example of protestors seizing upon existing frames at the intersection of piety and patriotism was the replacement of the government slogan "God, Syria, Bashar, and that's all!" with the revolutionary "God, Syria, Freedom, and that's all!"

At the same time, protestors used anti-sectarian slogans, such as "No to sectarianism, one, one, the Syrian people is one," and "We are not (Muslim) Brothers, nor foreign agents, we are all Syria, whether Muslims, Alawites, Druze, or Christians." In an expression of cross-sectarian outreach, protestors named Fridays to honor Alawite, Christian, or Kurdish communities, or to emphasize inclusive national unity (Droz-Vincent 2014, 47, 49).

A final question relevant for assessing the role of religion in collective action concerns the degree to which religious figures lent leadership to the protest movement. Syrian preachers based in exile played a different role, as I elaborate below. The positions of local ʿulamaʾ, however, varied with the communities and networks in which they were embedded. Muslim clergy in provincial towns where protest was strong and where the government responded violently tended to endorse the uprising, while those in Damascus and Aleppo, where the popular response was ambivalent, showed mixed stances (Pierret 2013, 217). Some establishment figures, like the Grand Mufti personally appointed by Bashar al-Assad in 2005, denounced political unrest in terms very similar to the regime. "Our imams and Muslim scholars let us down," one oppositionist judged such personalities. "Their stance was neutral and negative: 'Oh people, we don't want disorder.' They told us to calm down" (Interview in Zarqa, Jordan, August 11, 2013).

When religious leaders boldly endorsed the uprising, they often did so on the same nonreligious grounds articulated by demonstrators on the streets. Pierret (2013, 228) notes that, leading clerics released a petition enumerating "distinctly liberal demands such as the establishment of the rule of law, respect for civil and political rights, and the abrogation of Article No. 8 of the constitution according to which the Baʿath lead society and state." The mobilizing impact of local Muslim leaders, as with Islamic slogans and places, was thus not primarily due to Islam. Rather, they aided collective action to the degree that they strengthened resources and opportunities for a movement in which religion was ancillary to nonreligious demands and aspirations.

Escalation of Mobilization: The Role of Religion in Militarization and Radicalization

It was in the escalation of mobilization that religion, as faith and sectarian identity, came to play an increasingly prominent role. This was not due to a static or preexisting facet of protestors' identities or beliefs. Rather, it illustrates McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's (2001) insistence that movements evolve with dynamics of contention driven by contingent, relational mechanisms.

Primarily, in an effort to delegitimize protestors, pro-regime media explicitly and implicitly accused them of being motivated by sectarianism and religious extremism. In remarks just nine days after the Daraa protest, government spokeswoman Bouthaina Shaaban denounced unrest as a sectarian plot (Wimmen 2014, 23). When Assad made his first public address to parliament three days later, he invoked the word "sectarian" as many as seventeen times in condemning the uprising (Wimmen 2014, 23). One of my interviewees from Latakia observed this sectarianization, both in speech and action:

> I didn't even know the difference between Shiʿi and Sunni until this whole thing started, because nobody cared. Don't get me wrong—Shiʿa and Sunnis have been fighting forever. But nobody was mentioning any of that in Syria at the time. In 2011, the needs, the goals, and the demands had nothing to do with that. The goals were political reform, participation, real representation, and some actual active citizenship in the country.
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> The people in power saw those goals as a fundamental threat to their grip over the country. The only way they could maintain full control was by reframing the argument from reform to Shiʿa and Sunnis and radicals. They implemented that policy through their political speeches and military approach. And they imposed it on the ground . . . . And eventually things ended up where we are now. (Interviewed in Copenhagen, Denmark, on June 12, 2016)

In framing the confrontation between government and opposition in religious terms, the regime sought to "divide and conquer" the uprising. This instrumentalized religious minorities' anxieties to scare them into choosing the safety of the status quo they knew over the uncertainty of a revolution that they did not. In this context, stories circulated about protestors chanting the phrase "Christians to Beirut, and Alawites in the coffin." While reporting on the chant became widespread, most cite it as a rumor rather than something that witnesses verified having heard (Pinto 2017, 132; *New York Times* 2011). Portrayals of the movement as religiously motivated appeared to be deliberate misinformation, as a writer from the capital observed:

> There are certainly Sunni extremists protesting in the streets. But there are also atheists, communists, and feminists by their side. Although there have been pious individuals involved in the uprising, and even some who might envision a future religious state, this has never been a religious movement . . . . Although the fears of the Christian, Alawite, and Druze minorities are not unfounded . . . they seem to be exaggerated. The majority of the young revolutionaries and the older opposition leaders are demanding secular democracy. (*New York Times* 2011)

In addition to rhetoric, the application of state violence had sectarianizing effects. A robust literature shows that while repression can paradoxically intensify dissent (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005), it often has the effect of splintering nonviolent movements into more "moderate" and "radical" groups (Tarrow 1994), which can enable the latter to eclipse the former (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). Syria illustrates these dynamics. Observers note that regime forces aimed indiscriminate and collective repression at Sunni neighborhoods, even in cities where protestors came from various religious communities (Pinto 2017, 135). They also targeted Sunni sacred sites and objects, such as by desecrating mosques and burning copies of the Qurʾan, or attacked Sunni rituals, such as shelling communities while people broke the Ramadan fast (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015, 110–111). A sense of being singled out for punishment pushed some Syrians to identify in religious ways that they previously had not. One activist recalled, "When they started killing Sunni civilians randomly as opposed to just those protesting . . . my atheist friends began asserting their Sunnism, which is now more of a social than a religious identity" (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015, 110).

The identities of the agents of repression intensified the sectarianizing impact of the targeting of violence. The officer corps of the Syrian army, and especially the elite units deployed against the uprising, was predominantly Alawite (Droz-Vincent 2014, 39). That they took the helm in crushing an uprising in which most participants (like the population at large) were Sunni had sectarianizing effects. Military support for the regime from Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi volunteers likewise furthered many Sunni oppositionists' sense that they were being attacked by a specifically Shiʿi adversary (Pinto 2017, 140).

Compounding sectarianization was the role of Assadist "thugs," militias, and paramilitary units—different types of armed civilian groups referred to as *shabiha* (singular, *shabih*). Often armed and organized by Syrian intelligence (Lund 2015, 212), *shabiha* gained infamy for atrocities against civilians. Videos circulated that showed them forcing people to say "There is no God but Bashar," or to prostrate themselves before images of the president (Saleh 2017, 50). That most, though not all, *shabiha* were Alawite increased many Sunnis' perception that *shabiha* represented the entire Alawite community.

Here it is important to reiterate that high-profile members of all religious communities sided with both the regime and the opposition. Many Alawites felt that their community was "taken hostage by the regime" (Droz-Vincent 2014, 42). Yet others remained silent for fear of retribution or actively stood with the regime for fear of how its collapse would endanger the community. For many Sunni Muslims, the lack of strongly visible Alawite participation in the uprising magnified the impact of their strongly visible role in repression (International Crisis Group 2012, 8). Correspondingly, for many Alawites, deployment of Alawite-dominated forces helped the regime project the uprising as anti-Alawite, redoubling the belief that the community was fighting for its survival (Rifai 2018, 246).

Against this backdrop, perhaps the greatest factor shaping the role of religion in conflict escalation was the enormity of civilian suffering. Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami (2015, 108–109) write, "In most cultures the proximity of death will focus minds on the transcendent—there are no atheists in foxholes, as the saying goes—and more so in an already religious society like Syria's." Radicalization in Syria, they argue, is more aptly understood as traumatization. Echoing this analysis, Saleh (2017, 122–123) attributed the rise of a "militant nihilism" to three factors: the regime's horrifying violence, the inefficacy of the exile-based leadership, and the inaction of foreign powers, which left Syrians feeling abandoned in a world that "is indifferent to them, if not actively conspiring against them." Facing loss of trust in everything once believed to be reliable, many found solace only in religion. A father from Daraa voiced a similar analysis when I spoke with him in the fall of 2012:

> If there is no opportunity, people won't return to their religion. Only in hard situations, like what we're living in now . . . . If the situation continues like this, many countries will be dragged into a big war. A huge Islamic organization will be created.
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> It will happen, because no one is responding to us. No one has helped us. No one has put his hand in our hand and joined with us. Nobody. So what can you do? Just go back to God. After that, you'll organize yourself by returning back to the religious fundamentals . . . . Islam needs an opportunity and this opportunity is ready now in Syria.
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> In Syria now, everybody is returning to God. It's clear nothing works with the regime, not politics or anything else . . . . There is hope only in God. There is no other solution. What we are saying is that the entire world has left us. Publicly, not in secret. The world is watching and knows what is happening in Syria. So in this case we have no one else but God. (Interview in Irbid, Jordan September 17, 2012)

Transformation of Mobilization: The Role of Religion in Consolidating the Conflict as War

The protest movement remained overwhelmingly nonviolent through the summer of 2011. That July, military defectors announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army.

While it put forth the exclusively nationalist agenda of toppling the Assad regime, most members were Sunni Muslims and numerous brigades took Sunni-inspired names (Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018, 180).

Meanwhile, more radical understandings of the conflict gained influence. Adnan al-Aroor, a Saudi-based Syrian Salafi cleric, broadcast "charismatic diatribes" calling for the uprising to embrace arms as part of a broader struggle of Sunnis against Shiʿa (International Crisis Group 2012, 29). Aroor's most controversial statement came in a June 2011 speech when, in apparent reference to the regimes' weaponization of rape, he directed these words to Syria's Alawite community: "No harm will be done to those who remained neutral [during the revolution]; as for those who supported the revolution, they will be with us . . . however those who violated sanctities, . . . we will chop their flesh and feed them to . . . dogs" (Pierret 2013, 237).

These developments culminated with the establishment of expressly Islamist and even Salafi-Jihadi armed groups. Here, the regime's earlier encouragement and subsequent arrest of participants in the Iraqi insurgency played an important role. In mid-2011, Assad pardoned hundreds of the fighters whom he had previously imprisoned (Abouzeid 2014; Lister 2015). Lister (2015, 53) is one of many who views those amnesties as the regime's "devious attempt" to unleash extremists and terrorists into an opposition that it was already denouncing as extremist and terrorist. Then, in August 2011, eight al-Qaʿida leaders crossed from Iraq to Syria with the goal of replacing the Assad regime with an Islamic state (Abouzeid 2014). They convened with the militants freed from prison and began establishing cells throughout Syria. These al-Qaʿida affiliates would officially establish Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Other armed groups with different Islamist ideologies or goals subsequently formed and used religious rhetoric to recruit legions of foreign fighters. One of those groups, emerging from a rift between Jabhat al-Nusra and its al-Qaʿida parent organization in April 2013, was the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess whether members of these groups were true believers, adopted identities strategically, or were driven by a complex mix of religious and other impetuses. In mobilizing on Syrian soil, however, they both tapped into religious ideas preexisting in society and, arguably more importantly, benefited from the context of extreme violence. Given the latter, they employed religion in claiming to offer civilians a sense of purity, purpose, and clearly defined enemies; in legitimizing violence as a virtuous response to violence; and in extending some solace in casting death as martyrdom (International Crisis Group 2012, ii; Saleh 2017, 126). Beyond this, the rise of Salafi-Jihadism was facilitated by funding, weapons, organization, discipline, and military experience gained outside Syria. As Western countries offered scant military aid to the revolt, wealthy Gulf states and individuals emerged as the best sources of support. Competing to win it, rival armed groups often portrayed themselves as not only Islamist, but also anti-Shiʿa (Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018, 181). As early as fall 2012, the International Crisis Group (2012, 10) warned that this escalatory cycle would engulf the entire armed rebellion:

> The money flow from conservative donors did more than strengthen Salafi factions relative to their mainstream counterparts . . . . (I)t also pushed non-Salafi combatants

> toward joining Salafi units capable of providing them with the requisite weapons and ammunition. Groups with no ideological affiliation whatsoever began to adopt the symbols, rhetoric and facial hair associated with Salafism for that purpose. While such forms of behaviour typically might start as a largely opportunistic phenomenon and thus lead to exaggerated assessments of a rising Islamist tide, over time they could well turn into more genuine feelings, as the experience of a religiously-inspired struggle permeates a generation of fighters.

Once ascendant, Islamist groups attained and maintained power through approaches familiar to those of nonreligious political forces, including institution-building, territorial control, external relations, social service provision, propaganda campaigns, and sheer violence. Their relative weight in the Syrian opposition also profited from constraints on expressly civic, nonsectarian organizations. Another of my interlocutors explained:

> Our problem is that we don't have politicians or political parties. We have personalities, individuals. So when citizens started raising religious slogans, like "We have no one but God," they were right. Because they had no political actors or groups. So all they had was religion. (Interview in Antakya, Turkey, September 5, 2013)

During nearly a decade of conflict, hundreds of citizen initiatives inside and outside Syria have worked for a free and civil state in myriad ways (Citizens for Syria 2015). Civic groups have undertaken initiatives from collective gardens to educational activities designed to counter sectarianism in society (swisspeace, Conflict Dynamics International, and FarikBeirut.net 2016, 21–23). Nevertheless, civic groups faced the enormous challenge of both overcoming the preexisting constraints on Syrian civil society and building capable leadership and structures while under military assault. As the conflict escalated and transformed, their ability to offer nonreligious structures to channel social grievances and aspirations remained handicapped by a lack of funding, as well as attacks by regime and extremist forces alike (Becker and Stolleis 2016).

Against this backdrop, the Syrian conflict evolved into a multidimensional war with religious and sectarian dimensions. The summer of 2012 registered ghastly killings that many observers identified as sectarian massacres, including the slaughter of some two hundred villagers in Hula and Qubayr at the hands of *shabiha* and regime troops (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 2015, 112). In the years that followed, armed rebels engaged in other kinds of gruesome brutality with sectarian overtones (Droz-Vincent 2014, 56). Ideological fanaticism contributed to transforming the conflict from a peaceful popular uprising to a war that has killed more than 500,000 people, disappeared some 100,000, and forcibly displaced more than half the population of 22 million. "We tried our best to build something," a secular activist told me. "We faced a lot, and we faced it alone. And we faced it with the minimum of hatred toward others. But we lost control" (Interviewed in Gaziantep, Turkey, on January 11, 2016).

CONCLUSION

Given the sectarianism and religious extremism that would eventually consume Syria, it can be tempting to conclude that religion was a primary factor in mobilization from the start. This would be a mistake. Structures and strategies of rule before and under Assad rule set the stage for complex connections between politics and religion. In terms of both belief and collective identity, religion became entwined with issues of power and privilege, as well as deep feelings of subjugation, resentment, and fear across society.

Nevertheless, religion occupied only a marginal place in motivating the uprising. Once protest was underway, the role of Islam in aiding collective action was utilitarian far more than spiritual. Religion became most salient in mobilization as the conflict militarized and escalated, consolidating its transformation from popular uprising to a multidimensional war. Violence intensified the role of religion as both ideology and social cleavage, as well as the interconnections between the two.

The role of religion in accelerating violence was not inevitable, but in good part intentional. As Droz-Vincent (2014, 54) writes, the Assad regime sought to hold power at all costs, and "bet on the fact that precipitating a sectarian breakdown would produce the most favorable environment for the pursuit of its overwhelming military preponderance." In condemning peaceful grass-roots protest as the work of sectarian fanatics, the government's rhetoric generated a self-fulfilling prophecy (Pinto 2017, 136). Extremist Islamist groups entered the fray and grew in both strength and brutality. Yet even then, their preeminence was grounded in contentious dynamics not peculiar to Islam, including state repression, resources, intra-opposition competition, and the protraction of both violence and unmet aspirations.

Analysis of mobilization in the Syrian uprising and war encourages us not to assume the primacy of religion as a causal variable, even when protestors invoke the name of God, convene in mosques, or articulate resentment toward people of other faiths. A deeper examination can reveal that religion can function primarily as an indicator or symptom of nonreligious problems and processes, or as a variable whose political significance lays in interactions with variables unrelated to religion. This perspective generates a host of new questions for further research. In those contexts in which religion does become an independent driver of mobilization or conflict, what makes it so? When others perceive religion as being a more significant factor than it is, what drives those perceptions? What does that teach us not only about politics in Muslim societies, but also about non-Muslims' ways of viewing them?

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CHAPTER 26

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT

Insights from Kaduna, Nigeria

ALEXANDRA SCACCO AND SHANA S. WARREN

In February 2000, large-scale Christian-Muslim riots shook the Nigerian city of Kaduna, killing at least three thousand people and displacing tens of thousands more. In the course of four days of the most serious interreligious violence Nigeria had ever witnessed, dozens of churches, mosques, and entire city blocks were burned to the ground. Drawing on original survey data from a random sample of three hundred young men living in particularly conflict-prone neighborhoods in Kaduna, we analyze patterns of Christian-Muslim relations fifteen years after the February 2000 crisis. In this chapter, we build a case that, contrary to recent literature that points to relatively quick post-conflict recovery and documents a positive relationship between violence exposure and within-group prosocial behavior (e.g., Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012), local exposure to deadly intergroup violence continues to have profoundly negative social and political effects on intergroup relations nearly two decades later.

We show that Kaduna residents on either side of the religious divide continue to exhibit high levels of mistrust and prejudice against members of the religious out-group, and demonstrate substantial discrimination against members of the religious out-group in behavioral games with real material stakes. We highlight three lasting consequences of exposure to intercommunal violence, each of which complicates post-conflict reconciliation.

First, deadly intercommunal violence erodes intergroup trust and heightens perceptions of the out-group as threatening and dangerous. This increases the likelihood of further episodes of violence. Second, intercommunal violence on a large scale tends to increase residential segregation at the local level, as people become afraid to live near out-group communities. At the same time, out-group communities do not disappear entirely—they often continue to coexist but occupy separate spaces within the same locality. We follow others (e.g., Enos 2017; Enos and Celaya 2018; Weiss 2021) in suggesting that mixed but segregated cities are particularly likely to suffer from high levels of intergroup prejudice and discrimination, making post-conflict reconciliation and recovery more difficult.

Third, exposure to violence can have long-term psychological consequences. Simply put, exposure to intercommunal violence traumatizes populations. We draw on secondary literature documenting high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Kaduna and Jos—the cities in Nigeria's Middle Belt that have experienced the most frequent and deadly episodes of communal violence. Taken together, these consequences of violence exposure should lead us, on balance, to expect relatively slow, halting progress toward post-conflict recovery. We offer evidence on each of these consequences from the Nigerian context, and caution against expectations that post-conflict communities should quickly bounce back from episodes of interreligious violence.

Our data affords us a detailed view of the nature of Christian-Muslim relations in Kaduna, fifteen years after deadly intergroup conflict. Although intergroup attitudes are not uniformly negative, a picture clearly emerges of lingering mistrust, antagonism, and anxiety in intergroup relations. We are not arguing that Christian-Muslim violence is inevitable—in fact, it remains relatively rare, even in the religiously mixed cities of Nigeria's Middle Belt region. Nor are we arguing that post-conflict reconciliation and recovery are impossible. We simply urge caution against expectations that communities can easily and quickly bounce back from violent conflict.

Long-Term Impacts of Intercommunal Violence

Reviewing recent empirical work on the consequences of exposure to violent conflict, the casual reader might be tempted to conclude that, while initially devastating in terms of lost lives and property destroyed, the dark side of violence exposure casts a short shadow. A series of high-quality (and high-profile) studies documents a positive relationship between exposure to wartime violence and within-community prosocial behaviors in settings ranging from Uganda (Blattman 2009) and Burundi (Voors et al. 2012) to Nepal (Gilligan et al. 2014). Building on this work, a recent meta-analysis of sixteen micro-level studies of violence exposure during civil and interstate wars reports a set of surprisingly positive effects of exposure on political and social outcomes, including participation in community organizations, participation in local politics, and prosocial behavior more broadly (Bauer et al. 2016). The study concludes that violence exposure not only increases individual-level participation in local civic and political life, but also leads those who have directly suffered violence to be more trusting of others in their local community, and more altruistic in experimental laboratory games. It further suggests that "the increased local cooperation we document might help to explain why some post-conflict countries experience almost miraculous economic and social recoveries" (Bauer et al. 2016, 4–5).

It would be easy to conclude from this body of research that, if one were to check back in on a post-conflict setting like Kaduna, Nigeria, more than a decade later, things should not look too bad. Unfortunately, as we describe in detail below, that is not borne out in our survey data. There is little to suggest conditions of reconciliation or rapid recovery. Our observations from Kaduna are more consistent with a set of studies published in the past few years highlighting the negative medium- and long-term consequences of violence exposure. These studies suggest that violence exposure deepens negative intergroup attitudes and may in fact *decrease* prosocial behavior across social groups as well as within them (Hager et al. 2019).

In this vein, Beber et al. (2014) find that exposure to communal violence in Khartoum exacerbated already negative attitudes held by Sudanese Arabs toward South Sudanese residents of the city. Similarly, Grossman et al. (2015) find that exposure to combat hardens Israeli attitudes toward Palestinians, reduces support for political compromise, and increases voting for hawkish parties. Across a range of contexts, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kyrgyzstan, recent studies have found that individual- and community-level experiences with violent conflict solidify ethnic identities, increase distrust toward non-co-ethnics, and make ethnic parties more appealing to voters (Hadzic et al. 2020; Hager et al. 2019; Mironova and Whitt 2018). Further, this hardening of negative attitudes may also be passed down across generations (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011).

What might explain this disconnect in the literature? One possibility is that the set of violence exposure studies documenting negative consequences, as well as our own observations in Kaduna, focus on intercommunal violence in settings where members of the groups in conflict live in relatively close proximity to one another. This feature applies to religiously mixed cities across Nigeria's Middle Belt region. It also describes present and past settings of Hindu-Muslim violence in urban India, as well as communal violence in cities in Iraq, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the United States, among others. In contrast, the civil and interstate wars examined by Bauer et al. (2016) in their meta-analysis are conflicts in which parties to the violence are less likely to live in close proximity before, during, or after the fighting is over. Behavioral games designed to measure prosociality implemented in such settings therefore reflect *within-group* improvements and cannot inform us about intergroup attitudes or behavior in the aftermath of conflict.[1] As such, it is reasonable to expect the impacts of violence exposure to be very different, a possibility that Bauer et al. (2016, 251) themselves acknowledge.

The immediate effects of large-scale communal violence are easily observed. The case we explore here illustrates how destructive intercommunal violence can be. Casualty and displacement figures from the Christian-Muslim riots that took place in February 2000 in Kaduna are staggering, with conservative estimates of fatalities ranging from around 2,000 to 5,000 deaths, an estimated 125,000 people temporarily displaced in the aftermath of the violence, and billions of naira lost in private property damage (Angerbrandt 2011; Scacco and Warren 2018; Wapwera and Gajere 2017).

Beyond immediate effects, we should expect intercommunal violence on this scale to have large negative medium- to long-term social, political, and psychological consequences. We highlight three types of such consequences below. Exposure to intergroup violence may (1) *deepen intergroup mistrust*, complicating reconciliation processes, and increasing the likelihood of future violence; (2) result in *radical residential segregation*, complicating processes of intergroup reconciliation; and (3) lead to lasting *psychological trauma* within affected communities. We discuss each in detail below.

Intercommunal Violence Erodes Trust

The idea that violent conflict between groups living in close proximity worsens already fraught intergroup attitudes in divided societies is, of course, not new. Prior episodes of intercommunal violence make communal identities and social divisions more salient, hardening boundaries between groups in conflict (Beber et al. 2014; De Waal 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Hadzic et al. 2020). Histories of conflict can make it more difficult for people living in divided societies to update negative beliefs when faced with new, positive information about the out-group (e.g., Devine et al. 2002; Fiske 1989). The mistrust generated by communal violence may also decrease prosocial behavior, both across (Mironova and Whitt 2018) and within (Hager et al. 2019) relevant identity groups. The impacts of communal violence on intergroup attitudes can be observed far beyond the months and years following violent events; evidence suggests that negative out-group attitudes and high levels of out-group mistrust can be transmitted across generations (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011).

Literature in social psychology suggests that deadly communal conflicts can produce psychological repertoires of fear and grievance toward the out-group, making it more difficult to break out of cycles of repeated conflict. Research on such repertoires, discussed in Bar-Tal and Avrahamzon (2016) and Sharvit (2014), indicates that settings of repeated conflict pose what they term a "special challenge" for prejudice reduction, since even when individuals are able to develop more favorable beliefs toward out-group members (in lab experimental settings, for example), such beliefs are difficult to maintain in communities that perpetuate a culture of conflict. Further, even when explicit attitudes or beliefs shift in a more positive direction, recent lab experimental work in the Israeli context suggests that out-group animosity may continue to be stored in implicit beliefs and attitudes (Sharvit 2014).

The notion of a conflict repertoire resonates with field-based experiences from Nigeria's Middle Belt region discussed by Scacco (2020). During fieldwork conducted in the riot-prone city of Jos (a few hours' drive from Kaduna) in 2007, one of the authors (Alexandra Scacco) experienced what might be best termed a "near-riot" due to a misunderstanding conceivably amplified by the type of conflict repertoire the psychology literature identifies.

One summer morning, the author woke to cries from neighbors that there was "trouble in the town" because "the Muslims were mobilizing" for a riot. In Jos, commercial motorcycle drivers (who offer an inexpensive, efficient form of transport that many local commuters rely on) have historically tended to be Muslim men. In the hours that followed, rumors spread quickly through Christian neighborhoods that "religious trouble" was brewing. In reality, the motorcycle drivers had begun marching through the town and setting up roadblocks as part of a labor strike in protest against a recent order by the city government that they were no longer allowed to transport passengers after dark.

A religious riot was prevented through swift military intervention (by chance, due to the nearby location of a federal military barracks), but the panic and fear generated by the sight of out-group members marching together was unmistakable. The town of Jos had experienced deadly Christian-Muslim riots in 2001 and 2004, resulting in thousands of deaths. This history of violence led ordinary people to interpret an innocuous event through the lens of intergroup threat, shedding light on the process by which violence can beget violence in conflict settings and stubborn prejudices may be difficult to dislodge. Indeed, the very fact that episodes of communal violence tend to occur again and again in the same localities (see, for example, Varshney 2003 and Wilkinson 2006 for detailed evidence on the spatial concentration of Hindu-Muslim riots in post–World War II India) suggests how difficult it is for groups to reconcile after violence.

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND LOCAL SEGREGATION

Another feature of life in the wake of violent conflict can further amplify the problem of intergroup mistrust. Deadly communal conflicts often increase local residential segregation, as people who no longer feel safe living in close proximity to out-group members move into in-group residential enclaves. Intercommunal violence of the form we consider may be particularly likely to produce diverse yet locally segregated environments, as households relocate within the same locality.[2]

Although motivated by a desire for safety, local segregation along communal lines may provide especially fertile ground for intergroup prejudice and animosity. Recent studies have identified pernicious effects of segregation on racial prejudice and discrimination in American cities (Enos 2017), interreligious mistrust and violence in Jerusalem (Rokem et al. 2018), cycles of ethnic violence in Iraq (Weidmann and Salehyan 2013) and Kenya (Kasara 2017), and studies in laboratory settings (Enos and Celaya 2018).

One reason for this is that residential segregation in particular limits opportunities for meaningful cross-group social interactions among ordinary people—and communal leaders—that can provide information to quell incendiary rumors and resolve small-scale conflicts (Kasara 2013). Although residential segregation may make people feel more safe where they live, if things *do* go wrong, it is more difficult to contain communal violence in its early stages.

Other research links segregation with high levels of prejudice and mistrust more directly, independent from segregation's impact on levels of intergroup contact in daily life. Enos (2017) argues that diverse but segregated local geographies make identities of groups in tension more salient. Increased salience leads to more biased attitudes and behavior across the identity cleavage. Enos argues: "Social geography creates space between us in our heads before it creates a space between us in our relationships" (Enos 2017, 15). If segregation has both direct and indirect (through the standard theorized path of reduced intergroup contact) negative effects on attitudes toward and perceptions about the out-group, we should expect a greater risk of conflict recurrence in diverse but segregated local settings.

Psychological Consequences of Violence Exposure

On the surface, it might seem that the populations of cities "bounce back" quickly after even large-scale episodes of communal violence. People might resume trading across lines of cleavage in local markets weeks, or even days, after the riots. However, an emerging literature on the psychological impact of intercommunal violence suggests that deeper scars may linger for years in post-conflict settings.

The effects of violent conflict on mental health may be direct, if they stem from direct exposure to traumatic events, or indirect, if they arise from displacement or any other consequences of violent conflict, such as disruption of livelihoods. Direct effects of violence exposure on mental health include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), insomnia, anxiety, and depression (Bogic et al. 2015; Gordon et al. 2010; Mpembi et al. 2018). Conflict exposure may affect mental health indirectly, as a result of displacement, scarcity of basic necessities, such as food and water, and the loss of family and financial stability (Garry and Checchi 2020). To the extent that violent conflict increases the number of people living in extreme poverty where it occurs, we can draw on a large body of literature documenting the negative impacts of poverty on mental health (e.g., Lund et al. 2010; Patel and Kleinman 2003). Given the scale and intensity of the interreligious communal violence in religiously heterogeneous contexts, it is reasonable to expect to observe lingering negative mental health consequences among its survivors many years later.

In sum, the literature leads us to expect at least three sets of negative consequences of exposure to intercommunal violence in the medium to long term. That said, we do not intend to suggest that there is no hope at all for post-conflict reconciliation. Our goal here is simply to caution against applying optimistic expectations from the empirical literature on the effects of violence exposure on within-group prosociality to intergroup relations. Various dimensions of post-conflict reconciliation can be difficult and painful. Rebuilding intergroup trust can take time and can easily experience setbacks. We should not be surprised if recovery is slow and if gains are reversed.

Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria

We now turn to a discussion of Christian-Muslim intergroup relations in the Nigerian context. Decades of conflict across often overlapping ethnic and religious lines within the Nigerian state shaped the lens through which Kaduna residents could interpret and respond to the violent riot that shook the city in 2000.

Although social demography has long been, and continues to be, an issue of controversy and contestation, we can accurately claim that Nigeria is a multiethnic state of approximately 200 million people, with relatively equal proportions of Muslims and Christians and hundreds of ethnic groups. The Christian-Muslim political divide dates to British colonial policy, under which the predominantly Muslim North and largely Christian South were separately governed as the Northern and Southern Nigerian Protectorates (until 1914), then unified as the colony of Nigeria (1914–1954), and finally re-divided into three regions by splitting the Southern region into a Christian-dominant Eastern region and a religiously mixed Western region. The dominant ethnic group in each of these regions is one of Nigeria's three largest ethnic groups: Northern (Hausa, Muslim), Eastern (Igbo, Christian), and Western (Yoruba, both Christian and Muslim).

Civil and communal violence have occurred frequently across various social cleavage lines in Nigeria since independence in 1960. Just seven years after Nigeria obtained independence, a civil war broke out along a reinforcing ethnic and religious divide. The Eastern region, predominantly Igbo and Christian, attempted to secede as the independent nation of Biafra. The Nigerian government and military, under primarily Northern (Muslim) leadership, was victorious in the three-year civil war (1967–1970). In the process, over two million civilians within Biafra died. Interreligious tensions in Nigeria continued after the war, and still underpin many contemporary political grievances within Nigeria (Kendhammer 2014). Throughout the 1980s, many Nigerian Christians believed that the predominantly Muslim North received a disproportionate share of both political power and economic resources, fanning resentment across religious lines (Ibrahim 1991, 135).

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Nigeria haltingly inched toward a return to multiparty politics, violence across reinforcing religious and ethnic cleavages began to increase (Falola 1998; Ibrahim 1991). Some of this violence occurred within Nigeria's cultural Middle Belt, the region in which the dominantly Christian South and dominantly Muslim North meet, including a religious riot in Kafanchan, in Kaduna state, in 1987, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, serious property destruction, and spread to other cities and states in the region. Events such as the Kafanchan riot produced a reference point of religious violence through which subsequent communal conflicts in the Middle Belt and Kaduna could be interpreted. Yet the scale of violence remained small.

With Nigeria's return to multiparty elections in 1999, communal violence across religious lines increased more dramatically (Ukiwo 2003). Deadly interreligious violence recurred regularly in this period. There were only three years between 1990 and 2008 in which there were no recorded incidents, and at least 4,703 fatalities occurred in the same period (Basedau et al. 2013). Large-scale communal violence particularly began to concentrate across Nigeria's cultural Middle Belt, as shown in Figure 26.1, which compares riot events in two key states in the Middle Belt region—Kaduna and Plateau—with riot events in the rest of Nigeria. The height of each bar represents the number of riot events that occurred, while the numbers atop each bar represent total casualties from these events. We observe that violence in Kaduna state in 2000 was an outlier relative to the rest of the period, with nearly four thousand people killed in three incidents that year. We will return to the events of 2000 in the next section.

Interreligious tensions in contemporary Nigeria have become self-reinforcing at the national level alongside repeated violent incidents. A 2009 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life survey of 1,516 Nigerians examined the attitudes of Christians and Muslims toward religion and each other, situating Nigerian public opinion within a sample of nineteen sub-Saharan African countries (Pew Forum 2010). Over half (58%) of Nigerians said they believe that religious conflict is a very big problem in their country—the largest proportion of any of the nineteen sampled countries (tied with Rwanda). Both Christian



FIGURE 26.1: Riot events and fatalities per year in Kaduna and Plateau states.

Table 26.1: Religious Beliefs, Religious Practice, and Public Life in Nigeria

	Muslim	Christian
Conflict between religious groups a very big problem	60%	56%
Conflict between ethnic groups a very big problem	48%	48%
Shariʿa and/or Bible is literal word of God	90%	87%
Shariʿa and/or Bible should be official law	70%	71%
Know not very much or nothing at all about other faith	63%	55%
Pray every day	93%	92%

Data from Pew Forum (2010).

and Muslim Nigerians are deeply religious, and large majorities of both Christians and Muslims pray every day, believe that their holy books are the literal word of God, and would like the Bible and/or shariʿa to become the official law of the land, as shown in Table 26.1. Indeed, Nigerians were more likely than respondents from any other country in the Pew sample to believe that the Bible and/or Qurʾan are the literal word of God. This centrality of religious practice in daily life, combined with an interreligious conflict repertoire drawn from recent past experience with violence, reinforces the salience of religious identity. In short, in Nigerian society, religion is highly politicized, the Muslim-Christian divide is highly salient, and Nigerians are deeply concerned about interreligious conflict.

Christian-Muslim Relations in the Shadow of Violence: Kaduna

The city of Kaduna erupted in the worst interreligious violence ever witnessed in Nigeria's history over four days in February 2000. The Kaduna state government issued a report documenting 1,295 deaths during the riots, although other sources have suggested the true number may be far higher (Scacco 2020; Tertsakian 2003). The fighting was sparked by a public debate over whether to introduce shariʿa law into the criminal code in Kaduna state. Although shariʿa provisions had long been incorporated into "personal" or domestic law for Muslims throughout northern Nigeria, the debate raised concerns in religiously heterogeneous states that shariʿa would be imposed on Christian communities (Abdu and Umar 2002).

Several months before the violence in Kaduna, the government of Zamfara, an overwhelmingly Muslim state bordering Niger, decided to incorporate shariʿa laws into its state criminal code. State legislatures across the northern region soon followed suit, with the exception of states like Kaduna and Plateau, which contain large Christian populations. The issue was particularly contentious in Kaduna, and its governor at the time, Ahmed Makarfi, strongly opposed introducing shariʿa. In January 2000, however, under pressure from Muslim civil society organizations, the Kaduna State Assembly opened debate on the suitability of shariʿa criminal law for Muslim residents of the state. The action divided the assembly along religious lines, and sparked vocal protests from Christian civil society organizations (Kaduna State Government 2001; Sani 2007; Tertsakian 2003).

On February 21, the Kaduna branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria organized an anti-shariʿa demonstration. Announcements were made in churches across Kaduna city, urging parishioners to attend the demonstration, and the event attracted hundreds of demonstrators (Ullah 2002). Accounts of how exactly the fighting began differ, but small numbers of Christians and Muslims began throwing stones at each other as demonstrators made their way past Kaduna's crowded central market (Maier 2002). At this point, the fighting spread quickly, engulfing the town center in violence, as Christian protesters fought with Muslim traders in the market, using simple weapons such as stones and wooden planks. The fighting in the largely commercial center of town spread outward to residential areas across the Kaduna metropolitan area, as rumors circulated about atrocities committed on either side. Interview respondents from neighborhoods across Kaduna recalled seeing smoke rising from the center of town, and hearing stories about churches and mosques being set on fire (Scacco 2020). The riots lasted for four days, and were only put to rest when the central government ordered the military to intervene.

Violence in Kaduna in 2000 changed life in the city dramatically, as residents viewed the riots as evidence that it was no longer safe to live near out-group members, and abandoned more integrated neighborhoods and self-segregated across religious lines (Angerbrandt 2011). Figure 26.2 presents quantitative evidence of the increased segregation of ten Kaduna neighborhoods, using data from Scacco (2020). The x-axis measures the difference in proportions of each religious group living in the neighborhoods in 2000, and the y-axis the same data from 2008. If neighborhood composition had remained unchanged, all points would fall along the dotted line. Points above the line indicate increased segregation, which all ten neighborhoods experienced. While Kaduna was not a religiously integrated city before the 2000 riot by any means, it had already become much more segregated eight years later.

In the remainder of this chapter, we present a micro-level analysis of Christian-Muslim relations within the city of Kaduna to examine the long shadow cast by severe communal violence fifteen years after a major violent event. We use data from the control group for an experimental study of intergroup contact conducted in Kaduna in 2014–2015 (as outlined in Scacco and Warren 2018). The sampling frame includes all poor, conflict-prone neighborhoods within one hour's travel to central Kaduna, a city of approximately one million residents in north-central Nigeria, a few hours' drive from the national capital. Sixteen neighborhoods, eight in Kaduna's majority Muslim north and eight in Kaduna's majority Christian south, were selected from this frame.



FIGURE 26.2: Pre- and post-riot neighborhood segregation in Kaduna.

The final sample consists of 270 young men, aged 18–25, who were recruited for a baseline survey in August 2014, and interviewed about intergroup relations in January and December 2015. Table 26.2 demonstrates that our sample reflects the segregated context that defines contemporary Kaduna. Two neighborhoods include minority religious group enclaves: Barnawa and Kakuri. Barnawa is a predominantly Christian neighborhood, but within the market area of the neighborhood there is a small and concentrated Muslim minority. In both cases, residential segregation at street level is the norm, and neither are cases of well-integrated neighborhoods. The residential segregation already evident in 2008 has continued or deepened, and has led to religious segregation in education and other aspects of daily living.

Within the city of Kaduna, as in most of Nigeria, there is also broad overlap between religious and ethnic identities. Table 26.3 demonstrates the extent of this overlap within our sample. Our survey asked respondents to name their "home language."[3] The left-hand column lists all home languages cited by at least 2 percent of all respondents, ordered from most to least frequently cited. The remaining two columns present the share of Muslim or Christian respondents who cited those home languages. All languages cited by less than 2 percent of either sample are grouped together within the "Other" category. Significantly, we observe that 84 percent of all Muslims, but only 2 percent of Christians, in the sample are Hausa. Furthermore, among sampled Christians there is no home language cited by more than 12 percent of all respondents. Similarly,

Table 26.2: Survey Sample: Residential Segregation in Kaduna, January 2015

Neighborhood	Muslims (N)	Christians (N)	Segregation (% Dominant Group)
Badarawa	21	0	100%
Badiko	13	0	100%
Barnawa	11	4	73%
Hayin Banki	16	1	94%
Kakuri	10	18	64%
Kawo	11	0	100%
Kurmin Mashi	18	3	86%
Malali	8	0	100%
Narayi	0	46	100%
Nassarawa	0	8	100%
Sabon Tasha	0	20	100%
Tudun Nupawa	14	0	100%
Kanawa	8	0	100%
Shanu	15	0	100%
Sunday	0	10	100%
Television	0	15	100%
Total	145	125	-

Table 26.3: Survey Sample: Religion and Language (Ethnicity), January 2015

	Muslim	Christian
Hausa	84%	2%
Kataf	-	12%
Baju	-	12%
Igala	2%	10%
Yoruba	3%	6%
Igbo	-	9%
Idoma	-	7%
Gabagyi	1%	5%
Jaba	-	6%
Adara	-	2%
Ikulu	-	3%
Ibira	2%	-
Other	8%	26%
	100%	100%

Table 26.4: Survey Sample: Religious Practice, January 2015

	Muslim	Christian
Brotherhood or Denomination	Izala (75%)	Catholic (41%)
	Tijaniya (11%)	Pentecostal (28%)
	Unaffiliated (11%)	Evangelical (25%)
	Quadriya (3%)	Anglican (6%)
House of Worship Attendance	Multiple Times per Day (99%)	Every Day (6%)
	Less than Monthly (1%)	Several Times per Week (61%)
		Once per Week (30%)
		Monthly or Less Often (3%)

there is greater diversity of religious practice among Christian young men than among Muslim young men in our sample. As shown in Table 26.4, 75 percent of Muslims are affiliated with the Izala Brotherhood. Catholics, the largest Christian denomination within our sample, comprise only 41 percent of sampled Christians, and the Pentecostal and Evangelical categories include many different denominations.

As one would expect, since there is one predominant ethnic group among Kaduna's Muslims, and highly fragmented ethnicity among Kaduna's Christians, intrareligious ethnic conflict within the city of Kaduna has not emerged as a major fault line. Instead, the religious divide forms the main social cleavage.

Adherents of both religious faiths also report high levels of religious participation and engagement, as shown in Table 26.4. Nearly all (99 percent) of Muslim young men indicated that they go to a mosque to pray multiple times a day, and 97 percent of Christians reported attendance at religious services at least once a week. Despite differences in religious obligation, both Christian and Muslim young men in our sample reported high levels of engagement with the observance of rituals of their respective faiths.

In sum, the poor urban neighborhoods we studied in Kaduna replicate Nigeria's broad North-South and Muslim-Christian divide, along with the religiosity of Nigerians across the country. This social cleavage within the city of Kaduna is reinforced by a combination of an overlapping ethnic (Hausa–non-Hausa) divide and everyday religious practice. While the vast majority of Muslims are affiliated with the Izala Brotherhood and go to mosques multiple times per day, among Christians there is extensive variation in denomination and frequency of church attendance.

In spite of extreme residential segregation, Christian and Muslim residents of Kaduna do interact in daily life, but in generally superficial ways. Despite some regular interactions in employment, transportation, and shopping, Christians and Muslims in Kaduna exhibit high levels of anxiety about interactions and low levels of trust across group lines, even fifteen years post-conflict. Within our Kaduna micro sample, 30 percent of Christians and 40 percent of Muslims reported feeling anxious around members of the religious out-group. Table 26.5 presents the results of a series of questions about social trust, as well as estimated "trust deficits," comparing trust in members of an

Table 26.5: Intergroup Trust, January 2015

	All	Muslim	Christian
Religion and Trust			
Own religion	2.08	2.58	1.50
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Other religion	1.75	2.13	1.30
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Religious trust deficit	-0.33	-0.44	-0.19
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Ethnicity and Trust			
Own tribe	1.90	2.36	1.36
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Other tribes	1.68	2.03	1.26
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Tribal trust deficit	-0.23	-0.33	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Familial Trust			
Relatives	2.35	2.87	1.74
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Observations	*270*	*145*	*125*

Question: "How much do you trust each of the following types of people?" Responses scaled 0 (Not at all) – 3 (Very much).

Standard errors in parentheses.

individual's in-group faith and tribe to trust in members of the out-group faith and other tribes. We again show results for the full sample as well as the Muslim and Christian subsamples. As we would anticipate, respondents trust members of their own families more than any of the other prompted types. Beyond their own families, respondents report the greatest trust in co-religionists, and the least in non-co-ethnics. Levels of trust are lower for members of the religious out-group than those of the same faith, as shown by the negative estimated religious trust deficits.

Both Muslims and Christians in Kaduna have significantly less social trust than is typical in Nigeria more broadly. National averages are between "trust somewhat" and "trust a lot" for relatives, yet are between "trust a little" and "trust not at all" for Kaduna state residents. Over half of Kaduna residents reported not trusting their relatives at all. Only residents of the federal capital Abuja reported anywhere near that total, and nationally,

Table 26.6: Prejudice Indices, January 2015 and December 2015.

	January 2015			December 2015		
	All	Muslim	Christian	All	Muslim	Christian
Prejudice index	1.73 (0.07)	2.10 (0.11)	1.31 (0.08)	2.08 (0.07)	2.38 (0.09)	1.70 (0.08)
Observations	*225*	*119*	*106*	*246*	*138*	*108*

Responses scaled 0 (most prejudice) - 4 (least prejudice). Standard errors in parentheses.

less than 13 percent of Nigerians report a complete lack of trust in their relatives. With respect to trust in neighbors, Kaduna residents are again an extreme outlier in comparison to the rest of the country (Pew Forum 2010).

Table 26.6 presents summary results by religious group for an index of explicit prejudice. Respondents were asked how well each of a series of interspersed positive and negative attributes described members of the religious out-group. Negative attributes consisted of *arrogant*, *ungrateful*, *unreasonable*, and *fanatical*. Responses are scaled such that higher values indicate stronger disagreement with negative attributes. Within poor neighborhoods in Kaduna, both Muslims and Christians expressed overtly prejudiced attitudes toward members of the religious out-group. The mean Negative Attributes index value for all respondents of 1.73 in the January 2015 survey indicates that the average respondent fell between agreement with the negative attributes and ambivalence. As has been the case in other surveys in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa, Christians have more negative perceptions of Muslims than Muslims do of Christians (e.g., Pew Forum 2010).

Table 26.7 presents summary results by religious group for a behavioral game implemented during two rounds of our Kaduna survey in January and December 2015. Respondents played ten rounds of a dictator ("divide the dollar") game in both January and December 2015. Within behavioral economics and political science, the dictator game has been widely used to measure altruism and discrimination. In each round of the game, survey respondents were asked in a row to choose how to divide 100 Nigerian naira (about .50 US dollars at the time of game implementation) from a common pool with another randomly assigned survey respondent. We primed survey respondents with the first name of the individual to whom they could choose to allocate money, and asked them to indicate how many 10-naira notes they would give to the named individual. Importantly, within Kaduna, first names clearly and unambiguously signal religious affiliation. Respondents were informed that game play was nonreciprocal (for example, being asked to divide 100 naira with Shehu does not necessarily mean Shehu will be asked to divide 100 naira with you). This design mitigated concerns about retribution. All behavioral games were administered privately at respondent

Table 26.7: Discrimination

	January 2015			Nov-Dec 2015		
	All	Muslim	Christian	All	Muslim	Christian
Play outgroup	-0.19**	-0.34**	-0.02	-0.26**	-0.29**	-0.21*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Constant	2.57**	2.59**	2.55**	2.78**	2.62**	2.97**
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Observations	*2700*	*1450*	*1250*	*2730*	*1430*	*1300*

Standard errors in parentheses) clustered by respondent.

* $p < 0.5$,

** $p < 0.01$

households; respondents circled the number of notes to give in each round on a separate response sheet.

We implemented this game to examine how the treatment of individuals from the out-group differs from those from the in-group based solely on group affiliation, the only cue offered in the game. We found that respondents systematically discriminated against members of the religious out-group, with the exception of Christian respondents in the January 2015 survey. We note that Nigeria held an election in early February 2015, in which a Christian incumbent president lost the election to a Muslim challenger, representing Nigeria's first democratic transfer of power between parties since its independence in 1963. While ethnic identity is often heightened in the run-up to elections (Eifert et al. 2010), tensions on the eve of the election may have encouraged Christian respondents to censor their behavior.

Turning to the question of the potentially long-term consequences of exposure to communal violence for mental health, although our own survey did not include measures of respondents' mental health, we draw on three recent public health studies that examine large samples of survivors of Christian-Muslim violence in Kaduna and Jos, another religiously mixed state capital city in northern Nigeria that experienced large-scale Christian-Muslim violence in 2001. All three studies indicate widespread trauma in adult populations of survivors. Taken together, the Kaduna studies document high levels of PTSD (more than 40 percent of respondents) and depression (between 50 and 60 percent) among interview respondents—who witnessed violence, were temporarily displaced from their homes, and/or experienced personal property destruction—many years after large-scale episodes of communal violence in 2000 and 2001 (Obilom and Thacher 2008; Sheikh et al. 2014, 2015).

Conclusion

In this chapter we have demonstrated that large-scale intercommunal violence across religious lines may produce severe and long-lasting consequences. Using micro-level data from Kaduna, Nigeria, gathered fifteen years after a major violent event that produced lasting residential segregation, we find that lack of trust and prejudice across religious group divides may be particularly tenacious, given the close intragroup ties that are formed and reinforced through everyday religious practice and residential segregation. In contrast to optimistic assessments of relatively speedy post-conflict recoveries in homogeneous local settings, and positive consequences of violence exposure for *within-group* cooperation and trust, we find that violence exposure may necessitate a longer recovery in more diverse settings. Localities like Kaduna, Baghdad, Belfast, and Ahmedabad that have experienced interreligious communal violence should expect post-conflict reconciliation to be slow, difficult, and far from guaranteed.

How then can social recovery occur after communal violence across religious lines? Building and strengthening interreligious economic ties at the local level may increase trust and decrease riot events in the long run, as has been demonstrated in India (Jha 2013). Social contact theory suggests that efforts to desegregate public life and increase social contact across group lines may rebuild trust, decrease prejudice, reduce discrimination, and thereby reduce the potential for violent conflict (Allport 1954). Recent experimental studies of Christian-Muslim social contact interventions in Kaduna (Scacco and Warren 2018) and Baghdad (Mousa 2020) have demonstrated that although interreligious prejudice may be slow to change, micro-level interventions may be helpful in reducing discriminatory behaviors, even in settings with particularly difficult conflict histories.

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Notes

1. For instance, the common outcome measure of "trust" used in the studies included in Bauer et al. (2016) is "how much do you trust members of your village?," where the villages are typically homogeneous with respect to the identity cleavages along which the violence was wrought.

2. For an ethnographic account of "house swapping" by Christians and Muslims within the Kaduna metropolitan area as part of a systematic process of post-conflict residential sorting, see Scacco (2020).
3. "Home language" is equivalent to ethnic affiliation in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER 27

NEW MEDIA AND ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN EGYPT

ALEXANDRA A. SIEGEL

In the early days of the Arab Spring, as crowds gathered in Tahrir Square, academics and journalists hailed social media as a "liberation technology" empowering young liberal activists to protest and demand democratic change (Diamond and Plattner 2012). They argued that by facilitating the creation and distribution of user-generated content, social media has democratized access to information and communication tools.[1] A consensus formed among techno-optimists that Web 2.0 tools were tipping the scales, bolstering the powerless more than the powerful (Castells 2012; Earl et al. 2013; Howard and Hussain 2013; Tufekci and Wilson 2012). But young liberals were not the only actors to exploit these tools. As early adopters of new media technologies with a well-organized ground game, Islamists were particularly well positioned to use social media to mobilize when protests erupted in January 2011.

Despite the wealth of journalistic and scholarly attention paid to young activists' use of social media in the early days of the Egyptian revolution, this chapter suggests that Islamists were perhaps better equipped to use these tools to mobilize and amplify their messages. Motivated by resource mobilization theory, I argue that movements with stronger organizational structures, greater access to resources, and more coherent ideologies are able to use new media technologies more successfully than more fragmented and less-well-funded groups.

Drawing on almost a decade of public Egyptian Facebook posts, this chapter demonstrates that Islamist actors were particularly successful at gaining visibility and spreading narratives that advance their goals on social media, relative to other political actors. It also explores the political consequences of this online success, suggesting that the same social media technologies that facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood's mobilization efforts in the post-revolution period may have also undermined the organization by accelerating its fragmentation, amplifying extremist voices, and giving the military regime a new authoritarian toolkit with which to fight the Brotherhood on- and offline.

NEW MEDIA AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

While the Arab Spring protests and other recent episodes of collective action organized online have sparked a growing literature on the impact of new media technologies on social mobilization,[2] "new" media technologies have long shaped how groups mobilize, as well as the consequences of this mobilization (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1981). Since the rise of print media and mass literacy, diverse movements have relied on pamphlets, newspapers, radio, and television to broaden their constituencies, secure legitimacy, and advance their agendas (Caren, Andrews, and Lu 2020).

The potential of media technologies to facilitate social mobilization can be understood in terms of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resource mobilization theory posits that centralized, formally structured organizations will be more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movements, and their success is largely determined by strategic factors and political opportunity structures (Jenkins 1983). This suggests that the ability of opposition elites—including organizations, community leaders, and activists—to mobilize using new media technologies is moderated by organizational structure and access to resources. Social movements will be able to use these tools more effectively when they have strong centralized and efficient leadership and sufficient funding.

While social media is often heralded as a great equalizer that democratizes communication, viewed through the lens of resource mobilization theory, not all actors are equally well positioned to mobilize on social media. Although social media can be effective in mobilizing the "powerless," it has often reproduced or even intensified preexisting power imbalances. Describing this phenomenon, Schradie (2019) argues that conservative movements dominate the online sphere due to their comparative advantage in offline resources, infrastructure, and ideologies that favor maintaining or returning to a status quo. Although social media platforms are indeed low-cost and nonhierarchical, greater resources can be harnessed to maximize digital production and reach. Because progressive movements tend to comprise diverse coalitions, they often struggle to propagate a coherent message in the online sphere. As a result, while liberal movements have received a great deal of attention for their ability to "go viral" and mobilize in the streets, conservative digital media infrastructures have more quietly emerged, thrived, and persisted.

In the Egyptian context, this suggests that Islamists—particularly members of the conservative and well-established Muslim Brotherhood organization—may have been better positioned to effectively use social media tools than the liberal activists. At the start of the Egyptian revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood had powerful networks on the ground, extensive financial resources, and a relatively coherent ideology (Ullah 2017). Moreover, as I describe in detail below, Islamists have a long history of exploiting media technologies to mobilize, even under conditions of severe repression. Digital media technologies are the latest manifestation of this trend, enabling Islamists to mobilize and amplify their messages in real time.

Islamists' Long History with "New" Media

From audio tapes and photocopy machines to satellite television and social media, Islamists have historically capitalized on cutting-edge communication technologies to mobilize followers. By imbuing their messages with religious meaning and drawing on networks fostered through participation in religious community and institutions, Islamists have frequently taken advantage of available media tools to gain mass appeal. Such strategies have allowed diverse actors to build a shared set of symbolic references among constituents, shape mass preferences on the role of Islam in politics, and open new channels of increasingly rapid communication. This has enabled Islamists to more effectively solve collective action problems—both by increasing the degree of personal gain individuals anticipate from mobilizing and by lowering individual costs of mobilization (Mecham 2017).

In the 1950s and 1960s, as many Arab countries nationalized the press and began to develop state monopolies of radio and television, Islamists faced barriers to disseminating their messages. In Egypt, state radio and television broadcasted Friday sermons and hosted programs where state-sanctioned clerics would discuss religion, but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations were banned and blocked from the airwaves (Skovgaard-Petersen 2011). In this period of almost complete state control over the media, trust among the Egyptian public began to wane. Notoriously, in 1967, newspapers, radio stations, and television outlets across the Arab world reported that Arab armies had soundly defeated Israel and that Israeli planes were falling from the skies "like flies." Egyptian citizens soon learned the truth of their defeat from foreign sources, however, exacerbating widespread lack of faith in mass media (Fandy 2000).

In the 1970s and 1980s, amid this atmosphere of distrust of state media, the Islamic revival put pressure on Arab states to allow more religious content on radio and television. Most Arab countries slowly began airing Islamic programs as a means of demonstrating that Islam was an integrated and valued part of the official national culture. At the same time, however, Islamists use of mainstream media remained severely curtailed. While the Egyptian regime permitted the publication of a few small Islamic magazines that allowed some Islamist-leaning clerics to spread their message, overtly Islamist actors were barred from mass-circulation newspapers, radio, and television (Skovgaard-Petersen 2011). As a result, Islamists developed other creative approaches to disseminate their messages. They distributed tape cassettes, copies of pamphlets, and later video tapes to reach a broader audience discretely (Sivan 1990).

These inexpensive methods of communication also enabled a wider variety of Islamist actors to reach potential followers. Indeed, across the Arab World, beginning in the 1960s, audio cassettes of sermons were widely distributed—primarily among the lower classes—mostly for the purpose of promoting individual piety and correcting religious practice, though also to spread political messages (Echchaibi 2011). In Egypt, underground audiocassettes were particularly popular—often more popular than the content produced by state-sanctioned clerics and formally educated religious scholars. This was, in part, because the tapes were in Egyptian dialect, rather than the Modern Standard Arabic of the hadith and Qurʾan that was favored by preachers at al-Azhar (Egypt's premier institution of Islamic learning). This meant that messages on cassettes could reach less-educated Egyptians in Cairo and rural areas alike (Fandy 2000).

On the one hand, physical media like audiocassettes and photocopies were inefficient means of transmitting a message, as they were highly dependent—at least initially—on personal contact at mosques or rallies to spread the word. But they allowed for multiple points of production and distribution. This meant that they were nearly untraceable and irrepressible, making them powerful political messaging tools that authoritarian regimes found difficult to control (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1990). On the other hand, these underground forms of communication did not insulate Islamists from state repression. Daʾia, or Islamic preachers, who produced sermons through pamphlets or audiocassettes that were considered "insurgent" or anti-regime were frequently jailed, tortured, or exiled (Hirschkind 2006).

Islamists also seized on the advent of satellite television in the early 1990s, achieving new levels of mass-media penetration (Lynch 2006; Ullah 2017). For example, the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated cleric Yusef al-Qardawi's show on Al Jazeera, *Sharia and Life*, launched in 1996, boasted 40–60 million viewers worldwide (Rock 2010). The program addressed controversial contemporary issues from the point of view of Islamic law (Skovgaard-Petersen 2011). Unlike cassette sermons, which were largely popular among lower-class Muslims and served no direct commercial purpose, these television channels were and remain popular among middle- and upper-class Muslims and highly profitable for media companies (Echchaibi 2011).

Although satellite television greatly expanded the national and transnational reach of many clerics and Islamist movements, the license application, studio space, equipment, and start-up costs of launching a TV channel prohibited many Islamists from entering this sphere (Mecham 2017). Along these lines, states were (and still are) able to exert a great deal of control over satellite media by legislating, regulating, and owning stations, as well as through withholding funding, controlling trade unions, or threatening journalists or editors. Indeed, in most countries throughout the Arab world, private TV companies rely so heavily on the "good will" of the state that they express as much political loyalty as state channels (Sakr 2001). Thus, just as in the early days of radio and terrestrial television networks, even as satellite television transformed the Arab media environment, many Islamist actors remained excluded or limited by state control of the airwaves.

Continuing their long history of strategically capitalizing on new media technologies, Islamists were early adopters of the Internet. Even though Internet penetration was relatively slow to expand across the Middle East, it facilitated the formation of new organizational structures that helped Islamists to mobilize. Operating as "portable headquarters," websites offered the Muslim Brotherhood newfound flexibility to expand their reach both within Egypt and beyond national borders. In the early days of the Internet, some Islamist organizations began to host their websites abroad to bypass authoritarian surveillance, and frequently moved web addresses after government authorities shut down their sites (Lerner 2010).

After decades of being excluded from television and radio shows, the Muslim Brotherhood recognized the advent of the Internet as an opportunity to amplify its message. In 1998 the organization commissioned a website for its print publication, *al-Daʿwa* (*The Call*), and launched other websites focusing on Islamist political issues (Hafez 2008). Soon after, the Brotherhood began developing explicitly political websites, including Egyptwindow.net in 2002 and their official website Ikhwanonline.net in 2003, which became one of the most popular websites in Egypt (Awad 2017). After the Egyptian regime closed down the official Brotherhood website in 2004, the movement adapted by decentralizing its web presence. In this period, Brotherhood activists also began using the Internet to organize demonstrations (Ajemian 2008). Brotherhood blogs began to proliferate in 2007. As a result, the younger wing of the organization gained visibility, using blogs to bring international attention to the plight of jailed Brotherhood members (Ajemian 2008; Awad 2017).

As social media platforms gained popularity in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood worked to grow its online audience. Hoping to supervise the discussions and activities of the organization's youth, the older generation of Muslim Brotherhood leadership developed alternative spaces for group members to interact. These included Ikhwanbook, Ikhwan Twitter, and Ikhwantube, initially developed between 2009 and 2010. These platforms enabled members of the Brotherhood to share thousands of documents, speeches, statements, and videos with constituents (Herrera 2014). In the years before the Arab Spring, the Brotherhood also expanded its presence on mainstream social media platforms, setting up official pages and accounts such as @ Ikhwanweb. By the time protests erupted in Tahrir Square in January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood already had established a presence on online platforms. As one media strategist for the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood's political party, put it, "We used new media before the revolution to spread the message and people made fun of us" (Burleigh 2012).

Tracking Islamist Online Mobilization

Islamists' relatively centralized leadership, access to resources, and long history of taking advantage of new media tools to organize suggests that they were especially well positioned to mobilize on social media at the start of the January 25 revolution. But how effective have Islamists been at gaining visibility and spreading narratives that advance their goals on social media relative to other actors? To asses this, I draw on almost a decade of public Egyptian Facebook posts and interactions from January 2011 to June 2020, collected using Facebook's CrowdTangle API.[3] Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Egypt, with 90 percent of Egyptian Internet users using the platform as of 2019 (Dennis et al. 2019). Actors across Egypt's political spectrum have public Facebook pages and groups, including liberal activists, media outlets, military generals, popular clerics, and prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Facebook data therefore allows me to compare how everyday Egyptian Facebook users engage with these diverse actors over time.

To get a sense of the relative success of Islamist mobilization in the early days of the Egyptian revolution, I compare engagement with the Rassd News Network, a popular Facebook page used by the Muslim Brotherhood to organize protesters, to the Arabic-language "We are all Khaled Said" page, the Facebook page credited with helping spark the Egyptian revolution and the epicenter of activity by liberal activists during the protests (Alaimo 2015). This analysis is displayed in Figure 27.1.

Looking at data from the first year of the revolution, displayed in Figure 27.1, we see that while posts on the "We are all Khaled Said" page generally received a higher level of



FIGURE 27.1: Engagement with Rassd Network vs. We are all Khaled Said Facebook pages.
Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts on the Rassd News Network and We are all Khaled Said Facebook pages from July 2010 to January 2012.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

engagement (18,430,921 total interactions), posts on the Rassd Network page perform surprisingly well by comparison (13,214,113 total interactions). Interestingly, the Rassd Network received more engagement than the Khaled Said page in the first two weeks of the Egyptian revolution. This is particularly noteworthy given that the Khaled Said page is frequently credited as playing an important role in sparking the Egyptian revolution. Moreover, the Rassd Network page was not created until January 25, the first day of the revolution, whereas the Khaled Said page had been gaining followers since its creation in June 10, 2010.

In the post-revolution period, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to use social media to disseminate their messages and broaden their appeal. Following the uprisings, the use of social media across the Arab world grew dramatically (Liu, Kliman-Silver, and Mislove 2014), enabling the Brotherhood to reach a larger online audience than it had previously. This bolstered the organization's success as it seized the opportunity to compete for power in Egypt's first democratic elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood's electoral success in 2012 is often—rightly—credited to its impressive ground game, cohesion, and reputational advantage (Brooke 2019; Cammett and Luong 2014). At the same time, the use of social media alongside this offline mobilization helped to amplify the Brotherhood's message and broaden its appeal in this period. Beginning in April 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood began strategically promoting its election campaign on Facebook and Twitter. While many of the Brotherhood's constituents remained offline and in rural areas, social media helped Islamists to mobilize educated and urban Egyptians. As one spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood described in the lead-up to the 2012 election, "It is important for me to know the opinion of the educated classes of Egyptians and I can find those by mining the Internet . . . I don't want to lose them. . . . My state needs the educated people to drive the state—but under my rules. I have to cooperate with them, understand them and work with them" (Srinivasan 2014). In the lead up to the elections, candidates from across the political spectrum promoted their campaigns and attacked one another on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

Examining Facebook posts containing the Arabic term *intikhabat* or "elections" over time offers some insight into Islamists' successful use of social media during the 2012 elections. Figure 27.2 shows engagement with the most popular candidate and party Facebook pages posting about the election in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2012 presidential election. The solid line shows the weekly volume of interactions with posts from Islamist party and candidate pages, while the dotted line shows interactions with non-Islamist candidates and pages. As the figure suggests, Islamists dominated discussions of the election on Facebook both before and after the two election rounds.

The Muslim Brotherhood's online presence may also have contributed to its ability to peacefully transition to power in the aftermath of Morsi's electoral victory. Their coordinated online and offline campaign in the period surrounding the election made it very difficult for the election to be rigged or stolen and forced a new level



FIGURE 27.2: Facebook engagement with posts by Islamist vs. non-Islamist candidates and parties referencing the election.
Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts by Islamist and non-Islamist candidates from January 2012 to January 2013.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

of transparency. On the night of the election, members of the Muslim Brotherhood systematically updated and publicized results in real time on Twitter. The Muslim Brotherhood had people on the ground at polling stations who called electoral results into Muslim Brotherhood headquarters as votes were counted. As Zeynep Tufekci blogged in the aftermath of the election, if the old-regime apparatus had rigged the election or changed the results, a "Google spreadsheet would stare at them at every turn. And the narrative laid by Ikhwan's online and offline operation would be hard to surmount."[4]

The July 2013 military coup that ousted Mohamed Morsi sparked the largest wave of Islamist mobilization in Egypt's modern history. For months, in the face of violent repression, anti-coup protesters turned out in the streets. Protests persisted as Brotherhood leaders and members were jailed, tortured, and killed; financial assets were frozen; associations and centers were closed; and the organization was designated a terrorist group. Despite massive setbacks, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to organize. In this period, social media became a particularly effective resource for the Brotherhood. It helped the organization to broadcast its messages in real time and organize collective action as its traditional lines of communication were shut down. On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood's use of social media in the post-coup period represents a continuation of its long history of exploiting new media channels in the face of repression. On the other hand, the real-time networked structure of social media



FIGURE 27.3: Facebook engagement with posts mentioning Morsi, the coup, or the Rabaa massacre.

Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts on Egyptian Facebook pages referencing Morsi, the coup, or the Raba'a massacre from January 2012 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

made these tools particularly well suited to mobilizing collective action on the ground in a manner that previous technologies could not.

After Morsi was removed from power, his supporters used social media to condemn the military coup, highlight military brutality, and call for democratization. Dozens of popular pro-Brotherhood Facebook pages were used to disseminate the Brotherhood's message after its satellite channels were blocked. For example, the Rassd News Network page developed before the revolution had an audience of almost five million people by the time of the coup. The site worked to "reveal the agenda" of the military through a series of video leaks known as elSisileaks. Other pro-Brotherhood Facebook networks, such as Ahrar 25 TV and Egypt Online, also became very popular in this period (Shehabat 2015). Pro-Brotherhood Facebook pages and Twitter accounts worked to document military brutality such as the violent crackdowns on peaceful protests held in Rabaa and el-Nahda Squares when many thousands of peaceful protesters were killed. YouTube videos, photos, and voice memos were captured by protesters and posted daily in an attempt to persuade followers to denounce military rule. The daily volume of posts mentioning Morsi, the coup, and the Rabaa massacre on Egyptian Facebook pages are displayed in Figure 27.3.

These social media platforms were similarly used to mobilize collective action on the ground. The "Peace and Justice Party" Facebook page quickly gained almost two million followers, and frequently called for people to respect the legitimacy of the



FIGURE 27.4: Facebook engagement with Freedom and Justice Party page.
Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts on the Freedom and Justice Party Facebook page from July 2010 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

2012 elections and protest the coup. As Figure 27.4 demonstrates, engagement with the page increased in the immediate aftermath of the coup and again spiked throughout 2014 and 2015 as the crackdown on the Brotherhood intensified. Similarly, the "Morsi's Ultras" page called for daily mobilization of Muslim Brotherhood supporters to bring down military rule (Shehabat 2015). In addition to these public pages, anti-coup activists also used closed social media groups to coordinate national days of protest and disseminate tactics. This was especially necessary as the regime began to monitor the anti-coup movement online and search protesters' mobile phones or laptops. As a safety measure, these private groups, some of which had many thousands of members, were given misleading names such as "I love Christiano Ronaldo" or "Buy second-hand cars" (Ketchley 2017). Additionally, demonstrations were creatively organized online to prevent surveillance, and false dates for protests were posted on public social media platforms to throw off security forces monitoring the Brotherhood's social media accounts (El-Sharif 2014).

While most of this mobilization initially focused on peaceful protests, calls for action became increasingly violent over time. For example, postings about the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution celebration included warnings directed at the military regime, claiming that protesters would respond violently to any military brutality by burning police cars and armored vehicles, abducting military personnel, and using Molotov cocktails and attacking police stations. Pro-Brotherhood social media users shared advice and tactics on these pages, including videos from activists as far afield as the Ukraine, who, in the words of one Brotherhood supporter, knew "how to use Molotovs to hold their square against the police" (Ketchley 2014).

Pro-Brotherhood Facebook pages were also used to call for civil disobedience in this period. Brotherhood supporters were mobilized to disrupt trains in the metro, boycott military products, close businesses, and even set fire to public buildings (Pargeter 2018). One civil disobedience campaign started on pro-Brotherhood Facebook pages was called "expose them" and worked to dox or identify police and military personnel who had been involved in the killings of pro-Morsi protesters. Participants posted photos, phone numbers, and addresses of these individuals, urging supporters to seek revenge (Shehabat 2015).

The transnational reach of social media further bolstered mobilization of the anti-coup movement both domestically and abroad. Following the violent dispersal of anti-coup protests in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in June 2013, the four-fingered hand gesture that came to be known as the "Rabaa Salute" went viral on social media (van de Bildt 2015). Anti-coup Facebook pages and Twitter accounts called for their followers to use the Rabaa symbol in their profile pictures to show their solidarity with those who were harmed during the government crackdown. The symbol quickly spread, not only on Egyptian social media platforms, but also in the Gulf, Turkey, and across the broader Muslim world as sympathizers expressed their solidarity. Turkish prime minister Erdogan even played a role in the virality of the symbol, using the Rabaa salute to greet Turkish crowds shortly after the massacre (El-Shenawi 2013). In this same period, popular pro-Brotherhood clerics also expressed their support for the movement online, bringing more transnational support to the movement. For example, the Saudi cleric Mohamed al-Arefe tweeted and posted YouTube videos calling for solidarity with Morsi's supporters, which quickly went viral among his millions of fans across the Muslim world (Pan and Siegel 2020).

Social media also facilitated communication with exiled Brotherhood leadership and access to official Brotherhood media abroad. Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood sought refuge in Turkey after the coup. These exiled Islamists quickly set up their own television channels in Turkey in order to continue to broadcast their message. These pro-Brotherhood channels, which air twenty-four hours a day, include Rabaa, Misr Al'n, Mekammelyn, and Al Sharq (Magued 2018). Because each of these channels maintains active social media profiles on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, they were easily able to reach Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Egypt. Social media also made these television channels interactive, so followers and opponents could post content and interact with TV presenters in real time, directly incorporating social media into broadcasts. For example, the Al Sharq channel began



FIGURE 27.5: Facebook engagement with posts mentioning the Rabaa massacre inside and outside Egypt.

Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts on Egyptian and Non-Egyptian Facebook pages referencing the Rabaa massacre from January 2011 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

presenting programming where TV presenters discussed current issues in Egypt with viewers by reading aloud their comments on the channel's Facebook page and Twitter account.

The Facebook pages associated with these TV programs were critical in drawing attention to the anti-coup protests. Videos showing large anti-coup demonstrations occurring on Friday nights in Egypt and around the world spread quickly online. These videos were frequently live broadcasts of ongoing demonstrations and protests taken by demonstrators on their smartphones. In addition to protest coverage, these channels and their associated pages also documented the humanitarian conditions in Egypt's prisons as well as growing numbers of arrests, torture, and death sentences for Brotherhood leaders and supporters.

Examining interactions with posts mentioning the Rabaa massacre, Figure 27.5 suggests that posts on pages outside of Egypt received more engagement than posts from Egyptian Facebook pages, particularly after 2014 (11 million interactions vs. 9 million interactions in total from 2011 to 2020). The most popular posts outside of Egypt came from the Gulf, Turkey, and the UK, where many members of the Muslim Brotherhood moved after the coup.

How New Media Undermined Islamist Mobilization

As these examples suggest, social media played a key role in amplifying the Brotherhood's messages, spreading news and information, and facilitating collective action in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, bolstering its ground mobilization strategies. But the same features of social media that helped the Brotherhood to mobilize in the face of repression also undermined the organization by accelerating its fragmentation and polarization and amplifying extremist voices. Moreover, at the same time that the Brotherhood was using social media to mobilize, the military regime worked to use the tool against the movement.

While the proliferation of Brotherhood social media pages and accounts may have facilitated the spread of information and mobilization of collective action after the coup, by reducing barriers to entry and undermining hierarchical structures, social media may have played a role in fragmenting the authority of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The coup that removed Mohamed Morsi from office and the subsequent crackdown on Brotherhood activities dealt a devastating blow to the organization's leadership. With the core Brotherhood leaders imprisoned, rival factions began to operate separate websites with different spokespeople. Competing to secure the loyalty of their base, senior leaders posted rival statements on websites, and their followers responded in real time, frequently arguing on the leaders' Facebook pages. Other members set up independent Facebook pages to assert their demands or attack rival factions (Awad 2017).

While social media was of course one of many factors that contributed to this fragmentation of the Muslim Brotherhood, it provided an avenue for new actors to fill the void, amplifying extremist voices. For example, Brotherhood members courting Salafi support frequently framed the state's crackdown on the organization as a war against Islam, encouraging angry youth to embrace violent Salafi jihadism. As Awad (2017) argues, "[t]hrough these [social] media platforms, Brotherhood leaders and clerics also attempt to acculturate a fragmented organization and win over a young rebellious generation. When left unchecked, Brotherhood clerics and their Salafist allies with Gulf funding quickly propagated the most hateful, violent, and sectarian expressions of Islamism, arguably helping radicalize some youth by providing them with religious justifications for violence against the state."

Additionally, social media has several affordances that facilitated the amplification of extremist voices within the movement. First, online platforms provide social distance and anonymity, enabling people to produce and spread extreme or violent content with few consequences. Second, the amplifying nature of social media makes extremist content—once relegated to the dark corners of the Internet—highly visible (Siegel 2020). As a consequence, Egyptian extremist groups like the Islamic State in the Sinai and Ansar-Beit al-Maqdis have been adept at using a wide



FIGURE 27.6: Searches for Ansar-Beit al-Maqdis YouTube videos.
Note: Plot displays the relative weekly volume of YouTube searches located in Egypt referencing Ansar-Beit al-Maqdis from January 2011 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Google Trends API.

variety of social media tools to propagate their message and lure recruits. Groups like the Islamic State have used a combination of "atrocity porn," fear, and entertainment to gain visibility on social media (Berger and Morgan 2015; Siegel and Tucker 2018). They have also effectively developed cross-platform means of reaching supporters and would-be followers, radicalizing Brotherhood youth. For example, as Figure 27.6 suggests, Egyptian YouTube searches for Ansar-Beit al-Maqdis spiked after the coup, and then grew more dramatically in 2015, highlighting rising interest in the extremist group.

The networked structure of social media also means that individuals who seek out extremist content online often find themselves deeply embedded in echo chambers where harmful content is normalized and encouraged (Siegel 2020). Research on the Egyptian Twittersphere suggests that Egyptians became increasingly polarized into Islamist and Secular or non-Islamist networks after the coup (Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2015; Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2017). Indeed, the period after the coup was marked by a "great unfriending" in which anti-Brotherhood social media users stopped following Islamists, and vice versa. This polarization appeared to push Egyptians into more extreme camps. A recent study of political tolerance in Egyptian Twitter networks after the coup demonstrates that individuals who spent an additional year in ideologically homogenous networks—that is, networks where they were only exposed to content produced by either Islamists or non-Islamist Egyptians—expressed less tolerant positions toward the out-group over time (Siegel et al. 2020). In this way, as viral rumors



FIGURE 27.7: Facebook engagement with posts mentioning "Tahya Masr."
Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions including likes, shares, comments and reactions) with public posts on Egyptian Facebook pages referencing the pro-Sisi and pro-Military slogan "Tahya Masr" (Long Live Egypt) from January 2011 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

and polarizing content flowed through segregated online networks, moderate voices lost traction and extremist voices were amplified.

In addition to the acceleration of fragmentation, polarization, and extremism within the organization, the Muslim Brotherhood also faced a direct challenge from the regime in the online sphere. Authoritarian regimes in diverse contexts have not stood idly by as citizens and movements have used new media technologies to mobilize against them. Digital media provides regimes with an authoritarian toolkit, which they can use to promote their messages while stifling opposition (Roberts 2018; Tucker et al. 2017). As Figure 27.7 demonstrates, the volume of engagement with posts using the pro-Sisi and pro-military slogan "Tahya Masr" (Long Live Egypt) have continued to rise since Sisi came to power.

In the post-coup period, Egypt's military regime stepped up efforts to use social media to surveil and target members of the Muslim Brotherhood. While many members were arrested during protests on the ground, the government also began investing in new technology to monitor their online communications on a large scale. Although officially the monitoring was intended to focus on terror attacks, as one Egyptian Interior Ministry official described in 2014, "We are looking at any conversation, any interaction,



FIGURE 27.8: Facebook engagement with posts referring to Muslim Brotherhood members as terrorists.

Note: Plot displays the weekly volume of engagement (interactions, including likes, shares, comments, and reactions) with public posts on Egyptian Facebook pages referencing the Arabic phrase "Brotherhood are Terrorists" from January 2011 to June 2020.

Source: Data was collected through the Crowdtangle API.

we might find worrying or would want to keep a closer eye on. . . . We are watching conversations between Islamists, or those who discuss Islamism. We are watching communities, which we consider at risk" (Frenkel and Atef 2014). Along these lines, social media communications have increasingly been used as a pretext for arresting members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom House 2018), and recent legislation considers any individual with over 5,000 followers on social media to be a media entity, enabling the regime to further monitor and control online activity.

Beyond intimidation and censorship of online activists, the Egyptian regime has also embraced the use of computational propaganda, with General Sisi even stating publicly that he could sway social media agenda using "electronic brigades" (Darwish et al. 2017). These messages pollute the online sphere, inflating perceptions of grassroots support for the military regime and drowning out other voices. By portraying members of the Muslim Brotherhood as extremists and terrorists in the online sphere, the regime has effectively discredited the organization in the eyes of many Egyptians. As Figure 27.8 demonstrates, the volume of engagement with posts referring to members of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists increased after the coup and spiked again in 2020.

CONCLUSIONS

Islamists have long capitalized on new media technologies to mobilize their followers in the face of repression, and their embrace of social media is the latest manifestation of this trend. As the examples detailed in this chapter suggest, the Muslim Brotherhood's early adoption of new media technologies, extensive offline networks and financial resources, and hierarchical structure enabled the organization to be remarkably effective on social media relative to non-Islamist actors. Additionally, the organization has proven resilient, mobilizing online persistently in the face of severe repression in the aftermath of the coup that ousted Mohamed Morsi.

However, the same tools that gave Islamists new opportunities to mobilize have also accelerated the fragmentation of their leadership and amplified extremist voices. Given how adept extremist actors are at exploiting online platforms to broadcast their messages, this development is particularly troubling from a policy perspective. Moreover, as Egypt's military regime has increasingly harnessed social media to achieve its goals of stifling opposition, the ability of Islamists to continue to effectively mobilize on these platforms remains uncertain. If, as resource mobilization theory would suggest, groups with more centralized leadership and access to resources will mobilize more effectively both on- and offline, then we are likely to see the Egyptian regime, and repressive regimes in diverse contexts, increasingly exert control over the online sphere. At the same time, the flexible and fast-evolving nature of social media platforms enables opposition movements to constantly find new opportunities to mobilize. Given Islamists' long history of creatively harnessing new media technologies in the face of repression, we may instead continue to see the Muslim Brotherhood embrace alternative online platforms for mobilization. Thus, the cat-and-mouse game between Islamists and authoritarian regimes will likely continue to evolve across new platforms as Islamists continue their power struggle on- and offline.

NOTES

1. See Tucker et al. (2017) for an overview.
2. See Zhuravskaya, Petrova, and Enikolopov (2020) for a recent review of the literature.
3. CrowdTangle is a social media analytics platform owned by Facebook that tracks public posts on Facebook made by public accounts or groups as well as public interactions (likes, reactions, comments, shares, upvotes) to these posts. I received CrowdTangle data access from Facebook in collaboration with Social Science One through NYU's Center for Social Media and Politics. Crowdtangle tracks 99 percent of public posts from pages with over 100,000 likes, as well as a large number of pages with smaller followings. This makes it ideal for measuring engagement with posts over time as posts from more popular pages that receive high levels of engagement. It does not include paid ads unless those ads began as organic, nonpaid posts that were subsequently boosted using Facebook's advertising tools. CrowdTangle also does not track posts made visible only to specific groups of followers.

See https://help.crowdtangle.com/en/articles/1140930-what-is-crowdtangle-tracking for an overview of what data is included through the API.
4. Available at: http://technosociology.org/?p=1064.

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CHAPTER 28

ISLAMICALLY FRAMED MOBILIZATION IN TUNISIA

Ansar al-Sharia in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings

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This chapter addresses two main aspects of Islamically framed social mobilization, with a particular focus on the protest dynamics in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings in Tunisia. By "Islamically framed mobilization," I mean social activism visibly shaped by discourses and practices claimed to be Islamic by their proponents and recognized as such by those with whom they interact (regardless of whether or not they endorse the Islamic referent put forward). The first issue under scrutiny is the evolution of such forms of mobilization over time, as the state apparatus controls, more or less strictly, the political and religious field. This feature is particularly prominent in Tunisia after 2011 with the relaxation of authoritarian surveillance during the democratic transition. The second concern is how contextual factors in times of institutional change enable and/or constrain specific articulations and diffusions of Islamically framed movements. It sheds light on the processes of mobilization within the religious sphere in a situation of open competition between actors claiming the Islamic higher ground.

Empirically, the chapter uses the protest episodes of the 2011 Arab uprisings to shed some light on how different types of Islamically framed social mobilization interacted to produce both change and continuity. More specifically, I focus on Tunisia as the site of the only successful democratic transition in the region resulting from this wave of uprisings. The rise of two distinct religious forms of mobilization characterized the Tunisian transition. The Islamists of Ennahda articulated a rather conventional expression of religious conservatism in the social and political sphere through their associative network and their political party. The Salafists of Ansar al-Sharia mobilized grass-roots activists mainly in the social sphere without participating in institutional politics.

Whereas significant attention has been and is still paid to Ennahda as a "Muslim democrat" movement, less consideration has been given to the significance of Ansar al-Sharia, especially after its demise in 2013 when it was classified as a terrorist organization by the Tunisian state. This chapter delves therefore into the dynamics of this Salafi organization, and the factors that contributed to its rapid rise to fame after the Tunisian uprising, and its equally swift decline after 2013. The argument is grounded on interviews and participant observations conducted in Tunisia in 2014–2015, particularly with former sympathizers of the Ansar al-Sharia movement.

In the Tunisian case, I evaluate the effectiveness of Islamically framed mobilization in relation to the practices that bring together grass-roots actors in processes asserting specific religious solidarities and differentiations. I evaluate the success of mobilization in relation to the strategies of organized movements proposing a specific social and political agenda for state and society. From this perspective, the case of Ansar al-Sharia indicates that the religious agenda used by the organization to justify and explain mobilization was not always the main driver behind the strategic choices and behaviors of those underprivileged youths who most enthusiastically joined the movement. For these new grass-roots activists, a Salafi discourse helped them to articulate a new public role for themselves and gave them an opportunity for upward social mobility in a social system where they used to have a marginal role. The meaning of this mobilization is viewed in relation to the dominant political order present at any one time in the country—i.e., the pre-2011 authoritarian system and the post-2011 democratic regime.

While the insights gained from studying mobilization during this particular episode of institutional transformations cannot be directly generalized to other sequences of institutional change or to longer periods of authoritarian or democratic stability in the region, I argue that they underscore the malleability of Islamically framed mobilization. Whereas established Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood have often been shown to be constrained by quite rigid organizational and ideological structures (al-Anani 2015), the Arab uprisings illustrated that Islamically framed mobilization more generally was more influenced by context (Zollner 2019). The evolution of the Tunisian mobilizations outlined here highlights some of the most relevant contextual factors that intervene in these situations. In particular, it illustrates in the case of the Salafi activism linked to Ansar al-Sharia that the movement's rise and fall depended on creative appropriation of religious discourses and practices by would-be revolutionary actors.

Studying Social Mobilization in Tunisia and the Middle East

This section outlines how the explanations of social mobilization in the Middle East reflected the main debates and perspectives in social movement theory. These approaches shed light on the evolution of social movements in the region—particularly Islamist mobilization—and contribute to debunk the notion of an exceptional social context in that part of the world.

The study of mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa only became an area of serious interest for social movement theory in recent time. Until the 1990s, area studies specialists duly investigated protest mobilization and religious movements, but their approaches were not generally informed by the debates about social movements within established Western democracies. Indirectly, this mutual ignorance contributed to the perception that mobilization in the Muslim world, particularly by Islamically framed movements, could be somewhat distinct from the rest. Whereas social movements in Western democracies were generally seen as a positive feature of civil society, a new wave of movements coming from post-Communist countries and the developing world appeared to be more ambiguously so. In the early 1990s, Tarrow worriedly noted the rise of "ugly movements" rooted, among other things, in "religious fanaticism" (1994, 14).

By the early 2000s, Middle East specialists engaging directly with the mainstream social movement literature began to produce detailed investigations of Islamically framed mobilization in Muslim-majority countries. Their findings were generally supportive of the notion that such mobilization was not that different from what social movement theory had analyzed elsewhere. In-depth studies of Muslim Brotherhood activism in Egypt (Wickham 2002), in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Clark 2004), and in Jordan and Yemen (Schwedler 2006) illustrated the "normality" of these forms of social mobilization, which were understandable in terms of "political opportunity structure," "resources mobilization," and "framing."

In Tunisia, the growing public appeal and political visibility of the Muslim Brotherhood–inspired Movement of Islamic Tendency—subsequently renamed Ennahda—in the 1980s fit well within this general framework. In ideational terms, as the nationalist discourse of the regime was losing its appeal, the Islamic frames proposed by a newer generation of ideologues and activists such as Rached Ghannouchi were gaining a wider audience. In addition, the neoliberal economic model adopted by the regime indirectly contributed to strengthening socioeconomic networks of religious solidarity and gave the Islamists more resources. Finally, an aging President Habib Bourguiba was beginning to make political mistakes that not only emboldened the Islamist opposition but also increased intra-regime tensions. Ultimately, it was in the context of a wave of unrest launched by the Movement of Islamic Tendency in 1987 that Ben Ali, then prime minister, was able to stage a palace coup to replace Bourguiba (Anderson 1991).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several countries in the region experienced episodes of social mobilization that facilitated a reconfiguration of authoritarian regimes and political openings that bolstered social movements (Alexander 2000). Tunisia appeared to be transformed by the same dynamics that were visible across Eastern Europe and Latin America, as well as in neighboring Algeria, where Islamist activism was also rapidly growing (Volpi 2003). Yet the window of political opportunity for an Islamically framed mobilization to reform the institutional system was short-lived in Tunisia. It soon generated an authoritarian backlash that produced a long period of state repression of social movements, particularly but not exclusively of the Islamic kind. After briefly having been authorized to participate (as independents) in parliamentary elections in 1989, the members and sympathizers of Ennahda began to be systematically repressed in the 1990s as the Ben Ali regime closed all avenues of social and political contestation (Camau and Geisser 2003).

By the 2000s, Islamically framed mobilization was well studied across the Muslim world using the conventional tools of social movement theory (Wiktorowicz 2003). Islamically framed movements, and by extension Muslim societies, were not seen to be exceptionally prone to having “ugly” movements, or to be split between progressive movements (right-based, unions, environmental, etc.) and regressive religious ones. Rather, the Islamic dimension of social mobilization was but one aspect of these polities that produced movements which were behaving in relatively predictable ways. Islamic social mobilization, like any other culturally or identity-based mobilization was not particularly challenging for the theory—nor, it appears, for the authoritarian regimes in place in most of these countries. If there was exceptionalism in the Middle East and North Africa at the time, it was not about Islamically framed movements per se, but more about the repeated inability of otherwise effective forms of social mobilization to influence significantly the political system. Bayat’s (2007, 2010) post-Islamist approach and insistence on the role of nonmovements constituted one attempt at resolving the dilemma. In his analysis, the harsh authoritarian regimes prevailing in the region ensured the structural failure of organized social movements and placed the onus for social change on informal grass-roots networks and practices without explicit structures and ideologies.

For most of that decade, Tunisia was a vivid regional illustration of a well-run police state, where organized social movements hardly achieved any visible success against the regime (Camau and Geisser 2003). The Ben Ali regime tightly controlled the social and political sphere, and organized expressions of public dissent were rare. Protest mobilization was limited due to the self-limiting strategies adopted by structured movements, such as the still influential Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) (Beinin 2016), while informal networks had only a limited influence on the system due to pervasive state control and repression (Chomiak 2011). Islamically framed forms of mobilization were particularly scrutinized and targeted by the security apparatus. Unlike other movements in the region that had opted for political violence as a strategy of resistance, Ennahda sought to remain a nonviolent social and political movement. In this repressive political context, Ennahda survived as an opposition network in exile but hardly had any capability to mobilize its supporters in the country, as its infrastructure had been dismantled by the regime (Wolf 2017). Its main advantage over other political parties when it came back to Tunisia after the revolution was its ability to present itself as a “clean” political actor that was not involved in the Ben Ali system.

By the time of the Arab uprisings, social mobilization in the region was increasingly well studied and well understood, using the mainstream theoretical and analytical tools of social movement theory. While Islamist mobilization was not viewed as a particularly exceptional phenomenon, the harsh authoritarian context in the region was judged to be particularly constraining for social movements, and the case of Tunisia illustrated this situation quite well.

Mobilization and the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia

This section outlines the social and political processes that were salient at the time of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia. It presents the general trends that unfolded in the country and notes the particular challenges encountered by Islamist actors who had long been prevented by the regime from developing grass-roots activities among the population.

The 2011 Arab uprisings in Tunisia and more generally across the Arab world illustrated two main features of social mobilization in the region. First, they showed that sizeable protest movements could organize themselves outside structured social movements. Second, they quickly revealed that established organizations were able to use the situation to reposition themselves at the heart of the process of social and political change. This dual process is clearly noticeable in the case of Islamically framed mobilizations, as both old and new movements were able to take advantage, at least temporarily, of the political transformations that occurred in the countries of the Arab uprisings. Although in Tunisia, like elsewhere in the region, Islamist activists were not at the forefront of the protests when mobilization started, they were able to mobilize effectively once the process had gained momentum. In 2011 Islamically framed mobilization was generally more significant in the aftermath of the uprisings, mainly due to the preexisting configuration of repressive measures by the state.

In Tunisia, during the uprising itself, the most significant mobilizations occurred primarily outside organized social movements. Even when the latter mobilized, as in the case of the UGTT, they were following the dynamics of the popular protests rather than directing them (Hmed 2012). The importance of the leaderless/leaderful movements progressively decreased throughout 2011 as the institutionalization of a democratic political system facilitated the repositioning of structured organizations as intermediaries between the people and the state (Volpi 2017). The most visible success of such an organization during this transitional period was the rebirth of the Islamist movement Ennahda. Whereas at the start of the uprisings they were only present on the ground in Tunisia via small underground networks of sympathizers, they became, a few months later, the largest political party in terms of votes in the country.

Three processes were particularly important for the revival of the social movements previously repressed by the regime. First, there was the return from exile or liberation from jail of leaders and cadres of the movement. Second, there was the reactivation of the grass-roots networks that had fallen into abeyance due to the unfavorable political environment. Third, there was an opening of the movement to attract new members and sympathizers, particularly when the strategy was to participate in electoral contests

(McCarthy 2018). Along these three dimensions, Islamically framed mobilization was not particular different from what took place with other types of opposition movements in the country at the time.

While the 2011 Arab uprisings illustrated that conventional social movements could still be very relevant and effective, they also indicated that these episodes of institutional change were not simply an opportunity for them to implement a preexisting agenda. Not only was an established Islamic movement like Ennahda not the main actor driving institutional changes, but it also had to adapt itself to new demands and circumstances. Mobilization processes under a predictably harsh authoritarian system are different from those operating during an upheaval, an episode of regime change, or a sequence of reinstitutionalization due to changing environmental dynamics (Volpi and Clark 2019). In particular, Ennahda, like other established Muslim Brotherhood–inspired movements across the region, was confronted with a reorganization of the religious field and new competition from both religious and secularized social movements (Clarke 2014, Lacroix and Shalata 2016). While these processes produced some generic effects, the local context and the specific strategic choices made by these actors in Tunisia gave some effects more prominence than others (notably the pragmatism of Ennahda and the lack of institutionalization of Ansar al-Sharia).

In this context, Mische's argument that to understand mobilization "we should shift our attention away from cultural forms such as 'identities' or 'frames,' toward the study of how these forms are shaped, deployed, and reformulated in conversation, as this unfolds across social movement forums over the course of movement development" (2003, 259–260) is particularly pertinent. In the Tunisian context, the reconfiguration of movements' identity, practices, and strategies was partly a consequence of the loosening of earlier practices of authoritarian control, but it was also, in part, the result of new interactions between the individuals and groups in a revolutionary and then transitional situation. The first dimension of mobilization around Islamic themes and actors reflected the longer-term structural dynamics that had shaped the conditions of public and private discourse. The second dimension, by contrast, had more to do with the contextual, emotional, and interactive processes of reframing of identities and exploring new possibilities in situations where normative and political authorities were weak and changing (Jasper and Volpi 2018).

The reemergence, repositioning, and creation of Islamically framed social movements in Tunisia in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising was characterized by increased competition between religious movements, as well as, in some case, between these movements and the state (Donker 2019). At that time, a main religious competitor for Ennahda emerged in the shape of a new Salafi organization, Ansar al-Sharia. While the nucleus of Ansar al-Sharia preexisted the 2011 uprisings, it was the wave of protests and the process of regime change that made this movement powerful during the democratic transition (Merone 2017). As was the case with other established movements, the release from jail of cadres and ideologues and the reactivation of those parts of the network that were in abeyance was important to revive the organization. However, it was the recruitment and mobilization of new members and sympathizers that constituted Ansar al-Sharia as a distinctly new and successful organization at that time. At that juncture, protest mobilization shaped Ansar al-Sharia, which in turn shaped (religious) protest mobilization. This Salafi organization helped bring together an often-younger crowd of people who became religiously and politically active during the revolution and who endorsed the ultra-conservative religious discourses coming primarily from the Gulf. It facilitated the coordination of their actions and the spread of Salafi discourses and practices in the public space in a way that had not been experienced in the country before.

The empirical section of the argument that follows is based on fieldwork conducted in Tunisia during the democratic transition in 2014 and 2015 among Islamic activists linked to Ennahda and, for the largest part, linked to Ansar al-Sharia. As the Tunisian government classified Ansa al-Sharia a terrorist organization in 2013, grass-roots activists from the movement subsequently took their distance from the movement to avoid police repression. Hence, by 2014–2015, most of the activists identified themselves as former sympathizers of the movement, and most of them (9 out of 13) declared that they no longer engaged in any religious activism. These thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted over a two-month period in 2014 and 2015 in the governorates of Tunis and Medenine among young (aged 19–33) males approached through snowball sampling. Each lasted about an hour and took place in a cafe or at the interviewee's home. The argument highlights the frames and framing processes that were common among these activists as they tried to make sense of the successes and failures of the Salafi movement.

This section outlined the options and choices for mobilization that Islamically minded actors faced when the Arab uprisings offered them new opportunities for action. It introduced the different roles played by the Ennahda movement and by emerging Salafi actors.

SALAFI MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION IN TUNISIA

This section, focusing on the "rise and fall" of Ansar al-Sharia, illustrates that the shape of religious mobilization was more a consequence of the process of political transition than the outcome of an opposition between preexisting religious approaches. It highlights how the Salafi message became popular because it justified continuing mobilization against the status quo by people who did not benefit much from the consolidation of a new democratic order.

The Tunisian uprising reflected, among other things, a desire by the population to take back control of those levers of state power that had been captured by a predatory ruling elite for their own benefit. In the religious field in particular, the mosques were controlled by state-appointed imams who tended to follow strictly the religious and political orientations given by the ministry of religious affairs of a secularized regime

(Feuer 2017). The 2011 uprising thus provided an opportunity for the faithful to evict these religious officials and to nominate people who had, in their view, greater religious credentials. This process was itself fractious, as the consensus that emerged over the removal of state-appointed imams did not usually extend to the choice of their successors (K.D. interview, 2014).

In particular, there was a generational tension between an older generation of faithful with a traditional, conservative interpretation of Islam and a younger generation more attuned to the Salafi views and militant discourses coming from the Gulf region in particular (A.O. interview, 2014). These diverging opinions regarding religious leadership also reflected some important differences in the approach to the Tunisian "revolution." For the older generation, the fall of the authoritarian system meant primarily getting rid of the state surveillance and micromanagement of their religious practices. For the youth, it was often much more than this: it was an opportunity to redefine more broadly social and political relations in a way that empowered them (K.A. interview, 2015).

Although this divide was probably overemphasized by the activists, it helps explain how a different diagnostic framing of the religious problem underpinned the rapid emergence of a Salafi movement in Tunisia. It was overemphasized by the (former) activists because they sought to downplay the religious commitments of an older generation of mosque-goers who had accommodated themselves to the instrumentalization of religious discourse by the state, thereby presenting themselves as more credible religious actors despite their youth and inexperience. The slightly older generation of conservative mosque-goers was already well established in life and had little interested in a dramatic transformation of the relationship between the state and religious affairs beyond the removal of security personnel and imams who slavishly followed the instructions of the ministry of religious affairs. The younger generation of Salafi-inspired activists saw the revolution and the change of religious personnel as a means to mobilize human and normative resources to reorganize not only religious activities, but also the (local) social order. They could place new (younger) people in positions of authority in the mosques—people who could then bring to the attention of a wider audience the theological views and practices favored by the Salafis. In addition, controlling or taking a leading role in the mosques gave the Salafi activists greater social recognition and authority, which they could use to improve their own prospects for social mobility (from marriage to employment).

In terms of political opportunity structure, religious mobilization at the time of the Tunisian transition was thus more than a case of Islamic activism facilitated by the collapse of an authoritarian system that previously excluded religious actors from the public sphere. It was also, at least for a part of the population, a means of organizing and legitimizing the local power that they had gained and exercised during the uprising. From this perspective, the Salafi discourse proved useful to challenge the prevailing social and religious hierarchies (Marks 2013). It provided ideational and normative resources to a new generation of activists to challenge both religious and secularized actors (including the state). By invoking an "authentic" Islamic legitimacy based on their own interpretation of the scriptures, they would set out to change the social practices and codes that were commonplace under the previous regime—e.g., sale of alcohol, wearing of skirts, etc.—and delegitimize the actors that continued to validate these practices. Importantly, though, as will be made clear below, the Salafis' use of the theological card to justify their action and obtain approval did not mean that they all agreed on the same interpretation (or its practical implications). This process is not a case of a preexisting ideology suddenly going "viral." Recalling Mische's (2003) argument about the evolution of networks and frames, what took place among activists at that time was a creative reinterpretation of existing ideological resources in order make them relevant to their situation, rather than an attempt at implementing these prescriptions faithfully.

Eventually, most established Islamically framed movements in Tunisia ended up supporting a return to the constitutional order, especially after the parliamentary elections of October 2011. Despite some internal tensions, most movements did not seek to challenge the established institutional system, but rather to advance their strategic interests within the system (Donker 2013). In particular, Ennahda signaled very clearly to its supporters and its opponents alike from the very beginning of the democratic transition that it was not looking to introduce any dramatic "Islamic" transformation of the political system. It presented itself as a legal political organization and a responsible party of government that was able to build a dialogue and working coalitions with the secularized political forces of the country. Ansar al-Sharia, by contrast, discursively and materially challenged the established order by calling for a continuation and deepening of the Tunisian revolution—a process that should be leading, in their view, to the establishment of a genuine Islamic order (Merone 2015). In this context, the discourse of the organization was taken up by local activists and used to justify their strategies directed against religious and nonreligious competitors (including representatives of the state) in the public sphere.

The different types of Islamically framed mobilizations in Tunisia during the transitional period were the consequence of two related but distinct dynamics that reflect both the generic political processes unfolding during the Arab uprisings and the local specificities of the Tunisian context. The first one, which was most explicitly debated in the literature about the Tunisian transition, is the process of redefinition of state-sanctioned secularism in the country. There was an overt political competition between Islamist and secularist parties regarding the possibility of changing the existing institutional order to provide more formal recognition for religion and religious activities (Boubekeur 2016). This confrontation was particularly intense before the adoption of the new Tunisian Constitution in January 2014. At the time, Ansar al-Sharia generated a negative radical flank effect that facilitated the coming together of secularist forces against Ennahda—a situation that forced the Islamist party to call for early elections in 2014. At that juncture, not only did Ennahda and Ansar al-Sharia fail to build any common strategy on religious and political reform, but the two movements also increasingly blamed one another for the difficulties that they encountered. Unlike in other countries of the region that had experienced political liberalization after the Arab uprisings (notably Egypt), the main Salafi movement in Tunisia did not choose to produce a political party to advance its agenda in the formal political sphere. This lack of inclusion in the institutional system made the interactions between Ansar al-Sharia and Ennahda (and the other political parties) less predictable and calibrated. This opposition was eventually made official in the summer of 2013 when the Tunisian interior minister, a leading Ennahda cadre, formally classified Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization.

The second set of processes is less related to the religious underpinnings of mobilization and more a consequence of the social opportunities for mobilization during the transitional period. The discourse and practices promoted by Ansar al-Sharia allowed many young activists to reclaim the public sphere in the name of Islam (A.B. interview, 2014). At the local level in particular, they were able to carve out for themselves a space of freedom and authority where none was available to them under the old regime. Yet as structured social and political actors slowly began to reestablish themselves and enforce the new rules and boundaries of a democratic state, the underprivileged youth in particular, especially those with a strongly marked religious identity, saw their avenues of social recognition increasingly disappear (T.I. interview, 2015). For the members of Ennahda, on the other hand, formal inclusion in the political system enabled the party (like other actors in government) to have some degree of leverage (and patronage) in the state administration to help their supporters. The challenge to the system posed by Ansar al-Sharia may have been religious, but it was also one of the only visibly effective models of grass-roots activism available to these protest actors. Thus, religious mobilization was principally a way to challenge the redistribution of authority and resources produced by the new democratically elected elites by those who had gained the least from the change of regime (Merone 2015).

These tensions over who had authority to regulate local (religious) practices were not always directly the result of a strategy by Ansar al-Sharia to systematically push back the state (and other civil society actors). Instead, they were produced by local actors presenting themselves as members or sympathizers of the movement. In practice, the Ansar al-Sharia leadership had limited oversight over many Salafi activists (Volpi 2018). Not only was the movement's leadership not able to produce a unified strategy for the movement, but they were also not able to impose a strict discipline within the organization. The latter was a consequence of the rapid growth of the movement in 2011–2012 as an umbrella organization for religious-minded youth activists dissatisfied with the gradualist approach adopted by other movements (especially Ennahda). It is noticeable that a reformist movement like Ennahda also lost some of its support, as its performance in government was hardly impressive. However, by retaining a sizeable number of representatives in the parliament even as it went into opposition in 2014, the party was able to maintain discipline within its rank and buttress its reformist agenda.

The influence that the movement acquired was at the cost of a relative autonomy of action granted to the new groups and networks expressing their support for Ansar al-Sharia's agenda. In this context, trying to impose a stricter discipline within the organization ran the risk of having these groups dissociate themselves from the movement in order to pursue their local agenda and activities, thereby diminishing the reach of the movement. Repeatedly, therefore, the leadership of the organization had to make public statements to the effect that activists misunderstood or misapplied the religious precepts advocated by Ansar al-Sharia. However, grass-roots sympathizers repeatedly ignored these calls whenever they thought they knew best. As indicated by one of those interviewed (K.A.), although the organization's leaders told them not to use violence against people selling alcohol, some of the local activists assaulted the salesmen anyway to ensure an alcohol-free neighborhood, because they judged it was their duty.

The most spectacular failure of Ansar al-Sharia to control its supporters came during the 2012 demonstration in front of the US Consulate that turned into a partial ransacking and torching of the building complex. This episode forced one of the main leaders of the movement, and a key organizer of the demonstration, to go into hiding, as the government attributed the responsibility of the attack to him (Wolf 2017). The US Consulate event marked the beginning of an acceleration of the process of fragmentation of mobilization in the religious field, as Ansar al-Sharia confronted the hubris it helped to create. This point was dramatically illustrated in January 2013 by the assassination of a leftist parliamentarian by members of a Salafi network linked to Ansar al-Sharia who decided that armed struggle was now the most appropriate strategy for them. Although some of the leading members of Ansar al-Sharia publicly denounced the action of the armed network, this event showed the limitations of the movement's strategy of retaining a loose umbrella organization for all Salafi-inspired activists in the country.

The last annual conference of Ansar al-Sharia, in May 2013, witnessed intense last-minute debates among the leaders of the various tendencies of the movement to define a clear strategy and agenda for the organization. This focused, in particular, on whether the movement should accept the legal and institutional framework of the Tunisian state and become a legally recognized political party or civil society organization (Merone 2017). Their failure to reach an agreement revealed the inability of the movement to adapt to a situation of consolidation of the democratic institutional order, as well as the exhaustion of revolutionary fervor. The model of grass-roots activism that did make sense in 2011, and that retained some relevance for many in 2012 (as illustrated by the continuing growth of Ansar al-Sharia), increasingly became less relevant with time. In the early transitional period, the main role that Ansar al-Sharia played in the process of Islamically framed mobilization was not due to an effective recruitment and organizational strategy, but rather the consequence of the loose control over ideology and practices that the leadership exercised (Volpi 2018).

This mobilization around Salafi themes was noticeable but not so widespread that it could create the kind of popular groundswell that could have overturned the newly established democratic institutions of the country. As the revolutionary fervor diminished over time, ordinary citizens looked for better state institutions and policies, rather than for a complete overhaul of the system. In this situation, Ennahda too had lost some of its appeal, but because of its institutionalization it offered its members and voters access to the state and an opportunity to influence policymaking that the Salafi organization could not provide. The inability of the movement to adapt to changing patterns of mobilization (i.e., reduced activism), and the continuing nuisance created by the armed jihadi (who assassinated another parliamentarian in June 2013), facilitated the choice of the Ennahda-led Tunisian government to classify the entire movement a terrorist organization. The security clampdown that ensued directly contributed to the implosion of Ansar al-Sharia. Some of the activists went underground and joined jihadi networks at home or abroad in order to continue their struggle. Others cut their links with the movement and reorganized themselves as legal Islamic associations approved by the Tunisian state (Volpi 2018). Many simply stopped mobilizing in the face of increased police repression and downgraded or stopped their religious activism (B.N. interview, 2015).

After a heightened period of confrontation between Salafi actors, state actors, and secularized civil society actors in 2013, the patterns of Islamically framed mobilization in Tunisia began to follow a more routine and predictable course. Politically, Ennahda remained the main engine of electoral mobilization via its promotion of a pragmatic Islamic vision that balanced elements of traditionalism and modernism in order to attract a wider audience. In the social sphere, religious competitors to Ennahda increasingly adopted a legalist, reformist approach to ensure that their activities and their members were not targeted by police repression (Donker 2019). The occasional outburst of jihadi violence in the country, and the ensuing repressive backlash, ensured that a distinct Salafi-oriented, protest-focused, grass-roots activism was increasingly less and less able to attract followers in large numbers. After two to three years, when a distinctive form of religious mobilization raised the possibility of the social and political institutionalization of an Islamic model of governance, societal dynamics eventually buttressed routine reformist orientations in the religious field.

This section illustrated that the "direct action" appeal of the Salafi movement corresponded to the aspirations of a particular constituency at a specific moment of the country's political and institutional transformation. However, it pointed out that due to the different strategic choices and objectives of its members and sympathizers, the movement was not able to institutionalize this mobilization and attract other constituencies.

Conclusion

The current outlook and trajectory of social movements in Tunisia, be they framed around Islamic themes or not, increasingly correspond to trends observed in consolidating democracies. Structured organizations with clear hierarchies and formal strategies and discourses mobilize specific constituencies and/or specific themes in order to influence national or local policymakers. Islamically framed movements display, like many other nonreligious movements, a tendency toward specialization and bureaucratization. The process of democratic consolidation provides a legal and political structure that underpins predictable interactions between the state and social movements, between the movements themselves, and between the movements and the population. Even though new, commonly issue-based movements still occasionally erupt on the scene—e.g., "*winou el petrol*" (where is the oil)—the identity and repertoire of established social movements now evolve quite predictably.

Religious mobilization continues to play a significant role in Tunisia. However, religious and secularized movements alike converge in developing a reformist agenda. Only during a brief episode of institutional instability and transition was Islamically framed mobilization significantly different in form and content from both prior religious mobilization and from nonreligious mobilization. During this period, the "revolutionary" character of a brand of Salafi activism that challenged established religious views and practices, as well as the secularized institutions of the state, illustrated itself. This activism proved quite successful at a time when a significant number of individuals, particularly among the less well-off youth, who had successfully mobilized to overthrow the authoritarian regime, sought out new avenues for social advancement. At that juncture, Salafi mobilization competed effectively with more established religious and secularized movements.

Promoting an Islamic agenda was unmistakably an underlying factor of success for Salafi and other Islamically framed movements after years of authoritarian control of the Tunisian religious sphere. Both Ansar al-Sharia and Ennahda initially benefited from this revival in religious activism, albeit through different channels of mobilization. Initially, Salafi claims grounded on religious authority served to strengthen the legitimacy of various forms of "revolutionary" activism more effectively than the reformist discourse of Ennahda and its strategy of political institutionalization. Over time, however, the lack of internal coherence of the Ansar al-Sharia project and organization, coupled to a lessening of revolutionary fervor and the return of routine state administrative functions, made sure that this particular framing of Islamic identity did not gain ascendency in the religious or political sphere.

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Interviews

A.B, Medenine governorate, October 2014.
A.O., Medenine governorate, October 2014.
B.N., Tunis Governorate, October 2015.
K.A., Tunis Governorate, October 2015.
K.D., Medenine governorate, October 2014.
T.I., Tunis Governorate, October 2015.

CHAPTER 29

ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

CHANTAL BERMAN

THE study of political Islam and the 2011 revolutionary wave in the Middle East presents a conundrum. Islamist parties were arguably the Arab Spring's largest immediate beneficiaries. In Tunisia and Egypt, where incumbent regimes collapsed in the face of protests, Islamist parties went on to dominate their countries' first democratic elections, winning pluralities in 2011 in Tunisia and 2012 in Egypt. In Morocco, where the Alaouite monarchy rode out the February 20th wave largely intact, and where members of the Islamist Parti de la Justice et du Dévéloppement (PJD) were already a major force in parliament, early elections in October 2011 nevertheless resulted in the first PJD plurality and the first Islamist prime minister. At least until the cataclysmic roll-back of Egypt's democratic transition in 2013, it became common for scholars and pundits to remark that Islamists had "won" the Arab Spring.

Yet principle Islamist parties in each case responded quite differently to the escalating protest movements that swept across North Africa in early 2011. While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood eventually threw its weight behind the anti-Mubarak protest movement, the Moroccan PJD urged its members not to protest, and leaders of Tunisia's clandestine Ennahda movement largely watched the revolution play out from the sidelines. Outside of Egypt, scholarly accounting has credited labor unions, youth organizations, and social media networks for the 2011 uprisings to a far greater extent than Islam or Islamists. Further, survey research has shown that religious opposition to secular hegemony ranked quite low in self-reported reasons for joining the 2011 protests. As shown in Figure 29.1, motivations of social justice and economic opportunity often dominate these polls, even among self-identified Islamists.

In a context where Islam and Islamist movements have been long understood to constitute "the opposition" to secular regimes, their ambivalent role in the largest



Top reasons for 2011 protests in Egypt (Arab Barometer 2011)

Top reasons for 2011 protests in Tunisia (Arab Barometer 2011)

FIGURE 29.1: Reasons for anti-regime protest in 2011.

Source: Data from Arab Barometer (2011).

oppositional events of the 21st century bears investigation. Why was Islamist mobilization more visible in some cases than in others? Further, who counts as "Islamist" in the question of Islamist mobilization during the Arab Spring? Studies of political Islam in North Africa have tended to focus either on public attitudes or on Islamist organizations and parties.[1] Aiming to bridge the gap between organizational and individual approaches to the study of mobilization, this chapter does both.

First, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, I pose the question of why principle Islamist organizations responded as they did to their respective revolutionary movements. I argue that these varied responses were primarily *strategic* rather than ideological, reflecting each organization's experience of repression or inclusion under the incumbent regime and its resulting expectations regarding the benefits of a democratic future. Islamist leaders played the strongest mobilizing role where their parties prior to 2011 occupied a "middle ground" between repressed outsider and regime insider—where autocrats permitted above-ground Islamist organizations to flourish but constrained these groups from achieving true political influence.

Second, I shift the focus from organizations to citizens, using survey data ask how these elite strategies mapped on to patterns of mobilization of the rank-and-file. Cross-national gaps in protest participation suggest that many Islamist-leaning individuals did follow their leaders' edicts to either join the protests or abstain. A great many others, notably in Tunisia, protested in the absence of formal Islamist leadership, galvanized likely by economic grievance. *Collective* religious behaviors, namely mosque attendance, lead to higher protest in general, while private religious behaviors like prayer made an individual more likely to stay home.

These analyses underscore the diversity of Islamist actors in the MENA region and the extent to which prior experiences of authoritarianism shaped Islamists' capacities, strategies, and expectations during these revolutionary moments. They also reveal a complex relationship between organizational strategy and individual behavior. Organizational guidance matters, but it is far from determinative in accounting for citizens' decisions to protest.

Organizations, Individuals, and Regimes: What We Know about Revolutionary Actors

Among other debates, scholars have disagreed—both implicitly and explicitly—about which actors are the primary units of revolutionary mobilization. Many studies focus on the role of *revolutionary organizations*[2]—formal, named organizations that recruit and mobilize like-minded citizens to challenge the sovereign power of the incumbent. Revolutionary organizations may be formed for explicitly pro-democracy purposes, such as Solidarity in Poland (Mason 1989) or the African National Congress in South Africa (Wood 2001). Alternatively, they may be preexisting groups that pivot toward a revolutionary role given the opportunity.[3] Some studies ask explicitly how revolutionary leaders mobilize citizens and maintain public confidence over the course of a rebellion (Clarke 2014; Weinstein 2005), while others dwell more on the prerogatives and decisions of revolutionary leaders, setting aside questions of mass participation. In general, organizational studies tend to focus on actors already coded as "revolutionary"; the question of why existing organizations may support or oppose a revolutionary movement, given the opportunity, has received less attention.

An alternate branch of protest scholarship examines the prerogatives of individuals. What social, demographic, or ideational fact ors make some citizens more likely than others to join protests? Wider availability of nationally representative surveys, many of which ask explicitly about protest participation,[4] coupled with new methodological approaches to surveying protesters themselves (Berman 2018; Tufekci and Wilson 2012), have allowed scholars to test hypotheses about the individual-level determinants of protest participation. This approach has been used to great effect in the field of Arab Spring studies. Tufekci and Wilson (2012), for example, used a protest survey fielded during the Egyptian uprising to study the ways in which protesters consumed media. Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur (2015) used Arab Barometer surveys to characterize and compare revolutionary coalitions in Egypt and Tunisia. Cammett and Salti (2018) used Gallup polls to investigate the prevalence of different economic grievances in the run-up to the uprisings.

By and large, the organizational perspectives assume that revolutionary organizations, once activated, are representative of revolutionary interests in society. Often, these organizations become shorthand for the populations they represent (i.e. "the Islamists," or "organized labor"). Survey-based approaches, correspondingly, tend to side-step questions of revolutionary leadership and organization, leaving the reader with a fairly atomized view of the process by which individuals come to stand collectively. Nearly all revolutionary movements, of course, rely *both* on organizations and on the decisions of individuals. Curiously, few studies have explicitly asked how individual and organizational prerogatives during a revolutionary episode relate to one another. To what extent do organizational edicts determine their members' decisions to protest or not? How do organizational affiliations stack up against other individual-level drivers of protest participation? To what extent are organizations' positions toward emergent uprisings shaped "from below"?

These questions may be particularly important when it comes to assessing the role of Islam and Islamism in contemporary anti-regime movements. Though news reports and policy documents are rife with assumptions about *Islamists*, broadly construed, the question of who "speaks" for Islam, particularly during moments of political upheaval, is complex and unsettled. The movements that challenged incumbent regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco each represented broad coalitions of civil society organizations, joined by even larger crowds of citizens mobilized informally through social networks and new media platforms (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). Labor unions, human rights advocacy groups, student organizations, and social media groups all played a role. This chapter examines the role of Islamist organizations and Islamist-leaning individuals within these diverse coalitions. In so doing, I also aim to shed light on the relationship between party-based mobilization (or the lack thereof) and individual-level protest behavior. I begin by investigating the role of Islamist organizations in the 2011 uprisings, before moving on to survey analyses and, finally, to discussion of the links between these two.

ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EGYPT, TUNISIA, AND MOROCCO

What role did Islamist organizations and parties play in the popular uprisings that swept across North Africa in 2011? Though Islamists did not initiate the revolutionary protests in any case, principle Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt responded quite differently as the protests escalated in early 2011. In Tunisia, where networks of Harakat Ennahda were totally clandestine, Islamist leaders in prison or exile were unable to play a large mobilizing role, particularly in comparison with other societal actors like labor unions. In Morocco, where the PJD by 2010 played a well-defined role of parliamentary opposition to monarchical forces, the party came out against the February 20th movement and urged its followers not to participate. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers were permitted to operate large networks of social service provision but were also subject to military trials and electoral manipulation, Brotherhood leaders threw their weight behind protests planned initially by secular groups. I argue in this section that these varied responses were primarily strategic rather than ideological, reflecting each organization's experience under the incumbent regime and, thus, its expectations over the marginal benefits of a democratic future.

On what grounds are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ennahda movement, and the PJD comparable? Although these organizations differ in important ways—as the following sections will attest—these groups have key organizational similarities that facilitate comparative analysis. All three are designed as nationwide mass-membership organizations, though their capacity to operate as such has been periodically diminished by repression. Each organization advocates for a strong influence of shariʿa over law and public policy, though time and circumstance have proven these ideologies flexible, with matters of Islamic doctrine as well as views toward democracy subject to rigorous internal debate (Wickham 2013). Broadly speaking, all three organizations have navigated a transition from "outsider" movement toward major political organization, and have, when permitted, fielded candidates for public office. However, all three organizations have also practiced various forms of what Vairel (2011) calls "auto-limitation"—for example, purposefully limiting the number of parliamentary candidates fielded in order to limit confrontation with the regime (Masoud 2011; Willis 2004). Finally, all three parties were extremely successful as electoral forces during the post-revolutionary contests of 2011–2013.

The relationship between Arab regimes and Islamist parties, like the workings of opposition groups under authoritarianism more generally, has inspired large amounts of scholarly writing.[5] Scholars have also begun drawing connections between pre- and post-revolutionary periods, asking, for example, how prior experiences of repression shaped Islamists' approach to governance and constitution-writing after regime change

(Nugent 2020). Here, I leverage these historical perspectives to draw connections between each Islamist organization's experience of late-stage authoritarianism and their response to anti-regime mobilization in early 2011.

Coming Late to the Party: How the Muslim Brotherhood Joined the Egyptian Revolution

Out of the major Islamist organizations in North Africa, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood played the largest role in the 2011 revolutionary uprisings. Following the successful protests of January 25, the Brotherhood joined a coalition of left-leaning opposition groups and alternative labor syndicates in calling for countrywide protests on Friday, January 28. Though Brotherhood leaders were at first reticent to protest, younger activists within the organization were able to convince the Guidance Bureau to throw its lot in with the protest movement. The Brothers were able to mobilize adherents to protest and to provide organization and protection to the flagship sit-in at Tahrir Square. The Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party would go on to win 47 percent of seats in Egypt's 2011 parliamentary election, far more than any other party.

Historically, the Brotherhood's relationship to the authoritarian state has been a pendulum between repression and toleration. Neither acceptance nor co-optation have ever been on the table. Founded in 1928 by the Islamic scholar Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood is the region's oldest and most prominent mass-membership Islamist organization. During the interwar period, the Brotherhood grew in popularity through extensive mosque outreach before succumbing to severe repression under the Nasser regime. During the measured opening offered by the Sadat regime, the Brothers rebuilt their influence through membership in professional associations and greatly expanded their networks of social service provision—a strategy that would continue to win the Brotherhood widespread public support through the late Mubarak era (Brooke 2019; Clark 2004).

Hosni Mubarak's inauguration as Egypt's president in 1981 coincided with a shift in the Brotherhood's strategy and political orientation. Following intense internal debates over the value of "partyism," the Brotherhood opted to contest the 1984 and 1987 elections by entering into strategic alliance with a series of secular nationalist and leftist parties (El-Ghobashy 2005). Wickham (2013) refers to the 1980s as the "high point" of Muslim Brotherhood participation within the authoritarian system. By the 1990s, regime officials, alarmed by the Brotherhood's popularity, employed increasingly severe and blatant measures to manipulate parliamentary elections.[6] At the same time, mass arrests and military trials of Brotherhood members sought to force the organization out of political life. Nugent (2020) recounts nearly 100,000 arrests of Brotherhood members, often candidates for office, during the final decade of Mubarak's rule.

As the Brotherhood was slowly squeezed out of formal politics, the repression of the late Mubarak era also rendered Brotherhood leaders uneasy about demonstrations and other forms of street politics. Demonstrations involving Brotherhood members were often swiftly repressed, and Brotherhood leaders grew to expect that participation in protests would lead to greater targeting of Brotherhood members, even if other, non-Islamist organizations were also involved. Here, we should note an essential irony. In the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood was Egypt's largest and best-organized opposition group. It was also the most reticent about street politics. Important Egyptian protest movements of the 2000s—such as the Kefaya (Enough) movement and the labor strikes at Mahalla al-Kubra (Duboc 2011) did not involve the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thus, Muslim Brothers were not involved in organizing the first major protests of the 2011 revolutionary wave. The set of initial revolutionary organizations were predominantly secular. Left-leaning urban opposition groups and independent labor syndicates came together to organize multisited demonstrations against police brutality on January 25, 2011. As elsewhere, younger Islamists were early supporters of the protest movement. Student leaders within the Muslim Brotherhood formed alliances with secular anti-regime activists and demanded the right to participate in demonstrations under the banner of Muslim Brotherhood Youth. After initially declining, the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau heeded the advice of younger members on January 27 and officially endorsed the protests (Clarke 2014). Brotherhood branches were active during the January 28 Day of Rage and also during street battles with regime-sponsored thugs in Cairo the following week.

The Brotherhood's entry into street protests arguably lent the Egyptian revolutionary coalition its critical mass. Why did the Brotherhood's leadership pivot toward the revolutionary movement? The protests of January 25 were larger and more widespread than most Egyptians had expected. Coupled with the example of Tunisia, where the dictator Ben Ali had fled only ten days prior, the January 25 protests convinced many Egyptians—Brotherhood members included—of the *possibility* of deposing Mubarak through street protests.

Crucially, Wickham (2011) notes that Brotherhood leaders expected to "be the first target of the regime's wrath if the uprising failed." Shortly after the protests on January 25, the Ministry of Interior issued a statement blaming the Muslim Brothers for the unrest. The regime arrested more than a thousand demonstrators and moved to disrupt Internet and cell phone service, demonstrating intent to follow through on its repressive threats once again (Ketchley 2017). In an important contrast with the Moroccan PJD—as the following section will explore—the Brotherhood wagered that the organization would suffer *most* from a wounded-yet-still-intact Mubarak regime. Mistrust of the security state coupled with years of inflexible barriers to entry in electoral politics led the Guidance Bureau to conclude that revolution, rather than continued negotiation and self-limitation, was the best way forward.

For the sake of comparison, we must note that that the Brotherhood was *capable* as a mobilizing force because it was able to draw on an extensive internal organization and hundreds of thousands of active members. Had the Brotherhood's public organization been dismantled through repression as extensive as that visited on Tunisia's Islamists in the prior decade, its leaders' change of heart would have meant little. Yet, as Albrecht (2005) points out, the Mubarak regime never went so far as to destroy the Brotherhoods' organizational structure. Its clinics and schools were permitted to operate without excessive interference, likely because they provided a crucial supplement to the state's own meager social services. Thus, the Brotherhood's "mixed" experience of repression and toleration left the organization with adequate *capacity* to act as a mobilizing force, coupled with the *expectation* that regime change would remove impediments to the organization's future growth.

Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian revolution represents a case where less-senior members successfully prevailed upon senior leadership, swaying their stance toward the protest movement. Had Brotherhood youth not lobbied the Guidance Bureau to support their participation in anti-regime protests, the Muslim Brotherhood may never have formally endorsed the revolutionary movement against Hosni Mubarak. Though this case does not demonstrate influence of the "rank-and-file" per se—the youth in question were already participating in positions of leadership within the hierarchical organization—it does affirm the heterogeneity of Egyptian Islamists' responses to the uprisings and the *collective* nature of organizational decision-making, a dynamic often lost when revolutionary organizations are treated as unitary actors.

Loyal Opposition: The PJD's Insider Game during M20F

In contrast to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Moroccan PJD sided publicly against the February 20th movement (M20F). Though some younger PJD members supported the protests, PJD leaders—like other "opposition" parties in parliament—declined to lend their support and advised their members not to protest in the streets.

Instead, Moroccan Islamist leaders leveraged this rupture as an opportunity to extract specific concessions and increase its prominence within the Moroccan electoral sphere.

Like the Muslim Brotherhood, by early 2011 the PJD was a large and capacious formal organization with significant political influence and an extensive network of supporters. Like Islamist leaders throughout the Arab world, many of the PJD's leading figures were initially inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The PJD (formerly the Movement for Unity and Reform, *At-Tawhid wa al-Islah*) was founded in 1967. As in Egypt, Moroccan Islamists were barred from formal politics and faced devastating repression during the postcolonial decades. During the "Years of Lead" under King Hassan II, Islamists not jailed or disappeared were forced to work through clandestine networks (Vairel 2011).

The advance of Moroccan multipartyism in the late 1990s and the ascension of the more "liberal" monarch Mohammed VI allowed the PJD to slowly expand its influence and to branch, tepidly, into electoral politics. Known PJD members were permitted to join an existing political party (the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel, MPDC) and to file in this capacity as parliamentary candidates in 1997. After changing its name to PJD, a move that cemented Islamists' dominion over the party, the party again fielded candidates in the 2002 and 2006 elections, while purposefully contesting a limited number of seats in order to avoid confrontation with the regime (Willis 2004). The PJD over this period attracted a wide support base with its conservative Islamic principles, but also with its critiques of the regime in the arena of economic governance and social welfare provision (Daadaoui 2017).

In Moroccan politics, the parliament maintains limited constitutional authority, and political power remains concentrated around the monarch and his close circle of advisors, known as the *makhzen* (Yom 2017). Nevertheless, the monarchy watched PJD's rising popularity and organizational infrastructure with trepidation. The Moroccan regime's main strategy for tempering the PJD's rise in the decade preceding the uprisings rested not on direct repression or banning the party from participation in formal politics, but rather the creation of a novel monarchist party intended to serve as a counterweight to PJD's electoral popularity. The monarchist Parti de l'Authenticité et Modernité (PAM) was founded in 2008 by a coalition of political figures with close ties to the palace. PAM worked to undermine the PJD's role in Moroccan politics, for example, working to muscle the party out of local multiparty coalitions following the 2009 local elections (Buehler 2013a). As Wegner (2011) notes, the regime also attempted to intercede in the PJD's internal hierarchy in to neutralize its more outspoken critics.

Notably, the regime's approach to managing the PJD has involved little direct, physical violence. While PJD-related gatherings are sometimes policed heavily (Berman 2020), the PJD in the 20th century has faced far less repression than the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood *and*, importantly, far less repression than Morocco's secondary Islamist movement, al-ʿAdl wa al-Ihsan, which eschews formal politics in favor of mosque-based organization (Cavatorta and Durac 2011). In return, the PJD has not been reticent about using demonstrations of its mass base as a form of bargaining with the *makhzen* and the loyalist parties. However, the PJD has also fallen short of directly critiquing the monarchy or calling for regime change in Morocco. As Daadaoui (2017) writes, the PJD has "walked a tightrope of appearing loyal to the regime while also reproaching the palace for *tahakoum* [political manipulation]."

This strategy was in full force as the PJD leadership confronted the possibility of mass demonstrations in the week leading up to February 20, 2011, when a coalition of Moroccan activists called for nationwide protests. The February 20th movement (M20F), much like initial Egyptian protests, represented a coalition of organizations focused on social justice and human rights, notably including the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH). February 20th leaders did not explicitly call for regime change—the movement's stance toward monarchism and the precise nature of the Moroccan state was internally debated throughout its existence—but its anti-status-quo messaging combined with the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt prompted parties in the "loyal opposition" to circle the wagons. As in Egypt, many younger PJD members supported the protests, even publishing a supportive statement on February 17 before bowing to organizational pressure to retract it. That same day, PJD secretary general Abdelilah Benkirane, who would become Morocco's first Islamist prime minister in November 2011, announced that the party would boycott M20F. Despite record-breaking protests on February 20—demonstrations occurred in more than fifty Moroccan cities and towns (Lawrence 2017)—and demonstrations that continued through May, the PJD did not reverse its position (Bennani-Chraibi and Jeghllaly 2012).

The PJD's firm anti-revolutionary stance reflected more than simple loyalty to the king or wholesale co-optation. Buehler (2013b), for example, argues that the PJD viewed the February 20th movement—and the Arab uprisings more broadly—as a political opportunity to advance its own interests. As the regime and the monarch moved to placate Moroccans with proposed constitutional revisions and redistributive projects (Berman 2020), the PJD also gained important targeted concessions in exchange for its restraint. PJD Secretariat General member Jama'a Moatassim, previously arrested on corruption charges, was released from prison. The regime also dropped proposed changes to the electoral code designed to limit PJD's vote share. Finally, PJD took advantage of the political moment to roll back self-imposed limits on its electoral bids. In early elections in October 2011, the PJD increased its parliamentary presence by sixty-one seats, leading to an Islamist plurality.

Comparison of the PJD with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood is instructive. The PJD was also a capacious, well-liked organization with extensive popular networks. Had the PJD thrown its weight behind the anti-regime protests, as the Brotherhood did, it likely would have counted among the most important revolutionary organizations. Yet, unlike the Brotherhood, the PJD's strategic calculations rested on the projection that the party stood to benefit *more* from an intact (if politically weakened) Moroccan state than from a popular revolution. Based on their prior experience working within the system, PJD leaders were willing to gamble that the monarchy and *makhzen* would not use the M20F as pretext to ban or repress the Islamist party. Rather, they expected their own influence to expand—an expectation that would be unlikely in a context like Egypt or Tunisia, where Islamist leaders clearly viewed Mubarak and Ben Ali as inflexible barriers to the Islamist political project.

Observing from Exile: Why Ennahda Lacked Capacity to Revolt

Unlike their counterparts in Egypt and Morocco, Tunisian Islamists did not have formal, above-ground mass-membership organizations at the onset of the 2011 uprisings. Prominent Islamists and leaders of the Ennahda (Islamist renaissance) movement watched revolutionary events unfold from foreign exile or from prison. Tunisian Islamists remained popular, as attested by their quick reassembly and political domination of the early democratic transition. They certainly opposed Ben Ali's administration and supported the prospect of revolutionary change. Yet Ben Ali's systemic dismantling of Ennahda's domestic organization during the decade prior to the Jasmine revolution rendered the party unable to act as a major mobilizing force. Left and labor organizations, in particular the syndicates of the Union Générale des Travialleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), picked up the slack, steering Tunisia's revolutionary movement to victory.

As in prewar Egypt, Islamist organizing in Tunisia operated mainly through informal mosque networks until 1981, when Rachid al-Ghannouchi founded the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) with the objective of working through the country's electoral system to promote Islamic law. Like the Muslim Brothers, the MTI also forged links with other associations, in particular the Tunisian student union UGET. The organization also applied for a license to form an official political party. Observing MTI's growing popular and organizational infrastructure, the regime of Habib Bourguiba moved to repress the nascent Islamist movement, carrying out successive waves of arrests and interrogations against MTI members in 1981, 1983, and 1987 (Perkins 2014).

Based on these experiences of repression, Tunisian Islamists initially welcomed former prime minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's coup again Bourguiba in November 1987. Gearing up to participate in the 1989 parliamentary elections, MTI signed the National Pact and changed its name to Harakat Ennahda in a bid to comply with a new law banning parties based on religion, race, or language (McCarthy 2018). Unlike Islamist parties elsewhere, who were periodically permitted to stand as political candidates as either party members or independents, the 1989 elections would prove to be Ennahda's sole opportunity for electoral participation until the 2011 revolution. Ennahda contested a large number of seats and emerged as the largest opposition force, with 14.5 percent of the vote. The Ennahda deputies were prohibited from taking their seats in parliament and were instead subject to a massive wave of repression. In the years that followed, up to 30,000 Ennahda members were arrested, and many were subjected to torture. Thousands of Islamists who were able fled into exile. Ghannouchi himself was jailed 1981 and again in 1988; shortly thereafter, he fled to the UK, where he remained until the fall of the Ben Ali regime.

During the 1990s and 2000s, Ennahda leaders remained committed to their organization. They relaunched the party's newspaper *al-Fajr* and even participated in a series of rapprochement initiatives with leaders of Tunisia's secular opposition parties, most of whom remained territorially in Tunisia (Cavatorta and Haugbolle 2012). Yet as Wolf (2017) points out, maintaining a mass-membership organization with members dispersed in more than seventy countries and in prison remained a massive challenge. Members who remained at large in Tunisia lived in the shadow of fear. Thus, the organization itself atrophied. Further, Tunisian Islamists lacked affiliated social service organizations or other public-facing institutions that may have recruited more members. Some conservative Tunisian Islamists turned to Salafism and other ideologies that discourage engagement with the state.

Thus, when the initial protests of the Tunisian revolution broke out in December 2010, there were few Islamist leaders or institutions on hand to provide leadership. Ghannouchi himself would not return to Tunis until late January 2011, shortly after Ennahda was re-legalized. All indicators point to the fact that Ennahda leaders would likely have supported the anti-regime protests. Many of Ennahda's intellectual leaders had been endorsing democracy since the 1980s (Wolf 2017). Yet by virtue of the dismantling of their domestic political organization, their views counted for little. Ennahda was unable to play a significant role in mobilizing Tunisians to protest against the Ben Ali regime.

What did revolution in Tunisia look like in the absence of a strong Islamist presence? Previous research has examined difference between popular protest coalitions in Egypt and Tunisia. Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur (2015) argue that the Egyptian revolution was more middle-class, middle-aged, and relied more on the intermediation of "civil society organizations." The Tunisian revolution, by contrast, relied more on unemployed youth and on spontaneous forms of networked mobilization, including the use of Facebook pages to organize protests. These differences likely reflect, in no small part, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian revolution.[7] The absence of a parallel organized Islamist sector in Tunisia likely left these same middle-aged professionals un-mobilized, throwing the balance of the revolutionary coalition toward students and youth.

Yet the Tunisian uprising did unfold entirely without the aid of revolutionary organizations. Protests spread spontaneously at first, as citizens of Tunisia's marginalized southern governorates echoed protests in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Tunisia's leftist and secular opposition groups also contributed. If the Muslim Brotherhood's arrival at Egyptian protests provided the single biggest injection of organizational strength and mass membership, this role was played in the Tunisia by the UGTT. The UGTT is Tunisia's largest mass-membership organization, counting more than half a million members. Historically a militant force in Tunisian politics, during Ben Ali's final decade of rule the UGTT had shied away from its political role. As such, the UGTT National Committee did not jump to endorse the nascent protest movement spilling out of Tunisia's rural periphery in mid-December. As protests continued into January, however, the union leadership pivoted. Yielding to pressure from historically militant syndicates in the public sector, on January 11 the UGTT called for a general strike in Sfax, Tunisia's second city (Angrist 2013). A UGTT strike call in Tunis for January14 helped to catalyze Ben Ali's departure from Tunis that same day.

ISLAM AND PROTEST ON THE POPULAR LEVEL: SURVEY ANALYSIS

Principle Islamist organizations in North Africa responded differently to the 2011 Arab revolutions, reflecting each party's unique experience of authoritarian rule. Yet elite pronouncements are, in times of uprising, only part of the story. To what extent did the directives of Islamist leaders translate into protest participation (or lack thereof) among the rank-and-file? How did Islamist beliefs and religious commitments affect citizens' individual choices to protest, and how did these responses vary across countries? This section uses descriptive and regression analyses of the 2013 Arab Barometer Survey[8] to examine the role that Islamist beliefs and affiliations played in driving individuals to protest in 2011. These analyses help to draw out the individual-level implications of the country-level divergences discussed in the previous section.

For a snapshot of the revolutionary coalitions, Table 29.1 presents raw proportions of protest participation among Islamists, secularists, and the population at large. For

Table 29.1: Percent of Islamist and Secularist Citizens Mobilized in 2011

Islamist party role in uprisings	Egypt Supportive	Morocco Opposed	Tunisia No strong role
% Islamists protested	14.3%	8.2%	18.0%
% Secularists protested	12.1%	16.7%	22.0%
% Protested in the general population	13.5%	9.1%	18.6%

parsimony in this table, I use a rough dichotomous measure, coding "Islamists" as those citizens who either "agree" or "strongly agree" that parliament should enact law and policy in keeping with Islamist law, while "secularists" are those who either "disagree" or "strongly disagree." Protest participation overall was higher in the successful cases, topping 13 percent in Egypt and 18 percent in Tunisia, compared with 9 percent in Morocco.

These breakdowns indicate that Islamist party guidance may have held some sway over individual protest decisions. Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood became involved in revolutionary protests, is the only case where Islamist participation appears (slightly) higher than secularist participation, at 14.3 percent. By contrast, in Morocco, where the PJD implored members not to protest, Islamists participated at roughly *half* the rate of secularists. Given that Moroccan secularist participation (16 percent) was well within the range of Tunisia and Egypt, it is possible that low Islamist participation (8 percent) was a key factor in preventing the Moroccan February 20th movement from gaining critical revolutionary mass.

Still, nearly one in ten Islamist-leaning Moroccans protested against the instruction of the main Islamist party. Some of these were likely adherents to al-ʿAdl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity movement), PJD's more anti-state, clandestine counterpart, whose leadership endorsed the February 20th protests. Others were likely PJD adherents for whom the M20F's message of social and civic justice nonetheless resonated. Though the Morocco Arab Barometer surveys unfortunately contain no questions as to *why* citizens protested, the M20F's public messaging and its alliance with social justice organizations indicates a strong parallel role of socioeconomic grievance in mobilizing Moroccans of all ideological bents.

Tunisia provides an opportunity to examine protest rates in the absence of definitive guidance from an Islamist party. Islamist-leaning citizens appear to have protested at a slightly lower rate than secularists, but nevertheless made a strong showing at 18 percent. The near-parity of Islamist and secularist participation speaks, again, to the broadness of the revolutionary coalition that deposed Ben Ali, and to the primacy of other incentives—in particular, socioeconomic grievances—in mobilizing Tunisians in 2011. (See Figure 29.1.)

Table 29.2 complicates this picture by performing a set of multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is a binary measure of revolutionary protest participation. For each country (as well as the pooled three-country sample), I include one reduced regression, including indicators for Islamist beliefs, trust in Islamist parties, and religious practice, and

Table 29.2: Political Islam and Revolutionary Protest (Logit Regressions)

	Dependent variable: revolutionary protest participation (binary)							
	Pooled		Egypt		Morocco		Tunisia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Law should be based on shariʿa	-0.049 (0.060)	0.017 (0.062)	0.159 (0.107)	0.151 (0.111)	-0.323** (0.149)	-0.255* (0.154)	-0.103 (0.084)	-0.022 (0.089)
Trust Islamist party	-0.067 (0.051)	-0.054 (0.052)	0.013 (0.093)	0.040 (0.098)	-0.212* (0.111)	-0.181 (0.113)	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.038 (0.074)
Attend Friday mosque	0.268*** (0.050)	0.325*** (0.054)	0.472*** (0.118)	0.479*** (0.127)	0.129 (0.130)	0.133 (0.134)	0.236*** (0.063)	0.351*** (0.070)
Read Qurʾan	-0.191*** (0.060)	-0.139** (0.063)	-0.321*** (0.101)	-0.222** (0.107)	-0.090 (0.140)	-0.064 (0.143)	-0.136 (0.088)	-0.116 (0.095)
Urban		0.583*** (0.119)		0.663*** (0.192)		0.719*** (0.274)		0.437** (0.186)
Education		0.362*** (0.041)		0.577*** (0.008)		0.175** (0.080)		0.327*** (0.065)
Age		-0.026*** (0.004)		-0.007 (0.008)		-0.031*** (0.011)		-0.034*** (0.006)
Country: Morocco	-0.462*** (0.155)	-0.268 (0.165)						
Country: Tunisia	0.766*** (0.131)	1.030*** (0.144)						
Constant	-1.884*** (0.281)	-3.240*** (0.380)	-2.938*** (0.561)	-5.732*** (0.768)	-1.051* (0.600)	-1.343* (0.766)	-1.127*** (0.365)	-1.733*** (0.524)
Observations	3019	3019	1095	1095	897	897	1027	1027
Log likelihood	-1219.371	-1121.670	-430.022	-384.938	-264.508	-253.079	-516.130	-467.436
Akaike Information Critreion	2452.741	2263.340	870.044	785.876	539.016	522.158	1042.261	950.871
McFadded Psuedo-R squared	0.13	0.20	0.09	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.10	0.19

Note: * $p<0.1$;

** $p<0.05$;

*** $p<0.01$

one expanded regression, including common demographic covariates. These regressions don't aim to causally identify any singular effect, but rather to consider a range of beliefs and behaviors that may prove positively or negatively associated with the decision to protest.

In the simple regressions, the effect of Islamist beliefs—measured by support for the statement, "The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law"—is negative and significant in Morocco, and positive and nearly significant (p = 0.13) in Egypt. Also in Morocco, trust in the PJD is a significant negative predictor of protest. Significance is attenuated by the addition of the demographic covariates in both cases, although less so in Morocco. These results point, again, to the divergent implications of the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to endorse the protests and the PJD's decision to withhold its support. In Tunisia, we see little significance associated with either Islamist beliefs or trust in Islamist parties, again indicating relative parity of participation between Islamist and secularist citizens.

These regressions also consider the effects of nonpolitical religious behaviors. Were pious citizens more or less inclined to protests, regardless of their adherence to political Islam? Here, I find some strong yet divergent effects. *Collective* religious behavior (Friday mosque attendance) proves a significant predictor of revolutionary protest, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia. By contrast, individual religious behavior (Qurʾan readership) appears to exert a negative effect on protest throughout the sample.[9] These findings correspond to contextual evidence—as Ketchley (2017) points out, Friday services were often an important focal point for protests, and citizens would leave the mosque to protest together. These results also support the general view that individuals who participate in other collective endeavors—political or otherwise—are also more likely to protest, perhaps because they are more social or civic-minded.

In aggregate, these results suggest that the individual-level relationship between Islamist ideology and revolutionary protest is highly context-specific. Holding Islamist views doesn't automatically incline citizens toward anti-statist behavior, such as protest, even where regimes are avowedly secular. Further, faith in Islamist leaders and personal piety are shown to matter, but only up to a point. Here, I refer to calculated McFadden's pseudo-R squared, a statistic capturing the amount of variation explained by each regression. In Table 29.2, the pseudo-R squared statistics associated with the reduced regressions are, in each case, quite low. (The addition of the demographic covariates raises pseudo-R squared in each case, highlighting the importance of age, education, urban geography in predicting protest behavior.) These low values indicate that the factors under consideration in this chapter, while meaningful, constitute only some among many factors driving individuals to protest in each country. When it comes to explaining revolution in the Middle East, political Islam is one piece of a large and complex puzzle.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I will draw out key implications from the analyses presented in this chapter and address several alternative factors that may also have contributed to our observed outcomes.

First, we must recognize important variations in the political role of Islamists during the North African uprisings. Each principle Islamist party responded differently to the revolutionary wave. I have argued that Islamist parties' decisions to enter into revolutionary protests (or not) were primarily strategic, rather than ideological, or even theological. There is scant evidence to suggest that parties' decisions were based on any particular interpretation of religious text or tradition. In other words, there was nothing particularly *Islamic* about the ways in which Islamist organizations responded to the Arab Spring. That the Muslim Brotherhood's entry into the uprisings mirrored the process by which the UGTT came to participate in Tunisian protests reinforces the notion that Islamist and secular organizations, confronted with similar circumstances, made similar calculations.

Further, none of the Islamists in question were monolithic in their response. Decisions to participate or not participate were contested among leadership and among the rank-and-file. Generational splits were germane in many cases, with younger Islamists advocating for a more active oppositional role. In Egypt, younger members were able to sway senior leadership to join the protests. In Morocco, they failed to do so—largely because of the PJD's strategic calculations outlined above. Nonetheless, these internal debates speak to tremendous range in the ways that Islamists and Islamist organizations responded to the prospect of political revolution. Cross-national studies that use the prevalence of Islam as a "dummy" in regression analyses, particularly in addressing questions like regime change and democracy, should take note of this essential diversity.

Second, the multivariate survey analyses serve to remind us that Islamist beliefs and adherence to an Islamist organization represent only two among many factors shaping an individual's protest behavior. This chapter has not focused on the nonpolitical components of religious life in North Africa, but nonetheless we see evidence of mosque attendance associated positively with protest behavior. These regressions likewise affirm the crucial role played by demographic variables: across the board, citizens who are younger, more educated, and live in urban areas were far more likely to protest. Organizational studies (much like the first half of this chapter) tend to focus on *one* associational sector—the role of religious parties, the role of labor unions, and so on. Survey analyses by nature allow for multiple "explanations" for behavioral outcomes to coexist. This multifactor framework resonates with recent research on revolutions, which has stressed the diversity of revolutionary coalitions and the multiplicity of revolutionary actors involved in successful movements (Beissinger 2013).

Third, the role of Islamist parties in revolutionary events did not appear to determine their popularity during post-revolutionary elections. Islamists across the three cases swept the next round of elections in 2011–2012.[10] This dynamic is particularly interesting in the case of Tunisia, where Islamists won the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections despite the much larger role of secular organizations in the 2011 revolution. Ennahda's political dominance of the early transitional period—a coda to its impressive performance in the 1989 elections—helps to dispel a potential challenge to the argument that state repression is to blame for the nonexistence of organized political Islam in late-twentieth-century Tunisia. There exists a popular perception that Tunisian society is more secular-minded than other Arab countries, dating back to the Westernizing program of the postcolonial president Habib Bourguiba. Tunisia's purported secularity may pose a challenge to the argument that the Ennahda movement was weakened primarily by repression. Such a culturalist argument may hold instead that Ennahda did not maintain or mobilize formal networks of supporters in 2011 simply because Tunisians lacked interest in Islamist ideas. The 2011 elections demonstrated that the Islamist politics maintained significant popular appeal, and—most likely—that citizens understood that repression was to blame for Ennahda's low profile during the revolution.

Finally, the comparative analysis sheds light on which technologies of authoritarian rule may lead opposition parties to join the revolutionary coalition. Many scholars of political Islam have advanced and refuted the "inclusion-moderation" hypothesis—the notion that by incorporating Islamist organizations and citizens within the political system, authoritarian rulers could render these parties less likely to revolt against the state (Schwedler 2011). Whatever its empirical merits, autocrats in many cases seem to have embraced this wisdom, as regimes across the region began to accept Islamist electoral candidates in the 1980s and 1990s. Many regimes also tempered inclusion with violence, producing an ambivalent stasis of accommodation and repression. Islamists were neither fully accepted nor entirely routed. Yet, per the case of Egypt, these precise conditions appear to have led to the highest odds of Islamist participation in the revolution. Though far from definitive, this chapter provides some novel indication that the "mixed strategy" of carrots and sticks for opposition movements—in some ways, the gold standard for entrenched authoritarians in the early 21st century—may eventually backfire.

NOTES

1. For the former, see Grewal et al 2019; Nugent, Masoud, and Jamal 2016; Hoffman and Jamal 2014. For the latter, see Schwedler 2006; Clark 2004; Wolf 2017; Storm 2007; Brooke 2019; Nugent 2020.
2. Revolutionary organizations are conceptualized per McCarthy and Zald's (1977) more general criteria social movement organizations: "formal and complex organizations which align their interests with the movement and attempts to implement these goals."
3. Labor unions in particular have played such a role in turning organized interests toward a revolutionary posture, as in the cases of Peru and Argentina (Collier and Mahoney 1997).
4. Most Arab Barometer surveys since 2013, for example, have asked citizens about their participation in the 2011 uprisings.
5. See, for example, Blaydes 2011; Masoud 2014; Wickham 2013; Wolf 2017; Storm 2007; Schwedler 2006; Clark 2004.
6. Masoud (2011) refers to Mubarak-era elections as "stage-managed to generate victories for the ruling party."
7. Brotherhood scholars have argued that the Brotherhood's main constituency comprises middle-class professionals (Clark 2004).

8. Wave III of the Arab Barometer includes surveys from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Further information and data downloads for Wave III may be found at https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/arab-barometer-wave-iii/.
9. These findings contradict prior findings based on 2011 Arab Barometer data. Hoffman and Jamal (2014) find that Qurʾan reading positively predicts protest, and that mosque attendance does not.
10. Though the pendulum has since swung back somewhat—as tends to happen in democracy—PJD and Ennahda remain potent political forces in Morocco and Tunisia. The Brotherhood in Egypt has been heavily repressed since General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power, in a situation reminiscent of 1990s Tunisia. Electoral developments since 2011 are beyond the scope of this chapter; see Nugent's chapter.

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PART V

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES

CHAPTER 30

RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY AND LONG-RUN ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST

JARED RUBIN

For centuries following the spread of Islam, the Middle East was the economic, technological, and cultural leader of western Eurasia. Middle Eastern trade flowed much more widely, its cities were larger, its urbanization rates were higher, and its scientific production was greater than the "Christian West" (Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden 2013; Chaney 2016; Kuru 2019). This can easily be seen in Table 30.1, which lists the top eight most populous cities in western Eurasia from 800 to 1800. Urban population is one of the best proxies we have for premodern economic development. Large urban populations were indicative of a significant agricultural surplus, and it was mostly in urban areas where luxury goods were produced, traded, and consumed. These data tell a tale of a reversal of fortunes. Between 800 and 1100, the only city that could rival the Abbasid capital of Baghdad was the Byzantine capital Constantinople. The rest of the largest cities were Muslim-ruled, either in the Abbasid homeland (in Iraq) or in Muslim Spain.

This began to change in the late medieval and early modern periods, and at some point there was a reversal of fortunes. This reversal occurred well before the Industrial Revolution set parts of Western Europe on a fundamentally different economic trajectory. Middle Eastern wages fell behind those of Europe's leading economies, European technology well surpassed that of the Middle East, and Middle Eastern states struggled to collect the revenues to rival their increasingly wealthy European counterparts (Mokyr 1990; Özmucur and Pamuk 2002; Karaman and Pamuk 2013). Why did this reversal of fortunes occur? That is the question this chapter aims to shed some light on. It overviews some of the key theories of divergence in the literature and considers how they interact with each other to paint a fuller picture of the causes of economic divergence.

Table 30.1: Top Eight Most Populous Cities in Western Eurasia, 800–1800

City	Population (1000s)	Religion	City	Population (1000s)	Religion	City	Population (1000s)	Religion
800 CE			900 CE			1000 CE		
Baghdad	350	Muslim	Baghdad	450	Muslim	Baghdad	300	Muslim
Constantinople	250	Christian	Constantinople	300	Christian	Constantinople	300	Christian
Basra	100	Muslim	Fustat (Cairo)	150	Muslim	Fustat (Cairo)	135	Muslim
Fustat (Cairo)	100	Muslim	Alexandria	100	Muslim	Cordoba	100	Muslim
Kayrawan	100	Muslim	Cordoba	95	Muslim	Sevilla	90	Muslim
Kufa	100	Muslim	Basra	80	Muslim	Tinnis	83	Muslim
Alexandria	95	Muslim	Kufa	80	Muslim	Damietta	80	Muslim
Cordoba	75	Muslim	Wasit	80	Muslim	Alexandria	60	Muslim
1100 CE			1200 CE			1300 CE		
Baghdad	250	Muslim	Baghdad	200	Muslim	Paris	250	Christian
Constantinople	200	Christian	Fustat (Cairo)	200	Muslim	Fustat (Cairo)	220	Muslim
Fustat (Cairo)	150	Muslim	Paris	110	Christian	Granada	150	Muslim
Tinnis	110	Muslim	Constantinople	100	Christian	Venice	110	Christian
Damietta	100	Muslim	Damietta	100	Muslim	Damietta	108	Muslim
Sevilla	85	Muslim	Fez	80	Muslim	Constantinople	100	Christian
Cordoba	80	Muslim	Sevilla	80	Muslim	Genoa	100	Christian
Marakesh	70	Muslim	Marakesh	70	Muslim	Milan	100	Christian
1400 CE			1500 CE			1600 CE		
Fustat (Cairo)	250	Muslim	Constantinople	280	Muslim	Constantinople	700	Muslim
Paris	200	Christian	Paris	200	Christian	Paris	300	Christian

Genoa	100	Christian	Fustat (Cairo)	180	Muslim	Naples	275	Christian
Granada	100	Muslim	Adrianople	127	Muslim	Fustat (Cairo)	250	Muslim
Tunis	100	Muslim	Naples	125	Christian	London	200	Christian
Venice	100	Christian	Milan	100	Christian	Venice	151	Christian
Prague	95	Christian	Tunis	100	Muslim	Adrianople	150	Muslim
Baghdad	90	Muslim	Venice	100	Christian	Sevilla	135	Christian
1700 CE			1800 CE					
Constantinople	700	Muslim	London	948	Christian			
London	575	Christian	Paris	550	Christian			
Paris	500	Christian	Constantinople	500	Muslim			
Fustat (Cairo)	330	Muslim	Naples	430	Christian			
Naples	300	Christian	Fustat (Cairo)	263	Muslim			
Amsterdam	200	Christian	Vienna	247	Christian			
Lisbon	180	Christian	Amsterdam	217	Christian			
Madrid	140	Christian	Dublin	200	Christian			

Source: Data from Bosker et al. (2013).

Before addressing possible causes of divergence, it is necessary to dismiss the old trope of there being something "inherent" in the nature of Islam that made it more conservative, less conducive to change, or more antithetical to economic growth. This was the standard hypothesis of Western scholars in the early 20th century (Weber 1922; von Grunebaum 1966; Lewis 1982, 2002; Landes 1998). The biggest problem such explanations face is that they have a difficult time explaining the reversal of fortunes: if Islam is so detrimental to economic development, how can we explain the "Golden Age," when the Islamic world was far ahead of Western Europe? In any case, placing the blame on religion fails to recognize that, for all their differences, Islam and Christianity are *much* closer in doctrine and practice than they are apart.

Four recent theories of divergence attempt to account for the reversal of fortunes in a more nuanced, satisfying manner than simple explanations based on solely cultural or religious differences. I briefly discuss them here before returning to them in the concluding section. Timur Kuran has argued in a series of articles and his 2011 book *The Long Divergence* that aspects of Islamic law held the Middle East back. His argument does not merely regurgitate the simplistic argument that Islam is inimical to economic success. Instead, he argues that aspects of Islamic law arose in a premodern setting and were at one point in time conducive to economic growth. These parts of Islamic law became stifling over time for unforeseeable reasons. Examples, which we will detail later in this chapter, include laws on inheritance, partnerships, and legal biases favoring Muslims. Kuran argues that these laws—and the institutions that emerged in response to them, such as the waqf—stifled demand for changes to the law, even as changing economic conditions made such changes more beneficial. This in turn held the Middle East back just as Western Europe was beginning to re-emerge from its long economic doldrums following the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

Blaydes and Chaney (2013) offer a theory of political divergence that has implications for the economic divergence. They argue that the fact that Middle Eastern rulers had access to slave soldiers (*mamluks*) meant that they did not need to bargain with other elites in society to stay in power. In Europe, following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, rulers were relatively weak, forcing them to bargain with local (feudal) lords for revenue and military power. One result of these differing institutional arrangements was that power was more dispersed in Western Europe, meaning there were fewer powerful groups that were dissatisfied with the prevailing political authority. As a result, European rulers were more secure in their tenure following the European feudal revolution. Perhaps even more importantly from an economic perspective, this institutional arrangement entailed that European leaders were more constrained in their lawmaking than were Middle Eastern rulers. A large literature suggests that greater executive constraint in Europe permitted its economies to flourish (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Tilly 1990).

A third theory is put forth by Rubin (2017), who argues that the reversal of economic fortunes was a result of the different degrees to which rulers employed religious legitimacy in the Middle East and Western Europe. This theory, which will be elaborated upon in the remainder of this chapter, argues that religious legitimacy played an economically beneficial role in the centuries following the spread of Islam, as the spread of Islamic-based legal and economic institutions over a previously politically fractured land helped lower transaction costs and facilitated interpersonal trust, which is essential for economic exchange. Over time, however, reliance on political legitimacy meant that economic elites were kept away from the political bargaining table. The opposite was true in late medieval Western Europe, where the economic elite gained a political voice via their role in parliaments. Rubin argues that this helped place parts of Europe (specifically England and the Dutch Republic, where parliaments gained the most autonomy) on the path to economic success. This was not because the economic elite were more altruistic or intelligent, but because their own self-interest tended to coincide with the types of outcomes that yield economic success. They desired things like strong property rights (for themselves, at least) and expensive public goods such as transport networks. Since the English and Dutch economic elite had a much stronger seat at the political bargaining table, they tended to achieve their desired outcomes.

A fourth theory, highly related to the one proposed by Rubin (2017), is put forth by Kuru (2019). Kuru largely has the same premise as Rubin. He argues that the "ulema-state alliance" which formed in the eleventh century, is responsible for the ultimate economic decline of the Middle East. Like Rubin, Kuru argues that this institutional arrangement is not a natural state of things, but instead is something that emerged as the Golden Age of Islam concluded. He argues that this alliance helped place Muslim intellectuals and merchants on the sidelines, while raising the status of religious authorities. Ultimately, there is significant overlap with Rubin—and the theory overviewed in this chapter.

This chapter will primarily focus on laying out theories of political legitimacy, how political legitimacy can affect economic development, and how this can help us understand the economic divergence between Western Europe and the Middle East. It will briefly conclude by recounting the four theories highlighted above, noting how they complement each other.

A Theory of Political Legitimacy

Rubin (2017) presents a framework for understanding how political legitimacy affects economic outcomes. Its intuition is straightforward. It considers the vexing problem faced by any ruler: How does one stay in power and have one's subjects follow the preferred laws and policies? Different societies have answered this question in different ways, and the framework proposed by Rubin attempts to flesh out the economic implications of how this question is answered.[1]

The framework begins by noting that there are two primary reasons why people might follow a ruler: there is either some extrinsic motivation (coercion) or some intrinsic motivation. The latter motivation is what we shall denote as legitimacy: people follow a ruler because they believe that she or he has the *right to rule* and thus be obeyed. This conceptualization of legitimacy is similar to the dominant Weberian idea of legitimacy, which states that legitimacy stems from either charismatic, traditional, or legal-rational grounds (Weber 1947). It also builds off of the framework proposed by Lipset (1959, 86), who defines legitimacy as "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society."[2] In other words, how one derives legitimacy is dependent on a society's history and its informal institutions that facilitate beliefs in a ruler's right to rule.

The Weberian definition largely views legitimacy as *exogenous*. That is, legitimacy is a result of the traits of the person or the traditions of the society. While Rubin does not deny the importance of such exogenous characteristics, his theory focuses on how legitimacy is *endogenously* generated.[3]

How does a ruler obtain legitimacy (and coercion)? Importantly, there are people in society who can provide both of these. Rubin calls these legitimating (and coercive) *agents*.[4] For some reason in a society's past, certain individuals—whom we shall call *elites*—have the power to influence the beliefs of others. Indeed, this is what makes them elite. This power can be used in many ways, including augmenting beliefs about who is the rightful ruler. Examples include religious authorities, local lords, tribal chiefs, military heroes, and celebrities. The endorsement of these individuals can be a powerful means of keeping a ruler in power.

Of course, elites do not provide legitimacy or coercion free of charge. They expect something in return. Sometimes this is something small, like tax exemptions or monetary payouts. However, if these agents have a powerful enough bargaining position, they can ask for a bigger prize: a say in the society's laws and policies. Hence, we can view a society's laws and policies as an outcome of a bargaining game between a ruler and the various agents that provide the ruler with legitimacy and coercion. Bentzen and Gokmen (2020) show, for instance, that a society is more likely to have religious laws if it were historically hierarchical and held widespread beliefs in punishing gods. Such societies were likely to have institutionalized religion and given political power to religious authorities.

An interesting implication of this political bargain can be seen in medieval Egypt, where rulers relied heavily on religious authorities for legitimacy. Chaney (2013) shows that religious authorities gained power and were more secure in their rule when the Nile River was either dangerously high or low (meaning flood or drought conditions). This is precisely when a ruler would need legitimacy, and thus when the bargaining power of the religious establishment would be greatest. But why, more generally, do political bargaining outcomes differ over time and space?

The outcome of any bargain relies heavily on two features: the bargaining power of the players and what they want to get out of the bargain. The latter is dependent on the *identities* of the parties at the bargaining table. The economic elite, religious authorities, and military all want different laws and policies. In each case, we can assume that they desire outcomes that benefit their self-interest. But what determines who gets a seat at the bargaining table? And how is their bargaining power determined?

A society's *institutions* determine the costs and benefits of various forms of political legitimacy and coercion. These institutions differ by society and evolve endogenously over time, meaning that the task of finding the "root causes" of differing political arrangements is inherently a historical one. For the purposes of the current framework, we will focus on institutions that make various sources of legitimacy or coercion particularly effective or inexpensive from the perspective of the ruler. For instance, religious doctrine and institutions that are conducive to legitimating rule make religious legitimacy more effective. Likewise, institutional features that give rulers power independent of the elite make them less dependent on other agents to keep them in power, thus strengthening the bargaining power of the ruler and weakening that of all others. This is one dimension on which Blaydes and Chaney's (2013) argument sheds significant light. Muslim rulers had substantial power independent of other elites because they had access to slave soldiers. Rulers typically did not need to appeal to other elites for resources or military power, and they could thus cut these elites out of the political bargaining table. On the other hand, weaker medieval European rulers depended on their feudal lords for military service and revenue, without which rule would have been impossible and the threat of conflict constant. This meant that medieval European feudal lords had substantial influence at the political bargaining table.

Political outcomes in any society are therefore determined by the identities of the various players at the political bargaining table and their bargaining power, both of which are in turn determined by a society's institutional and historical past. But who were the people who were *actually* at the political bargaining table in the medieval and early modern Middle East and Western Europe? The answer to this question matters for the outcome of the political bargain, because this outcome reflects both the bargaining power and the interests of those at the table. Religious authorities desire different outcomes than do economic elites, who desire different outcomes than military elites, and so on.

In both Islamic and Christian histories, religion has played an important role in legitimating rule. There is one important reason this has been such a persistent phenomenon: religious legitimacy is *inexpensive* relative to other forms of legitimacy or coercion (Gill 1998). Military expenditures require resources, and economic elites tend to want the "big prize"—property rights—as well as expensive investments like transport networks or security (to facilitate trade). Religious authorities can often be "bought" more cheaply; for example, tax exemptions, some policy favoring their interests (which are often orthogonal to economic development), and suppression of rival religions are often enough to win favor with religious authorities. Religious authorities are also effective at legitimating rule (although the next section makes the case that their efficacy differed in Islam and Christianity). There are many reasons this is the case. First and foremost, in both Islam and Christianity, religious authorities are the primary interpreters of religious doctrine. To the extent that the population has internalized religious rules as those that are the appropriate ones to live by,[5] this gives religious authorities power to affect the beliefs of the population. What is pertinent here is that this allows religious authorities to affect beliefs about the ruler's right to rule. Moreover, religious authorities tend to have more personal contact with the population. In the medieval and early modern Islamic and Christian worlds, people would regularly see a local religious figure, often multiple times a week. This would be the closest that many people would come to an "elite" in their lives (although not all religious figures were "elite"). Friday or Sunday sermons gave religious authorities a pulpit to spread ideas that were common knowledge to everyone in attendance. Of course, this pulpit could also be used to support the ruler. The Ottomans were well known for doing just this: it was common that the Friday sermon would include a prayer for the sultan, thus linking him with religious authority.[6]

Since religious authorities were effective at providing legitimacy while also being relatively inexpensive, rulers in both Islam and Christianity brought religious authorities to the bargaining table. This strengthened their own capacity to rule while also strengthening their own hand vis-à-vis alternative sources of legitimacy and coercion. Yet although religious legitimacy is relatively inexpensive, the next section makes the case that its efficacy differed between the two religions because of differing historical circumstances. This meant that Islam was more effective at legitimating rule, and Islamic religious authorities thus tended to have a larger seat at the political bargaining table. The remainder of the chapter lays out the consequences of this historical and institutional arrangement.

THE LURE OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY

The efficacy of religious legitimacy in Islam was a result of the circumstances under which it was founded. Islam formed conterminously with empire—the early Islamic empires were among the largest (in land mass) the world had seen up to that point (see Table 30.2). In the span of less than a century, the "Islamic world" stretched from South Asia in the east to the Iberian Peninsula in the west. At the same time, the corpus of Islamic law was being formulated, synthesizing existing traditions with dictates attributed to Muhammad. Importantly, the corpus of Islamic law arose at precisely the time that various rulers were attempting to legitimate their rule in the context of an Islamic empire.

The first four caliphs after Muhammad (the Rashidun Caliphate) derived legitimacy from the fact that they were Muhammad's companions. At this time, the institutions of Islamic law were hardly established and there was no clerical class to serve as a legitimating agent of their rule. For this reason, the first four caliphs faced major legitimacy crises: three of the four were assassinated, and succession disputes caused the Sunni-Shiʿa split. Without a set of agents who could bolster their legitimacy, the first caliphs claimed religious authority for themselves. Under this conception, the fact that they had ties to Muhammad was enough to make them the rightful rulers of all Muslims. None of their successors could claim such ties, although the Umayyad Empire (661–750 CE), the Sunni successors to the first four caliphs, employed the legitimating concept

Table 30.2: Largest Empires in World History, through 1750

Empire	Birth Year	Death Year	Peak Land Mass (million km^2)	Muslim
Mongol	1206 CE	1502 CE	33.2	No
Russian	1462 CE	1795 CE	16.5	No
Umayyad	661 CE	750 CE	13.2	Yes
Qing	1644 CE	1911 CE	12	No
Qin	247 bce	209 bce	12	No
Abbasid	750 CE	861 CE	11	Yes
Rashidun	632 CE	661 CE	9	Yes

Note: replicated from Rubin (2017, Table 3.1); data source is Iyigun (2010).

that they were the "deputies of God" (*khalifat Allah*) to justify their right to rule (Crone and Hinds 1986).

Unlike the stereotype of Islamic religious authority exemplified by the first four caliphs and the Umayyad Caliphate, in which all religious authority is vested in the caliph (Lewis 2002), religious authorities from the eighth century onward had authority that was independent of the ruler. It was precisely in this period that the sunna (exemplary actions of Muhammad) and hadith (reports of the teachings of Muhammad) were codified. Ultimately, these religious doctrines were codified as a source of law, although this took centuries (Hallaq 2005, especially chapter 5). As a result, the Islamic legitimating concept changed as the religious establishment began to be consolidated by the turn of the eighth century (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; Berkey 2003; Hallaq 2005; Coşgel et al. 2009). Leading jurists would regularly hand out opinions in accordance with Islam and would employ independent reasoning (*ijtihād*) to mold Islamic law in response to new exigencies. Once the clerical class consolidated, they formed a group capable of serving as legitimating agents of Muslim rulers. This process began in earnest in the mid-tenth century when the weakness of the Abbasid Empire became apparent. Their political weakness increased the value of religious legitimacy (Coşgel et al. 2009). The preeminence of the clerical class was not achieved, however, until the eleventh century, when the four schools of Sunni Islam consolidated, and a ruler-cleric alliance emerged throughout much of the (Sunni) Islamic world (Kuru 2019). On the one hand, this was good for Muslim rulers—independent legitimating agents are more effective because they are not under the ruler's thumb (Greif and Rubin 2020). On the other hand, it meant that Muslim rulers had to cede more to religious authorities, whom they could not control, in return for legitimacy.

Importantly, the confluence of the consolidation of the religious establishment along with expanding empires seeking to justify their rule meant that there was much to be gained from a unifying ideology that associated Islam with political legitimacy.

Consequently, there are numerous passages of Islamic doctrine that demand obedience to a ruler who acts in accordance with Islam. This is perhaps most vividly seen in the hadith of al-Bukhari, which are among the most important and influential in Islam (quoted in Rubin 2017, 52):

> The Prophet said, "A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it. (Vol. 9, Book 89, No. 258)

This is not to say that doctrine is the reason that Muslim religious authorities have the capacity to legitimate rule. Doctrine can always be interpreted to fit the needs of the day, as indeed it has in both Islamic and Christian history (Noonan 2005). In fact, most religious doctrine should be viewed as an *outcome* of a bargaining process between religious authorities and other interested parties (political authorities, economic elites, military elites, etc., depending on the case; see Rubin 2011 for a theoretical exposition). Islamic doctrine in support of associating political legitimacy with "being a good Muslim" is no different. It was a manifestation of the institutional environment that pervaded the earliest Islamic polities: the Rashidun Caliphate, the Umayyad Empire, and the Abbasid Empire.

Even though the institutions of later Muslim empires were different from their predecessors, their institutions did not arise in a vacuum. The elements that worked in the past tended to be used in the future, albeit in different forms. Indeed, Turkic empires like the Ottomans could clearly not claim a bloodline to the Prophet (as could, say, the Rashidun and Umayyad caliphs), but were clearly aware of the potency of religious legitimacy. The Ottomans brought the religious establishment into the state. In return for their patronage, the sultanate received fatwas from their Grand Muftis on all sorts of issues. This gave the sultan religious cover for what would have otherwise been controversial actions. The point here is simply that the Ottomans (and many other medieval and early modern Muslim states) were acting in accordance with a long-established tradition of appealing to religious authority to legitimate various aspects of their rule.

This stands in stark contrast with Christianity. While it is not worth going into early Christian history in detail, the differences of the origins of the two religions are key to why Islam is more effective at legitimating rule than Christianity.[7] The latter was born in the Roman Empire, which was hardly a newly expanding empire. The Roman political elite had numerous mechanisms for legitimating their rule and did not need the support of a fledgling religion. In any case, Christianity was a minority religion for centuries. For this reason, early Christian doctrine is largely silent on the capacity of religion to legitimate secular power, and where it does speak its overarching premise is that secular authorities rule over their own sphere, separate from that of God. The most famous passage along these lines is attributable to Jesus: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).[8]

The fact that Islam is so effective at legitimating rule means that it has historically been—and continues to be today—attractive for rulers to use to legitimate their rule. Consider what this means in the context of the framework laid out in the previous section. In that framework, rulers choose to negotiate with agents who can provide some combination of legitimacy and coercion based on the costs and benefits that each can provide. Since Islamic doctrine is so explicit in stating that one should follow a ruler who "acts in accordance with Islam," Muslim religious authorities are an extremely effective source of legitimacy. They are, after all, the ones who can determine what it means to act in accordance with Islam. This is all the more the case when compared with Christianity, for which there is less doctrinal and institutional basis for legitimating rule. This is not to say that Christianity cannot be used to legitimate rule—it clearly has been used in that way, especially in the medieval period. It is just that Islam and its institutions are more effective. This means that the benefits to rulers of negotiating with Muslim clerics exceeds that of negotiating with Christian clerics. In the context of the framework proposed previously, this means that (all else being equal) Muslim rulers will employ religious legitimacy to a greater degree than their Christian counterparts. In turn, Muslim religious authorities will have a greater seat at the political bargaining table, and their desires will be reflected to a greater extent in the laws and policies of society.

To be clear, this does *not* mean that "church-state separation" is inherent in Christianity or inherently opposed in Islam. Such separation, or lack thereof, is a choice made by various elites at various points in time, subject to the institutional environment they find themselves in and the incentives provided by these institutions. It *does* mean, however, that Muslim rulers historically had *greater incentive* to bring religious authorities to the political bargaining table. This can explain the relatively large role of the clerical class in historical Muslim polities. But there is nothing in the origins of Islam (or Christianity) that predetermined this outcome. What this means for the long-run economic trajectory of Muslim societies is the issue we will turn to next.

Religious Legitimacy and the "Long Divergence"

The theoretical framework proposed earlier, combined with the historical "lure" of Islamic religious legitimacy overviewed in the previous section, sheds light on numerous aspects of the "Long Divergence" between the economies of the Middle East and Western Europe. After the Sunni religious establishment consolidated in the eighth and ninth centuries and the major schools of Islamic thought solidified by the end of the tenth century, reinterpretation of Islamic law slowed in spite of changing economic circumstances. Western scholars denoted this phenomenon as the "closing of the gate of *ijtihād*" (independent reasoning). While there is plenty of evidence that the gate was hardly closed in theory or in practice, there is also evidence, overviewed by Rubin

(2011, 2017), that reinterpretation did slow after this period. Yet, as the framework above emphasizes, this was not due to some inherent "conservatism" or backward-looking nature of Islam. Instead, it can be seen as an equilibrium outcome in which rulers derived legitimacy from clerics, clerics received favorable laws and policies in return, and the masses risked transgressing both secular and religious authorities should they violate religious law. In this interpretation, the "gate of *ijtihād*" may have been closed (or ajar), but it was *not* locked. The political equilibrium simply dictated that there was little demand for change—and thus little change was supplied.

This outcome was reinforced and institutionalized in the eleventh century with the rise of madrasas as centers for Islamic learning (Kuru 2019). The rise of madrasas signaled a changing landscape, one that favored religious learning at the expense of scientific learning. Yet the increased importance of madrasas was not a cause of Islamic scientific decline; it was rather a manifestation of the changing political equilibrium that occurred over the previous century, in which religious legitimacy gained paramount importance. The rise of madrasas had numerous important implications for Muslim economic and scientific fortunes. Chaney (2016), in an extensive study of Islamic book production, finds that Islamic production of scientific works well outpaced that of Christendom during the "Islamic Golden Age," roughly the period from the seventh through tenth centuries. However, consistent with the theory espoused above, there was significant decline in Islamic scientific output beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as religious authorities gained greater political power throughout the Muslim world. Chaney notes that the rise of the madrasa system and the increased emphasis on religious works are the likely culprit. This, in turn, was a direct result of the increased importance of religious legitimacy in Muslim polities in this period. This finding is consistent with the one proposed by Kuru (2019), who argues that the strengthening of the cleric-state alliance in the eleventh century was responsible for the slowing down (although not elimination) of Muslim scientific and philosophical thought. The study of Blaydes, Grimmer, and McQueen (2018) reveals a related pattern. They find that texts offering advice on governance in the Muslim world increasingly emphasized religion over time, with an inflection point in the eleventh–thirteenth centuries. Meanwhile, late medieval European texts placed a decreasing emphasis on religious appeals over time. All of these findings suggest a rise in the importance of religious legitimacy toward the end of the Islamic Golden Age, which was reinforced and institutionalized by the spread of the madrasa system.

But why did this matter for economic outcomes? The framework proposed above indicates one possible reason. To the extent that religious authorities kept their place at the political bargaining table—at the expense of the economic elite—by refraining from accepting economically beneficial laws and policies, a dampening of economic activity should follow. There is reason to believe this is what happened. Among the most important mechanisms through which Muslim religious authorities kept their hold on power was their monopoly over numerous aspects of law, including commercial law, via Islamic courts. Kuran (2005, 2011) spells out numerous unforeseeable implications of this arrangement. One consequence resulted from Islamic law regarding partnerships and inheritance. Under Islamic partnership law, partnerships were disbanded upon the death of any member. This would only be a problem if the partnership were not immediately reformed; if it were not, the fixed (sunk) costs associated with the venture would be lost. However, Islamic inheritance laws placed a major impediment to partnerships reforming after the death of a member. The law provided specific guidance for who the rightful heirs of one's estate were, and the split was often among many individuals. If any of these heirs needed their inheritance for a pressing issue, they might not be willing to reinvest their inheritance in the partnership. As Kuran notes, this dampened incentives for Muslim merchants and others engaged in commerce to enter into long-lived partnerships with numerous individuals in the first place. Kuran contrasts this with Europe, where such impediments were not in place. Over time, marginal changes made to the partnerships and partnership law resulted in vastly more complex organizational forms, eventually culminating in the corporation.

There are many more unintended and unforeseeable economic consequences of the equilibrium in which Islamic law provided the dominant form of commercial law. For instance, Balla and Johnson (2009) note that the absence of the corporate form in the Islamic world meant that Ottoman tax farmers had no means of banding together to constrain sultans if the sultan encroached on their property rights (by confiscating their tax farms). Balla and Johnson compare this to the situation in France at the time, in which tax farmers did precisely this in order to have some bargaining power vis-à-vis the autocratic Bourbon crown. This was a consequence of Islamic law, which disincentivized individuals from building large and long-lasting enterprises. Kuran and Lustig (2012) show another negative effect that Islamic law had on commerce: it was biased towards individuals with some degree of power. In particular, they find that those with elite titles were more likely to win court cases, holding constant a number of factors that might affect the merit of the case. Kuran and Rubin (2018) show that these biases directly affected the interest rates paid by those with privilege in Islamic courts—not just the elites, but also men and Muslims, both of whom are favored by various proscriptions in Islamic law. They show that the privileged paid a price for their privilege: the interest rates they paid on private loans were 2–4 percentage points higher than their less privileged counterparts. Since the privileged were the most likely to have the means to invest in capital and business enterprises, the fact that they paid a higher cost for credit must have had a negative effect on the long-run trajectory of the Ottoman economy. Rubin (2010) shows yet another consequence of the dominance of Islamic law in commerce: the Islamic bill of exchange (*suftaja*) remained an instrument for merchants who wished to avoid the costs of carrying specie. This is only an obvious impediment to economic growth when seen in the light of the evolution of the European bill of exchange, which transformed into the most important financial instrument of late medieval Europe. The schools of Islamic law that considered the *suftaja* legal in the first place forbade their use as an instrument of finance, since this would have been too obviously in violation of the usury prohibition. The framework described earlier in this chapter suggests why such laws persisted for so long despite being economically harmful.

More generally, the economic elite had little seat at the political bargaining table for much of Middle Eastern history, especially after the consolidation of the clerical class in the tenth and eleventh centuries (Kuru 2019). This was particularly true in the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), where the religious establishment was brought into the apparatus of the state. This provided great flexibility for the Ottoman ruling elite—the Grand Mufti would generally find a way to make the sultan's desired policies consistent with some interpretation of Islam (Imber 1997)—even if it meant that the religious establishment was less independent and thus had a weaker capacity to legitimate rule. As a result, the Ottoman economic elite—merchants, money-changers, manufacturers—had little say in governance (Pamuk 2004a, 2004b). The reason is simple, and it follows directly from the framework proposed above: if Ottoman rulers did not have to bargain with the economic elite in order to have legitimacy or resources, there was little incentive for them to do so. As a result, the desires of the religious establishment were reflected in Ottoman laws and policies. One example of the consequences of this arrangement will suffice. Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin (2012a) argue that the Ottomans failed to adopt the printing press for nearly *250 years*, despite knowing about it, precisely because it would have undermined the monopoly of the clerical class on religious knowledge (a suspicion that proved prescient, as suggested by the Protestant Reformation). The Ottoman sultanate made printing in the Arabic script punishable by death. It is clear why the Ottomans would forgo the "free lunch" offered by the new and important technology in light of the framework proposed above. If the press threatened the power of one of the sultan's key legitimating agents, the sultan stood to lose an important source of his own power by permitting the press.

The failure to give a seat to the economic elite at the political bargaining table was the fundamental reason the Middle East fell behind Western Europe. In the leading European economies of the early modern period (England and the Dutch Republic), a series of events dramatically increased the bargaining power of economic elites in parliaments. Not surprisingly, a series of laws and policies aligned with their interests followed, including stronger protections of property rights; investments in public goods such as canals, poor relief, and turnpikes; and the strengthening of the rule of law. To be clear, the economic elite did not bargain for these laws out of some altruistic motive. They desired these laws for self-interested reasons. It just so happens that many (but *not* all) of the types of laws and policies desired by the economic elite were also beneficial for economic success.

Meanwhile, the dominant Middle Eastern power of the period—the Ottoman Empire—slowly fell behind its European rivals. This outcome was not obviously preordained. For most of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottomans were just as powerful as the leading European powers and not obviously behind economically. This changed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was known as the "sick man of Europe." This chapter suggests that there were deep historical roots to this reversal of fortunes. The failure of the Ottomans (and other Middle Eastern polities) to bring the economic elite to the political bargaining table was not a foolish mistake, nor was it a stroke of bad luck. The Ottoman ruling establishment was simply incentivized to *not* bring the economic elite to the bargaining table. What began as small economic differences were therefore magnified over time, and by the nineteenth century there was a clear economic and technological divergence between the Middle East and Western Europe.

Bringing the Theories Together

In the introduction, I noted that there have been four recent theories of the economic divergence between Western Europe and the Middle East: those proposed by Timur Kuran, Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney, myself, and Ahmet Kuru. I conclude this chapter by considering how these theories fit with each other.

It is my impression that the four theories *complement* each other. The most obvious similarity between the four is that all focus on the role of politics in the economic divergence. The closest connection is between Rubin (2017) and Kuru (2019), who both focus on the role that religious legitimacy has played in the political and economic fortunes of the Middle East. They differ a bit on why religious elites were able to achieve such power—Rubin focuses on the institutions that emerged in early Muslim states, while Kuru focuses on the institutionalization of madrasas in the eleventh century—but both recognize the role that religious authorities can play in dampening economic development when they are given a position of political power. The theory of Blaydes and Chaney (2013) similarly focuses on how rulers are constrained and what that means for economic development. Unlike Rubin and Kuru, whose primary (though not sole) focus is on religious authorities, Blaydes and Chaney focus on the role that military elites play in constraining rule. They emphasize the important distinction between European feudal lords and Muslim slave soldiers and their capacities to constrain and negotiate with their rulers. This theory is highly complementary to the ones proposed by Rubin and Kuru. Religious authorities were not the only group to constrain medieval and early modern rulers. Nor were military elites. Hence, while none of these three theories paint a complete picture of Middle Eastern and Western European governance, combined they come much closer to doing so. Finally, the arguments of Kuran (2011) reveal one of the most important reasons *why* religious legitimation had such a dampening effect on economic activity. In this light, Kuran is most closely related to Rubin and Kuru. As discussed above, the fact that religious authorities (ulema [or ʿulamaʾ]) had purview over most aspects of commercial law for much of the medieval and early modern periods had numerous unforeseeable, yet damaging effects, on economic development. Kuran highlights why this was the case. Yet it was the very fact that religious authorities played such an important political role that permitted them to maintain their purview over commercial law in the first place.

In short, each of the four theories has something unique to say about the long-run economic divergence between Western Europe and the Middle East. Such a long-run, wide-spanning event is bound to have multiple causes, and these theories focus on three of those causes. In fact, each theory helps shed some light on the others. Combined, they provide a complex, nondeterministic story for why the Middle East fell behind Europe despite being so far ahead in the centuries following the initial spread of Islam.

NOTES

1. For a similar framework that also considers how the cultural/religious evolution of a society interacts with legitimating and institutional changes in that society over time, see Bisin et al. (2020).
2. For similar definitions of political legitimacy, see Razi (1990); Levi, Sacks, and Tyler (2009); Greif and Tadelis (2010); and Greif and Rubin (2020).
3. Greif and Rubin (2020) expand significantly on the notion of endogenously generated legitimacy. Their paper, however, primarily focuses on early modern England.
4. For more on the theory of legitimating agents, see Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin (2012a, 2012b).
5. The degree to which society is religious is endogenous to the degree to which religious authorities have political power. See Bisin et al. (2020) for a theoretical exposition of this insight.
6. Religious authorities in both Islam and Christianity had many other sources of power vis-à-vis local populations. For one, they were the primary providers of poor relief. They could also be used to maintain social control, especially during periods of political turmoil.
7. For much more on the differences between the legitimating conceptions in Islam and Christianity and their effects on economic outcomes, see Rubin (2011, 2017).
8. Platteau (2017) and Auriol and Platteau (2017) argue that a different, but related, institutional difference between Islam and Christianity is salient with respect to economic and political outcomes: the (de)centralization of religious institutions. Their theoretical insight is that in a decentralized system, like that of Sunni Islam, a ruler will have to co-opt (for legitimacy) the *marginal* cleric, leaving some, more radical, clerics outside of the ruling coalition. Meanwhile, under a centralized system, like Catholicism, rulers only have to co-opt the *average* cleric, and the church will make sure all others fall in line. One insight that stems from this logic is that Muslim rulers are more likely to have challenges from radical authorities. This means that inter-clerical competition could (and did) arise in Islam, but only those clerics sufficiently in line with the state would be co-opted by the state. Platteau and Auriol's arguments are hardly inconsistent with the ones proposed in this chapter. Both view religious legitimacy as an essential part of Middle Eastern and European political history, and they provide complementary explanations regarding how legitimacy affects political and economic outcomes.

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CHAPTER 31

ISLAM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Case of Non-Muslim Minorities in the Middle East and North Africa

MOHAMED SALEH

The conjecture that Islam has a detrimental impact on economic development in the Middle East and North Africa (henceforth, MENA) is an old one, dating back to the pioneering European scholarship on the region in the nineteenth century. During the twentieth century, Bernard Lewis put this conjecture in a more concrete form in his influential study of the region (Lewis 2002). There are typically two main historical puzzles to which this conjecture offers an answer. First, MENA is much poorer than Europe, which is known as the "Divergence Puzzle": After the so-called Golden Age of Islam, which lasted roughly from the seventh to the eleventh century, why did MENA lag behind Europe at some point in the early modern period, or during the late Middle Ages? Second, within MENA, Muslims tend to be poorer, more rural, and less educated, on average, than the native (non-European) non-Muslim minorities, such as Coptic Christians, Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Levantines, Rabbinic Jews, and Karaite Jews. The "Islam-based" set of explanations argues that there is something about Islam, either as a set of beliefs or as a set of institutions, that hindered the development of the MENA region as a whole, or at least of its Muslim population, vis-à-vis Europe or non-Muslim minorities in MENA.

An alternative conjecture traces the two phenomena to European colonialism. Instead of tracing the cause of MENA's or Muslims' underdevelopment to Islam, broadly defined, this conjecture seeks the cause in colonialization. Due to Europe's increased influence in the Ottoman Empire starting from the eighteenth century, and the subsequent direct colonization of the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the region was kept behind Europe. European powers also favored the region's non-Muslim minorities in various domains, including the capitulations and access to European legal structures (Issawi 1981; Kuran 2004), as well as access to European missionary or secular schooling. The colonialism explanation tends to be the preferred explanation by the nationalist postcolonial historiography in the MENA region.

While both conjectures have their own merits and are consistent with some of the empirical facts, there is a surmounting need for empirical evidence that puts these theories under close scrutiny. This chapter thus has three objectives. First, it attempts to provide the reader with a critical evaluation of these two theories by focusing on evidence on the second puzzle: the socioeconomic (henceforth, SES) inequality between non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority in the MENA region. The chapter's argument is based on the author's published research on SES inequality between Copts and Muslims in Egypt, the most populous MENA country, with its Coptic Christian population being the largest non-Muslim population (in absolute number) in the region. Using a wide range of novel primary data sources, I argue that the Coptic-Muslim SES gap cannot be explained by a causal negative impact on Muslims' economic development of "Islam," defined as a set of beliefs (cultural explanation) or a set of institutions (institutional explanation). Nor is it explained by the negative impact of colonization on Muslims. Instead, I trace the phenomenon to selection on SES during Egypt's conversion from Coptic Christianity to Islam following the Arab Conquest of the then-Coptic Egypt in 641 CE. Specifically, Arabs introduced a tax system that imposed a poll tax on every adult male Copt (initially, all Egyptians), which was removed only if he converted to Islam, and this poll tax remained until 1856. Because of the (quasi) lump-sum nature of the poll tax, it arguably led to the shrinkage of non-convert Copts into a better-off minority. I trace the subsequent persistence of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap to group restrictions on access to artisanal and white-collar occupations, which led the initial positive selection of non-converts to perpetuate.

Two remarks are in order. First, while Islamic taxation is an Islamic institution, the tax-induced conversion explanation of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap differs in an important way from the institutional explanation that traces Muslims' underdevelopment to "Islamic institutions." Specifically, the impact of taxation on the Coptic-Muslim SES gap operates only via screening/sorting of converts on SES during the historical formation phase of religious groups (Muslims and Copts). However, Islamic taxation does not impact converts' SES, once they become Muslims. This is in contrast to the institutional hypothesis that we find in the previous literature (e.g., Kuran 2004), where Islamic institutions affect Muslims' SES, taking their religious affiliation itself as exogenous. Second, taxation is not the sole cause of conversions or of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. There are many other processes that impacted the conversion process, and that altered the Coptic-Muslim SES gap, such as modern schooling and state industrialization. However, unlike the other explanations, the tax-induced conversion explanation offers a coherent explanation to both conversions and the Coptic-Muslim SES inequality. More importantly, it emphasizes the endogeneity of the formation of religious groups, and the ever-changing membership in these groups via conversions. This is often an overlooked fact in the recent literature on the economics of religion, which, in its attempt to identify the causal impact of religion on economic outcomes, tends to understudy the (self-)selection of individuals into religions.

The second objective of the chapter is to highlight the importance of relying on primary archival sources and the need for large-scale research projects that digitize the unearthed and under-studied data sources of the MENA region. There is a longstanding belief among researchers in Western academia that MENA is poor with respect to data. This is an unfounded belief. By and large, MENA possesses rich sources of data that are even on par with Western Europe and North America. Specifically, the chapter employs a wide range of novel data sources for Egypt (digitized by the author), including papyrological poll tax records in 641–1100, a dataset on occupations and religious affiliation constructed from the papyri in 641–969, a dataset on locations of Christian churches and monasteries in 1200 and 1500, and two nationally representative individual-level samples from Egypt's population censuses of 1848 and 1868. It also employs the subsequent village-level population census reports in 1897–1986 (CEDEJ 2003), and individual-level samples of Egypt's population censuses of 1986, 1996, and 2006 (available on IPUMS-International).

The third and final objective of the chapter is to introduce the reader (in the Conclusion section) to future areas of research and other archival data sources that remain undigitized and can potentially shed light, not only on the question of inter-religion SES inequality in the MENA region, but also on within-group inequality.

Copts' Population Share and the Coptic-Muslim SES Gap

Egypt was almost 100 percent Copt on the eve of the Arab Conquest in 641 CE. Tracing Copts' population share, and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap, is feasible for the period 1800–2000 using both archival and published population census data. Tracing both variables between 641 and 1800 is more difficult, though, in the absence of population censuses, which requires using nonstandard primary data sources. I discuss in this section the descriptive statistics in 1800–2000, before proceeding to the pre-1800 period.

Descriptive Statistics in 1800–2000

The proportion of non-Muslim minorities in the MENA region is a topic of heated and probably never-ending debate. In Egypt, the widely accepted figure of 10 percent is not based on any population census or household survey. In Lebanon, the last population census was conducted in 1932, due to the inter-religious tensions over the population share of each religious group.

In a similar vein, the socioeconomic superiority of the native non-Muslim minorities in the region in comparison to the Muslim majority has been long noted, albeit qualitatively, by various scholars, including Tagher ([1951] 1998), Issawi (1981), and Courbage and Fargues (1997). Copts, Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Catholic Levantines, Armenians, and Jews all tend to outperform Muslims in educational and occupational attainment during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They tend to have better health outcomes and to have witnessed the mortality and fertility decline earlier than Muslims (Courbage and Fargues 1997).

Understanding the facts about this phenomenon—its existence, magnitude, causes, and how it was impacted by colonization and state-led modernization over the last two centuries—is of major interest. This is not driven by mere historical curiosity, but also because of its implications for today's economic and political problems. Religious affiliation is still among the major sources of social segmentation in the region. In many ways, it is similar to race in the Americas. It is an inherited social marker that individuals do not typically choose. Inter-religion tensions, often caused by conflict over economic resources, have recently resurfaced and have made the democratic transition following the uprisings in 2010–2011 challenging (along with the Sunni-Shiʿite division among Muslims).[1]

Yet we lack comprehensive individual-level evidence on this phenomenon. What we have are historical narratives that tend to over-represent the urban elite of each religious group. We also have scattered statistics based on the published aggregate statistics in population census reports or statistical yearbooks that mostly come from the colonial/mandate period. Even the latter sources remain for the most part undigitized and under-studied. Saleh (2013) attempted to fill this gap in the literature by digitizing two nationally representative individual-level samples of the Egyptian population censuses of 1848 and 1868, from the original Arabic manuscripts that are preserved at the National Archives of Egypt. These are the earliest precolonial modern population censuses in the MENA region. They include information on every household member, including females, children, and slaves, and not only adult free males, as was the case with the Ottoman tax registers from the period.[2] They are in fact two of the earliest precolonial population censuses from any non-Western country.

Using this source, Saleh (2015) documents the educational and occupational differences across religious groups in mid-nineteenth-century Egypt. Egypt was an autonomous Ottoman province at the time, under the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha (reigned from 1805 to 1848) and his successors. The two censuses come from the precolonial period before the British colonization of Egypt in 1882. About 7 percent of the population was non-Muslim; 94 percent of these were Coptic Christians, 4 percent were non-Coptic Christians who included Levantines, Greeks, and Armenians, and 2 percent were Jews, both Rabbinic and Karaite.

The population census samples reveal that school enrollment in 1848 was the highest among Jews, followed by non-Coptic Christians, Coptic Christians, and Muslims. The data also reveal that non-Muslims were over-represented among white-collar workers and artisans and under-represented among farmers and unskilled (non-farmer) workers. But there were important differences across non-Muslim minorities. Whereas non-Coptic Christians and Jews were entirely urban minorities, Copts were mostly rural. And while the occupational advantage of non-Coptic Christians and Jews over Muslims stemmed from their over-representation among merchants, moneychangers, and jewelers, Copts' occupational advantage stemmed from their over-representation in the fiscal bureaucracy, in both urban and rural Egypt, and in artisanship, such as jewelers, carpenters, tailors, and weavers. If anything, Muslims were more likely than Copts to be merchants.

Saleh (2016) examines the urban quarter/village-level data in the subsequent published population census reports for Egypt from 1897 to 1986. These data enable us to document the long-term evolution of the proportion of non-Muslims and of the inter-religious educational and occupational differences during the twentieth century.[3] First, the proportion of non-Muslims increased slightly between 1897 and 1927, due to European immigration into Egypt, and then declined to reach 6 percent of the population in 2006, which is not very different from the proportion of non-Muslims in 1848. Second, examining the correlation at the quarter/village level between the proportion of non-Muslims and each of the male literacy rate (the proportion of the male population that is able to read and write), and the proportion of males who work in the non-agricultural sector, enables us to estimate the difference between non-Muslims and Muslims with respect to these outcomes.[4] The data reveal that both the educational and occupational gaps between non-Muslims and Muslims declined during the second half of the twentieth century.

A further piece of evidence comes from the 10 percent individual-level population census samples for 1986, 1996, and 2006. We are able to examine the differences in literacy, years of schooling, and being in a white-collar occupation by cohort of birth and religious affiliation.[5] Hence, we can trace the long-term evolution of the Christian-Muslim gap with respect to these outcomes among survivors in 1986, 1996, and 2006. This exercise reveals similar trends to those that we find in the urban quarter/village-level exercise. The literacy and years of schooling differentials went down among cohorts born in the second half of the twentieth century. The white-collar gap also declined. However, there is an interesting pattern here. While the proportion of white-collar workers was going up among both Christians and Muslims, it started to decline among the 1950s and 1960s cohorts of birth. This is likely because of the abolition in the 1980s of the employment guarantees in the government and public sectors for university and secondary schools graduates.

Descriptive Statistics before 1800

A more daunting task is to trace the population share of non-Muslims, let alone the inter-religious educational and occupational gap, before 1800. We know that non-Muslims constituted 100 percent of MENA's population before the Arab conquests of the region, which started in 632. But we do not know the evolution of this share between 632 and 1848 for Egypt (or 1881–1892 for the Levant and Iraq). The reason is that there are no population censuses before 1848 in Egypt, and before 1881–1892 in the Ottoman

Empire. The sixteenth-century Ottoman tax registers provide a further data point on the religious composition of households at the village level in the Levant ad Iraq. The aggregate statistics from this source reveal that non-Muslims were around 5–9 percent in Iraq and the Levant by 1600. The sixteenth-century Ottoman tax registers for Egypt are preserved at the National Archives of Egypt but have not yet been digitized.

To produce plausible estimates of MENA's religious composition during the millennium that elapsed between the Arab and the Ottoman conquests, we need to rely on other (non-census) sources. For Egypt, Saleh (2018) employs two medieval Coptic chronicles in 1200 and 1500 that list Christian churches and monasteries by location. They include both Coptic and non-Coptic ones. Using these lists, it is possible to estimate the proportion of villages that had at least one Christian church or monastery in 1200 and 1500, which can be used as an estimate of the proportion of non-Muslims under certain assumptions. The findings suggest that villages that had at least one Christian church or monastery were 16 percent of the total number of villages in 1200 and about 3 percent in 1500. This suggests that the majority of Copts' conversions to Islam happened between 641 and 1200.

Studying the Christian-Muslim occupational gap is more difficult because it requires having data on both religious affiliation and occupational title. The Arabic Papyrology Database (APD) offers some solution. Saleh (2018) collected all mentions of occupational titles and names of workers in the papyri between 641 and 969 (date of the Fatimid conquest). I then inferred religious affiliation from names. This data set reveals two findings. First, the Coptic-Muslim occupational gap first emerged between 641 and 969 and persisted through 1848 and 1868, as Copts are over-represented among white-collar workers and artisans and are under-represented among farmers and unskilled workers. Second, Copts were *not* a top political elite but rather an *apolitical (technocratic) middle class* in both rural and urban areas. The top white-collar jobs, such as high bureaucracy, judiciary, military, police, and (Muslim) clergy, were actually monopolized by Muslims by law. The source of Copts' occupational advantage over Muslims stemmed from their over-representation in the mid-low (fiscal) bureaucracy, such as scribes, tax collectors, accountants, and land surveyors, and in certain skilled artisanal jobs, such as carpenters, jewelers, tailors, and weavers.

DOES "ISLAM" EXPLAIN WHY MUSLIMS ARE WORSE OFF?

Why were non-Muslim minorities better off than the Muslim majority in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and even before? The first set of explanations traces the inter-religious SES inequality to Islam, either as a set of religious beliefs or as a set of institutions. If Muslims are poorer than non-Muslims, it is plausible that this is because Muslims endorse a specific set of beliefs about life that hinders economic success.

Three beliefs generally stand out in the literature as being pro-economic success: (1) the work ethic, and related beliefs such as thrift and the view of wealth as God's reward to individuals for exerting effort; (2) individualism, which facilitates the emergence of impersonal exchange; and (3) the salience of human capital formation. The work ethic explanation is due to Max Weber ([1905] 1930), who traced Protestants' superior economic outcomes in Europe to their stronger work ethic in comparison to Catholics. Extrapolating his thesis to other regions, he argued that the latter were not conducive to capitalism. The individualist/collectivist cultural belief can be found in Greif (1994), who postulated that collectivist cultures, including Islam, were less conducive to the emergence of impersonal exchange and third-party contract enforcement. The human capital formation belief has been suggested by recent scholarship in the economics of religion literature. Botticini and Eckstein (2005) argued that the literacy requirement introduced by Rabbinic Judaism in the second century CE led to the conversion of Jews with a weaker taste for education out of Judaism, and thus to the shrinkage of Rabbinic Jews into a better-off and educated minority. Becker and Woesmann (2009) showed that Protestants were better off than Catholics in nineteenth-century Prussia, not because of their stronger work ethic, but rather because of Protestants' emphasis on literacy and the formation of human capital.

The second explanation of the underdevelopment of Muslims traces the phenomenon to Islam, not as a set of beliefs, but rather as a set of institutions. The argument is that Islamic institutions subjected Muslims to certain constraints or rules that prevented them from economic growth, at least after a certain point in time. Lewis's (2002) influential thesis on Islam and economic development traces MENA's underdevelopment to the incompatibility between Islam and modernization, due to the inseparability of religion from the state in Islam, which (according to Lewis) dates from the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime. The pioneering work of Timur Kuran offers a more nuanced institution-based explanation, where Islamic institutions may have been pro-economic growth in the premodern period but hindered the economic growth of the region in the modern period. Kuran (2004) traced the rise of non-Muslim minorities to the fact that they had access to European legal systems via the capitulations system, unlike Muslims who did not have this access and thus had to resort to Islamic courts.

I argue that both the cultural and institutional explanations do not account for the superior socioeconomic outcomes of Copts in Egypt. Starting with the cultural explanation, it is widely accepted that Coptic Christianity, as a set of beliefs, does not put a particular emphasis on work ethic, individualism, or the formation of human capital, in comparison to Islam. First, Copts actually share with Egyptian Muslims (who were mostly Sufi Sunnis up to the mid-twentieth century) a mystic outlook on life that attributes materialistic success to metaphysical factors rather than to effort. The salience of saints and martyrs in popular Coptic Christianity resembles the salience of Sufi saints among Egyptian Muslims, and in fact many of the festivals of Coptic and Muslim saints are attended by both Muslims and Copts, especially in rural Egypt. Second, family values and collectivism are arguably equally salient among Copts. Third, the Coptic Church does not place any particular emphasis on literacy or human capital formation. Unlike non-Coptic Christians, such as

Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Levantines, who are urban and educated minorities and are thus over-studied in the literature, Copts are mostly rural and less educated. In particular, despite Copts' superior educational level compared to Muslims, illiteracy remains sizable among Copts, reaching 21 percent of Coptic males in 2006.

The institutional interpretation is not capable either of explaining why Copts are better off than Muslims for two reasons. First, Copts' superior occupational status long predates the rise of Europe. As shown in the previous section, papyrological evidence suggests that the occupational gap between Copts and Muslims emerged between 641 and 969. Second, I attempt to test Kuran's (2004) explanation that traces non-Muslims' advantage to their access to European legal systems. The 1848 and 1868 population census samples indicate that among non-Muslims, only Jews and non-Coptic Christians had a relatively sizable proportion of "protégés," those who purchased access to European consulates' courts. Copts and Muslims had essentially no protégés. Moreover, the proportion of protégés among non-Coptic Christians and Jews is low, between 10 and 20 percent, and cannot on its own explain their economic advantage over Muslims. The reason for this difference in protégés across non-Muslim minorities is likely driven by their occupational differences. While non-Coptic Christians and Jews were over-represented among merchants, where European law mattered to resolve conflicts with European traders, Copts' advantage stemmed from artisanship and mid-low fiscal bureaucracy, where European law played less of a role.

This is not to say, though, that the cultural and institutional explanations of why Muslims fell behind non-Muslims are not consistent with *any* empirical fact about non-Muslim minorities in the MENA region. It is only to say that both explanations do not appear to explain the Coptic-Muslim SES difference in Egypt. However, Kuran's (2004) hypothesis may explain why certain Jews and non-Coptic Christians in Egypt were better off than both Copts and Muslims. But even for non-Coptic Christians and Jews, we need to collect data on the pre-1800 period in order to understand how their SES advantage evolved both before and after the emergence of the capitulations system.

Does Colonization Explain Why Muslims Are Worse Off?

The second set of explanations trace the SES superiority of non-Muslim minorities to colonization. European powers favored non-Muslims, whether during the "indirect colonization" episode under the Ottoman Empire or under the direct colonization/mandate episodes in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (Issawi 1981). One version of this theory overlaps with Kuran's (2004) institution-based explanation outlined above. It postulates that the capitulations system favored non-Muslims because they were able to purchase access to European consulates' court system, but Muslims were not.

Given that the Coptic-Muslim SES gap emerged long before colonization, this explanation does not fully account for the gap that we observe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, this is not to say that colonization did not have any effect, but that we rather need to be specific on what is meant by colonization, which is in fact a large bundle of institutions and policies. For example, one aspect of colonization is the rise of European schools, whether missionary or secular. The 1848 and 1868 population census data reveal that non-Muslim children in Egypt were more likely to enroll in school than Muslim children in 1848. Almost all students (Muslims and non-Muslims) were enrolled in religious traditional schools, with a tiny proportion of Muslim students enrolled in public modern schools, which were established by Muhammad Ali Pasha starting from 1818 (non-Muslim students were not allowed to enter public modern schools until 1873). However, non-Muslim students significantly shifted from religious schools to modern private schools in the subsequent decades: In 1868, 40 percent of non-Muslim students were enrolled in modern private schools, in comparison to only 4 percent of Muslim students who were enrolled in public modern schools. But contrary to the colonialism explanation, these modern private schools were not only European, let alone missionary, schools. In fact, Egyptian non-Muslim minorities started to respond to European missionary and secular schools by establishing their own communal (private) modern schools, and this response was faster than that of the Muslim community. The school censuses in 1906/07–1951/52 reveal that most Muslim students continued to rely on religious schools until 1951, whereas most non-Muslim students in 1951 were enrolled in modern schools, both public and private, European and native. Hence, while European schools may have indeed contributed to increasing the educational gap between non-Muslims and Muslims between 1848 and 1951, the full effect of modern schools was not only due to European schools but also included the (under-studied) private native schools.

Colonization and the Role of the Local Institutions

The colonization explanation implicitly presumes that colonization emerged within a vacuum, and typically underestimates the effect of the precolonial local institutions or the local institutions that emerged (or evolved) in response to colonization. First, non-Muslim religious schools were of better quality than those of Muslims long before colonization. Coptic and Jewish schools in Egypt taught arithmetic and geometry to students, whereas Muslim schools lacked this training. Second, as indicated above, modern private schools that enrolled non-Muslim students in Egypt were not only European schools. Copts, Jews, and non-Coptic Christians responded to European schools by establishing their own modern schools.

The role of the local state between 1800 and independence in the post-WWII period is typically absent in the colonization explanation. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali and his successors embarked on an ambitious, yet coercive, program of state-led modernization that spanned agriculture, education, manufacturing, and the military, long before the British colonization in 1882. Saleh (2015) examines the impact of state industrialization in 1816–1868 on the Christian-Muslim occupational difference. The paper finds that while the first wave of state industrialization in 1816–1848, which focused on textiles, was upskilling among Christians, it was deskilling among Muslims. The second wave, in 1848–1882, which focused on transportation, was upskilling among both groups. Both waves of state industrialization did not reduce the Christian-Muslim occupational gap that we observe in the traditional sector. The reason is that state manufacturing and transportation firms in both waves hired people based on their preexisting skills that they acquired from the traditional sector. State firms did not train (Muslim or Christian) workers to improve their occupational status, though.

In a similar vein, the role of the postcolonial state is important to examine. In the schooling domain, Egypt's postcolonial expansion of public mass modern education in 1951–1953 contributed to the decline of the Christian-Muslim educational and occupational differences in the second half of the twentieth century (Saleh 2016).

Taxation and the Self-Selection of Converts on SES

The two explanations discussed above implicitly assume that "Muslims" and "non-Muslims" are exogenously formed groups that are fixed over time. This is not valid historically, though. While in today's world, religious affiliation is mostly inherited (although non-Muslims have the choice of converting to Islam), this was not the case historically. Any religious group is, by definition, formed via the conversion of an initial population to that religion. MENA's local populations were entirely non-Muslims in the early seventh century: mostly Christian, with a small Jewish minority. Over the centuries that followed the Arab conquests, MENA was Islamized, meaning that a majority of its local population became Muslim. This process can be due to either conversion of the local population to Islam or to Arab immigration from the Arab peninsula into other parts of MENA.[6] Historical evidence suggests, though, that Islamization was driven by voluntary conversion of the local population to Islam. The reason is that Arab immigration was small in comparison to the local populations of MENA. The full population of the Arab peninsula was much smaller than that of the Levant, Iraq, and Egypt. Within these territories, Arab immigrants were not a sizable proportion.

Saleh (2018) argues that the Coptic-Muslim socioeconomic gap can be partially attributed to the tax system that was imposed upon the Arab conquest of the then-Coptic Christian Egypt in 641 CE, and that was enforced until 1856. Arabs imposed a discriminatory poll tax (*jizya*) on adult non-Muslim males, a tax that was removed upon an individual's conversion to Islam. Due to the (quasi) lump-sum feature of the poll tax,[7] the incentive to convert to Islam was likely stronger among poorer Copts, holding other factors (notably, Coptic religiosity) constant. The paper thus documents that the poll tax led to the conversion of poorer Copts to Islam (who since then became Egypt's "Muslims") and to the consequent shrinkage of non-convert Copts into a better-off minority.

The empirical evidence for this hypothesis is based on exploiting the local variation in the poll tax rate. A simple model in which a Coptic Christian chooses whether to convert or not by comparing the (psychological) cost of conversion to the lump-sum poll tax predicts that poorer Copts are more likely to convert at a given level of religiosity, and that less religious Copts are more likely to convert at a given level of income.[8] It thus follows (unsurprisingly) that the proportion of non-convert Copts is decreasing in the poll tax rate. It also follows that the magnitude of the Coptic-Muslim average (before-tax) income gap is increasing in the poll tax rate.[9] Put differently, high-poll-tax areas are expected to have relatively fewer non-convert Copts but a greater Coptic-Muslim income gap.

Constructing a novel data set from papyrological poll tax registers and receipts in Egypt in 641–1100, Saleh (2018) first documents that Egypt's high-poll-tax districts in 641–1100 were less likely to have any Coptic churches or monasteries in 1200. Given that all districts were 100 percent Copt in 641, this finding suggests that these areas witnessed relatively more conversions to Islam among Copts between 641 and 1100. Second, these districts had a larger Coptic-Muslim occupational gap in the 1848 and 1868 population census samples, which are the earliest data sources with *localized* individual-level data on both religious affiliation and occupational titles. Specifically, while Copts in all districts were more likely than Muslims to be white-collar workers and artisans, and less likely to be farmers and unskilled non-agricultural workers, the Coptic-Muslim occupational gap was greater in high-poll-tax districts.

This theory emphasizes the endogenous process of the historical formation of religious groups that may be characterized by (self-)selection on SES. A deeper understanding of the inter-religious SES differences in the MENA region thus arguably requires studying how non-Muslim groups were formed (and evolved) historically. This stands in contrast to the existing literature on non-Muslim minorities in MENA, which treats Copts, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Levantines as exogenously formed groups that do not change over time (except via migration). In this regard, self-selection of converts is also implied by Boticinni and Eckstein's (2005) hypothesis about Rabbinic Jews' higher SES status: Rabbinic Jews with a weaker taste for education convert out of Judaism (and thus lose their Jewish identity), whereas those with a stronger educational taste continue to hold the group's identity.

PERSISTENCE OF THE COPTIC-MUSLIM SOCIOECONOMIC GAP

The empirical evidence in Saleh (2018) suggests that non-convert Copts shrank into a minority by 1200 and that the initial positive selection of non-converts emerged in

641–969 and persisted through 1868. (Note that this section is taken from Saleh 2018, 419–424.) The persistence of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap for over a millennium poses a theoretical dilemma, though. Economic models of intergenerational mobility trace the correlation between parents' and children's outcomes to the parental investment in a child's human capital (nurture) and the inheritance of biological and cultural traits (nature). These models typically predict that dynasties eventually regress to the mean after a few generations, even at high rates (<1) of intergenerational persistence (Becker and Tomes 1979). To be sure, since the poll tax was enforced from 641 to 1856, persistence can be possibly explained by repeated (negatively) selected conversion waves, even in the absence of poll tax rises, due to idiosyncratic shocks to SES and religiosity. Indeed, Copts' population share declined, albeit slowly, between 1200 and 1868, and so it is plausible that selected conversion on SES continued throughout the whole period, leading the SES gap to perpetuate. Yet this explanation fails to account for why non-convert Copts did not vanish. An additional mechanism, besides intergenerational transmission of SES within dynasties, is thus needed to explain not only the persistence of the gap but also the survival of non-convert Copts.

Saleh (2018) explains both the persistence of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap and the survival of Copts by group effects on children's SES. Group effects operated by allowing the in-group children's human capital accumulation (and blocking that of the out-group children), via group control over apprenticeships and schooling. In medieval Egypt, white-collar and artisanal occupations required learning occupation-specific skills from a young age. As human capital was job-specific, it was acquired primarily via apprenticeships and, to a lesser extent, schooling. The supply of both apprenticeships and schooling was mostly restricted, though, to the social networks of white-collar workers and artisans. For one, obtaining an apprenticeship, the gateway to most artisanal and white-collar occupations, required the approval of a master in a specific occupation. Masters were more likely to admit their family members and acquaintances. For another, school enrollment that provided training for white-collar jobs (which had to be later augmented by apprenticeships) was limited to social networks of workers in these jobs. Conversions of Copts to Islam between 641 and 1200 arguably redefined social networks along religious lines. As conversions sorted Copts and Muslims on occupations, each group then attempted to exclude the other from apprenticeships and schooling that would qualify a child to the white-collar and artisanal jobs in which the group was over-represented. Put differently, a child's occupational attainment depended on two factors: intergenerational transmission of SES via both nature and nurture, and the family's religious group.

This mechanism is supported by historical evidence. Copts restricted access to skills that were required for jobs in the mid-low bureaucracy. While Coptic elementary schools taught arithmetic and geometry in order to train Coptic children for jobs in the mid-low bureaucracy, Muslim schools failed to provide this training (Heyworth-Dunne 1938, 2–7, 84–92). However, it was primarily apprenticeships, not schools, that trained Coptic children for bureaucratic jobs. (Samir (1996, 190) notes that in Fatimid Egypt (969–1171),

> the persistence of Coptic administrative personnel [was because] the agrarian administration was very complex and not easily mastered. In it the Copts played an important role at the local level as well as at the central offices in the capital. . . . The administrative knowledge was passed on by the officials in their families when fathers employed their sons, thus maintaining the hold of the family over posts.

In the words of Lord Cromer, the British consul of Egypt in 1883–1908, the Coptic accounting system was "archaic" and "incomprehensible to anyone but themselves" (Tagher 1951, 213). Copts used fractions and "ambiguous abbreviations" in accounting based on units of measurement in use in rural Egypt. Group effects on acquiring human capital were not limited to Copts in the mid-low bureaucracy, though. Copts were legally banned from the judiciary, military, police, and Muslim clergy, and these jobs were thus monopolized by Muslims. Muslims were banned from brewing, which became a Coptic specialization. The 1848 and 1868 censuses reveal that Copts were over-represented among jewelers, dyers, carpenters, weavers, and tailors, whereas Muslims were over-represented among blacksmiths, sawyers, bakers, and butchers. Raymond (1973, 544–51) suggests that the reason for the persistence of this occupational specialization was restricting apprenticeships to group members. The Coptic-Muslim occupational gap may have increased in the late nineteenth century with the expansion of modern (European and private non-Muslim) schools, but it later declined in the late twentieth century with the expansion of public mass modern education in 1951–1953, which relaxed each group's restrictions on access to skills (Saleh 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined a well-known phenomenon in the MENA region: the superior SES of its native non-Muslim minorities, in comparison to the Muslim majority, both historically and today. Employing a wide range of novel data sources, I argue that the Coptic-Muslim SES gap in Egypt is not driven by a negative causal impact on Muslims' SES of Islamic beliefs, Islamic institutions, or colonization. Instead, I trace the phenomenon to the Islamic tax system, which arguably provided stronger pecuniary incentive among poorer Copts to convert to Islam, leading to the shrinkage of non-convert Copts into a better-off minority. The Coptic-Muslim SES gap then persisted because of group restrictions on skill formation.

The chapter opens new and exciting areas of research. First, there is a question of the external validity of the tax-induced conversion argument beyond the case of Coptic Christians in Egypt to other non-Muslim minorities of the region and beyond. There are two remarks to make here: (1) The poll tax was not limited to Egypt. It was introduced in all the conquered territories of the Arab Caliphate including Iran and India, and subsequently in all Muslim-ruled territories up to the nineteenth century. It is thus important to investigate its effect on the historical formation of other non-Muslim minorities (e.g., when and why did Christians shrink into a minority in Lebanon, why did certain Hindus and Zoroastrians convert to Islam, and why was Christianity but not Judaism wiped out from North Africa, west of Egypt?). (2) When evaluating the Islam-based and colonization-based theories, it is important to examine each historical context in depth, allowing for potentially context-specific conclusions. For example, MENA countries went through different forms of colonization. French colonization of Algeria and Tunisia was probably different from the mandate colonization of Syria and Lebanon during the interwar period. Egypt had been an autonomous Ottoman province since the early 1800s, and its British colonization was primarily focused on controlling the Suez Canal. Capitulations may have also had different, potentially larger, effects on non-Coptic Christians and Jews in Egypt and elsewhere.

Second, and relatedly, studying this topic requires measuring the long-term trends of the religious composition, and of the socioeconomic advantage, of other native non-Muslim minorities in MENA, both before and after 1800. A promising future area of research is to expand the descriptive analysis to non-Muslim minorities in other MENA countries with sizable non-Muslim populations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This includes Syria, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia. We know that Christians and Jews in these countries were all better off than Muslims (Courbage and Fargues 1997). The individual-level (or at least sub-country level) data sources that can be used to quantify this argument for the Levant and Iraq are the Ottoman population censuses of 1881–1892 and 1914. Later statistics for the Levant and Iraq include the French mandate statistical yearbooks and population censuses for Syria and Lebanon, and the British mandate statistics for Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine. Sources for Tunisia and Algeria include the French colonization statistical yearbooks and population censuses.[10] Finally, the national population censuses and statistical yearbooks are available for the postcolonial period for most MENA countries.

Third, while this chapter focuses on SES inequality across religious groups, within-group inequality is an important area of future research. While intergroup inequality typically receives more attention in the public debate, probably because of the salience of inter-religious tensions, it is not obvious if its contribution to overall inequality actually exceeds that of within-group inequality. It is thus important to evaluate the relative weight of intergroup and within-group inequality in overall inequality.

Fourth, this chapter has examined educational and occupational inequality across Muslims and Copts. Yet there are other important outcomes that are worth studying. For example, income and wealth inequality are of utmost significance, both across and within groups, although they are more challenging to study. In Egypt, data on earnings are only available for the most recent period (1988–2012), and even then they do not record religious affiliation. Data sources on wealth are primarily the agricultural and real estate tax registers (cadasters) that extend from 1813 to the present day, but these are challenging to digitize and require a collaborative data collection effort. Equivalent cadastral data for the Levant and Iraq are available from the sixteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman tax registers in the precolonial period, the British and French cadasters during the mandate period, and the national cadasters in the postcolonial period. French cadasters for Algeria and Tunisia are important to investigate. Another example is health outcomes, which can be observed in the Demographic and Health Surveys, such as the female genital-cutting practice, which went down faster among Copts than among Muslims during the second half of the twentieth century (Blaydes and Platas, forthcoming).

Fifth, the chapter has examined two colonization institutions or policies: capitulations and schooling. A more complete examination of the impact of colonization is an exciting area for future research, though. This research agenda must study one colonial institution or policy at a time, and examine in depth how it interacted with local institutions, both in the precolonial period and during colonization.

Finally, the analysis has focused on outcomes of men. This is justified because enumeration of women's schooling and employment was extremely low in the pre-1900 population censuses. However, women's outcomes improved drastically during the twentieth century, and it is an exciting area of research to examine how the evolution of women's outcomes may have varied across religious groups in the MENA region.

NOTES

1. This is not to say, though, that socioeconomic inequality across religious groups is more salient that inequality within groups. In fact, intragroup inequality may well be much higher. However, intergroup inequality has been often used by the elites of each group to maintain their socioeconomic privileges vis-à-vis the masses. I come back to this point in the Conclusion.
2. The earliest Ottoman population census was conducted in 1881–1892. It covered the Levant and Iraq within the MENA region, but not North Africa, which had already been under direct colonial rule (Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia) by 1881. I do not know if Libya was enumerated in this census. The pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman tax registers are from the sixteenth century and are at the village level.
3. The 1882, 1996, 2006, and 2017 population censuses do not report the religious composition at the urban quarter/village level, although the religious affiliation is available at the individual level in the IPUMS 10-percent individual-level samples for 1996 and 2006 (urban quarter/village of residence is not recorded though).
4. The urban quarter/village-level tabulations in the population census reports from 1897 to 1986 do not report literacy and occupational composition by religious group. They only report the religious composition and the proportion of the population that is literate (or works in a specific sector). Regressing these outcomes on the proportion of non-Muslims gives us an estimate of the inter-religious gap with respect to these outcomes.
5. The 1986, 1996, and 2006 population census samples do not distinguish among Coptic and non-Coptic Christians. The proportion of the population who have "other" religious affiliation is negligible. This is because of Jewish exodus and deportation from Egypt in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis and the 1967 Egyptian-Israeli war.
6. Other demographic processes that can drive Islamization are mortality and fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims and intermarriage between Muslim males and non-Muslim females (opposite scenario is prohibited under Islamic law). Demographic

evidence from the 1848 and 1868 censuses suggests that there were no statistically significant mortality and fertility differences between Copts and Muslims. Intermarriage (without prior conversion of one of the partners) was extremely rare.

7. Following the emergence of Islamic jurisprudence circa 750 CE, the poll tax was imposed in three brackets: 1 dinar on the poor, 2 dinars on the middle income, and 4 dinars on the rich. Despite this variation, the poll tax was regressive in income.
8. The model predicts that the poorest non-convert will be richer than the richest convert, at a given level of religiosity. This prediction does not hold, though, if religiosity varies in the population. In particular, the model allows for poor Copts who do not convert because of their high religiosity, and for rich Copts who convert because of their low religiosity. The model generates the prediction that non-converts are richer, on average, than converts, which is the main empirical fact that the paper is interested in. Importantly, rich Copts may have converted to Islam for non-tax reasons (to access high bureaucracy, for example). However, their population share was presumably not large enough to offset non-converts' SES privilege over converts.
9. The latter result is not trivial. As the poll tax rate rises, the proportion of non-convert Copts will go down. Non-converts will be richer on average as they lose their poorest members. The same holds for converts, though, who will be richer on average as they gain new converts who are richer than any previous convert. Hence, the Coptic-Muslim income gap may go up or down depending on the shape of the income distribution. It is increasing in the poll tax rate if the density of income is everywhere decreasing.
10. I exclude Morocco because I was not able to locate its pre-independence statistics. Morocco was not under Ottoman rule. It fell under French/Spanish joint rule in 1912, but I am not aware of French/Spanish population statistics for Morocco between 1912 and its independence in 1956. To the best of my knowledge, Italian statistics for Libya did not enumerate the local population. The Arab peninsula did not have a sizable non-Muslim population, perhaps with the exception of Yemen.

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CHAPTER 32

STATE INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT

LISA BLAYDES AND SAFINAZ EL TAROUTY

Leading theories in political economy suggest that state institutions are essential prerequisites for generating high levels of economic growth and prosperity. North and Thomas (1973) argue that secure property rights regimes provide incentives for innovation and investment, with positive effects on development. Formal markets expand when the costs of economic transactions decline and property rights are made secure. North (1981, 20) argues that "the existence of the state is essential for economic growth," since states provide the institutional basis for property rights protection. Epstein (2000) suggests that political centralization put Europe on the path to high levels of economic growth by lowering transaction costs and the costs of organizing new institutions. For Epstein (2000, 169), the "centralization of government" was the main contributor to premodern economic growth in Europe.

At the same time, however, scholars have argued that when states are too strong, rulers can predate on the citizenry or impose growth-stifling taxes. Because both weak and strong states generate distortions that can damage development, the best outcome from an economic growth perspective is a "consensually strong state equilibrium," whereby the state is strong enough to impose taxes and provide public goods, but politically weak enough that society exercises constraint over the government (Acemoglu 2005).[1] Dincecco (2011) argues that to generate a prosperous economy, states need to first overcome the challenge of fiscal decentralization; after that, national parliaments are vital for holding the monarch accountable and avoiding out of control spending.[2] Dincecco and Katz (2014) find that fiscal centralization and limited government, together, improved economic performance, but that centralization was even more impactful than limited government in generating development.[3] These existing arguments suggest that states not only need to achieve "goldilocks" levels of state strength and executive constraint (e.g., Acemoglu 2005), but also that the ordering of state fiscal centralization relative to the emergence of limited government institutions also matters in generating economic growth and prosperity (e.g., Dincecco 2011; Dincecco and Katz 2014).

If state centralization was a boon for economic development in the European context, what lessons might be drawn from the Middle Eastern experience, and particularly the history of institutional development in Egypt? Middle Eastern states long enjoyed forms of centralization, even if the precise definition of a "centralized" state has varied over time.[4] Blaydes (2017) argues that the relatively early transition to agriculture in the Middle East meant that states in the region tended to have relatively high levels of fiscal and bureaucratic capacity relative to other world regions, particularly Europe. For example, Blaydes (2019) shows that during the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517 CE), a large percentage of agricultural land in Egypt was held by the state, with a relatively sophisticated bureaucracy that administered land grants offered as payment for military or other service to state servants. Over the course of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, however, Egypt became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire and witnessed a decentralization of political control. During this time, military and religious elites enjoyed considerable influence over relatively weak Ottoman envoys, who exercised only limited control over Egypt's fiscal apparatus.

In this essay, we examine Egypt in the nineteenth century through the lens of the development of state centralization and executive constraint. While national governments in Europe were undertaking centralizing reforms over the course of the "long" nineteenth century (Dincecco and Katz 2014), similar efforts were occurring contemporaneously in Egypt. Indeed, the reign of Muhammad Ali (1805–1848) is often cited as a turning point in the emergence of modern Egypt, ushering in an era of fiscal centralization and nation-state building. During this period, Egypt developed institutions in the image of European models of state development, such as a standing military, a centralized tax system, and a professionalized bureaucracy.[5]

Yet centralization of fiscal authority in Egypt was also accompanied by an increasing concentration of power in the hands of the executive. Levi (1988) argues that rulers are predatory, constantly requiring revenue to provide collective goods associated with the states they control. Military, political, and economic constraints, however, limit the amount of revenue that they can collect. Our findings suggest that the *order* of modernizing reforms matter for economic outcomes, particularly insofar as they affect the political strength of societal elites. Fiscal centralization without an institutional legacy of executive constraint can sideline those elites who may have been best positioned to reign in excessive ruler spending. Because no power center emerged that was able to effectively constrain Muhammad Ali and his successors, rent-seeking and international borrowing eventually made the Egyptian state politically vulnerable to European colonial intervention.

The rest of the essay proceeds as follows: First, we discuss Egypt's transition from an Ottoman province with a fragmented political elite to a more centralized state following the reforms of Muhammad Ali. Next, we consider the effects of these centralizing reforms on Egypt's economic development in the first half of the nineteenth century. We argue that state centralization eliminated those elite actors—particularly slave soldiers and Islamic clerics—who were best positioned to constrain the executive in the future. Third, we consider the development of parliamentary institutions in Egypt and find that they were stacked with elites beholden to the Egyptian khedives, who were poorly positioned to effectively constrain successive rulers. Indeed, the lack of constraints on the executive may have contributed to costly and unsustainable international borrowing that damaged Egypt's longer-term development prospects.

Egyptian Political Institutions before Muhammad Ali

How can we characterize the institutional status quo in Egypt before the rise of Mohammad Ali, Egypt's celebrated state-building leader? The Mamluk Sultanate ended in 1517, following the conclusion of the Ottoman-Mamluk War (1516–1517). After that point, Egypt was administered as a relatively unruly Ottoman province, with a brief French occupation between 1798 and 1801. This section provides a broad overview of the political institutions in Egypt that predominated between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

Mamluks and Pashas

During Egypt's period as an Ottoman province, the Ottoman sultan would send a viceroy, or governor, to Cairo, typically with the title of *pasha*.[6] Several of these governors came directly from the sultan's imperial court. For example, six viceroys were eunuchs who began their careers in the household of the sultan. These viceroys often emphasized their personal piety in a bid to enhance their public image.[7]

Although the Mamluk Sultanate was overthrown, successive Ottoman governors incorporated members of the Mamluk forces into the state administration of Egypt.[8] For example, a Mamluk was appointed by the sultan and funded by the state to lead the yearly pilgrimage caravan to Mecca (*amir al-hajj*) and protect it against bedouins (Winter 1998, 13).[9] A Mamluk was also named the leader of the caravan that carried the yearly tribute to Istanbul, a highly prestigious position. The head of the financial administration (*defterdar*) was also appointed from among the Mamluks (Marsot 1985, 42).

Under early Ottoman control, imperial possessions in Egypt were divided into parcels (*muqata'at*) and distributed to civilian officers, chosen by the sultan, who would be responsible for tax collection. These civilian officers were paid annual salaries and were responsible for delivering the taxes collected (Shaw 1958, 31). By the seventeenth century, the Ottoman authorities could not easily direct affairs autonomously in Egypt and prominent positions in the administration increasingly went to Mamluks (Crecelius 1998, 60). For example, Mamluks came to play an important role in tax collection. Tax farming became the norm for revenue collection whereby each tax farm (*iltizam)* was auctioned to the highest bidder (*multazim*), who paid for the right to collect taxes; many of these tax farmers were Mamluks. By the eighteenth century, tax farming came to increasingly resemble a form of land ownership whereby the heirs of tax farmers were able to inherit the right to a tax farm (Marsot 1985, 41; Shaw 1958, 37–38). Many of these tax-farming landlords were absentee, relying on local village leaders to administer on their behalf (Marsot 1984, 139).[10]

Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, Ottoman Egypt fell under the influence of a group of Mamluks of Georgian origin. For example, Ibrahim Kahya al-Qazdaghl established the Qazdaghl household that exercised de facto control over Egypt from 1748 to 1754. Most of the Georgian Mamluk rulers of the late eighteenth century belonged to this household (Hathaway 1995, 44).[11]

During the period of Ottoman control of Egypt, there was considerable turnover of Ottoman governors (see Figure 32.1).[12] These Ottoman governors left office in a variety of ways. Rulers were withdrawn due to corruption; executed for declaring themselves sultan; dismissed after failing to collect enough tax revenue; appointed to a different position, including Grand Vizier; murdered during a mutiny; or dismissed for mismanagement of Nile River flooding. Ruler duration in Egypt was relatively unstable during this period, with high levels of Ottoman elite turnover.



FIGURE 32.1: Smoothed duration of rule (in years) for Ottoman governors to Egypt.

Source: Data from Öztuna (1994) and Sureyya ([1890] 1996).

Religious Elites

During the final decades of Ottoman rule in Egypt, religious elites (*ulema*) came to exercise unprecedented power and influence. These religious elites included teachers, scholars, and judges, as well as those at the top of the religious and political hierarchy like the Rector of al-Azhar, the muftis of the major schools of Islamic thought (sing. *madhhab*, pl. *madhahib)*, the chief representative of the descendants of the Prophet (*naqib al-ashraf*), and the heads of two major Sufi orders (Marsot 1968, 267). Religious elites played the role of mediator between rulers and ruled, with ordinary Egyptians submitting complaints and petitions through religious channels that might then be conveyed to the political elite (Marsot 1973, 133).[13]

The political power of religious elites was magnified by their economic influence. Religious elites enjoyed economic rents as a result of their role assisting in the administration of religious endowments (sing. *waqf*, pl. *awqaf*). While many tax farms were controlled by Mamluks, religious elites began to purchase the rights to collect revenue (Marsot 1973, 136).[14] In some cases, the economic influence of religious elites served to balance the economic strength of Mamluks (Marsot 1973, 137). For example, in one case a Mamluk dignitary sought to increase taxes on a particular agricultural region; the local tax farmers in that area appealed to the rector of al-Azhar, who was also a tax farmer in that area, and the rector was able to appeal to the Mamluk dignitary to limit the increase in taxes (al-Jabarti 2013a, 309–310).

MUHAMMAD ALI AND STATE CENTRALIZATION

In July 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte and his forces landed in Alexandria. The army of Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey was defeated on July 21 during the Battle of the Pyramids. While Ibrahim fled to Gaza and Murad to the South, the French established rule across Egypt for a period of three years (Bjorneboe 2007, 68). During the occupation, the French relied on religious elites from across Egypt in a bid to exert political control; on the other hand, Mamluk forces were largely excluded from power (Fahmy 1998, 140; Marsot 1968, 272; al-Rafei 1981, 22–25).

Despite the brevity of the French occupation, this period witnessed a weakening of Mamluk power. War deaths and disease led to a reduction in the overall number of Mamluks from between 10,000 and 12,000 to just 1,200 by 1802 (Bjorneboe 2007, 72; Marsot 1984, 38). After the French departure, two Mamluk dignitaries from Murad's household, Uthman Bey al-Bardisi and Mohamed Bey al-Alfi, took on leadership for the group, though internecine struggles for power were common (Fahmy 1998, 141).

During this period, Egypt experienced a breakdown of law and order. In urban areas, soldiers attacked merchants, forcing them to lend money and to purchase goods with forged currency. In rural areas, unpaid soldiers attacked peasants (Fahmy 1998, 141). The economic deterioration was such that citizens accused Uthman Bey al-Bardisi of living off their economic ruin (Marsot 1968, 272).

Muhammad Ali and the Mamluks

With the French departure and a weakening of the Mamluks, the Ottoman Sultan attempted to fill the power vacuum by sending a relatively small force of well-trained Albanian troops to re-establish control over Egypt (Fahmy 1998, 141–143). Mohammed Ali was second-in-command of this unit and recognized the opportunity to exercise influence. Leveraging his control over the Albanian troops, as well as the Mamluks under al-Bardisi, he worked to deport the Ottoman governor to Istanbul. When various social forces—like the religious elites, merchants, and local notables—complained about the high taxes needed to sustain the Mamluks and other military forces, Muhammad Ali suggested that were he to rule, such taxes would not be required in the future (143). Muhammad Ali was eventually named the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt with the rank of pasha. He next focused his gaze upon the Mamluks.

In 1806 and 1807, two leading Mamluk dignitaries—al-Bardisi and al-Alfi, respectively—died, leaving the various Mamluk factions relatively leaderless in the face of Muhammad Ali's strategic political maneuvers (Fahmy 1998, 145). Shortly thereafter, Muhammad Ali expelled the Mamluks from the Nile Delta, giving them authority in Upper Egypt. After failing to pay overdue taxes, however, Muhammad Ali removed the Mamluks from Upper Egypt in 1810, returned them to Cairo, and consolidated political control over all of Egypt.

The infamous event to follow led to a nearly complete destruction of the Mamluks. In March of 1811, Muhammad Ali held a celebratory event at his residence in the Citadel, to which all Mamluk chieftains were invited. While trapped in a passageway, Muhammad Ali's troops opened fire on the Mamluks, resulting in the deaths of 450 Mamluks; a campaign was then waged against those who managed to escape.[15] Muhammad Ali went on to expropriate the tax farms held by Mamluks (Fahmy 1998, 148–149). One result of Muhammad Ali's consolidation of tax collection capacity through expropriation of the Mamluks was that he was able to increase his annual revenue considerably (149).

Fiscal Centralization

Muhammad Ali undertook a series of centralizing reforms that significantly increased the capacity of the state. Most significantly, he abolished the system of tax farming. How was this achieved? Expropriation of fiscal rights and resources rarely occurs without resistance. Muhammad Ali first raised taxes on tax farmers, leading many of them to default; this action then providing him with an excuse to confiscate their properties. In

1809 Muhammad Ali imposed taxes on some land types that had previously been designated tax-free properties (Rivlin 1961, 47–48).

By 1815 most of Egypt's agricultural land had been converted into state land. Profits from agriculture became available to the ruler, and Muhammad Ali reorganized the administrative structure of the government to ensure strict control of the economy.[16] In addition, a new tax on the waqf was implemented, though it had been previously tax-free.[17] In sum, Muhammad Ali changed the land tenure system, abolished tax farming, created a more centralized bureaucracy, and forced peasants to pay their taxes directly to the government, all of which created a more centralized political and fiscal order (Issawi 1961, 4–5; Panza and Williamson 2015).

Muhammad Ali's fiscal centralization policies were accompanied by other centralizing reforms. For example, by 1816 the government had come to control farming to a much greater extent, providing peasants with capital and buying their crops at fixed prices (Hunter 1984, 15). Beginning in 1821, long-staple cotton was planted and exported to Europe under the auspices of a state-controlled monopoly; this pattern was extended to other industries as well (Issawi 1961, 5). The increasing centralization of fiscal authority allowed Muhammad Ali to invest in a professional, standing military. Panza and Williamson (2015, 81) summarize these reforms:

> [Muhammad Ali] intervened in an effort to augment state revenues to finance his expansionary military agenda. . . . Ali adopted a series of state led fiscal and trade policies aimed at moving resources into industry and increasing government revenues. One of the most important reforms was the replacement of tax farming with a system whereby land revenues accrued directly to the state. The reform also extended taxable land through the introduction of a tax on *waqfs*, landholdings managed by religious authorities and devoted to charitable purposes.

Panza and Williamson (2015) argue that although Muhammad Ali picked a difficult time to pursue his economic agenda, his policies were largely successful at growing the economy.[18] Egypt was transformed from a primarily agrarian society to one with growing industries in textiles, food processing and metallurgy.[19]

Muhammad Ali and the Religious Elite

Muhammad Ali developed a strong, early relationship with Egypt's religious elites, only to see that relationship deteriorate over time. The religious elite initially backed Muhammad Ali over Ottoman alternatives, saying that "we will have none but you; you will become *wali* over us, on our conditions and what we have seen from you of justice" (al-Jabarti 2013b, 403). After initially demurring, Muhammad Ali accepted calls for his formal accession to leadership. After accepting both the rector of al-Azhar—Shaykh al-Sharqawi—and the *naqib al-ashraf*—Umar Makram—these religious leaders placed Muhammad Ali in a ceremonial kaftan as an official act of investiture (al-Jabarti 2013b, 403). Muhammad Ali pledged an oath to rule justly and in consultation with the religious elite (*bi mashurat al-ulema*) (Marsot 1968, 275).

In the years to follow, Muhammad Ali regularly consulted with the clerics of al-Azhar before imposing new taxes to pay for state expenses (al-Rafei 1982, 32–33). For example, in September 1805, Muhammad Ali sought revenue to pay for military costs and approached the leadership of al-Azhar for an endorsement of higher tax rates. With the consent of al-Azhar, the state seized a third of the revenue collected by tax farmers during that year. After the tax farmers objected, Muhammad Ali said that the confiscation of revenue was an exceptional case related to rising military expenses. Despite the fact that Muhammad Ali—in consultation with the religious elites at al-Azhar—issued an order prohibiting higher taxes, shortly thereafter the government imposed new taxes on merchants (al-Rafei 1982, 32–33). The merchants complained to the religious elites and asked them to negotiate a tax reduction (33). In 1806 and 1807, the taxes collected by Muhammad Ali were insufficient to cover government expenditures and the clerics of al-Azhar agreed that he should be able to collect reduced taxes but also that religious elites were to be exempted (Rivlin 1961, 47).

During the initial years of his rule, Muhammad Ali completely exempted the religious elites from taxes (Marsot 1984, 140). Beginning in October 1807, however, religious elites were no longer exempt (al-Rafei 1982, 84).[20] Muhammad Ali was also able to effectively cultivate divisions between members of the religious elites, particularly through the exile of Umar Makram, an act that decreased the collective influence of the clerical establishment (Marsot 1968, 276–277).[21] Marsot (1968, 277) writes that with Umar Makram gone, the religious elites were unable to mount an effective opposition to the power of Muhammad Ali; and once he confiscated the religious endowments, the ulema "became dependent on the pasha's bounty for survival, and in a greater position of subservience than they had ever been."

Creating (and Recreating) Elites

After eliminating the Mamluks and reducing the power of the clerics, there was a void in the class of political elites that came to be associated with a new landed aristocracy. In this spirit, Muhammad Ali granted land (*ib'adiya*) to high state officials and regime insiders, who were exempted from paying taxes on the condition they cultivate the land.[22] Those who received the land only enjoyed usufruct rights, though in 1842 Mohammad Ali granted complete rights of ownership, including sale and transfer rights (Baer 1962, 17). He also granted estates to royal family members (*jiflik*), including to himself and members of his family (18).[23] One of the main groups to benefit from land grants were an emerging class of landed elites who did not simultaneously serve as village mayors.[24] Many of these individuals came from foreign, particularly Circassian and Turkic, backgrounds.[25] Often, those who benefited from the land grants were former Mamluks who had reconciled with Muhammad Ali and opted for a permanent settlement with the state (Abu-Lughod 1967, 332).

Ethnicity—particularly Turkish or Circassian background—was no longer a decisive factor in the assignment of high-level positions and elite status, however (EzzelArab 2004). Although these ethnic groups continued to be well represented at the elite level, indigenous Egyptians increasingly came to enjoy elite status as large landowners and members of the military or bureaucracy elite. EzzelArab (2004) argues that both indigenous Egyptians and elites from a Turkish or Circassian background came to enjoy a stake in the existing regime, as it served their economic interests.

This section has argued that Muhammad Ali oversaw the centralization of political authority and a decrease in the power of the Mamluks. Early during his time in power, religious elites—like the rector of al-Azhar—were able to exert influence over policy by channeling complaints from various societal classes and bringing those issues to Muhammad Ali (al-Rafei 1982, 85); in exchange, religious elites enjoyed special tax status and other privileges. Over time, however, religious elites saw their influence decline. Muhammad Ali eliminated the former ruling elite, expropriated the tax-farming class, and subordinated religious elites to the state. In addition, Muhammad Ali oversaw the fiscal centralization of the Egyptian state through a channeling of agricultural resources into the hands of an increasingly centralized state authority. The net result was that "no group within Egyptian society was capable of forcing fundamental changes upon him [Muhammad Ali] ... elements that might have served as the instruments of change had been crushed at the outset of his regime."[26]

WEAK PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT

In 1829 Muhammad Ali established the Council of Consultation (Majlis al-Mashura), which was composed of senior government employees, religious elites, and local notables, and headed by his eldest son, Ibrahim Pasha. The council was created with the nominal purpose of advising the government regarding how to best administer the country (Marsot 1984, 108; Sami 2009, 349–352). Despite this mandate, the council met just once a year and had only an advisory role (al-Rafei 1982, 517). Under Muhammad Ali's successors—Khedive Abbas and Khedive Sa'id—the Majlis al-Mashura did not meet at all (al-Rafei 2016, 328).

Beginning in the late 1850s, Egypt's external debt began to balloon, and existing institutions were poorly positioned to halt this development. For example, construction of the Suez Canal was financed, in part, with foreign loans that grew considerably between 1858 and 1860 (Issawi 1961). In 1862, under Khedive Sa'id the Egyptian government took out the first state loan (rather than a loan to the khedive), with repayment guaranteed by revenue generated by the provinces (Issawi 1961). Egyptian economic fortunes looked very positive at this period as the US Civil War meant that demand for Egyptian cotton was especially high.

Changes in the international economic environment also contributed to the growth of Egyptian foreign debt. The globalization of international finance accelerated over the course of the nineteenth century, a trend that coincided with the development of nation-states in world regions outside of Europe (Queralt 2019). The ready availability of external finance may have dampened the need for governments to increase domestic taxation, with associated implications for the development of state institutions, like robust parliaments (Queralt 2019).

In 1866, Khedive Ismail (1863–1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali, established the Advisory Council of Delegates (Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab*)*. Al-Rafei (2001, 88) writes that this council was similarly focused on a consultative role.[27] Despite the state's continued borrowing and major efforts at state-building, there was no opportunity for the council to exercise control over the decisions of the executive. Scholch (1981, 15), for example, argues that the Advisory Council of Delegates was not an instrument for constraining the power of the khedive. Indeed, the by-laws of the council gave the khedive the power to dissolve the body, to modify the duration of parliamentary sessions, to call for elections, and to appoint both the chair and deputy chair (al-Rafei 2001, 85–88).[28]

During the first two sessions of the Advisory Council of Delegates, discussion focused on issues that reflected the interests of the delegates rather than the country as a whole or the heavily burdened Egyptian peasantry.[29] Parliamentary actions dealt with the distribution of unused agricultural parcels to the landed elites, rescheduling of tax payments for landholders, amendments to the inheritance law that sought to prevent fragmentation of land, and repairing of canals and bridges to provide irrigation water for landed elite (Barakat 1977, 380–381).

In 1868, the minister of finance, Ismail Pasha Seddiq, went to the Advisory Council of Delegates seeking support for an increase in taxes as well as the adoption of a new loan in the value of 5 million Egyptian pounds. Despite the large value of previous unpaid loans, the members of the council did not oppose the new loan request. In fact, Ismail Pasha Seddiq went as far as to borrow almost 12 million Egyptian pounds, more than what he had pledged to the deputies (al-Rafei 2001, 110–111). Salem (2009, 138) finds that Khedive Ismail sent an envoy who would inform the members of his will; deliberation took place, but delegates did not typically oppose the khedive's directive. In other cases, the council was not consulted on high-salience policy decisions. The net result was that the Egyptian deficit grew further, reaching increasingly unsustainable levels (Tuner 2015).

In response to the debt crisis, the Egyptian government began exploring options to increase government revenue. In addition to the Advisory Council of Delegates, the khedive also convened a Privy Council (Majlis Khususi) made up of ministers at the head of nine government departments, in addition to a small number of select individuals.[30] In 1871 the Privy Council submitted the Muqabala Law (i.e., the Law for Exchange) to the khedive for confirmation (Abd al-Moaty and Hosny 2006, 8). The law was designed to trade off a 50 percent tax reduction on landed property in return for the landholders' advance payment of land taxes.[31] The khedive's advisors believed that Egypt's growing state debt could be eliminated in a relatively short period of time through the adoption of this law, even if it meant borrowing against the future (Hunter 1984, 180–181).

In practice, the Muqabala Law failed to raise the amount of funding needed and only seemed to benefit large landowners (Hunter 1984, 180–181). Elites expressed little concern for how these payments would be used or the long-term implications of the Muqabala Law for Egypt's financial solvency (Weipert-Fenner 2020, 50). During a meeting called by Khedive Ismail to discuss the Muqabala Law, delegates speculated about the future of the law while also raising questions about the 1875 budget (Hosny and Abd al-Hamid Mohammed 2011, 10–12). In 1876 the Advisory Council of Delegates affirmed the Muqabala Law, an outcome deemed in the interest of the delegates (Ezzelarab 2009, 317).

Egypt's economic situation became increasingly grim over the course of Khedive Ismail's reign. It is worth pointing out that the Egyptian experience was consistent with financial crises taking place in states around the world. Abetted by European financiers, countries like Egypt struggled to service their debt, a pattern that eventually led to waves of default in several postcolonial contexts (Taylor 2006). Many of the loans secured were used to enhance the khedive's personal power and interests. For example, a portion of one loan was used bribe the Ottoman Sultan to change a succession rule to allow political control to pass to Khedive Ismail's eldest son instead of his brother or his uncle (al-Rafei 2001, 35).

By 1876, Egypt's external debt (including the Khedive's private debt) reached 91 million Egyptian pounds, an amount equivalent to 80 percent of total revenues for that year (Amin 2014, 27–28). This was the point at which European economic and political actors began to become more involved in the administration of Egyptian finances. In December 1875 a committee headed by a senior British official was invited by Khedive Ismail to report on the state of finances in Egypt. In May 1876 the Caisse de la Dette was created for direct receipt of public revenues allocated for debt repayment (EzzelArab 2002, 11). Figure 32.2 suggests that expenditure far outstripped revenue for more than a decade.[32]

In January 1878, Khedive Ismail established a commission of inquiry (Commission Superieure d'Enquete) to investigate the sources of Egypt's insolvency, as well as to recommend financial reforms. By August 1878 the commission had submitted its preliminary report, which included recommendations regarding corruption, the need to increase taxes, as well as the curbing the economic and political powers of the khedive (EzzelArab 2002, 12–13). The report recommended that the khedive delegate all responsibility to an independent cabinet—a council of ministers. In this context, the khedive would have the role of endorsing the cabinet's decisions.

Khedive Ismail appointed Nubar Pasha as Egypt's first prime minister.[33] Two of the most important portfolios in Nubar's cabinet—minister of finance and minister of public works—were given to Europeans who were members of the Commission of Inquiry (EzzelArab 2002, 44–45). While members of the Advisory Council of Delegates tried to constrain the khedive's power, they were largely unsuccessful. In fact, European influence may have led the delegates to be less likely to oppose the khedive. Scholch



FIGURE 32.2: Revenue and expenditure for Egypt (in millions of Egyptian pounds).

Source: Data from Henin (2008).

(1981, 80) writes that "the vehement opposition exercised by the delegates was . . . against the Council of Ministers . . . (and) the delegates aligned themselves with the Khedive against the 'European government.'"

Early 1879 witnessed a growing confrontation between traditional elites and European cabinet members over policy measures related to taxes and resource access (EzzelArab 2004). In March 1879 additional executive powers were delegated to Europeans. These ministers had the right to veto any decision, provided the veto was issued by both.[34] When the two European ministers decided to end the Advisory Council of Delegates session held on the 27th of March (and Prime Minister Riyad Pasha supported their decision), members organized opposition. In particular, the delegates refused to leave the assembly without inspecting the government's financial policy. This act represented the first time that delegates directly opposed the government (Abduh 1961, 60; al-Rafei 2001, 191–194). Days later, the delegates signed a petition of grievances to present to the khedive, protesting disregard of the assembly in addition to the cabinet's proposal to declare Egypt bankrupt (al-Rafei 2001, 194–195). According to EzzelArab (2004), these efforts represented a meaningful attempt to derail European-proposed policy measures.

In April 1879 a national convention was held that included a wide range of participants, including traditional elites, religious dignitaries, merchants, and army officers. The group promulgated a "national program" (*al-laiha al-wataniyya*) that was sent to the khedive with over three hundred signatories (al-Rafei 2001, 199). Members of the Advisory Council of Delegates contributed to less than 20 percent of the signatories, however, suggesting that the national program was supported by social forces distinct from council (EzzelArab 2009, 309). Debt settlement featured prominently in the national program as well as a proposed requirement that the Council of Ministers submit to the authority of the Advisory Council of Delegates (al-Rafei 2001, 197–199). EzzelArab

(2009, 320) argues that, at its core, the national program was "an attempt to redistribute power among and within groups of contenders to political control who claimed the space created by the decline in khedivial powers, namely Europe and the traditional (Egyptian) elites."

Khedive Ismail was sympathetic to the demands of the national program, but in June 1879, European and Ottoman administrators forced Khedive Ismail to abdicate.[35] After Ismail was replaced by Khedive Tawfiq, the Advisory Council of Delegates met on July 6, 1879, and was disbanded after it was suggested that its deliberations were proving too long (Landau 1954, 25).[36] In 1881, 1,600 people presented a petition to Khedive Tawfiq asking the government to convoke a new meeting of the council.[37]

The British occupation of Egypt began in 1882, and Lord Dufferin was sent to Egypt to reorganize its administrative machine. Dufferin's final report suggested the creation of two semi-parliamentary institutions—the Consultative Legislative Council (Majlis Shura al-Qawanin) and the General Assembly (al-Jam'iyya al-Umumiyya). Under the British occupation, the principle of subjecting the cabinet to the parliament was not mentioned in the Egyptian constitution until 1923 (al-Rafei 2001, 203). Despite the existence of multiple Egyptian consultative and parliamentary institutions, none were able to impose forms of executive constraint on the khedives of the nineteenth century and the early 20th century.[38]

Implications and Conclusions

The idea that the wealthy countries of the world today were both fiscally centralized and politically limited is intuitive and powerful. Prominent theories focused on economic development in Europe suggest that state centralization was a key precondition for achieving higher levels of growth and prosperity. Epstein (2000, 8), writing of the European experience, suggests that "limitations to, rather than excesses of, state sovereignty are what restrained the rise of competitive markets." In this setting, only states are in a position to provide the institutional framework required for high levels of economic growth. Dincecco (2011) develops this theoretical line by arguing that, in historical Europe, the interaction of state fiscal centralization and limited government combined to encourage economic development.

This essay examines these arguments in the context of state and economic development in the Middle East, particularly nineteenth-century Egypt. Prior to the nineteenth century, local military and religious actors exerted meaningful forms of political influence during Egypt's period of relatively weak and decentralized Ottoman control. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, Muhammad Ali introduced a set of modernizing reform that included centralization of fiscal authority. Scholars have suggested that these reforms did encourage forms of economic development for Egypt (Panza and Williamson 2015), though not at levels comparable to what was happening contemporaneously within Europe.

Over the longer term, what were the implications of state centralization for economic growth? In particular, we consider the extent to which elites were able to exert forms of executive constraint within Egypt. We find that the centralizing policies introduced by Muhammad Ali represented an important break when compared to Egypt's traditional pattern of governance. His reforms decreased the influence of the Mamluks and religious elites—the two most important power brokers in the previous period. As these influential actors were sidelined, nascent representative institutions were created. These institutions lacked influence, however, as they tended to be consultative, and delegates used their institutional platform to pursue their own rent-seeking agendas rather than to provide a check on the executive.

During this time, spending initiated by the Egyptian khedives increased considerably. A growing Egyptian debt took place in a global context characterized by external loans proffered by European financiers. While access to credit allowed for investment in state-building efforts, these loans also financed unproductive investments, including khedival vanity projects. Egyptian elites, however, were poorly positioned to rein in foreign borrowing, even though they came to strongly oppose losses of political power to European actors due to debt. Queralt (2019) stresses the dangers of external financing, arguing that domestically collected taxes have different implications for state-building compared to politically "cheap" foreign loans.

European actors began to play a larger role in governance of Egypt, and by 1882, Egypt's inability to repay its debt had opened the door to foreign domination by Britain. The evidence we have presented suggests that, at least for the Egyptian case, the order of reforms matters for achieving economic development. If centralizing reforms eliminate the strength of elite power brokers, the process of centralization itself may limit the possibility for future executive constraint. Traditional elites in Egypt were concerned about losing political decision-making and administrative power to Europeans (EzzelArab 2004), but they were unable to stop the state from taking on crippling levels of foreign debt that came to damage their interests.

This essay has pointed to limits associated with the external validity of existing research on development in Europe as applied to the premodern Middle East. There are a number of reasons why these ideas do not extend easily to the Egyptian context. First, the nature of centralizing reforms may have been different in Egypt as compared to the European context. Second, perhaps Egypt's economic development trajectory was determined by factors that long preceded debates regarding the importance of nineteenth-century centralization and executive constraint (e.g., Blaydes and Chaney 2013; Kuran 2010; Rubin 2017). Finally, even if Acemoglu (2005) was fundamentally right about the importance of balancing state strength and state weakness, perhaps such an outcome is simply difficult to calibrate. When states are too strong, rulers impose taxes that stifle economic activity, but when states are excessively weak, the ruler does not believe he will be able to extract rents in the future and fails to provide public goods. Egypt was not able to achieve this balance over the course of nineteenth-century reforms, though the precise reasons why remain opaque and debated.

NOTES

1. For Acemoglu (2005), weak states underinvest in public goods because rulers are self-interested and do not expect to derive any future private rewards from that action.
2. For Dincecco (2011), fiscal centralization is operationalized as the year that a country secured revenue through a tax system with uniform rates across the country; executive constraint (i.e., limited government) is generally coded as the year that a country established a constitutional monarchy.
3. England is coded as having limited government in 1688, the majority of European country cases see the arrival of limited government between 1831 and 1876 with the establishment of constitutional monarchies and stable parliamentary regimes. For example, Dincecco (2011) sees fiscal centralization taking place in France starting in 1790 and in Denmark in 1903.
4. Even the most prosperous of premodern states lacked highly centralized institutions by modern standards.
5. Besley and Persson (2009) find that common interest public goods, along with political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity.
6. There are a variety of terms used to describe the Ottoman viceroys to Egypt, some of which overlap with the terminology used to describe Egypt's slave soldiers, the Mamluks (sing. *mamluk*, pl. *mamalik*). For example, Khayr Bey ruled as the Ottoman viceroy (*wali*) until he passed away in 1522. With the exception of Khayr Bey, all viceroys who followed him were given the title of *pasha*. The Mamluks were collectively referred to as the *beys* (Marsot 1985, 40).
7. For example, Khadim Hafiz Muhammad (1591–1595) knew the Qurʾan and read it every Friday. Most of the pashas adhered to Islamic law (shariʿa). But Dugakin Oglu Mohammed (1554–1556) was deemed to be wanton and immoral, and he was executed by the sultan (Winter 1998, 7–9).
8. A number of defeated Mamluks were pardoned and permitted to remain in Egypt (Hathaway 1998, 37).
9. According to Abdel Qadir al-Jaziri, from 1517 to 1550, there were fifteen *umara al-hajj,* six of whom were Mamluk *amirs* (Winter 1998, 13).
10. Marsot (1984, 139) writes that "society at that time was built on intermediaries acting as buffers between the population and the administration . . . the authority of the central government was gradually usurped by the intermediaries, especially in time of crisis."
11. After the death of Ibrahim Kahya al-Qazdaghl in 1754, one of his Georgian Mamluks, Ali Bey al-Kabir, continued his predecessor's policies in controlling political and economic life. Ali Bey al-Kabir's most trusted retainer, Mohammed Abu al-Dahab, followed him. Upon the death of Mohammed Abu al-Dahab in 1774, leadership was split between two of his retainers, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, who together dominated political life in Ottoman Egypt until the arrival of the French in 1798 (Bjorneboe 2007, 30).
12. The duration of Ottoman governors in Egypt has been well documented in Ottoman sources, including Öztuna (1994) and Sureyya (1996). The data presented in Figure 32.1 are smoothed with a ten-year moving average.
13. Rubin (2017, this volume) argues that religious elites long enjoyed forms of political legitimacy in Muslim societies.
14. Moreover, some tax farmers were transforming their landholdings into non-taxed religious properties that could be passed on to heirs of the tax farmer. For example, according

to the 1812 cadastral survey of agriculture lands, waqf properties were estimated to comprise 20 percent of all cultivated land (Marsot 1984, 143).

15. In 1812 Ibrahim Pasha was sent by Muhammad Ali to Upper Egypt to search for the Mamluks who escaped the Citadel massacre (Fahmy 1998, 146–148). While some scholars argue that the Citadel massacre constituted the complete end of Mamluks in Egypt, Abu-Lughod (1967, 331–332) argues that "many mamluks who had fled to Upper Egypt opted for a more benign alternative." Indeed, Hunter (1984, 25) argues that Muhammad Ali employed a large number of Mamluks, including 500 who worked for him directly in the civil and military administration or were tutors within his household.
16. Helen Rivlin, "Muhammad Ali: Pasha and Viceroy of Egypt," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-Ali-pasha-and-viceroy-of-Egypt.
17. The status of waqf properties in light of a centralizing state was increasingly precarious. In 1846 Muhammad Ali sought to issue a decree preventing the creation of new waqf properties from agricultural land. He justified this policy change by arguing waqf properties worked against Islamic law regarding inheritance and also prevented the government from collecting taxes. The head mufti refused to issue a religious edict (fatwa) endorsing Muhammad Ali's desire to place limits on the waqf. Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, advocated for the removal of the mufti; instead, Muhammad Ali approached the mufti of Alexandria to issue the fatwa instead. The fatwa was revoked a short time later (Hillal 2016, 1835–1838).
18. See Saleh (2015, this volume) for more on the impact of this economic agenda on socioeconomic inequality between non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority in Egypt. For example, Saleh (2015) shows the impact of state industrialization in the Christian-Muslim occupational difference between 1816 and 1868.
19. In contrast to other analysts, Panza and Williamson (2015) consider the counterfactual of what would have happened to the Egyptian economy were Muhammad Ali to have not intervened, in broader, comparative context.
20. Muhammad Ali sparred with religious elites over questions related to economic justice. For example, in September 1808, the rector of al-Azhar (Shaykh al-Sharqawi) asked Muhammad Ali to show more kindness to the Egyptian people through an easing of the sources of economic and societal injustice. He pushed back against the characterization that he alone was responsible for injustice in Egypt and accused the religious elites of abusing the peasantry. In particular, he pointed to the fact that when he eased taxes on the religious elites, they then turned around and increased their own taxes on the peasants (al-Jabarti 2013c, 93–94).
21. Following the exile of Umar Makram, Muhammad Ali was no longer on good terms with the rector of al-Azhar but dared not remove him; instead he was put under house arrest. See Hillal (2015, 1286) for more information on this subject.
22. The first decree by Muhammad Ali for *ib'adiya* was in 1826 (Baer 1962, 16; Barakat 1977).
23. For example, the first *jiflik* was granted to Mohammed Ali's daughter in 1838 (Barakat 1977, 36).
24. See Baer (1962, 47) for a discussion of this class of elites, known as *zawat*.
25. For example, Khorsheid Pasha—the governor of Dakhaliyya—was originally Georgian and owned more than one-fifth of the villages in that province. Mohammed Sharif Pasha, son of a Turkish judge, was appointed prime minister under Khedives Ismail and Tawfik and was granted 1,000 feddans from Ismail in addition to an *ib'adiya* he held. Mahu Pasha

was appointed the governor of Sudan in the 1820s; by the end of the 19th century, his heirs owned over 1,000 feddans of property (Baer 1962, 47).

26. Helen Rivlin, "Muhammad Ali: Pasha and Viceroy of Egypt."
27. For example, in his opening speech to the council on November 25, 1866, Khedive Ismail said, "I often thought of establishing *Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab* . . . no one can deny the usefulness and advantages that the matter should be a consultation between the rulers and the ruled." In the speech, Ismail also referenced Qurʾanic verses about the importance of consultation. See al-Rafei (2001, 92–93) for more details.
28. Even at the time that the council was established, elites were aware that their influence over policy would be limited. For example, Lady Duff Gordon relates a relevant anecdote in her "Letters from Egypt" (Ross 1902). She meets a group of Nubian deputies who are on a boat down the Nile on their way to the inauguration of the council. She says to them, "Now you will help to govern the country, what a fine thing for you," to which the deputies respond, "What words are these? Who is there on the banks of the Nile who can say anything but *hadir* (i.e., to assent)?" (Ross 1902, 315). According to another anecdote, during the opening of the council in 1866, deputies refused to sit on the left of the chamber because this would suggest that they were in opposition to the government, an impossible position. One of the deputies reportedly said, "We are all your servants, so how can we resist your government?" This anecdote is disputed, however, and there are no surviving minutes of this meeting in the parliamentary archive. See Rizk (1995, 129) and al-Rafei (2001, 105–106) for more on this subject.
29. The peasants were burdened by the heavy taxes imposed upon them. For more information on this topic, see Salem (2009, 28–30) and Barakat (2018, 208).
30. The Privy Council was established in 1847, before the creation of the Advisory Council of Delegates. For more information on the Privy Council, see al-Rafei (1982, 523–524).
31. In some cases, the khedive used the Advisory Council of Delegates to endorse policies to increase the wealth of his family. This was evident when the council ratified Ismail's decision to confiscate land that was subsequently allocated to members of his family (Hunter 1984, 53).
32. These data come from Henin (2008).
33. The Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar), was created by Khedive Ismail in 1878 to replace the Privy Council.
34. Following this declaration, Prince Mohamed Tawfiq was appointed prime minister in March 1879 (al-Rafei 2001, 189–190). By late March, the confrontation between the Council and the European cabinet reached its highest level. Forty-nine members of Council wrote a memorandum against the minister of finance for failing to report fiscal plans.
35. See al-Rafei (2001, 242–250) for a complete discussion.
36. The name of the council was changed from Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab to Majlis al-Nuwwab by the end of Khedive Ismail's rule.
37. The khedive convened the council, electing members based on the 1866 Electoral Law despite controversy regarding the appropriate rules to use.
38. This is not to say that representative institutions represented the only locales from which executive constraint might emanate. For example, by the late 1870s Gamal al-Din al-Afghani had formed a national freemasons lodge that had over 300 members, including journalists, intellectuals, notables, and religious elites, as well as some members of the Assembly and the military (Kudsi-Zadeh 1972, 30).

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CHAPTER 33

ISLAM AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT

Shrines and Literacy in Pakistan

ADEEL MALIK AND RINCHAN MIRZA

> *Sufism has been involved in all that we think of as politics: conception of authority and power, legitimacy and contestation of rule, formation of socio-moral order of a community or nation, competition for patronage, prestige and control of a society's wealth, the mobilization of people and resources in support or against the status-quo, and so on.*
>
> —Paul L. Heck, *Sufism and Politics* (2007)

A growingly influential field of research has probed the impact of religious beliefs and institutions on economic development (Carvalho, Iyer, and Rubin 2019). Considerable scholarly effort has been expended on studying the impact of religion on human capital through a focus on the role of Protestantism in Europe (Becker and Woessmann 2009), Catholicism in France (Squicciarini 2020), and Christian missionaries in former colonies (Chaudhry and Rubin 2011; Woodberry 2004,). However, the primary focus of this research has remained on non-Muslim contexts. Furthermore, as Iyer (2016) argues in her wide-ranging review of the literature on economics of religion, the relationship between religion, politics, and economic processes remains significantly under-studied. In an ongoing project (Malik and Mirza 2018), we seek to address both of these gaps by examining the role of religious elites on literacy in the second-most populous Muslim country, Pakistan.

While past scholarship has mainly focused on the impact of religious beliefs, practices, and norms on long-run development, we offer a slightly different empirical take by emphasizing the role of religious elites. Elite power plays a crucial role in dominant political economy accounts and helps to explain the strong patterns of institutional persistence witnessed globally (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). The interests and incentives of elites can matter for development, since they can impede or facilitate prosperity-inducing reforms. Elites can oppose technological change if they perceive it as a threat to their future political power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Cosgel, Miceli, and Rubin 2012). Similarly, elite opposition to schooling in the context of high land inequality has received considerable empirical attention. For example, landed elites have obstructed the spread of mass education in the United States (Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009), Latin America (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), and India (Banerjee, Iyer, and Somnathan 2005). Favorable elite incentives can, on the other hand, improve public goods provision. Drawing on evidence from rural China, Tsai (2007) has shown that in regions where local solidarity groups are stronger, elites are incentivized to improve public goods provision to maintain and enhance their "moral standing."

Despite this emerging emphasis on elites, the literature on religion and development lacks a systematic inquiry on the role of religious elites in shaping development. In the context of Muslim societies, the role of religious clergy (ulama) figures prominently in broader historical accounts of divergence in development between Western Europe and the Middle East (Kuru 2019; Rubin 2017). However, there are few systematic empirical attempts to capture the impact of Muslim religious elites on development. Using historic flood data on the River Nile, Chaney (2013) demonstrated that Egypt's central religious authority assumed greater political power in the face of economic shocks. Similarly, Bazzi, Koehler-Derrick, and Marx (2020) shed light on the origins of Islamic politics in Indonesia and demonstrate that the risk of land expropriation in the wake of Indonesia's land reforms in 1960 increased the transfer of lands into waqf endowments, and these transfers left a deep imprint on the size and electoral support of Islamic parties. However, these studies are principally concerned with understanding the deep institutional foundations of Islam in the public domain and their focus remains on religious clergy (ulama) and Islamic political parties. We study the direct impact of a third dimension, Islamic mystical orders (Sufism), on long-run development.

Sufism has long been understood as a central force in the transmission of Islam across vast swathes of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The missionary activities of mystical Islamic brotherhoods not only extended the borders of Islam, but also left a deep imprint on local economic and political structures. Yet it is surprising that the emerging political economy scholarship on religion has completely neglected this central aspect of Islamic civilization. Our research provides a first stab at addressing this important gap by studying the developmental impact of religious elites whose authority and power is derived from distinguished Sufi shrines that were recognized and rewarded by British colonial administration. Our empirical material is drawn from Pakistan's largest province, Punjab. In this chapter we synthesize evidence from two related papers, Malik and Mirza (2018) and Malik and Malik (2017). Interested readers can find the full technical scope of our argument in these papers.

Interspersed between Central Asia and the heartlands of India, Punjab is home to some of the oldest Islamic mystical orders of South Asia. Traveling from Central Asia and the Middle East, early Muslim saints settled down in different parts of Punjab and were credited with bringing entire tribes and communities into the fold of Islam. The tombs constructed to celebrate the sacred tradition of these saints became the "symbolic cultural outposts" of Islam (Gilmartin 1979). Guardians of these shrines acquired immense legitimacy and prominence in the eyes of the local populace and became important controllers of economic and political power over time. Shrine caretakers have historically acted as brokers between the centralized state and its peripheral subjects. Whether Mughal rule or Sikh interregnum, British colonial administration or post-independence Pakistan, no ruler has passed without extending favor to powerful shrine families to seek their support.

To define a measure of the power of shrine elites, we compile a novel data set on the presence of historically significant shrines from colonial-era district gazetteers. To investigate their impact on literacy, we utilize a coup-induced administrative shock to public goods provision that gave elected politicians greater power over spending and allocation of public goods in their constituencies. We show that the impact of shrine elites on literacy only becomes salient after General Zia's coup when the system of public goods provision underwent a radical change. We argue that, with their greater aversion to mass education, shrine elites leveraged their political power to suppress literacy expansion in shrine-dominated regions after the coup-induced reforms.

While our analysis substantiates prior evidence on the opposition of landed elites to schooling, we emphasize religious, as opposed to economic, motives. We argue that, compared with landed elites, shrine elites have both a greater incentive and capacity to oppose schooling. The standard explanation rests on elites suppressing education by directly restricting educational spending or blocking the construction of new schools. We offer a more nuanced mechanism whereby shrine elites make existing school provision defective by influencing the location of schools, the quality of school infrastructure, and school size.

In relating shrine elites with literacy, we are inspired by a well-established literature that presents education as an existential threat to the power of shrine elites since it can interfere with the structure of voluntary obedience and compliance that they seek to promote. Our focus on literacy as a development outcome connects with a vast literature on the role of human capital is a determinant of the wealth of nations (Glaeser et al. 2004; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 2005). In thinking about constraints to human capital development, our work is directly related with studies that argue that schooling differences across countries are grounded in history and political economy (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Gallego 2010).

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: We start by offering a brief background on the historically persistent power of shrine elites and synthesize the core empirical insights of Malik and Mirza (2018). Subsequently, we discuss the main mechanisms through which shrine elites influence literacy and highlight the salience of the political dimension. The chapter concludes by drawing out the broader significance of our analysis for the study of Islam and development.

THE POWER OF SHRINE ELITES

With regard to the influence of shrine families, three aspects are pertinent to our analysis. First, the spiritual and material influence of shrine caretakers is mainly derived from their sacred lineage and their association with the shrine as a seat of religious power. Second, the power of shrine families is historically embedded. While courted by all rulers, the British colonial rule radically transformed their power through the introduction of formal property rights. By barring the sale of land from "agrarian" to "non-agrarian castes," the Land Alienation Act of 1900 effectively preserved and expanded elite control over land (Ali 1987). Exercising their discretion, the British colonial administration treated prominent shrine families as "agrarian castes," which made them fit to receive landed gentry grants. Large tracts of land were awarded to prominent families in return for preserving social order and lending support to British rule.

While past rulers similarly awarded land grants to key shrine families, these usually reverted back to the state upon the death of a shrine guardian. However, with the establishment of property rights under the British, hereditary succession acquired a powerful economic motive and converted these families into both spiritual and feudal masters, or *pīr-zamindārs*. *Third*, given their religious and economic power and their ability to act as intermediaries of rulers, shrine guardians were natural contenders for electoral politics when the British opened the gates for it in the early twentieth century. Entering the electoral race from an early period, big shrine families were able to expand their presence. Their political influence has gained salience post-partition in Pakistani Punjab and persists to the present day.

This leaves us with a final introductory hook around the possible significance of these shrine elites for development. Our interest lies in exploring whether shrine-dominated regions witnessed a substantially retarded trajectory of literacy rates over time relative to non-shrine regions. Our focus on literacy is motivated by both historical and contemporary literature that alludes to the aversion of shrine elites to education. In an important monograph, *The Punjab Peasant*, British civil servant Sir Malcolm Darling presciently observed that shrine elites are "instinctively opposed to the two movements from the which the ordinary cultivator has most to hope. Neither education nor cooperation has their sympathy, for both strike at the regime which it is their one object to maintain" (Darling 1928, 100).

Subsequent studies have affirmed this insight. In *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, Anatol Lieven echoes the same concern: "in practice the *pirs* and their families cannot genuinely advance either local education or local democracy, as this would strike directly at the cultural and social bases of their own power." (Lieven 2012, 138) In *Religion, Land, and Politics*, the noted historian K. K. Aziz argues that it is difficult for shrine elites to "countenance any prospect for the education of the masses when his supremacy, status and income depended on their ignorance and superstition" (Aziz 2001, 27). Access to education can unravel the hierarchical structure of power that is based on unquestioned loyalty, obedience, and superstition.

Evidence on Shrines and Literacy

Our empirical analysis is based on two key innovations: the compilation of three complementary data sets on the presence and influence of shrines across different regions of Punjab, and a novel research design that uses a coup-induced shock to the administration of public goods provision to identify the impact of shrine elites on literacy growth. We spell out these two contributions and offer a quick summary of the main findings in Malik and Mirza (2018).

Data

Our primary contribution is to compile three unique databases on shrines. The first database covers the universe of shrines across tehsils, the lowest administrative unit of Punjab. The primary source for this data is the Punjab Auqaf Department, which is responsible for the administration, construction, decoration, and management of shrines. To fulfill these functions, it maintains a detailed list of shrines across different regions of Punjab. Shrines with missing or incomplete location details were separately treated through specialized interviews with informed respondents in each district circle.

A second source of shrine data is the colonial-era district gazetteers of Punjab that systematically provide information on major shrines in each district. Such information was typically documented in a separate subsection titled, "Religious Fairs and Festivals." This is a crucial data source for our project, since British administrators were more likely to recognize shrines that were influential in the precolonial era. It was often the same shrines that later received colonial land grants, official titles, administrative posts, and other instruments of colonial patronage. All shrines mentioned in district gazetteers were separately recorded and consolidated with our original database. This required mapping each historical shrine to the contemporary tehsil where it is located. A total of 146 shrines across Punjab were mentioned in district gazetteers, with forty-seven tehsils containing at least one shrine mention.

In a third data set we compiled supplementary information on the direct participation of shrine families in electoral politics. Using electoral records from fifteen waves of election results since 1937 and a variety of primary and secondary sources, we identified all shrine families that directly participated in electoral politics and entered in national or provincial assemblies. We were thus able to identify sixty-four shrines with a direct


Mingora
Chagcharan
Kabul
Mehtar Lam
Jalalabad
Dhodial
Bandipora
Behsud
Mardan
Abbottābād
Baramulla
Srinagar
Jar
Day Mirdad
Peshawar
Haripur
K
Parachinar
Nowshera
Tral
Afghanistan
Attock
Rawalpindi
Anantnag
Sangar
Ghazni
Tota Khil
Kohat
Shopian
Gizab
Gardez
Karbogha Sharif
Khost
M-2
Banihal
Loman
Bannu
Zarghun Shahr
Chora
AH 1
Jammu
Lakki Marwat
Miānwāli
Mandi Bahauddin
Gujrat
Sialkot
Day Chopan
Khushāb
Adamkay
Kathua
Wana
Shahbaz Khel
Sargodha
Hafizabad
Gujranwala
Pathank
Dera Ismāil Khan
M-3
AH 1
Batala
Dasuy
Laškar Gāh
Kandahar
Bhakkar
Chiniot
Lahore
Amritsar
Hos
Zhob
Civil Lines
Township
Jalandha
Jhang Sadar
Samundri
Kasur
Ludh
Chaman
Layyah
Okāra
Kot Sultan
Gulistan
Pishin
Taunsa
Sāhīwāl
Kuchlak
Loralai
Kot Addu
Pākpattan
Dera Ghāzi Khān
Multan
Khānewāl
Abohar
Punjab
Quetta
Muzaffargarh
Bahawalnagar
Mansa
Pakistan
Vehāri
Shujaabad
Sri Ganganagar
Mastung
Nushki
Sibi
Jampur
Sirsa
Chak 21RB
Hanumangarh
Jatoi
Bahawalpur
Fazilpur
Rajanpur
Ahmedpur East
Vijaynagar
Suratgarh
Gharsana
H
Liāqatpur
Zāhir Pīr
Khairpur
Rajgarh
Rahim Yar Khan
Khanpur
Sardarshahar
Jacobabad
Sadiqabad
Bikaner
Benisar
Churu
Shikārpur
Tejrasar
Khuzdar
Shahdādkot
Pano Aqil
Sujangarh
Sikar
M-8
Larkana
Sukkur
Buili
Kanji Ki Sird
Nokha
Khairpur
Ranipur
Nagaur
Phalodi
Legend
● 0-0.4
● 0.4-0.8
● 0.8-1.2
● 1.2-1.6
● 1.6-2
● 2-2.4

FIGURE 33.1: Spatial distribution of politically influential shrines in Punjab.

Source: Malik and Malik (2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000949, © Cambridge University Press 2018. Reprinted with permission.

political connection. Figure 33.1 maps the spatial distribution of politically influential shrines. A quick glance at Punjab's sacred geography demonstrates substantial variation in shrine presence across different regions. A greater number of shrines in southwest Punjab were mentioned in district gazetteers and subsequently selected into politics. However, a significant proportion, 39 percent of all politically influential shrines, are situated in central Punjab.

Our main proxy for the historically embedded power of religious elites is the number of shrines mentioned in colonial-era district gazetteers per 10,000 persons in a tehsil, the lowest administrative unit for which data is available. Shrines tend to vary in terms of their number, size, and significance. Our argument is not based on the generalized impact of shrines but on a subset of historically significant shrines, which bestowed on their guardians tremendous power in both economic and political domains. For our outcome variable, we compiled a long historical panel of literacy rates that spans over a century (1901–2011). The data has been compiled at the tehsil-level for which archival and contemporary data on literacy is available. Since some administrative boundaries have changed over time, we conducted our empirical analysis while keeping historical tehsil boundaries fixed at 1931.

Coup-Induced Shock

To identify the effect of shrine elites on literacy, we relied on a coup-induced universal shock to the administrative regime for allocation of public goods. After coming to power in the wake of the military coup in 1977, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq radically altered the administrative regime that governed the administration of public goods. Prior to the coup, major decisions regarding public goods provision were in the hands of bureaucrats who were relatively insulated from local political influence.[1] After General Zia's coup, elected politicians were given direct control over allocation of public goods. They now had a direct influence over the number and type of development schemes to be pursued and the ensuing allocations and disbursements for these.

Besides this administrative change, three other dimensions of the Zia-period (1977–1988) provide a crucial background to our empirical analysis. First, the military coup was not driven by shrine elites and was largely exogenous to the domestic political milieu. While a national political agitation preceded the imposition of the coup, it was spearheaded by an urban right-wing alliance. Furthermore, while coup leaders typically blame prevailing political crises as the main reason for the coup, such crises are often manufactured to pave the way for such coups (Shah 2014). Furthermore, all of Pakistan's military coups coincided with major geopolitical projects and were probably influenced by an interplay of domestic and international factors. Second, the Zia era saw an unprecedented expansion of schooling infrastructure. Education became a major area of development priority and attracted more public spending.

Third, soon after ensconcing himself in power, and in the face of growing external pressure for holding elections, Zia selectively opened the electoral arena. But he did so in a manner that radically changed the political landscape for decades to come. Using the Martial Law Order No. 65 and through a series of amendments in the Political Parties Act of 1962, Zia disqualified members of a popular political party, the Pakistan People's Party, from participating in elections. The elections, held in 1985, disallowed candidates from declaring any party affiliation, which cleared the electoral field for the entry of new political actors who drew their strength purely from their wealth, status, and social networks. This meant that factors constituting the society's basic social formations, such as tribe, clan, kinship, and religious authority, assumed greater salience in determining electoral success. Shrine elites were important beneficiaries of this, as many shrine families were incentivized to consolidate their political influence by increase their direct electoral participation.

The Zia era thus set in motion a new politics of development both through changes in the administration of public goods provision and electoral laws. This has profound implications for our analysis. We have already argued that shrine elites are more *averse* to education because it poses an existential threat to the regime of voluntary obedience around shrine-based religious authority. With these sweeping changes brought about by General Zia, shrine elites also now possessed a greater *ability* to undermine educational provision. We thus hypothesize that the interplay between shrine-based religious power and the *de jure change* in the administrative regime for public goods provision should be adversely associated with literacy.

Main Findings

Our empirical analysis, based on a difference-in-differences regression framework, compares the impact of this policy treatment on the evolution of literacy rates across regions that had greater historically embedded religious power versus those who lacked such power—see Malik and Mirza (2018) for technical details. Concretely, we expect that tehsils with a higher number of historical shrines per capita would witness a differential trajectory of literacy relative to low-shrine tehsils. Our results lend support to this. Areas with a greater concentration of historic shrines witnessed a substantially retarded growth of literacy in the post-coup period relative to low-shrine areas. There is no systematic difference in literacy trends between high- and low-shrine tehsils prior to the 1977 military coup. Furthermore, shrine regions do not differ systematically from low-shrine regions in terms of levels of public infrastructure provision. The impact of shrine elites remains latent until 1977. The divergence in literacy rates emerges only after the military coup.

Alternative Explanations

Our main finding is robust to a variety of perturbations in the empirical set-up, which includes, among others, controlling for various literacy determinants, geographic controls, and competing explanations. Two important dimensions of this analysis deserve some attention. First, we recognize the possibility that shrine location could itself be determined by tehsil-level characteristics that may have a direct bearing on literacy. Second, to the extent that shrine elites act as controllers of both land and politics, their influence on local political economy is similar to those of landed elites who are similarly incentivized to suppress the expansion of schooling. Is the shrine effect then simply proxying for the influence of landed elites?

It turns out that the negative effect of historic shrine presence on literacy holds up when we account for the geographic selection of shrines and land inequality. Given that some of the most prominent shrines in Punjab are situated in close vicinity to the river, distance from river appears as a significant correlate of historic shrines. Analyzing the diffusion of Islam in western Punjab, Eaton (2009) highlighted the role of agrarian change, ecology, and larger socioeconomic changes. According to Eaton, the transmission of Islam during the period 1300–1800 was gradual and mostly occurred in regions considered peripheral to the Hindu cultural system and treated as frontier regions by the Mughal sultanate.

The riverine regions of Punjab were mostly populated by tribes that were untouched by Hindu culture and religion. The riverine tracts also afforded superior agricultural possibilities in an era when perennial irrigation through canals had not yet existed. Access to the river also supported greater mobility of people at a time when rivers were important modes of transportation for trade and the movement of people. For all these reasons, riverine regions were excellent candidates for shrine location. Reassuringly, controlling for both distance from river and distance from Delhi in our empirical analysis does not alter the result.

To ensure that our basic finding is not driven by land inequality, we rely on a variety of empirical strategies. First, we use information on land tenure contracts from colonial district gazetteers and construct a measure of initial land inequality, which is defined as the proportion of villages in a colonial tehsil that are subjected to *zamindari* contracts (landlord contracts). Given the absence of genuine land reforms in Pakistan and the persistence of land inequality, initial land inequality could serve as a useful proxy. Second, in one of the earliest investigations on land inequality in Punjab, Calvert (1925) established rainfall as a leading correlate of the size and distribution of land holdings. While such proxies of land inequality turn up as statistically significant correlates of literacy, they do not eliminate the shrine effect. We also rule out other pertinent explanations that could potentially interfere with our results, including the role of partition-induced displacement, the incidence of canal irrigation, urbanization, and migration.

The Primacy of Politics

We explore possible mechanisms that underpin the negative effect of historic shrines on literacy in the post-coup period. In doing so, politics emerges as a central intervening variable. As argued earlier, since mass literacy poses a direct and existential threat to the religious authority of shrine elites, they are more averse to education and have therefore a greater incentive to suppress schooling than non-shrine elites. We have also argued that the administrative and electoral reforms under Zia placed greater financial and political power in the hands of elected politicians. Enjoying a stable and growing electoral presence, shrine elites now had greater ability to undermine educational expansion after the coup.

To put some meat behind this argument, we first present evidence on how shrine elites have maintained—and, in fact, increased—their foothold on electoral politics in their respective regions. We also show that regions with historically significant shrines are more likely to witness the entry and presence of shrine elites into politics. Second, we highlight some factors that are crucial for understanding the political resilience of shrine elites. Finally, we identify the strategies that shrine elites seem to have deployed in suppressing education after the 1977 military coup.

Shrines and Politics

Historically serving as intermediaries between centralized rulers and their peripheral subjects, shrine elites have enjoyed influence with most ruling powers. Their religious authority confers on them a complementary power of intermediation: an intercession between God and man. In his book, *Religion, Land, and Politics in Pakistan*, the noted historian K. K. Aziz highlighted the political advantages associated with a sacred shrine lineage:

> Medium-size shrine makes him a small landowner and a local squire. The big shrine gives him an entrée into the zamindar club and makes a magnate of him. A leading shrine is a gold mine, which catapults him into the aristocratic category and brings him riches large enough to . . . enter politics directly at the highest level.
>
> (Aziz 2001, 109)

Persistence

The influence of shrine elites on the local political economy, their capacity to act as intermediaries, and their control of landed property serve as crucial political assets. It is therefore not surprising that when the British opened the electoral arena in 1920, shrine guardians eagerly participated in them. The 1937 and 1946 elections in British India saw many prominent religious families taking part (see Table 34.1 for details). When the demand for Pakistan gained strength, religious families readily joined the ranks of the Muslim League and "played a decisive role in mobilizing support for Pakistan" (Gilmartin 1979). Since then, shrine elites have remained a permanent fixture of Pakistani politics. Their high degree of political persistence is evident from the fact that while roughly 19 percent of total rural Muslim constituencies were held by shrine families in the pre-Partition period (1920 and 1946), the corresponding ratio only fell to 16 percent in 2013 (Malik and Mirza 2015).

Shrine elites have served in every political dispensation, whether a political party is ideologically on the left or right or whether a military ruler supported "Islamization" (General Zia-ul-Haq) or "enlightened moderation" (General Pervez Musharraf). General Zia-ul-Haq reached out to key shrine families and inducted them into his *Majlis-e-Shura* (consultative assembly). Some of the same families joined General Pervez Musharraf's cabinet two decades later, this time for undoing Zia's legacy. And, even as dictatorial rule gave way to civilian elected governments, the sun has never set on the political power of shrine notables.

Growing Electoral Presence after Zia

The new electoral restrictions introduced by General Zia's military regime paved the way for the entry of new families in electoral politics, including shrine aristocrats who

Table 33.1: Participation of Shrine Families in Elections in Pre-Partition Punjab

	Candidates from shrine families	
Constituency	1937	1946
Attock	Syed Ameer Ahmed Shah (*Ittehad-e-Millat*)	Mohy-ud-din Lal Badshah (*Unionist*, *Won*)
Sargodha	Syed Nawazish Ali Shah (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Sir Qalandar Shah
Pind Dadan Khan	Raja Ghazanfar Ali (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Raja Ghazanfar Ali (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Jhang Jhang East	Syed Mubarak Ali Shah (*Unionist*, *Won*) Sardar Hasan Hussein Shah	Syed Mubarak Ali Shah (*Muslim League*, *Won*) Syed Ghulam Mohammad Shah (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Toba Tek Singh	Pir Nasir-ud-din Shah (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Pir Nasir-ud-din Shah (*Unionist*)
Shujabad	Syed Razi Shah Gilani (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Mohammad Raza Shah Gilani (*Muslim League*, *Won*) Mureed Hussain Qureshi (*Unionist*)
Multan	Major Ashiq Hussain Qureshi (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Major Ashiq Hussain Qureshi (*Unionist*, *Won*)
Lodhran	Makhdum Wilayat Gilani (*Unionist*, *Won*)	Syed Mustafa Shah Gilani (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Dera Ghazi Khan	Khwaja Ghulam Murtaza (*Unionist*, *Won*)	
Ferozpur	Syed Amjad Ali* (*Unionist*, *Won*)	
Gujar Khan	Ali Raza Shah	
Depalpur		Syed Ashiq Hussain Shah (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Kabirwala		Pir Syed Naubahar Shah (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Khanewal		Pir Budhan Shah Khagga (*Muslim League*, *Won*)
Pakpattan/Arifwala		Mohammad Masood Chishti

Source: Malik and Malik (2017). Data from Anjum 1995; Punjab Assembly Website.

* related to the caretakers of Daud Bandagi in Shergarh.



FIGURE 33.2: Shrine-affiliated candidates for National Assembly elections, 1970–2008.

used this opportunity to increase their direct presence in electoral politics. As Anatol Lieven (2012, 137) correctly observes, in the Pakistani political milieu, “it is not wealth alone, but wealth plus either kinship or spiritual prestige, or both, that gives political power.” With their control of both religious and landed power, Punjab’s shrine notables were well placed to increase their political fortunes under Zia’s military regime.

Indeed, even a cursory analysis of electoral data reveals the growing participation of shrine elites in electoral politics since the Zia era. Figure 33.2 provides a preview of this by plotting the number of shrine-affiliated candidates during the period 1970–2008, and shows a noticeable spike in the number of shrine-affiliated candidates since the 1980s. Shrine families also seem to have received a major boost in their electoral fortunes in the post-Zia period (see Figure 33.3). Representation of major shrine families in the national legislature increased by roughly three times since 1970. Adjusting these shrine victories by the number of constituencies (or seats) preserves these basic patterns (see Figure 33.4). Analysis of provincial election results reveal the same pattern of rising political presence of shrine families. Temporally, we can thus notice a clear shift in the participation and prospects of shrine-affiliated families in electoral politics in the post-Zia period.

Beyond their direct participation in elections, shrine elites have always remained an important indirect influence. In any region that hosts the tomb of a major Muslim saint, the blessings of the shrine guardian are essential for candidates competing in that constituency. Typically, election candidates try to win the confidence of the shrine guardian,



FIGURE 33.3: Shrine-affiliated winners for National Assembly elections, 1970–2008.



FIGURE 33.4: Victory of shrine-affiliated candidates per National Assembly constituency, 1970–2008.

who usually tends to control vast networks of devotees who can be swayed to support any candidate of his choice. While such indirect political influence of shrine magnates tends to vary across different regions, there are numerous instances where a shrine guardian's influence can play a decisive role in electoral contests. Sometimes, this influence also spans several neighboring constituencies. Like the British, who were the masters of indirect rule, all military regimes from General Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharraf have cultivated ties with major shrine families and depended on their political brokerage. Regardless of whether a shrine family exerts a direct or an indirect political influence, it was able to partake in new patronage opportunities afforded by the political control of development funds that General Zia's administrative restructuring facilitated.

Factors Shaping Shrine Presence in Politics

To tie this discussion more firmly to our empirical analysis, we probe the determinants of shrine presence in contemporary politics by asking whether regions with a greater concentration of historically significant shrines recognized by colonial-era district gazetteers saw a disproportionately higher presence of shrine electables in the post-independence period (1947–2013). To do so, we ran a simple probit model where our binary-dependent variable was coded as one for tehsils where shrines have a direct electoral linkage, and as zero otherwise. Our main explanatory variable was a dummy variable that picked out tehsils with historically recognized shrines (i.e., shrines mentioned in colonial-era district gazetteers). Our analysis showed that as the historic shrine dummy changes from zero to one, the probability that a tehsil has a political shrine increases by 42 percentage points (Malik and Mirza 2015). In short, it is mostly regions with historical shrines that have witnessed a greater presence of shrine families in politics.

Let us now turn to a larger question: What gives shrine elites political salience, and what might explain their political persistence over time? In traditional rural settings, guardians of notable shrines act as both religious and political figures and have substantial land holdings. The control of religious, economic, and political power is a lethal combination in the electoral arena. It not only allows shrine elites to use the traditional instruments of patronage and control typically deployed by landed gentry, but also affords greater social control over local populations by shaping their cognitive beliefs and mental constructs. In sociological terms, power relations demand compliance not just through coercion and reciprocity, but also through voluntary obedience. It is with regard to the latter that shrine elites, thanks to their established religious authority, enjoy an additional political leverage. As Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills (1953, 193–195) argue:

> [T]he crux of the problem of power rests in understanding the origin, constitution, and maintenance of voluntary obedience . . . . An adequate understanding of power relations thus involves a knowledge of the grounds on which a power holder claims obedience, and the terms in which the obedient feels an obligation to obey.

Shrine elites are able to elicit such voluntary obedience through their control of what the American sociologist Robert Bierstedt (1950, 153) describes as "supernatural resources" of religious communities, which as "as agencies of a celestial government, apply supernatural sanctions as instruments of control." In rural settings, local populations frequently believe in the ability of shrine guardians to offer divine intercession. Enjoying an unquestionable obedience and loyalty of their devotees, shrine leaders usually advise believers on consequential decisions, such as the purchase of property, job selection, marriage, dispute resolution, and health decisions. Voting is just another item on this list. It is common for shrine devotees to cast their vote in favor of a candidate endorsed by the shrine guardian. Typically, before any electoral contest sets in, potential candidates start queuing up to seek the blessings of shrine families. Thus, even in constituencies where shrine families are not directly contesting elections, their indirect political role can be a decisive factor in electoral success (Malik and Malik 2017).

In short, through their control of both material and symbolic power, shrine elites are a political force to reckon with. They possess all three constitutive elements of power described by Bierstedt: numbers, organization, and resources. Influential shrines have a vast network of devotees that often spans multiple constituencies. For example, one major shrine of central Punjab alone (Sial Sharif) has a vote bank in over thirty constituencies, and controls about 10 percent of the total registered votes in each constituency, on average.[2] Besides their numerical strength, shrines afford their guardians superior organizational capacity by regularly holding congregations and festivals.

Turning to potential explanations for the political persistence of shrine families, our work has highlighted at least five factors (see Malik and Malik 2017). First, shrine families have been extremely adept at changing their political loyalties. In any electoral season, shrine-affiliated candidates are the first ones to change their party affiliation. Enjoying a stable and captive vote bank, shrines enjoy a portable network that can be transferred with relative ease across political parties. Second, shrine elites tend to penetrate party structures in ways that keeps political parties dependent on them for accessing the electorate. In many constituencies, the electoral space remains impenetrable without the political intercession offered by shrine guardians.

Shrine notables can act as political gatekeepers in these areas by influencing political party decisions on who to award a party ticket for general elections. With their social and religious capital cutting across party lines, they are also valued by political parties for their support in coalition building inside the parliament. Frequent military interventions provide a third key reason for the staying power of shrine elites. After usurping power, every military ruler faces a legitimacy gap that is filled by cultivating ties with traditional elites. All three of Pakistan's dictators tried to kill party politics and devolve power to the local level in ways that allowed them to centralize political power, entrench clientelist politics, and build a pliant and dependent class of political brokers. Extending the colonial legacy of indirect rule, successive military regimes have, in turn, strengthened shrine elites through their strategies for patronage and control. As part of this, the Awqaf departments were systematically reorganized under Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq to streamline their financial and administrative resources and selectively channel them to shrine elites.

Fourth, strategically formed marital connections and extended family ties allow shrine elites to play a much larger role in national politics beyond their constituencies and afford them greater relevance and durability in all political seasons. Some of the country's most prominent shrine families are related by marriage with other noted shrine magnates and members of the landed gentry, bureaucracy, and business community. Figure 33.5 provides a stylized description of the extended marital ties of Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, a former prime minister and long-time parliamentarian, and a member of one of Pakistan's most prominent shrine families, the Gilani Syeds of Multan. As Figure 33.5 shows, the Gilani Syeds are related to at least eight other shrine families controlling key seats of religious power in Punjab and Sind. Such dense familial networks define the larger shrine brotherhood.[3] Thus, the Aristotelian logic that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" befittingly applies to shrine elites.


Brother-in-law of Yusuf Raza Gilani is Makhdum Syed Ibrar Hussain Shah
Sajjada Nasheen of Sandhlianwali Sarkar
Tobatek Singh
Syed Ghulam Mohiyuddin Gilani
Sajjada Nasheen of Golra Sharif
Islamabad
Pir Safiuddin Shah Gilani
Sajjada Nasheen of Makhad Sharif
Attock
Fatber' sister marries into family of...
Pir Syed Ijaz Shah Gilani
Sajjada Nasheen of Hujra Shah Mugeem
Okara
Cousin marries into family of...
Syed Wajahat Hussain
Sajjada Nasheen of Pir-e-Piraan Musa Pak Shaheed
Multan
Elder sister marries...
Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani
Yusuf Raza Gilani and his sister marry into family of...
Cousin is...
Pir Syed Israr Hussain Shah Bukhari
Sajjada Nasheen of Sandhlianwali Sarkar
Tobatek Singh
Syed Wajahat Hussain
The Gardezi syeds of Bahawalpur
Son, Abdul Qadir Gilani, marries grand-daughter of...
Father married daughter of...
Father, brother marries into family of...
Cousin marries into family of...
Pir Pagara
Sind
Makhdum-ul-Mulk Ghulam Miran Shah
Sajjada Nasheen of the shrine of jamal al-Din Wali
Rahimyar Khan
Makhdum Syed Shams-ud-din-Gilani
Sajjada Nasheen of Uch sharif
Bahawalpur
Another daughter of makhdum-ul-mulk Ghulam Miran Shah was married in the family of Pir Pagara of Sind

FIGURE 33.5: Marital alliances of Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani.

Source: Malik and Malik (2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000949, © Cambridge University Press 2018. Reprinted with permission.

Finally, the instrument of hereditary succession, whereby guardianship of shrines passes to members of the same family, allows shrine elites to spread religious power across several generations and consolidates family interests, including property holdings. Arguably, the *gaddi* (seat of shrine religious lineage) provides a more stabilizing source of dynastic power:

> In comparison with landed elites, the staying power of shrine guardians may also be tied with the stabilizing association that shrine, as a fixed institution, offers to pīrs. Conceptualizing shrine-based gaddis as semi-permanent "family seats" might explain as to why shrine families are usually spared from some of the most destructive forms of factionalism. While internal strife, especially emanating from succession battles for the gaddi, is not entirely uncommon, it is subdued by the role of a shrine as the classic centripetal force that could generate incentives for cooperation among family members.
>
> (Malik and Malik 2017)

While this discussion offers a generalized description of the political influence of shrines, it is pertinent to highlight that there is considerable temporal and spatial heterogeneity in the sacred geography of Punjab. It is precisely such variation that allowed us to investigate the differential effects of shrine penetration on development.

Strategy to Undermine Educational Expansion

We have so far argued that shrine elites have greater incentives to oppose mass education and that shrine dense regions have witnessed a more retarded expansion of literacy since the 1977 military coup. Our explanation for this rests on the greater capacity of shrine elites to suppress educational expansion post-Zia, due to both the changes in the administration of public goods and the greater political consolidation of shrine elites during and after General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime. This naturally leads us to pose another important question: What specific strategies could these shrine elites have deployed in retarding education? For example, they could restrain public spending, block the construction of schools, make educational provision defective, and/or influence the demand for schooling in their regions of influence. Pinning down these mechanisms is essential for completing the analysis—and for situating the role of shrine elites in the everyday politics of development.

Given that General Zia's military regime expanded the educational effort and gave control over development spending directly to elected politicians, some of the strategies discussed here became more politically optimal for shrine elites than for others. With more state resources now available for development projects (e.g., the construction of schools, hiring of teachers, etc.) and indirectly administered through politicians, Zia's policies increased the opportunity cost for shrine elites to disengage from this new competition for state patronage. We therefore expect that, rather than restraining development spending or outright opposing the construction of schools, shrine elites would find it politically more optimal to reduce the quality of educational provision.

Evidence in Malik and Mirza (2018) tends to favor this prior. We find that shrine-affiliated members of the national assembly did not receive systematically lower allocations and or have lower utilization rates of development funds compared to non-shrine parliamentarians. Similarly, shrine-dense regions did not have a lower number of schools or teachers per child in either primary or secondary schools relative to non-shrine regions. In fact, there is no statistically significant difference in school provision between shrine and non-shrine regions. It is also possible that shrine regions witnessed a differential demand for schooling after the military coup. Conceivably, the coup could have brought changes to the local economy, exposure to nonagricultural opportunities, or increased the power of shrine guardians in ways that could influence the demand for schooling. Exploring this demand-side explanation using tehsil-level data on urbanization and economic migration, we find that neither of the two dimensions is fully able to account for the negative shrine effect.

Instead, we find stronger evidence in favor of another supply-side dimension: more defective educational provision in shrine-dominated regions. Our empirical analysis suggests that shrine-dense regions have schools that are more distant from target populations and lack essential facilities, such as electricity and boundary walls. Furthermore, schooling resources are spread more thinly in high shrine regions. This was reflected in the suboptimally lower size of primary schools and is a direct corollary of political elites using school construction as a source of rents and a means to expand personalized clientelist networks.

This evidence on defective educational provision chimes well with broader evidence on the politicization of schooling that was amplified during the Zia-period and continued thereafter. As Gazdar (2000, 31) argued, influential politicians vied to

> get a disproportionate number of public works in the areas of their influence or in areas where they wish to dispense patronage are, of course, quite damaging to the performance of public services . . . . The use of government jobs as patronage implies that employees are not selected for their abilities, and are also more difficult to hold accountable. The take-over of finished civil works (i.e. school buildings) for private use implies that public services cannot be delivered. The issue appears, therefore, not to be one of active opposition to schooling, but one of incidental damage due to the loss of accountability and the private appropriation of public resources.

Our evidence suggests that such politicization left a deeper imprint on shrine-dense regions. This is also consistent with anthropological evidence from the field (Martin 2016). Zia's legacy of channeling development spending through elected politicians continues to this day. Before being elected as prime minister, Imran Khan was vehemently opposed to giving development funds to members of provincial assemblies and the national assembly. However, once in power, he has been unable to fulfill his promise and has faced stiff opposition from his own party members, including mostly prominently from Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtiar, an important shrine guardian from southern Punjab.

Conclusion

We conclude this article by drawing out the broader implications of our analysis. Our research on the political economy of shrines highlights the need to pay attention to the interplay between Islam and the underlying distribution of economic and political power. As Avner Grief argues, the impact of a society's informal institutions is conditioned by a historical process where political economy structures routinely interact with cultural factors to shape outcomes. Religion is thus part of a complex institutional matrix, a "system of social factors that conjointly generate a regularity of behaviour" (Grief 2006, 30). Grief's approach to institutional analysis thus emphasizes the role of both timing and context. While modern political economy has highlighted the role of history for explaining contemporary development outcomes (Nunn 2009), the challenge of "persistence studies is to figure out why and how history matters" (Fouka 2020). The impact of a historical variable can remain latent for a long time until it interacts with other factors to shape contemporary outcomes. Persistence, in other words, could be "time-varying." Summarizing recent literature on the subject, Fouka (2020) notes that, in many recent studies, "the time-varying persistence of past events is engineered by political elites." This is a hugely pertinent observation for the study of historic Islamic institutions on long-run development. Like Grief, Fouka's observation that "the way history's shadow manifests depends on timing and context" carries particular relevance for examining the relationship between Islam, politics, and development.

In developing the external validity of our argument, it is therefore important to stress that the impact of shrine elites in different societies will depend on how they are structurally positioned within the prevailing power structure. In Morocco, authoritarian legitimacy is partly derived through cultivating ties with powerful Sufi orders that have recently pushed their influence on the political stage (Werenfels 2014). In northern India, Sufi establishments were similarly patronized by past rulers through revenue-free land grants. But they subsequently witnessed a decline in their material fortunes, first under British rule, due to succession battles in civil courts, and then after the introduction of land reforms in the 1950s. Jafri (2006) shows how the financial fortunes of a prominent shrine in southern Awadh suffered after the enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1952. While the connection between religion, land, and politics was decoupled after independence in India, it was structurally consolidated in Pakistan.

The larger implication of this is clear. The impact of religion on development should be studied in its relevant material context. Religion is but one variable in a complex configuration of causes, and its effect can be highly nonlinear and mediated by other variables in the surrounding institutional environment. One illustration of this is the work on education, politics, and religious transformation in Egypt by Gregory Starrett, who shows that Islam is "put to work" through the "changing intersections of power, interest, and circumstance" (Starrett 1998, 235).

NOTES

1. The decline of civil services had already started during the 1970s but gathered greater momentum after General Zia's coup.
2. Interview of authors with the caretaker of Bhera Sharif in Sargodha.
3. The Chishtis of Shaikh Fazil in Vehari, for example, are related by marriage to the Chishti family of Pakpattan Sharif in Arifwala and the prominent shrine families of Chishtian in Bahawalnagar. Daughters of Makhdum Sajjad Hussain Qureshi, the former governor of Punjab, are married to Pīr Shujaat Hasnain Qureshi of Khanewal and Senator Iftikhar Ali Bukhari of Rajoa Sadaat (related to caretakers of Shah Jewana, Jhang). See Malik and Malik (2017) for more details.

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CHAPTER 34

ISLAM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MELINA R. PLATAS

THE world's fastest-growing Muslim population resides in sub-Saharan Africa,[1] a region with the lowest levels of economic and human development globally. Within African countries, Muslims often fare worse in terms of economic and human development than their Christian counterparts. Across African countries, Muslim-majority countries experience lower levels of socioeconomic development on average than countries where Muslims are a minority. Islam in Africa has tended to be understudied with respect to scholars of Islam and development as well as with respect to scholars of development in Africa. In this chapter I bridge the gap between these rich bodies of scholarship, demonstrating the importance of considering the role of religion in the study of economic development in Africa, but not limiting the role of religion to religious beliefs and institutions.

I use administrative and survey data to demonstrate the broad patterns that exist across and within countries with respect to religious affiliation and economic development. Focusing on several common development indicators, I show that within African countries, Muslims are often worse off compared to Christians, particularly with respect to educational outcomes. I also show that Muslim- majority countries are poorer, experience higher rates of child mortality, and have lower rates of literacy and educational attainment than countries where Muslims are a minority. What explains these patterns? Does religion, and Islam in particular, affect development outcomes? If so, how, and what is meant by "religion" in these explanations?

Drawing on existing literature regarding long-term predictors of economic development as well as the relationship between Islam and development, I discuss several channels through which religion might affect development outcomes and, in particular, generate a gap in development across religious groups. First, I discuss the role of institutional factors in shaping development trajectories across religious groups in Africa.

There is little evidence that Muslim-majority countries are less democratic than non-Muslim-majority countries, and thus it is unlikely that variation in regime type explains the patterns we observe. Further, while the features of Islamic economic institutions have been posited as an explanation for the divergence in economic development between the Middle East and Europe, the political and economic institutions in Africa today have been heavily influenced by European colonialism, such that Islamic economic institutions may play less of a role in divergent development trajectories.

Instead, existing work suggests that areas inhabited by Muslim populations and areas under Islamic political rule in the precolonial period affected the type and extent of colonial investments in public goods and the type of political institutions developed during the colonial period. Extensive reliance on Christian missionaries to provide formal education meant that Muslim-majority areas and areas under Islamic rule may have received fewer educational investments during the colonial period. Historical disparities in educational investments have persisted to the present, and in turn likely affected economic development more broadly. Evidence from case studies suggests that colonial authorities may have also employed a more severe form of indirect rule in predominantly Muslim areas, which may have undermined the accountability of local leaders. This argument builds on the idea that institutions matter for the different development trajectories that Muslim and non-Muslim societies have taken historically; it does not focus on the role of Islamic institutions *per se*, but rather on the role of the colonial response to the presence of Muslim populations and Islamic institutions in explaining long-term trajectories.

Second, I examine the potential role of *norms and beliefs* in shaping development outcomes. I find that Muslims in Africa tend to have lower levels of support for gender equality than Christians with respect to political participation and land inheritance, which could in theory translate into gaps in development outcomes. I do not find that Muslims exhibit lower levels of trust in medicine or higher rates of use of traditional medicine, which provides suggestive evidence that there is not a gap in health-seeking behavior. However, compared to Christian women, Muslim women consistently report higher values for their ideal number of children, and are also more likely to report that their husbands want more children than they do. Muslim women exhibit higher fertility rates than Christian women in Africa, and this disparity, perhaps supported in part by differences in preferences for the number of children desired, could also affect development outcomes and lead to a gap in health or education across religious groups. For example, having a higher average number of children could result in having fewer resources to spend per child on education or health resources.

Some evidence suggests differing preferences across Muslims and Christians for formal education, positing that Muslims may view state-led secular education as less legitimate than do Christians (Manglos-Weber 2017), or that Muslims have a preference for Qurʾanic education (Dev et al. 2016), or that Muslims and Christian communities have developed distinct norms about school attendance due to the historical relationship between Christianity and formal education (Platas 2019). Together, this work suggests norms and beliefs do play an important role in explaining divergent development trajectories; however, the beliefs and norms at play are not necessarily religious in nature.

Finally, the geographic distribution of Muslim populations could affect development outcomes differentially if, for example, Muslims tended to live in more arid or rural places on average, as compared to Christians. In examining education and health outcomes, I include fixed effects for subnational regions within countries, to account for the possible effects of spatial clustering. For the most part, the gap in outcomes is still observed between Muslims and Christians, even taking into account their spatial distribution, suggesting geography is unlikely to explain much of the development gap. Further, areas exposed to Islamic rule historically, many of which have large Muslim populations today, are not systematically worse off in terms of factors related to economic development such as historical population density, suitability of land for agriculture, rough terrain, or malaria prevalence.

These findings underscore the imperative in taking religion and religious affiliation seriously in studies of comparative development and politics (Grzymala-Busse 2012), particularly in Africa, where many existing accounts have tended to focus much more on the role of ethnicity and ethnic diversity than religion (Easterly and Levine 1997; Franck and Rainer 2012; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). However, they also point to the importance of thinking broadly about how "religion" matters for development. It is not only the explicitly religious content of institutions or beliefs, such as religious teachings or ideology, that matter for development, but also how religion shaped the design of colonial institutions and distribution of public goods investments, particularly in a region where Christian missionaries played such a large role in public goods provision historically.

ISLAM IN AFRICA

I begin with an overview of present and historical religious demographics in Africa, a region that is home to a Muslim population of around 300 million. By 2050 it is expected that the African Muslim population will exceed that of the Middle East and North Africa, Europe, North America, and Latin America combined, and will comprise about one-quarter of the world's Muslims (Pew Research Center 2015).

There is substantial variation in the size of the Muslim population across African countries, as shown in Figure 34.1. Seventeen have substantial Muslim-minority populations (between 5 and 49 percent), while fourteen are Muslim-majority countries. Another sixteen have very small Muslim minorities (less than 5 percent). In all of these countries, Christians make up the majority of the rest of the population, while African traditional religions are practiced by very small minorities.

This degree of religious diversity reflects the process through which Islam spread in Africa from the eighth century onward, culminating in the colonial period, which nearly all African countries experienced simultaneously in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000). Islam entered the region through two main



FIGURE 34.1: Percent Muslim by country, 2010.

Source: Data from World Religions Database.

routes, across the Sahara in West Africa and via the East African coast. Scholars have noted that conversion to Islam in Africa followed a three-stage process (Austen 2010; Levtzion and Pouwels 2000). The first to convert were those directly engaged in trade, and were concentrated in trading towns and cities. Local rulers then began to see Islam as useful both politically and economically. Islam not only connected them to global trading networks, but Muslim traders and scholars also carried useful skills, including literacy, numeracy, and medicine (Loimeier 2013). A number of local political leaders converted to Islam throughout the ninth–thirteenth centuries, and both Sahelian West Africa and coastal East Africa were home to kingdoms for which political authority was Islamic in nature. The third stage of the spread of Islam in Africa was the conversion of the masses. This last stage did not happen until relatively close to the colonial period in Africa, such that by the time European colonizers and Christian missionaries arrived, Islam remained a religion practiced by a minority of the population in the region.

Religious demographics changed most quickly during the colonial period. Estimates from the World Religion Database, relying on historical government records, atlases, and reports from religious organizations, indicate that while three-quarters of Africans practiced traditional religions in 1900, by 2010 this figure had fallen to less than one in seven (Pew Research Center 2010). Christianity grew at a faster rate than Islam during the same time period, and especially from the 1950s onward, but both Islam and Christianity made large gains in the region during this hundred-year period. Today, approximately two-thirds of the population practices Christianity, while approximately one-third practices Islam.

In most countries for which data are available, the plurality of Muslims report being Sunni, followed by "just a Muslim" (Pew Research Center 2010). Those who identify as Shiʿa are a minority in all countries where data are available, with the countries with the largest Shiʿa populations being Chad (21 percent of all Muslims) and Tanzania (20 percent). There are large minorities of Ahmadiyya in Ghana (16 percent of Muslims), Tanzania (15 percent), and Cameroon (12 percent). Religious switching is relatively rare, with the vast majority claiming adherence to the religion in which they were raised.

African countries today report some of the highest levels of religiosity around the world. In a survey of nineteen countries (Pew Research Center 2010), the majority of African respondents reported attending religious services at least once a week and praying at least once a day.

More than 85 percent of Muslims in all but one country surveyed report fasting during Ramadan, and between a quarter and two-thirds of the Muslim population across countries surveyed reported high levels of support for religious jurisprudence.

Despite considerable religious diversity and high levels of religiosity, religious conflict has been relatively rare, though it has been increasing in recent years. A minority of Muslims in all countries believe most, many, or all Christians are hostile toward Muslims, and only a slightly larger minority of Christians report the same regarding Muslims. In only three countries did a majority of respondents cite religious conflict as a "very big problem" affecting their country: Rwanda, Nigeria, and Djibouti. Crime, corrupt political leaders, and unemployment were far more frequently cited as major problems.

The Muslim population in Africa is projected to grow faster than the Muslim population in any other region over the next several decades. At 5.6 births per woman, Muslims in Africa have substantially higher fertility rates than Muslims living in any other region, where the global average is 3.1 births among Muslim women. African Muslim populations also have higher fertility rates than African Christian populations, where the rate is 4.5 births per woman.

Islam and Development across and within African Countries

In this section, I use administrative and household survey data to document the relationship between religious affiliation and development indicators across and within African countries. Across African countries, Muslim-minority countries tend to be richer, and they experience lower rates of child mortality and higher rates of education. Figure 34.2 shows this set of bivariate relationships, where a set of common development indicators are plotted against percent Muslim at the country level. Specifically, I examine the relationship between percent Muslim of a country and (a) income per capita (2017), (b) child mortality (2018), (c) expected years of education (2017), and (d) the Human Development Index (2017).[2]



FIGURE 34.2: Islam and development outcomes cross-nationally.

Source: Data on religious affiliation comes from Pew Research Center; data on economic and human development indicators comes from various sources compiled by the United Nations Development Programme.



FIGURE 34.2: Continued

These figures suggest that Muslim-majority countries within Africa have, on average, worse development outcomes than those countries where Muslims are a minority. As shown in the top left panel, there is a negative relationship between percent Muslim and income per capita. Moving from 0 to 100 percent Muslim is associated with a decline of about $3,700 in GDP per capita. Average income per capita among non-Muslim majority countries ($4,550) is more than twice that of Muslim majority countries ($2,100).

There is a positive relationship between child mortality, measured as the number of deaths of children under 5 per 1,000 live births, and percent Muslim of the country (top right panel). The average child mortality rate among Muslim-majority countries is 82 deaths per 1,000 births, compared to 62 deaths per 1,000 births among non-Muslim-majority countries. With respect to education, there is a strong relationship between percent Muslim and expected years of education (bottom left panel). Average expected years of education is 10.8 for Muslim-minority countries, and 8.4 for Muslim-majority countries, a gap of nearly two and a half years. The relationship between percent Muslim and years of education is stronger among non-Muslim majority countries. Among Muslim majority countries, the percent Muslim of the country provides little to no additional predictive power, which is similar to the pattern observed for the Human Development Index (bottom right panel). These associations are not meant to indicate causal relationships, but rather to document patterns worthy of further exploration.

Within countries, Muslim populations also tend to experience worse educational and health outcomes than Christians. To document relationships between religious affiliation and development outcomes at the subnational level, I use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS are conducted in over eighty low- and middle-income countries around the world. These surveys typically target women of childbearing age, but are also conducted with a subsample of men, and include demographic questions about all household members and all of the female respondents' births. With a few exceptions, surveys include a question about the respondents' religious affiliation. For the results presented below, I use the sample of respondents who self-identify as Muslim or Christian in the surveys.[3]

The primary variables of interest with respect to education are whether a respondent has ever attended school, total years of education, and literacy. *Any schooling* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the respondent reports having ever attended school. *Years of education* indicates the number of years an individual has attended school. In DHS questionnaires, questions about education frequently reference levels of formal education (e.g., primary, secondary, etc.) and thus it is assumed that years of school and any schooling refers to formal schooling. *Literacy* is a dichotomous variable where a respondent is coded as literate if they can read part of a sentence or a full sentence, and otherwise not. Because *any schooling* and *years of education* likely do not capture forms of schooling outside what is traditionally thought of as formal schooling, such as religious schooling, literacy provides a way of assessing whether or not respondents acquire skills associated with formal education regardless of whether or not they report attending school, and also provides a basic measure of the quality and content of education. For these analyses, I include adults who were born between 1965 and 1995.[4]

Table 34.1: Religion and Educational Attainment

	(1) Any School	(2) Any School	(3) School Years	(4) School Years	(5) Literate	(6) Literate
Muslim	−0.182***	−0.191***	−1.921***	−1.997***	−0.176***	−0.182***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female		−0.128***		−1.534***		−0.179***
		(0.001)		(0.013)		(0.001)
Rural		−0.175***		−2.669***		−0.218***
		(0.002)		(0.025)		(0.002)
Birth year		0.007***		0.067***		0.007***
		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.000)
Constant	0.747***	−13.838***	5.928***	−122.865***	0.651***	−12.138***
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(1.334)	(0.002)	(0.141)
Observations	1,090,037	1,076,958	1,073,886	1,073,886	1,005,774	1,005,774
R^2	0.360	0.406	0.339	0.422	0.298	0.362

Notes: All models include country and region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by survey cluster.

*** p«/i>0.01;

** p«/i>0.05;

* p«/i>0.10

Table 34.1 shows that across all three measures, Muslims experience lower educational attainment than Christians. They are more likely to report never attending school, and to attend for fewer years, and are less likely to be literate. All models include fixed effects for country and subnational region, suggesting that the relationship between religious affiliation and education is unlikely to be driven by a few countries, nor by the spatial clustering of Muslims in particular areas within countries. Women and those who live in rural areas experience lower educational attainment. Birth year is positively associated with educational attainment, suggesting that attainment is increasing with time. These results also suggest that the relationship between religious affiliation and education is not driven by women, and, if anything, there may be a larger gap in attainment between Christian and Muslim men than women.

To explore the role of gender further, Figure 34.3 shows the relationship between religious affiliation and years of education by country, plotting the coefficient for "Muslim" for men and women, respectively. As in the models in Table 34.1, these country-level results include covariates for birth year and urban residence as well as fixed effects for subnational regions. In many cases, the Muslim coefficient is quite similar for both men and women. Where it differs significantly, it is usually the case that there is a larger gap for men than for women. It is notable that while there are a handful of cases where there



Covariates: Birth year, urban. Region FE. SE clustered by survey cluster.

FIGURE 34.3: Difference in years of education by religion and gender.

Source: Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program.

is no significant association between religious affiliation and educational attainment, there is only a single case (women in the Democratic Republic of Congo) in which there is a positive and significant relationship between being Muslim and years of education.

Does the increase in educational attainment over time mean that the education gap is closing between Christians and Muslims over time? Figure 34.4, which shows average years of education by cohort and country, suggests this is not the case. Most countries exhibit relatively parallel trends in average years of education over time across religious groups. A few countries, such as Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have an educational gap that seems to be narrowing with time but remains substantively large, at one to two years for the youngest cohort.

Next I examine the relationship between religious affiliation and child mortality, one of the most common health indicators. The DHS ask women for a complete birth history, including whether each child born to her is still alive. Child mortality is an indicator that is equal to one if a child is reported to have died before reaching the age of five years, and zero otherwise. I include the sample of births that have taken place at least five years before the year of the survey, again focusing on the sample of children whose mothers report being Christian or Muslim. The sample includes nearly 2.4 million observations, and I include controls for urban residence, mother's education, total births, mother's age at birth and its square, child gender, whether the child is a multiple



FIGURE 34.4: Years of education among Christians (open circle) and Muslims (closed circle) by country-cohort.

Source: Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program.



FIGURE 34.5: Child mortality difference by country.

Source: Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program.

birth (e.g., twin), short birth spacing (less than 24 months), and child's birth order and its square, with fixed effects for subnational region and child birth year.[5]

Figure 34.5 shows the difference in child mortality rate for Christians and Muslims by country, specifically, plotting the coefficient for "Muslim." There are six countries where Muslims experience significantly higher mortality rates than Christians, and only two where Muslims experience significantly lower infant mortality. Small sample sizes of Muslims in countries like Burundi and Rwanda combined with a relatively low-incidence event may make it difficult to observe significant differences in mortality rates even if they exist. While the patterns with respect to child mortality and religion are not as consistent as they are with respect to education, Muslim children are at higher risk of death in many countries, and rarely at lower risk.

Further, in the pooled sample, Muslims experience approximately 8 additional deaths per 1,000 births than Christians. While as a percentage this figure is relatively small, it translates into a large number of children and families being affected in practice. There are more than thirty million children born in the region each year, and if we assume at least one-third of these are born to Muslim families, an additional 8 deaths per 1,000 births translates into around 80,000 deaths if past trends are applied to the future. This is almost certainly an upper bound, and there are a number of caveats, including the fact that the DHS is not conducted in every country and that child mortality rates have been falling steadily, but it is nevertheless indicative of the magnitude of this effect.

(How) Does Religion Matter for Development?

As the results above demonstrate, there are systematic differences in common development indicators across both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries, as well as differences across religious groups within countries. Does "religion" matter for these development outcomes? If so, how, and what aspect of religion is responsible? I discuss three channels through which religion may shape development outcomes: institutions, norms and beliefs, and geography.

First, religion could affect development outcomes through political and economic institutions. A prominent line of work in examining the relationship between institutions and development evaluates the relationship between regime type and economic development. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that inclusive political institutions foster development, while some, though not all, studies show that democracy, or the stock of democracy, is associated with higher levels of human development and with economic development (Acemoglu et al. 2019; Gerring et al. 2012; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). One hypothesis, therefore, in explaining the cross-national patterns documented in this chapter is that Muslim-majority countries are less likely to be democratic than non-Muslim majority countries, and that this explains their relative underperformance in development. However, while it is well established that Muslim-majority countries are less likely to be democratic than non-Muslim-majority countries globally, a phenomenon that has been explained by political history and socioeconomic factors (see chapter by Nugent in this volume), this pattern does not seem to hold in the African context. Since independence, Muslim-majority countries in Africa have experienced an average of 9.5 years (16 percent) under democracy, compared to 9.45 (17 percent) years in non-Muslim majority countries. The average polity score in the post-independence period in Muslim majority countries is −1.9, and for non-Muslim majority countries is −2. Thus, there is no apparent relationship between regime type and Muslim-majority status in Africa, such that differences in regime type are unlikely explain the disparity in development we observe between Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority countries.

Another vein of research on institutions and development, particularly in the African context, examines precolonial and colonial legacies. Some of this work demonstrates the long-term effect of centralized precolonial institutions, typically finding higher rates of contemporary economic development in areas that were part of precolonial states (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). Bauer et al. (2019) qualify this general finding, showing that within Africa, areas exposed to Islamic rule—that is, areas that were part of Islamic states or kingdoms in the precolonial period—today experience lower levels of education, higher rates of child mortality, and lower levels of economic development than those that were not.

This work points to an important source of institutional variation within Africa: the extent to which precolonial societies were governed by Islamic political institutions. Prior to colonization, Muslim societies in Africa varied in the presence and extent of Islamic institutions, and centralized polities varied with respect to the religious basis of political authority. Some precolonial Muslim societies were governed by institutions that were more highly centralized and in which political leaders derived legitimacy through Islam, while other Muslim societies were governed to a greater extent by traditional systems of authority, which were often less centralized. Meanwhile, there were also a number of precolonial states that existed among non-Muslim societies.

Both the extent of Islamic institutions and the distribution of the Muslim population in the precolonial period could affect long-term development across and within countries through their effect on investments by Christian missionaries during the colonial period, as well as affect the design and implementation of colonial institutions.

There is substantial evidence that investments by colonial authorities and Christian missionaries during the colonial period had long-term effects on development, and particularly on educational outcomes (Huillery 2009; Nunn 2014). Colonial investments in social services, especially those provided by Christian missionaries, were likely to be lower in areas where Muslims were a majority or areas governed by Islamic rule. Missionaries may have avoided areas already inhabited by large Muslim populations, or they were explicitly banned from operating in these areas, as was the case in parts of northern Nigeria and Sudan (Sharkey 2012). Lower levels of investment in social services, especially schools, could have a lasting impact on contemporary development through reduced access to education and lower levels of education among earlier generations (Wantchekon et al. 2015). Alesina et al. (2018) find that intergenerational mobility in education also correlates strongly with proximity to Christian missions. Bauer et al. (2019) find that missionaries were less likely to operate in areas exposed to precolonial Islamic rule, and Platas (2019) finds that within African countries, areas where Muslims form a majority have lower levels of education than areas where they are a minority.

The relatively low educational attainment among Muslims within countries as well as in Muslim-majority as compared to Muslim-minority countries is thus likely explained in part by historical differences in access to social services in areas that were or were not predominantly Muslim during the colonial period, which persisted due to continued differences in access to education as well as intergenerational factors. Disparities in historical enrollment in formal education may explain education gaps in North Africa as well. For example, Saleh (this volume) notes that in Egypt, non-Muslim students were enrolled in “modern” schools at a far higher rate than Muslim students, while Muslim students were primarily enrolled in religious schools, which was also a result of the nature and implementation of colonialism. This pattern persisted until the mid-twentieth century and appears to explain much of the education gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Egypt.

In addition to differential investments in social services such as education, where colonial authorities encountered Islamic political authority at the time of colonialism, they may have implemented a more extreme form of indirect rule. This would have meant granting greater authority to local leaders as well as limiting colonial interference and investment in these areas. Evidence from northern Nigeria, for example, suggests that areas under centralized Islamic rule were granted greater autonomy both because they tended to be hierarchical polities ready-made for indirect rule, and also because colonial authorities viewed Islam as a more legitimate religion than African traditional religions, and were thus reluctant to dismantle Islamic authority (Hailey 1951). A policy of noninterference in the Muslim north of the country led to the increased concentration of political powers among emirs, who became the sole native authority within their jurisdictions (Archibong 2018). Even in the absence of centralized states, colonial authorities could have relied more heavily on indirect rule where there were large Muslim populations. For example, the Northern Territories of Ghana, with a large Muslim population, experienced a higher degree of indirect rule than the centralized (non-Muslim) Ashanti kingdom in the Gold Coast (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020). Greater indirect rule, in turn, could serve to undermine the accountability of local leaders. In a cross-country analysis, Lange (2009) finds that a greater extent of indirect rule is associated with lower bureaucratic quality and state capacity.

Finally, areas under Islamic rule may have been politically disadvantaged in the long run, particularly if they ended up in countries that were non-Muslim majority and were excluded from majority Christian political coalitions. The relatively low rates of attendance at colonial (Christian) schools among Muslim populations may have also placed them at a disadvantage in terms of political participation. Archibong (2018) argues that leaders in the highly centralized Muslim north of Nigeria chose not to comply with the federal autocratic regime in the postcolonial period, which led them to be punished by the regime, incurring costs with respect to public services. More broadly, Bauer et al. (2019) find that ethnic groups that were historically part of Islamic kingdoms have less political power in the postcolonial period, a finding that is driven by countries in which Muslims today comprise a minority.

This type of institutional argument contrasts with other prominent arguments about the relationship between religion, institutions, and development, in that the proposed mechanisms are not the content of religious institutions, but rather how the presence of Islam and Islamic institutions affected colonial governance. While existing accounts in this literature focus on the role of religion, and specifically Islam, in shaping the content of economic institutions, there are reasons to believe that this explanation may play less of a role in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Kuran (2004, 2011) argues that legal and economic institutions that developed in Islamic societies in the Middle East and North Africa were less globally efficient than those that developed in Europe, even if they were efficient locally, ultimately disadvantaging these societies economically in the long run. However, the development of economic institutions in African countries was somewhat different from those in the Middle East, due to the timing and spread of Islam within Africa, as well as the effect of colonialism on both political and economic institutions. Nevertheless, as much of the work on colonial institutions has paid little attention to Islamic institutions (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020), and as much of the work on Islamic economic institutions has focused little on sub-Saharan Africa, this is an area that is ripe for future research.

A second channel through which religion may matter for development, and which may explain inequalities in development outcomes across religious groups, is that of norms and beliefs. This includes beliefs that could be classified as "religious," such as beliefs based on religious texts, or beliefs that guide behavior among members of a religious group but are not necessarily religious in content. These beliefs include expectations about what is considered appropriate behavior (on religious or other grounds), as well as empirical expectations about how others are likely to behave under a variety of circumstances (Bicchieri 2016). Could norms and beliefs explain differences in behavior across religious groups, such as attending formal education or health-seeking behavior? If so, what types of beliefs would affect these behaviors?

First, Muslims and Christians could have different beliefs about gender equality with respect to political, social, and economic issues. For example, Fish (2011) finds that societies that have a proportionally larger Muslim population have higher levels of gender-based inequality. Using data from recent Afrobarometer surveys I examine two indicators relating to attitudes toward gender equality. Specifically, I examine the extent to which respondents agree with each of the statements: "*Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men*," and "*Women should have the same rights as men to own and inherit land*." I find that there are large differences in attitudes both across religious groups and across gender. For example, 84 percent of Christian women compared to 69 percent of Muslim women support women's land inheritance, while among men support is lower than their co-religion female counterparts, but there still exists a gap across religion—75 percent of Christian men compared to 58 percent of Muslim men support women's land inheritance. The same pattern is observed for support of women as political leaders, though both the gender and religion gaps are slightly smaller than for land inheritance. These findings do suggest there are important differences in beliefs about women's rights, which could in theory translate into differences in health and education outcomes and are worth exploring further in future research. However, the fact that the education gap and the child mortality gap are found across gender, and are often larger for men than for women, suggests that the overall gap in development outcomes is not being driven solely by outcomes among Muslim women.

Another potential difference in norms and beliefs could exist with respect to preferences for "modern" or "Western" medicine or education, especially to the extent to which these have been associated historically with Christianity or Christian missionaries in Africa. The DHS includes questions about the use of traditional medicine as well as whether respondents would consent to a blood test, which has been used as a measure of trust in medicine (Lowes and Montero 2018). Further, the DHS also includes questions about respondents' ideal number of children as well as their husband's preferences, which could contribute to the fertility gap that exists across religious groups, and could in theory affect health and education outcomes—for example, by creating greater resource constraints among Muslim families.

Table 34.2: Religious Affiliation and Health-Related Beliefs and Behavior

	Dependent Variable:			
	Blood Test Consent	Traditional Medicine	Ideal Number of Children	Husband Preference
Muslim	−0.003	−0.015***	0.520***	0.073***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.003)
Constant	0.977***	0.030***	4.515***	0.227***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.096)	(0.033)
Observations	148,211	18,811	301,582	318,278
R2	0.315	0.040	0.393	0.137

Notes: All models include covariates for age, years of education, and wealth index, and country and survey-region fixed effects. The samples for each include the most recent round of DHS surveys for which the dependent variables of interest are available. *Blood Test* takes a value of one if the respondent provided consent to a blood test for anemia and 0 in the case of a refusal. *Traditional Medicine* takes a value of 1 if the respondent reported using traditional medicine to treat diarrhea in a child in the past two weeks, and 0 otherwise, for the subset of respondents who report diarrhea in a child in the past two weeks. *Ideal Number of Children* is a variable indicating the number of children desired by the respondent. *Husband Preference* takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicates that her husband desires more children than herself, and 0 if the respondent desires more or the same number as her husband. Standard errors are clustered by survey cluster.

*** $p > 0.01$;

** $p > 0.05$;

* $p > 0.10$

Table 34.2 suggests that trust in medicine and the use of traditional medicine are unlikely to explain differences in health outcomes between Christians and Muslims. There is no difference in the rate of consenting to a blood test (column 1), and, if anything, Muslims are less likely to report using traditional medicine to treat common illnesses (column 2). However, there is a large gap between Christians and Muslims in both the ideal number of children (column 3) and the likelihood that husbands want more children than their wives (column 4).

With respect to education, a preference for Qurʾanic education over formal education could reduce investments in the latter among Muslim populations, and there is some evidence that this explains part but not all of the Muslim-Christian education gap in Nigeria (Dev et al. 2016). Manglos-Weber (2017) suggests that Muslims may not prioritize state-sponsored schooling as highly as Christians, given that in many African countries, national education systems are built upon the colonial-era missionary education system and Muslims may view these schools as less legitimate than Qurʾanic schools and other types of Islamic education.

Schooling choices may also have implications for political participation. For example, within Francophone Africa, Bleck (2013) finds that parents who send their children to Islamic schools are less politically active than those who send their children to public schools. Possible mechanisms linking these two phenomena include that parents who send their children to Islamic schools perceive state institutions as less legitimate that religious institutions, that because they use nonstate services they are less interested in policy decisions related to state services, or that the use of religious institutions integrates them into an alternative local community in which to participate.

Attendance at Islamic religious schools, especially if this takes place at the expense of formal education, could also lead to the acquisition of Arabic to a greater extent than the colonial languages that are often the official language of government in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries in Africa. This could then mean that those who attend religious schools are less likely to be employed in the formal sector, have fewer job opportunities, and are less likely to hold government positions. In turn, this could lead to lower incomes and less influence on political processes and policymaking.

The relationship between religious education, language acquisition, employment, and participation in politics is an area that should be investigated further, with the caveat that cross-national data on both the attendance of religious school and language acquisition at the individual level is scarce. A survey conducted in southern Malawi found a positive correlation between formal and religious education among Muslims—those that attended formal education were also more likely to attend religious school—and also that attendance of Islamic schools in this context was not strongly associated with the acquisition of fluency in Arabic (Platas 2019). While Muslims in Malawi are not representative of African Muslims generally, these findings point to the need to examine the relationship between religious practice, development outcomes, and political participation in a variety of contexts.

Platas (2019) also proposes another mechanism explaining persistent educational inequalities: norms about the importance of formal school attendance. While there was widespread distrust of missionary schools among Muslim populations in the colonial period, this distrust does not extend into the contemporary period in some countries where the Muslim-Christian education gap is still observed. In addition to the institutional legacies discussed above, this suggests that predominantly Muslim and Christian communities have developed distinct social norms with respect to school attendance—due to the historical relationship between Christianity and formal education in many African countries—and that weaker norms enforcing school attendance in predominantly Muslim communities explain some of the continued gap in educational attainment across religious groups.

All of these findings suggest an important role for beliefs and norms in explaining differences in development outcomes between Christians and Muslims, but more work is needed to examine the conditions under which institutional factors or norms play a relatively greater role in explaining development gaps, as well as how institutions and norms may reinforce one another.

Finally, geography is another channel through which religion may matter for development, and which may contribute to development gaps between Christians and Muslims. Michalopoulos et al. (2018) find that the spread of Islam globally was shaped by Islamic trade routes, but also that predominantly Muslim areas tend to be arid or semi-arid with relatively little fertile land. Residing in arid lands could affect economic development directly, for example, resulting in poor agricultural potential or greater food insecurity, and could also affect the design of local institutions. While variation across Muslim and non-Muslim areas in terms of geography is a potential avenue to pursue for research, geography is unlikely to be the primary explanation for the gaps observed. In their examination of precolonial Islamic rule, Bauer et al. (2019) do not find that areas under Islamic rule within Africa were necessarily worse off than areas not under Islamic rule. In fact, compared to non-Islamic kingdoms, areas under Islamic rule had higher population densities, greater land suitability, and less rough terrain, with no differences in the degree of land inequality or malaria prevalence. If anything, many of the factors on which areas under Islamic rule differ might be expected to be positively associated with contemporary development. Further, in the within-country analyses for education and health, substantial disparities persisted even within subnational regions—in other words, holding geography constant.

CONCLUSION

Sub-Saharan Africa is home to the fastest-growing Muslim population in the world, and for this reason the region will hold an increasingly important place in the study of Muslim societies in the years to come. Globally, Africa experiences the highest levels of poverty and low levels of human development. This chapter has shown that within Africa, Muslim-majority countries tend to perform worse on measures of economic and human development than countries where Muslims are a minority. Further, within countries, Muslims tend to experience lower levels of human development than Christians, particularly in the area of formal education.

Together, these empirical patterns and the existing literature suggest the need to take religion and religious affiliation seriously in studying development in Africa. However, in examining how and why inequalities emerge and persist across religious groups, it is important to consider not only factors that are explicitly religious in nature, such as religious beliefs or institutions shaped by Islamic or other religious law, but also factors such as the historical legacies of colonialism, along with norms and beliefs that differ across religious groups but are not themselves religious in content. The fact that African countries are highly diverse with respect to religious demographics, geography, and political institutions also makes the region an ideal setting for closely examining the relationship between Islam and development, and will complement the much larger body of work that exists on this subject in the Middle East and North Africa.

NOTES

1. Henceforth sub-Saharan Africa will be referred to as "Africa" for ease of exposition.
2. Data on religious affiliation come from the Pew Research Center; data on economic and human development indicators come from various sources compiled by the United Nations Development Programme.
3. Although there may be interesting differences across denominations within Christianity or Islam, these are not coded systematically across countries and would also likely result in very small sample sizes for some of the denominations. For this reason, I combine all denominations within each religion.
4. Only survey waves where there are at least 100 respondents from the minority religious group are included in the analysis.
5. Covariates modeled after Franck and Rainer (2012).

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CHAPTER 35

ISLAMIC FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA

FULYA APAYDIN

In many ways, the banking industry is the lifeline of modern economic systems. This is because banks are not only financial intermediaries, but also serve as private creators of money when they extend credit, either for consumption or investment (Ingham 2004; Minsky 1986; Pettifor 2017; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, and Werner 2011; Wray 2015).[1] Banks can create money when they extend loans and simultaneously transfer this amount into a deposit account, as the accounting rules followed by banks enable them to increase the overall volume of transactions on their balance sheet without keeping equivalent amount of hard cash in vaults.[2] According to some scholars, the diffusion of this model has been the necessary engine that enabled capitalist development in the Global North (Arrighi 1994; Desan 2017).

Unlike conventional banks, Islamic scripts ban individuals or organizations from extending credit without an underlying physical asset. In that sense, any bank that operates on the principles of shariʿa would be limited in its ability to follow the conventional route in money creation. According to these orthodox interpretations, only God can create value out of nothing. Within shariʿa-compliant finance, money only exists in the form of gold, silver, and other mediums that could also be exchanged as money, such as wheat, rice, barley, salt, and dates. These commodities derive their intrinsic value from God. The value of any other commodity can be measured using any of these mediums. Together with the standard ban on interest, this "money as commodity" interpretation seriously limits Islamic economic actors to be up to speed with capitalist money creation, given the natural limitations on the rate of growth of these acceptable mediums. This has led some scholars to argue that Islamic banks are not well-suited to follow the conventional blueprint in credit creation (Choudhury 1997).

Yet there are recent and surprising cases—such as Malaysia—where these theoretical expectations face new challenges. Since the inception of the first Islamic bank in 1983, Malaysia has witnessed a rapid growth of this industry, where one-third of all financial transactions are now classified as shariʿa-compliant. Islamic banks self-style themselves as moral harbingers of a risk-sharing economy, one that avoids speculation, asymmetric transfer of risk and, contractual ambiguity. Proponents of Islamic banks often cite Malaysia to argue that these banks can indeed stimulate growth (Aziz 2011; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013). Others are more critical, suggesting that such techniques are simply deceptive ruses to attract pious customers without any genuine potential to yield positive returns, let alone risk-sharing (Kuran 2004). This debate motivates the guiding questions of the chapter: What is the role of Islamic finance in development? Are Islamic banks well-equipped to jump-start investment in the Global South?

This chapter argues that the relationship between Islam and economic development is contingent on the conditions under which they engage in private money creation. Recent evidence suggests that a banking system that is solely based on an orthodox interpretation of shariʿa principles is unlikely to foster capitalist development, since their role in money creation is limited.[3] Rather, arrangements where Islamic banking and financial services exist side-by-side with secular counterparts are more common in emerging market economies with predominantly Muslim populations. However, not all Islamic banks have been commercially successful under competitive pressures. In settings where the state supports the private creation of money by building new market institutions, modern Islamic banks complement conventional finance in creating new lines of credit. In the absence of such support, Islamic banks have remained marginal and their role in economic development is inconsequential.[4]

At the same time, the emergence of a complex institutional infrastructure is insufficient to stimulate equitable development, especially when private money creation is driven by consumer debt. The case of Islamic finance in Malaysia is particularly telling: while an extensive network of Islamic banks attracts domestic and international investors, much of the loans extended by these banks finance real-estate and consumer-durables purchases, contributing to fast-rising household debt levels. By contrast, Islamic banks are less willing to finance small and medium sized businesses on the grounds of perceived high risk. The key beneficiaries of the Islamic financial industry are large financial corporations that raise capital via issuing Islamic equity, and governments that diversify their debt composition using shariʿa-compliant bills and bonds. There, Islamic banks have turned into a major conduit for transferring market risks to individual borrowers as debt-driven consumption has accelerated.

To elaborate these points, the next section begins with an overview of existing theories of Islam and economic development. The chapter then takes a closer look into the Malaysian experience and suggests that financial institution-building along liberal market principles does not guarantee the channeling of credit into high-value-added industries. This discussion is based on primary and secondary resources collected during fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur between November and December 2016. The respondents include political and economic elites who have held key positions with decision-making powers, either in the Islamic financial industry or the government. The participants were identified based on the key positions they held, and therefore the sampling is non-random. To address problems associated with potential sampling bias, descriptive data obtained from the Central Bank of Malaysia is also included in the analysis. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of Islamic finance, debt-dependent growth, and development.

Islamic Finance and Development in Historical Perspective

Today, the most vocal critics of Islamic finance argue that shariʿa-compliant exchanges are not capable of stimulating economic growth and development because the industry practitioners deliberately transform simple procedures into complex, costly, and resource-draining tasks (El-Gamal 2008; Kuran 2018). At the heart of these allegations lies the presumption that Islamic institutions are fundamentally incompatible with capitalism, which arguably requires liberal institutions for development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; North 2005). Among these, two perspectives stand out. The first is the *long divergence hypothesis* (LDH), which posits that Islamic law is responsible for holding back capitalist development in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East (Kuran 2011). According to this framework, Muslim societies are inhibited by Islamic scriptures that prevent the formation of large corporations, which are necessary for capital accumulation and reinvestment in the long run. Underlying impediments include the Islamic inheritance law, which requires a complete dissolution of a person's estate and distribution of possessions among the legal heirs. Moreover, because Islam does not ascribe legal personhood to any entity other than individuals, the LDH argues that it was not possible to set up European-style corporations where Islam remained dominant (Kuran 2011, 97–117). Kuran (2018) goes further to argue that Islamic foundations (waqfs) further inhibited the development of markets due to their rigidity and prioritization of their founders' directives regarding the use of funds. Consequently, such institutional roadblocks prevented the early accumulation of capital, restricting Islamic traders to simple and short-term partnership arrangements that did not last longer than a lifetime. This had further implications, leading to poor interpersonal trust due to the short-term nature of Islamic business contracts.

However, this emphasis on religious institutions is based on a somewhat orthodox imagination of Muslim societies—one where shariʿa remains uncontested. In practice, this could not be further from the everyday experiences of economic actors. While most equate Islamic institutions with Qurʾan and hadith, multiple reinterpretations of the Holy Book and the Prophet's sayings, as well as local customs have shaped the development of Islamic economic institutions in myriad ways over centuries (Ercanbrack 2015). Very importantly, the evolution of these institutions is not independent of the political dynamics that surround them.

A second group of explanations brings *politics back in* and examines how the resulting nonsecular political arrangements have shaped future development trajectories of Muslim-dominant societies. These works reveal that across much of the Muslim world in the pre-capitalist era, the ruler's choice of institutions was largely driven by political motives. For example, Rubin, (this volume) highlights political legitimacy concerns as one mechanism through which religious authorities became influential actors in the Ottoman Empire, enabling successive Sheikh-ul-Islams to issue fatwas on market exchanges as well (Rubin 2017, 2020). Initially, the rise of religious figures into powerful positions was driven by the sultans' concerns to centralize religious training and thereby control diverse medreses under their rule (Bulliet 1972).[5] Most notably, the appointment of Ebussuud Efendi by Suleiman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century was a game changer in many ways—also on the financial market building front—following his decree that legitimized cash waqfs as shariʿa-compliant organizations for providing access to credit.[6] Prior to Suleiman's rule, cash waqfs were deemed shariʿa-incompliant by the ulama; however, the growing need for financing economic activity under Suleiman's reign motivated this critical modification of the Islamic religious code.

The nonsecular political arrangements also had notable implications on the everyday lending and borrowing practices of individuals. A related hypothesis highlights the *financial power of the powerless*, with a focus on the role of the state and minority politics in shaping financial development. Looking at the creditor-borrower relations in Istanbul during the sixteenth century, Kuran and Rubin (2018) find that if the borrower comes from the majority Sunni group with a privileged status, non-Muslim creditors impose higher interest rates to ensure the repayment of the loan. Because the courts systematically favored Muslims over non-Muslims, and since Muslims were first among the Ottoman hierarchy of subjects, they were charged higher interest rates when borrowing from the private moneylenders (who were often non-Muslim). Kuran and Rubin conclude that this unequal treatment prevented capital accumulation among the Muslim majority, and partially explains why the Ottomans fell behind the West (Rubin 2017).

However, an exclusive focus on nonsecular dynamics comes at the expense of neglecting the long-term impact of institutional arrangements that were not primarily driven by religious concerns. Other economic choices crucial to the survival of the state also emerged out of political necessities and had unintended consequences for financial market development. For example, most Islamic states sought to expand their fiscal revenues by relying on tax-farming (*iltizam*) and life-time farming contract (*malikane*) based systems (Broms and Rothstein 2020; Fleet 2003). While these features were widely common in most Islamic states, the arrangement is not exclusively informed by shariʿa principles. One consequence of this was the absence of long-term borrowing by the Ottoman state.[7] Thus, until the nineteenth century, private lenders were limited in their role as money creators in the Ottoman Middle East, debt relations were mostly organized around short-term borrowing and lending in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (typically on high interest rates), and long-term borrowing from private moneylenders began to be the norm in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Galata bankers (*sarrafs*) became prominent financial actors (Pamuk 2000, 200; Rubin 2017, 81–82).[8] Rather than the strictly prohibitive Islamic institutions, then, this experience suggests that political preferences of the rulers are responsible for the shortage of affordable financing options.

Because of these political dynamics, the social pacts that underlie lending and borrowing relations remained very decentralized in the absence of any organized banking system.[9] Unlike in late seventeenth-century Britain, moneylenders in Islamic states lacked the capacity to organize into a corporation-like entity (e.g., as in Bank of England), since the Ottoman sultans did not seek long-term loans from private lenders well into the eighteenth century.[10] Thus, financial contracts were mostly short-term arrangements between creditors and borrowers that ended as soon as debts were repaid. This practice substantially limited the money creation capacity of the lenders.[11] Other attempts to address liquidity problems through new financial instruments (such as trading of *gedik*—tenancy or occupational rights—in secondary markets in the Ottoman Empire) remained limited to stimulate the development of capital markets (Agir 2017; Agir and Yildirim 2015). In the long run, these dynamics prevented the stabilization of lending rates as well.

The focus on unstable and irregular interest rates is an important staring point to understand the roots of economic underdevelopment in Muslim-dominant settings. The *financial power of the powerless* was further enhanced in an environment where a persistent pattern of decentralized lending has prevented the stabilization of interest rates as multiple creditors priced loans at greatly varying rates.[12] However, this process was not strictly driven by religious concerns or institutions. In the absence of regular public borrowing by the state and a fiscal architecture that gave way too much power to the military officers as tax collectors, Ottoman rulers had limited power to coerce private moneylenders into standardizing rates. Thus, *sarrafs* in Ottoman Empire remained uncoordinated in their day-to-day business operations until the formation of a financier's guild in the nineteenth century.[13]

These practices had further implications on the subsequent slowdown of economic activity. For example, following the loss of control over major trade routes, long-distance transactions by Ottoman traders became especially risky, and the lack of affordable funding options prevented entrepreneurs from pursuing profitable business opportunities. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the arrival of modern banking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did little to lower lending interest rates and stimulate private money creation, as many of these banks did not have an extensive branch network beyond Istanbul (Clay 1994). This meant the majority of the borrowers in rural areas relied exclusively on moneylenders for loans, who continued to charge high interest rates (Clay 1994). Overall, rather than strictly religious impediments to capital accumulation, a series of political decisions locked the empire onto a path where the systematic lack of access to loans in volatile markets without an organized lending infrastructure eventually accelerated the economic decline. In the late nineteenth century, the rulers tried to reverse this process by creating a centralized commercial code informed by religious principles known as *majalla*; however, it was far from effective in stimulating the much-needed domestic capital accumulation.[14] As such, *majalla* was replaced by a new commercial code following the founding of the new Turkish Republic in 1926.

While it may be difficult to generalize across a much more complex geography of Muslim inhabitants based on the exclusive experience of the Ottomans, the imperial outreach of the sultans and the reforms implemented in the nineteenth century had a wider projection. In that sense, the economic development trajectories of Muslim-populated areas are not only influenced by religious dynamics, but also by subtle political networks that facilitate the transfer of ideas and institutions across diverse geographies. For example, *majalla* was in use not only in former Ottoman territories like Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan long after the disintegration of the empire, but also reached Malaya via a transfer of political and economic institutions. Specifically, the sultan of Johor's travels to the Ottoman capital in the late nineteenth century prompted him to the nearly identical adoption of *majalla* (Hussin 2016). Despite having a much different historical experience under the British colonial rule, Malaya had a similar problem in the financial marketplace: a decentralized money creation characterized by multiple currencies in circulation (Singh 1986), and high interest rates on loans extended by private moneylenders. By adopting a centralized commercial code in 1893, the sultan of Johor sought to modernize a system where "Chinese mercantile practices, British contracts and Malay maritime rules commingled" (Hussin 2016, 169).

Curiously, while the use of *majalla* was abandoned in the Middle East by the late twentieth century, it became the basis for developing the legal framework of Islamic banking and finance in Malaysia nearly a century after its adoption. Unlike most former Ottoman territories that adopted new commercial codes based on civil law, Malaysia combined common law with religious law following independence from the British. This allowed practitioners sufficient flexibility to reinterpret existing codes in accordance with the changing needs and demands of the marketplace. Following the global diffusion of Islamic banking and finance, Malaysian policymakers benefited from this malleable framework to develop a systematized set of rules to attract investment and support the industry in line with a broader developmental agenda of the state.

The Malaysian experience with Islamic banking and finance gradually turned into a model that many countries look up to in developing their unique standards.[15] Today, many Islamic banks can get around formal restrictions on money creation by relying on the verdicts of shariʿa scholars (the legal experts on Islamic economic law). These range from replacing "interest rate" with a "mark-up" charge to devising halal products that mimic conventional ones through incorporating the buying and selling of commodities into shariʿa-compliant financial contracts. The *fatwas*, or legal ordinances of these experts, offer the legitimacy to become relevant actors in the global marketplace (Calder 2016; Rethel 2011). In that sense, these verdicts are more than tricky stratagems: shariʿa-compliant Islamic financial contracts enable these institutions to turn into active participants in a capitalist market economy. Thus, Islamic banks also serve as conduits of aggregation into a capitalist market, rather than challenging its fundamental premises (Calder 2016). However, as the Malaysian case reveals, the political conditions under which the articulation of Islamic financial institutions to the capitalist economy occurs have notable implications on their lending behavior and subsequent development outcomes.

ISLAMIC FINANCE AND MARKET-BUILDING IN MALAYSIA

The fact that Malaysia has achieved impressive growth rates in the 20th century—despite the dual presence of common law and shariʿa—raises additional questions about the suggested limitations imposed by Islamic institutions on economic growth. An important factor that contributed to this was the stabilization of interest rates following Malaya's independence from British colonialism. Following independence, the new government prioritized building financial institutions as part of its new development policy. This was partially driven by ongoing tensions between Malaysia and Singapore regarding the terms of their currency union and the political struggle over seigniorage rights (Schenk 2013). Though the Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, or BNM) was founded in 1959, it operated alongside a currency board that issued notes known as Malaya dollars. Though the BNM had no seigniorage powers during its first few years, it became the sole authority for issuing ringgit following the dissolution of the monetary union between Malaysia and Singapore in 1975. Thereafter, BNM played a key role in reducing Malaysia's financial dependence on Singapore and focused on building a national banking system to ensure access to credit on affordable terms. Along with other institutional changes, this further contributed to year-on-year Malaysian growth on equitable terms (Kuhonta 2011).

Despite these changes, there remained pockets of pious individuals who refused to engage in interest-based transactions. The size of these groups was even larger in areas where the state remained weak to consolidate its authority over indigenous communities (Scott 2009). Often seeing them as a potential security threat, the Malaysian authorities sought to control these groups (also known as *ajaran sesat* (deviant)–including many Sufi orders, Ahmadiyah and Darul Arkam) by issuing official fatwas (Shiozaki 2015). Others who were part of the *bumiputera* (indigenous Malays following the Shafiʿi school of Islam) were also left outside the formal market-building efforts and effectively had no power to influence conventional interest rates, even though they were indirectly affected by market dynamics. Modern Islamic finance in Malaysia emerged in response to these interweaving dynamics.

The predecessors of Islamic banks appeared in the form of credit and savings unions—one of the first being Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH)—during the second half of the twentieth century, to finance the pilgrimage expenses of very poor Malays to Mecca by way of extending interest-free loans.[16] However, because this organization had no power to shield itself from the changing conditions of the marketplace, it faced an existential threat. Within the first decade following its launch, LTH managers had seen a rapid increase in the number of members, but they had no power to create halal money in isolation from the rest of the economy. Most importantly, because the organization had no financial instruments to hedge against market instabilities, their assets faced the risk of losing value over time. This compelled the founders to seek a different solution and lobby for political support in favor of a shariʿa-compliant banking system.[17] The opportunity was seized by United Malays National Organization (UMNO) leaders who were also concerned about losing political support to the rival Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)–a political party that found some support among the more conservative Sheiks and the ulama–and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad was born (Apaydin 2018; Lai 2015).

As the experience of LTH shows, banks are more than savings associations. To be financially viable, these organizations need political support to sustain their lending and borrowing activities. Among other things, this support enables the creation of necessary banking reserves, access to a lender of last resort, and interbank money markets to manage their short-term liquidity needs. The role of the state is crucial in setting up this financial architecture, so that the Islamic banks can go beyond simple intermediation and become part of the capitalist growth by extending credit.

Since the inception of the first Islamic bank in 1983, the Malaysian government has nurtured a large Islamic financial industry with a well-developed regulatory infrastructure (Rethel 2015), where shariʿa scholars rely on *majalla* as the blueprint to devise new regulations. From the very first days, the state was heavily involved in developing the industry: Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad founders were given an office within the Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, BNM) and had access to technical assistance when setting up their operations.[18] The government also played an active role in building the financial architecture necessary to conduct day-to-day business operations of the Islamic banks. Following the decision that enabled conventional banks to open up Islamic windows in 1993, the Islamic Interbank Money Market was set up in 1994, and the BNM took the lead in creating a shariʿa-compliant platform to trade reserves. Thereafter, the state began to issue shariʿa-compliant short-term instruments—a necessary means to address the everyday liquidity needs of these institutions.

Proponents showcase the Malaysian experience as a success story where a dedicated state commitment has created a favorable institutional setting that investors desire and dream of. This process was strongly driven by the political will of the dominant party (UMNO) focused on building a shariʿa-compliant financial market.[19] Gradually, Islamic banking and finance has become strongly embedded in the national development and competitiveness agenda of the government, constituting a major priority in future plans (Lai 2015; Rethel 2018). However, the creation of these institutions based on liberal economic principles by no means guarantees the channeling of funds into productive and high-value-added industries. Today, the impressive performance in shariʿa-compliant financial market-building leaves much to be desired for equitable growth. While a well-regulated Islamic banking and finance industry enabled corporations to raise capital on shariʿa-compliant terms, and helped investors diversify their financial portfolios, retail customers were encouraged to take on greater debt for their financial needs and face a greater risk of penalty for any failure to repay the loan. Thus, rather than promoting risk-sharing, the Islamic banking industry played an important role in raising household debt largely for motor vehicle, consumer durables, and real-estate purchases. Overall, the majority of the credit extended by Islamic banking institutions finance consumption rather than production.

Rethinking Financial Market-Building and Development: Credit for What and Whom?

Until the Asian financial crisis in 1998, Islamic banking services in Malaysia were either provided by Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad or through the Islamic windows of conventional banks. However, as the country experienced significant growth rates during the 1990s, Islamic banks found themselves in an increasingly competitive environment to attract customers. During this period, conventional banks became influential players in enabling access to credit, as the ratio of bank lending to GDP rose from 69 percent in 1994 to 99 percent in 1997 (Takayasu and Yokoe 1999). To reduce this overexposure to risk via bank lending, the government rolled out a new policy to develop capital markets and encourage nonfinancial firms to secure their long-term needs on alternative platforms via equity financing. As part of this initiative, the securities commission of Malaysia was tasked to oversee the issuing of first shariʿa-compliant securities in the stock market in 1996. Thereafter, the government began to promote the development of an Islamic equities market, creating attractive incentives for corporate sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuance and trading (COMCEC 2018, 77).

During the 1998 crisis, the average cost of bank loans increased (reaching to 12.1 percent), making it quite difficult for small and medium-sized firms to access affordable funding.[20] Consequently, the plan to move away from bank-based financing to market-based financing accelerated in the aftermath of the crisis. Larger firms gradually moved to capital markets for their funding needs, while banks increasingly focused on retail consumers. Meanwhile, corporate sukuk issuances increased exponentially beginning in 2000s. At the same time, the volume of shariʿa-compliant shares traded in the stock market has also risen. However, much of this happened at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises, which found themselves increasingly excluded from affordable funding options by conventional and Islamic banks.

Indeed, a closer look at the distribution of loans given by Islamic banks reveals that most of the credit is channeled into consumption-oriented sectors, such as mortgage financing, vehicle purchase, and consumer credit (Apaydin 2018, 475). Between 2007 and 2016, most of the shariʿa-compliant banks were far from financing trade or productive industries and did not significantly contribute to the growth of economic activity in Malaysia.[21] Most of these shariʿa-compliant loans—including real-estate and vehicle purchases—carry a lower risk in line with Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines. Therefore, Islamic banks have generally been less willing to change the composition of their assets from consumption-oriented to production-oriented loans.[22] These dynamics also played an important role in the rising household debt in Malaysia, where individuals carry the major burden of market risks in an increasingly financialized environment, thanks to fast-rising private debt levels (Rahman, Ertürk, and Froud 2019; Rethel 2011). The share of household debt as a percentage of GDP is consistently on the rise, and doubled from 43 percent in 1997 to 89 percent in 2016 (Soh, Chong, and Chuah 2017, 39).

To encourage a change in the lending behavior of Islamic banks, the Malaysian government took several measures. In a first step, the Badawi government designated the entire halal industry as a priority as part of its economic development policy and launched the first Malaysia International Halal Showcase (MIHAS) in 2004.[23] As the government sought to transform Malaysia into a global hub of halal economy, the policymakers also hoped to link small and medium-sized firms operating in halal food, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and the travel industry to Islamic banks for their financing needs. In a second step, the BNM provided new incentives to encourage banks to move away from markup-based contracts (*murabaha*) to profit-sharing arrangements (*mudaraba*) and thereby finance productive activities informed by the principle of risk-sharing via the launching of the Investment Account Platform.[24] The long-term impact of these measures on the composition of Islamic banking loans remains to be seen.

Thus far, the most notable beneficiaries of Islamic financial market growth include the state and large private corporations that rely on equity financing. Since the inception of Islamic bonds (sukuk) in 1990, sovereigns as well as corporations have increasingly used this instrument to attract investors and borrow to meet their short- and long-term needs.[25] At a global level, Malaysia had the largest share of domestic sukuk issued between 2001 and 2017, where private and public borrowing on shariʿa-compliant terms in capital markets constituted around 73 percent of the global sukuk market (IIFM 2018, 45). While Malaysia's sovereign sukuk issuances have become increasingly popular to attract petro-dollars from the Gulf countries, a substantial share of this debt is held by public institutions—most notably, the Employees Provident Fund (COMCEC 2018, 89) and Public Sector Retirement Fund (KWAP).[26] In terms of sectoral distribution of corporate sukuk in 2017, about 70 percent of issuances are by financial service providers and infrastructure and utilities companies, while the manufacturing sector issues less than 10 percent of all corporate sukuk combined (COMCEC 2018, 83).[27]

In sum, the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia complements the conventional banking industry. It creates money by way of extending shariʿa-compliant credit and serves as an important conduit for the financial inclusion of previously unbanked individuals or customers who feel uncomfortable with conventional finance. A well-developed network of financial market institutions and regulatory architecture provides a sound base for the industry players to carry their day-to-day operations. However, in terms of mobilizing funds for investment in development, the Islamic banking sector has a negligible impact, as much of the loans extended by these banks are for domestic consumption. Rather than practicing and promoting risk-sharing, these entities shift risks to borrowers by encouraging consumption-driven debt growth.[28] While the rapid growth of Islamic capital markets enabled investors to diversify their risk portfolios, the majority of corporate sukuk is issued by financial companies who seek to strengthen their budgets via shariʿa-compliant equity financing. Overall, the exponential growth in the corporate sukuk market is not driven by demand from large manufacturing firms but by a fast-growing financial services industry.

Conclusion

Across much of the Global South, economic growth and development are contingent on affordable financing and reinvestment options. In settings where money creation is highly decentralized—as has been the case in the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire—countries were unable to build effective financial system to channel funds into production and trade. These historical disadvantages were somewhat attenuated in areas where the state took a leading role in building modern market institutions. Thus, Islamic banking and finance grew faster in political settings where the government exhibited a clear commitment to aggregate this industry into capitalist market building. In Malaysia, this process was strongly influenced by local demands of financially marginalized groups that sought to shield themselves against the vagaries of liberalizing markets.[29]

The development of Islamic banks and halal money creation through the hand of the state had three important implications. First, the growth of Islamic banks went hand in hand with the creation of Islamic capital markets, including a shariʿa-compliant securities exchange and insurance industry (*takaful*). A second development involves the financing of rapidly growing shariʿa-compliant markets (also known as the halal industry), including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and food. Most of the halal certification agencies are based in Malaysia and collect global rents by providing shariʿa compliance certificates to producers of these commodities, not only in Malaysia, but also in Central Asian republics and the MENA economies (Rethel 2019). Third, in areas with low financial inclusion rates, Islamic banking has turned into a vehicle for financial inclusion and the mobilization of savings. As the founders of Islamic banks encountered an opportunity to push forward their agenda in the midst of a political competition between two Islamist political parties, previously unbanked populations were integrated into the financial system through the increasing availability of shariʿa-compliant instruments.

Some suggest that Islamic banking and finance—especially the national variant in Malaysia—is emerging as a credible alternative to conventional finance, with an ambitious goal to move the current headquarters from New York, Tokyo, and London to Kuala Lumpur (Rudnyckyj 2018). Arguably, the architects of Islamic finance seek to replace the problematic debt-based financing model with an equity-based one, where entrepreneurs and financiers share risks rather than seeking opportunities to extract rent via instruments that mimic the use of interest (Rudnycky 2017, 2018). While there is a greater call from shariʿa scholars to encourage equity-based instruments and thereby finance private entrepreneurs, current evidence reveals that the industry players are quite sluggish to adopt this as their preferred business model. At least in Malaysia, the managers of these banks are quite skeptical of this proposal, because it significantly limits their ability to extend loans on more profitable terms.[30]

For Islamic banks to add a new impetus to capitalist development, consumer debt-driven growth needs to be replaced with one that channels credits into productive industries, placing the emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises. Until recently, Islamic financial actors have sought legitimacy in international markets by taking conventional finance as the benchmark in developing the industry while claiming to offer a more sustainable model as an alternative, highlighting the risk-sharing principle as their moral imperative. However, as of today, none of the Islamic banks have been able to fulfil this lofty promise. Consequently, notable critics, such as Kuran (2004, 2018) and El-Gamal (2008), accuse the industry players of being deceitful opportunists eager to scam faithful individuals. Aware of the problems associated with the growing dominance of conventional models in Islamic finance, a group of Islamist economists have embarked on a search for an alternative legitimacy framework, showing concern for contemporary challenges such as inequality, climate change, and environmental degradation. Among these, the Responsible Finance Initiative stands out with its ambitious goals to reroute Islamic finance towards supporting equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economic development.[31] However, current evidence suggests reasons to curb one's enthusiasm in the face of bottom-up initiatives' capacity to change the financial landscape without a clear political commitment by the state.

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Notes

1. According to some scholars, since the end of the Bretton Woods system, banks play an even greater role than the state in this regard: printed fiat money and other forms of state-created reserves constitute an ever decreasing share in the overall volume that is in circulation (Ingham 2004; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, and Werner 2011).
2. While banks may seek collateral or demand the borrower demonstrate future revenue flows for paying off the loan, they are not limited to the existing amount of savings for extending credit.
3. Examples of this include Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan.
4. One such case is Turkey between 1984 and 2018. Since the creation of Islamic banks by Turgut Ozal's ANAP government, the industry did not have access to government subsidies and enjoyed limited institutional support to encourage its growth. Consequently, the majority of the customers—including the pious—continue to work with conventional banks, and the share of Islamic banking in the overall financial sector varies between 3

and 5 percent. Other similar cases where Islamic finance lacked state support include Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, to name a few.

5. Though quite powerful, those occupying the seat of Sheikh-ul-Islam were not completely autonomous in their decision-making. There have been at least three executions by sultan's orders when the Sheikh-ul-Islam found himself at odds with the ruler or acted too independently. For a detailed account on one of these cases, see Nizri (2014).
6. While Kuran (2018) argues that religious rules that prevented mergers among cash waqfs prevented large-scale capital accumulation and stagnated growth, there are reasons to suspect the validity of this claim. Recent findings suggest that the absence of double-entry bookkeeping and the use of the *stairs method* (*merdiban* technique) in cash waqf accounting partially explains why these funds dwindled over time (Demirhan, Susmus, and Gonen 2012). Though this technique was also used by the Ilkhanids and Abbasids, there is no strictly religious basis behind the use of this method in Islamic states.
7. Unlike the British Crown, the Ottomans were very late in borrowing from private lenders; it was only after the financial difficulties in 1760 that private moneylenders emerged as critical players to finance Ottoman borrowing needs (Pamuk 2000).
8. Relatedly, Rubin finds that the average real interest rate on loans was much higher—around 19 percent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Rubin 2017, 80). For the same time period in Britain, interest rates varied between 3 and 5 percent (Stasavage 2003).
9. The diversity of trade relations is another important dynamic behind a decentralized organization of the financial marketplace across most Islamic states (Platteau 2017).
10. When they borrowed in the domestic market, the sultans sought to broaden the base of lenders beyond powerful *sarrafs* and reached out to small investors (Pamuk 2014).
11. Despite formal limitations on usury, however, borrowers in Muslim societies paid interest to moneylenders regardless of their religious denomination (Calder 2016; Ercanbrack 2015; Kuran and Rubin 2018; Pamuk 2000; Rubin 2017). According to Ercanbrack (2015), there were a lot of exceptions to the way financial exchanges operated on the ground. Local customs were increasingly accommodated as a "go-to" source to justify decisions that otherwise did not conform to shariʿa.
12. This was the case despite the formal ban on interest under very powerful Muslim clerics, who arguably delayed the development of organized moneylending and financial services under banks (Calder 2016; Rubin 2017).
13. As Pamuk also notes, "in their monetary practices, Ottoman governments were well aware of the limitations of their power. In comparison to goods markets and long-distance trade, it was more difficult for governments to control . . . exchange rates and interest rates" (Pamuk 2000, 226).
14. *Majalla* is the Ottoman civil code that covers sales, insurance, rental contracts, debt, and settlements, all informed by the Hanafi jurisprudence.
15. Later, Malaysian success came as a surprise to many, since most experts predicted Gulf countries—such as the UAE—to become global leaders in halal finance, given their historical role in the emergence of modern Islamic banking.
16. This organization was founded by Ungku Abdul Aziz for pious Muslims to deposit their savings and take out loans to finance their pilgrimage to Mecca—with an embedded goal to increase financial inclusion (Rethel 2015, 120).
17. Interview with an academic expert on Islamic banking and finance, November 29, 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

18. Interview with former Islamic banking manager, November 22, 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
19. Interview with a former government member, November 24, 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
20. Data source: World Bank, Lending interest rate percent, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LEND?locations=MY&view=chart, accessed on March 20, 2019.
21. Even today, the Islamic retail banking industry's biggest share of loans goes to financing housing and real estate purchases. While they also extend credit to the manufacturing sector, mortgage credit for buying property constitutes a large share of the business for these banks. In some cases, their lending rates can be even more competitive than the conventional interest rates. In that sense, Islamic banking's largest impact is on the development of housing and real estate, because elsewhere they cannot compete with the conventional banks, which are much faster in offering credit.
22. Interview with an Islamic bank manager, November 30, 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
23. See http://mihas.com.my/mihas-over-the-years/, accessed on March 30, 2019. The halal industry includes production of Islamic halal food, pharmaceuticals, and modest fashion, as well as tourism.
24. See https://www.muamalat.com.my/business-banking/investment-banking/Investment-Account-Platform.html, accessed on February 15, 2019. *Murabaha*-based contracts are the most commonly used contracts when extending consumer loans.
25. As of 2018, the public sector has issued 34.6 percent of all sukuk in Malaysia, while the share for private sector stands at 65.4 percent (COMCEC 2018, 2).
26. Employees Provident Fund is a social security institution that manages the savings of private-sector employees and provides retirement benefits. KWAP is for public-sector workers. As of 2016, 45 percent of EPF's assets under management are invested in sukuk, while KWAP has invested 49.7 percent of its total assets in sukuk (COMCEC 2018, 87).
27. Among all sectors corporations that offer sukuk, financial services hold the largest share and were responsible for nearly 50 percent of all corporate sukuk issued in 2017 (COMCEC 2018).
28. In addition, the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia follows in the footsteps of the conventional bankers in promoting a market-based solution to improve welfare, and allocates some of its profits for donations to Islamic charity or halal corporate social responsibility activities. However, the share of these initiatives is miniscule and their capacity to trigger a multiplier effect to address socioeconomic inequalities is questionable.
29. In other Muslim-dominant settings with no similar demand, the development of Islamic banking and finance has been very limited. Examples include Turkey and Indonesia, where the volume of Islamic banking transactions constitute around 5 percent of total banking exchanges. Findings on customer preferences in these contexts reveal that the demand for shariʿa-compliant banking services is not very strong and the majority of borrowers feel comfortable with using conventional banking instruments (Demiralp and Demiralp 2015; Pepinsky 2013).
30. For example, many Islamic retail banks are also subject to similar liquidity ratio requirements, as recommended by the Basel III committee, and moving from debt-based to equity-based financing significantly lowers the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratios, as required by the Central Bank. Elsewhere in the GCC—including the Emirates—there is hardly any intention to abandon debt-based financing instruments in favor of

equity-based arrangements. Interview with an Islamic bank manager, November 30, 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

31. See http://www.rfi-foundation.org/, accessed on December 12, 2018. Most RFI board members and council of advisors have held key positions in Islamic finance industry in Malaysia, though the initiative includes industry practitioners from the Middle East as well.

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PART VI

SOCIAL WELFARE AND GOVERNANCE

CHAPTER 36

COLONIAL LEGACIES AND WELFARE PROVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

MELANI CAMMETT, ALLISON SPENCER HARTNETT, AND GABRIEL KOEHLER-DERRICK

In the decade since the Arab uprisings began, protesters across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have called upon their governments to address deep-seated socioeconomic grievances and long-standing regional inequalities. These grievances mirror the findings of academic analyses of the MENA region as beset by structural obstacles to economic and political development (Krafft and Alawode 2016; Malik and Awadallah 2013; Noland and Pack 2007; Rougier 2016).[1] Protesters and analysts alike note the centrality of welfare provision to the well-being of citizens and the health of national economies. In public opinion polls, citizens report high levels of dissatisfaction with public services and perceptions of rising inequality, and unfair access to economic opportunities are widespread (Cammett and Salti 2016). As others have shown, MENA welfare states vary significantly from one another in the targeting and generosity of services (Eibl 2020). The early design of MENA public welfare, however, predominantly originated under foreign rule. We propose that colonial configurations of the welfare state laid the foundations for long-run patterns of service provision post-independence.

In this chapter, we contribute a historical argument that links the development of welfare services under colonialism to postcolonial welfare provision. We seek to explain variation in welfare provision in two core social sectors: health and education. We measure welfare provision in two ways: physical infrastructure (i.e., hospitals and schools) and efficacy (i.e., crowding in schools and hospitals). We argue that much of the observed variation in postcolonial welfare expansion is due to a combination of the degree to which welfare provision under colonialism relied on public versus private institutions and how much the composition of the ruling elite changed post-independence.[2]

We argue that post-independence politics were crucial in determining the scope of social welfare provision, particularly in the distribution of the expansion of welfare infrastructure that occurred throughout the region in the decades following independence. Under colonialism, European officials designed and implemented limited welfare services in occupied territories that served political logics of control and co-optation, including to educate the nascent bureaucratic class (Hourani 1968) and, where settler colonialism existed, to benefit European settlers (Owen 1981). Given the limited scope of welfare provision under colonialism, governments across the region faced pressure to expand access to social welfare institutions at independence. However, despite popular demand, there was enormous variation in the expansion of social welfare in the key decades following independence. Drawing on histories of the region, we note that in the MENA region the expansion of social welfare provision was a top-down process determined at the highest levels of political power. We argue that it was more likely that governments would expand welfare infrastructure where political elites were more broadly representative because patronage incentivized politicians to ensure adequate health and school infrastructure in their "home" regions. The more concentrated the political elite, the less pressure there was to expand social welfare infrastructure beyond key urban areas. To measure this, we focus on the relative breadth of ministerial cabinets as a proxy measure for elite inclusivity.

While increasing access to social welfare was crucial, the decades post-independence were characterized by significant variation in the quality of public services across the MENA region. We argue that the degree to which colonial governments relied on public versus private institutions in the education and health sectors accounts for much of the variation in efficacy post-independence. In some cases, like Tunisia, health and education were primarily provided by public facilities under colonialism. In others, like Jordan, key welfare sectors were dominated by private institutions. Where private institutions predominated under colonialism, post-independence states faced higher costs to train and retain the small pool of teachers and doctors so desperately needed to meet surging demand for social welfare services. Where public institutions were more prevalent under colonialism, post-independence governments faced fewer obstacles to training and recruiting teachers and doctors even as demand for social welfare services increased exponentially.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews prominent theories that account for variation in social welfare provision generally, and then discusses the limitations of these theories for accounting for variation in social welfare in the MENA region. We then outline our theory, introduce our data and key concepts, and present descriptive evidence supporting our theoretical claims about the importance of elite coalitions and colonial reliance on public versus private institutions. We conclude with four brief case studies that substantiate our theoretical claims using historical evidence.

A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

There is general consensus on the proximate causes of underdevelopment in the Middle East, including weak integration in the global economy, low levels of investment, lack of technology transfer, industrial noncompetitiveness, high levels of government ownership and investment, the low quality of education, and the high costs of doing business (Noland and Pack 2007, 11). However, these factors are symptoms of deeper causes and do not entirely account for intraregional variation in economic and social outcomes.[3]

Theories of the development of welfare states often emphasize factors such as electoral competition (Niedzwiecki 2018), the role of organized labor (Esping-Anderson 1990), or business interests (Mares 2003). Organized labor and business interests in MENA have traditionally been weak and lacked independence from the state, particularly in the initial decades after independence (Beinin 2001; Bellin 2011; Cammett 2007).[4] Another dominant strand in the literature concerns the role of ethnic diversity and social welfare outcomes (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). However, other scholars have highlighted numerous theoretical and conceptual obstacles to assessing this relationship (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Singh and vom Hau 2016; Wimmer 2016), which helps to explain why the association between ethnic diversity and social welfare is so highly contested and inconsistent. In some cases, ethnic differences do appear to have limited social welfare provision (Franck and Rainer 2012; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Soifer 2016), but in other contexts, ethnic groups have transcended these differences (Miguel 2004; Singh 2016; Tajima, Samphantharak, and Ostwald 2018). Even within the MENA region, where some parties are closely tied to various ethnic groups, ethnicity alone is an unreliable predictor of the provision of social welfare services (Cammett 2014).

Recent advances in the literature on nation-building and welfare under autocracy provide another set of explanations for examining the historical origins of autocratic welfare institutions. Scholarship in this vein has shown that contrary to the expectations of modernization theory, autocrats are frequently more redistributive than their democratic counterparts (Albertus 2015). Studying the expansion of education over the last two centuries, Paglayan (2020) finds that most expansion of primary schooling happened under autocratic regimes. Slater and Fenner (2011) argue that expanding public services like schooling is a core component of durable regimes because it increases the state's infrastructural power by registering and socializing students as well as making professionals like teachers dependent on state employment. In sum, the literature leads us to expect that a combination of elite preferences and the historical endowment of welfare infrastructure play an important role in conditioning welfare provision in autocracies.

We focus on the relationship between institutions and policies, on the one hand, and welfare provision, on the other, because of the long-standing emphasis on this key relationship in the literature on economic development (Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson 2014). We examine the colonial period because prior to colonization, with the possible exception of Egypt, no government in the region had attempted to create a nationwide network of publicly administered schools and hospitals (Gallagher 1983, 1990; Szyliowicz 1973). Furthermore, a large body of literature from across the developing world suggests that colonial legacies were particularly influential in shaping long-run trends in education, and MENA cases stand to contribute to our understanding of how and why some patterns rooted in colonialism survive beyond independence (Nunn 2014; Valencia Caciedo 2019; Wantchekon, Klasnja, and Novta 2015).

In focusing on the nature of elite coalitions after independence, we draw on a large literature that suggests that the preferences and strategic considerations of elite coalitions play a role in shaping a range of policy outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Eibl 2020; Haggard and Kaufman 2009; Hodler and Raschky 2014; Khan 2010; Pepinsky 2009; Ricart-Huguet 2020; Slater 2010; Teichman 2016; Waldner 1999), as well as historical accounts that emphasize independence as a critical juncture for economic and political development across the MENA region (Issawi 1995; Owen 1981; Owen and Pamuk 1999). We are, of course, not the first to focus on the role of elite coalitions and social welfare provision in the region. Eibl (2020) argues that the political elite may factor ethnic divisions into their calculus regarding welfare spending, but only if those divisions are politically salient. While we agree that elite politics are crucial, rather than focusing on the role of external threats for elite cohesion (Eibl 2020; Slater 2010), we instead examine the relative continuity of political elites after independence. Where there was relative continuity, we argue there was much less incentive to expand social welfare provision.

A Theoretical Framework for Colonial Legacies and MENA Development

We contend that two factors shaped welfare provision in the postcolonial Middle East: the breadth of elite political coalitions post-independence, and the reliance of colonial regimes on public versus private institutions. First, we distinguish between the legacies of colonies that relied heavily on facilities controlled by private, nonstate interests (i.e., *private institutions*), and those in which colonial governments expanded a national network of facilities funded, staffed, and administered by the state (i.e., *public institutions*). Variation in colonial reliance on public versus private institutions shaped welfare promotion post-independence because it shaped the human capital inherited at independence and impacted the labor market for scarce white-collar workers in the decades after independence. In colonies that relied on public institutions, the post-independent state inherited more human capital at independence and faced less competition for the services of doctors and teachers, reducing the costs of training and recruitment relative to former colonies, which relied on private institutions.

Second, the relative breadth of the political elite at independence determined the extent to which the state would promote welfare in terms of expanding the geographic reach of services, determining eligibility criteria for public schools and healthcare facilities, and setting funding levels for public institutions.

Public and Private Institutions and the Welfare State

Even the most ambitious post-independence plans for welfare expansion faced real constraints imposed by colonial policy. Although colonial education never reached more than a small minority of subjects, we argue that its relative breadth proved highly consequential at independence. There were at least three reasons for this. First, colonies that relied on public institutions generally provided services to larger number of colonial subjects than colonies that relied on private institutions. Second, public institutions were typically more geographically dispersed than private ones, which tended to cluster in a few key urban locales. Third, where private institutions persisted post-independence, they often disincentivized investment in the public sector because they allowed political elites to "opt out" of public institutions and often provided more attractive terms and working conditions for scarce white collar workers.[5]

A defining feature of European colonialism across the world was inequality in health and education outcomes between European citizens and colonial subjects. These inequalities arose for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to colonizers' strategic limitation of education to colonized populations or preferential provision to European settlers. These dynamics are well documented in historical accounts of colonial education in the Middle East (Allman 1979; Ayachi 2003; Falb Kalisman 2017; Hyde 1978; Salman 1986; Segalla 2009; Szyliowicz 1973) as well as health policy (Amster 2014; Gallagher 1990, 1983). While inequality characterized access to public institutions between citizens and subjects in colonies throughout the region, there was significant variation in the ways that colonial governments structured the provision of healthcare and education. In some countries, like Lebanon, public institutions were limited, and private institutions, particularly those of a religious character, dominated the provision of education and healthcare. In others, like Morocco, the colonial government was hostile to private institutions, particularly missionary organizations, meaning that with the exception of a limited number of facilities run by the Catholic Church, the state was solely responsible for the provision of education and health services.[6]

Figure 33.1 provides an illustration of variation in public service provision for four countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The plot shows changes in the portion of public schools at five-year intervals for all available years between 1900 and 1970. (The dashed line indicates the year of independence.) We observe significant differences across all four countries. More than half of schools in Jordan were private prior to independence, but this total never exceeded more than 10 percent in Tunisia. We argue that this variation in the relative influence of private institutions had significant implications for welfare promotion after independence.



FIGURE 33.1: Public schools as a percentage of all schools in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Building on classic works emphasizing the essential role of public institutions in the process of nation-building and modernization (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Weber 1976), we conceptualize this binary distinction strictly, classifying both traditional and modern institutions run by nonstate (often religious) authorities as "private." This includes the broad network of "traditional" Qurʾanic schools known as *kutabs*,[7] which often were regulated by the government, but whose funding came from local sources.[8] The importance of this binary distinction is shown in Figure 33.1, where the rapid increase in Egyptian public schooling during the 1920s and 1930s reflects not only a program of educational expansion that began in 1923, but also the fact that in the mid-1930s, the government brought all *kutabs* under the authority of the Ministry of Education, making what had been privately run institutions public.

Political Elites and Welfare Outcomes

Our analytical framework combines a focus on the constraints inherited from colonial rule with an understanding that the political will to expand welfare was a central feature of postcolonial state-building. Elite coalitions—the political elites that constitute the ruling regime—shape the institutions and policies that affect subsequent economic and political policies and, potentially, development outcomes. Put differently, the composition of the political elite determines the political motivation to enact more or less expansive welfare policies.

For example, when post-independence rulers emerged from a revolutionary break from the *ancien regime*, they were more likely to prioritize greater investment in welfare as part of state- and nation-building projects (Cammett and Sasmaz 2016, 8), yielding a rupture in historical legacies. Since colonial governments typically restricted political participation to a narrow elite, continuity suggests that postcolonial policies would be less inclusive than those in places that experienced a revolutionary break from the past. For example, as Waldner (1999) shows, in some newly independent countries, the policy choices of new ruling elites were driven by their need to launch populist appeals to shore up their support bases in the face of elite fragmentation.[9] Elite coalitions have also been found to be important in other studies of distributive politics in MENA. Eibl (2020) uses postcolonial spending data to show that broad and narrow coalitions exert different levels of welfare effort.[10] Hartnett (2019) finds that the inclusivity of colonial and postcolonial coalitions conditioned the strength and nature of rising elites' demands for land reform, primarily due to the fact that inclusive coalitions engaged in alternative forms of urban-rural redistribution while exclusive regimes resisted out-group demands. Similarly, in her study of women's rights and family law in North Africa, Mounira Charrad (2001) demonstrates that the Moroccan regime's alliance with conservative rural notables deterred reform while the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party's reliance on a coalition of middle-class professionals brought about changes in the legal status of women, even in the absence of a grass-roots feminist movement.

We assume that, like all governments, elite coalitions post-independence tried to maintain political power. Unlike previous studies that emphasize divisions among elite coalitions (Eibl 2020; Waldner 1999), however, we focus specifically on the inclusivity of the political elite. Elite coalitions were particularly important, we argue, because in the authoritarian regimes that emerged across the region post-independence, distributive politics were personal and parochial. While governments set aspirational goals, political elites enjoyed tremendous discretion over the allocation and prioritization of resources. In the absence of electoral accountability, politicians had incentives and opportunity to direct resources to their home region, where thicker networks of personal contacts and connections facilitated their control and influence over local implementation and strengthened their personal and family reputations.[11]

Following previous scholarship, we focus on the composition of the ministerial cabinet to measure elite composition, as this gives us a generalizable measure of the composition of the highest levels of formal political power (Arriola 2009; Arriola and Johnson 2014; Buehler and Ayari 2018; Nyrup and Bramwell 2020). Although there are many ways to operationalize elite coalition composition, we follow Ricart-Huguet (2020) in adopting a measure of ministers' geographic diversity as a telling indicator of political inclusion. By examining ministers' birth places, we attempt to capture not only the individual-level diversity of ministers, but, more importantly, the potential for diverse constituencies to be represented at the highest level of politics. Scholars of ministerial politics in postcolonial sub-Saharan African countries have noted that a region's representation in the ministerial cabinet often increases the level of distribution to that region via mechanisms such as elite favoritism, patronage politics, or constituent lobbying (Koter 2016; Kramon and Posner 2016).

Using data from Hartnett (2020), Figure 33.2 plots the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for postcolonial cabinets in Tunisia,[12] Morocco,[13] Egypt,[14] and Jordan[15] from independence until 1970. HHI is a measure of concentration ranging from 0 to

10,000. Originally used to describe competition in economic markets, a low HHI value (from zero to 1,500) indicates that the field of competition, in this case geographic representation in the ministerial cabinet, is more diverse and not dominated by elites from any one region. An HHI value ranging between 1,500 and 2,500 signifies a moderately concentrated cabinet, where geographic representation might draw several ministers from a few select districts in a given cabinet. Values greater than 2,500 indicate highly concentrated ministerial geography, where typically one or two regions monopolize political power.

We observe in Figure 33.2 that no country case falls into the competitive category, reflecting the propensity toward political inequality in postcolonial and autocratic regimes. But the plot also shows clear variation between cases. Egypt shows moderate levels of concentration and is the most geographically inclusive of our cases, with an HHI of 2,136. Although Tunisia's HHI of 2,972 falls above the "highly concentrated" threshold of 2,500, the ministerial elite draw from a larger pool of districts than either Morocco (HHI = 3,692) or Jordan (HHI = 4,578). Based on these relative differences, we use this measure of cabinet geographic diversity to categorize the elite coalitions of Egypt and Tunisia as relatively inclusive, whereas Moroccan and Jordanian elite coalitions are more exclusive.



FIGURE 33.2: Average cabinet, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), independence to 1970.

Source: Data from Hartnett (2020).

A Typology of Postcolonial Welfare Provision

Table 33.1 characterizes our expectations for welfare provision after independence based on two variables: legacies of public and private welfare provision under colonial rule, and elite coalition inclusivity.

This typology yields four distinct ideal types of social development regimes in the postcolonial MENA region. At one end of the spectrum in the typology is the "expansive, effective" pattern, in which post-independence elites embarked on ambitious state-building projects. Breaking with colonial era ruling social coalitions, they aimed to expand social welfare provision for a broad swath of the population, thereby fostering broader human development. Building on public institutions built under colonialism, it was easier to staff these new facilities, both because the absence of a private sector reduced competition for doctors and teachers, but also because a greater reliance on public institutions under colonialism increased the pool of future white collar workers.

Political elites in these contexts were more willing to spend significant portions of their limited budgets on social welfare provision because the expansion of health and education infrastructure enhanced their local prestige, increased their influence over an important source of patronage, and helped address soaring demand for services that were extremely limited under colonialism.

At the other end of the spectrum is the "restrictive, ineffective" pattern, which features economic and social policies aimed at a narrow subset of the population and continuity between the colonial and postcolonial ruling social coalitions. In these cases, despite colonial reliance on public institutions, continuity in the elite coalition pre- and post-independence meant there was little incentive to expand the provision of public goods beyond rewarding key urban constituencies. This resulted in a publicly oriented social welfare system, but one shot through with glaring inequalities in both infrastructure and staffing.

Two other patterns of state investment in welfare provision fall in between these types. The "restrictive, effective" variant entails policies that are relatively successful in developing and implementing policies to promote welfare provision. However, given

Table 33.1: Patterns of Welfare Provision in Post-Independence Polities

		Colonial Education and Health	
		Public Oriented	Private Oriented
Elite Coalition Post-Independence	*Inclusive (Broad Elite)*	Expansive, Effective (Tunisia)	Expansive, Ineffective (Egypt)
	Exclusive (Narrow Elite)	Restrictive, Ineffective (Morocco)	Restrictive, Effective (Jordan)

the elite social foundations of the post-independence ruling coalition, which exhibits relative continuity with the colonial period, economic and social policies involved less expansion in welfare provision. The "expansive, ineffective" type encompasses regimes that included a diverse ruling elite, which broke from colonial-era rulers, and expanded social welfare infrastructure. However, these regimes often faced huge difficulties in staffing and training, often because of the continued importance of private institutions under colonialism and after independence.

Data and Conceptualization

To illustrate our argument, we draw on data from government statistical yearbooks and archival resources from four countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan. These data come from the Middle East/North Africa Historical Data Archive (MENAHDA) project.[16] This database consists primarily of digitized statistical yearbooks, annual publications that collected statistics from across the bureaucracy in a single bound volume. Dating back to the colonial period, these yearbooks provide us with valuable information from a range of different domains, including public health, education, and infrastructure, as well as economic indicators at both the national and subnational level. While there is variation in the nature of statistics reported in each country, as well as the level of aggregation and consistency year-to-year, these yearbooks provide a wealth of demographic, economic, and administrative statistics at the national and subnational levels. The data below illustrates how these four cases perform based on the expansiveness and effectiveness criteria in our theory.

Expansiveness

We measure welfare effectiveness as the number of public schools and hospital per 100,000 citizens.[17] As shown in Figure 33.3, there is stark variation across our four cases in terms of the provision of public schools adjusted by population size. Jordan exhibits the sharpest increase in public schools post-independence, followed by a more gradual increase in Tunisia. In Morocco, there is virtually no change post-independence, and public school accessibility actually declined in Egypt, as surging population growth overcame the expansionary efforts of the Nasser government post-independence, discussed in more detail below.

Figure 33.4 shows distinct trends across cases with respect to healthcare infrastructure. The number of hospitals per capita started to increase in Egypt prior to independence, a trend that continued under Nasser. In Jordan, the number of hospitals per capita increased initially but fell precipitously with the loss of the East Bank in 1967. In Morocco and Tunisia, trends were essentially flat pre- and post-independence.



FIGURE 33.3: Education infrastructure in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.



FIGURE 33.4: Health infrastructure in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Effectiveness

What about the relative effectiveness of these distinct patterns of welfare provision? As previously noted, although governments differed in the degree to which they encouraged and facilitated the expansion of public education, all governments post-independence had to respond to the challenge of a surge in demand for social welfare services while facing significant constraints in training and staffing these facilities. Figure 33.5 illustrates this challenge by focusing on trends in student crowding, specifically the number of students per public school.



FIGURE 33.5: School crowding in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia (students per public school).



FIGURE 33.6: Doctors per hospital in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Independence reduced the barriers to entry to public education across the region, but governments clearly differed in how quickly and effectively they were able to meet surging demand for social welfare services. Student crowding surged in Egypt and Morocco post-independence, but was much more gradual in Tunisia, a direct result of a massive expansion of public schools, and increased only modestly in Jordan. While this was in part due to the role of UNRWA schools in Jordan, as discussed in more detail below, there is a clear contrast between Jordan and Tunisia and our other cases with respect to school crowding.

Figure 33.6 examines the presence of doctors per hospital. In Morocco and Tunisia, virtually all hospitals were public, and the vast majority of doctors were French citizens who left at independence. As a result, hospitals faced a challenge at independence: how to train an adequate number of doctors while simultaneously expanding access to public healthcare facilities. Despite achieving independence in the same year (1956), Tunisia clearly weathered this storm much more effectively than Morocco. By the 1960s, there were roughly twice as many doctors in Tunisian hospitals than peer institutions in Morocco. Unlike with school crowding, trends were basically flat in both Jordan and Egypt, reflecting the relatively limited changes pre- and post-independence for countries that were generally more reliant on private institutions under colonialism.

HOW COLONIAL LEGACIES SHAPE POST-INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR COUNTRIES

To explore how patterns of colonial-era investment in public welfare contribute to post-independence welfare regimes, we present brief qualitative case studies of four countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. Collectively, these countries illustrate the four distinct types of welfare regimes theorized in our typology.

Tunisia

Tunisia is the quintessential example of the "expansive, effective" category. Due to a series of highly contingent events, private institutions played a limited role in the provision of healthcare and education under colonialism. Access to public institutions was also relatively broad, as compared to our other cases. Drawing on a much broader group of elites than under colonialism, Tunisia's Neo-Destour Party was ideologically committed to the continued expansion of social welfare, especially in the countryside. As a result, Tunisia was able to simultaneously expand access to public facilities while maintaining relatively high levels of efficiency for decades after independence.

Colonial Education: From Private to Public

Private institutions played an influential role early in the history of the protectorate, especially among the Italian population, which was initially much larger than the French settler presence (Lewis 2014). Rather than risk a direct and potentially costly confrontation with the Catholic Church, French colonial officials dramatically expanded public institutions (Machuel 1900, 3), which were explicitly secular, confident that access to public goods would increase the colonial government's influence among the Italian community.

Education policy in the Tunisian protectorate was exemplary of the campaign to reduce the influence of private institutions. The first law governing public schools stated that neither nationality nor religion would be an obstacle to enrollment (Ayachi 2003, 23). Tunisian subjects were the unintended beneficiaries of this competition between the French colonial state and the Italian community. Enrollment in public schools among Italians citizens was slow, especially prior to World War I, and vacant spots in public schools were seized by Muslim subjects. By the 1920s, the colonial government was ready to assert its authority over private schools. Although private schools were allowed to persist, they were placed under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education, giving colonial government oversight of these previously independent institutions (Macken 1975).

The Emergence of an Educated Middle Class and the Neo-Destour Party

Competition for the loyalty of Tunisia's large Italian population resulted in a relatively expansive approach to public education under colonialism. Although there were still huge discrepancies in rates of education between colonial citizens and subjects (Poncet 1949), the expansion of public schools facilitated the emergence of a small but politically significant middle class outside of Tunis.[18] The leadership of the nationalist Neo-Destour movement, which successfully agitated against colonialism and would play a decisive role in post-independence politics, and the majority of its key leaders were educated in colonial public schools (Hermassi 1972, 118).

Independence and the Expansion of the Public Sector

Consistent with our theory, the Tunisian government prioritized the expansion of public education post-independence (Tarifa 1971, 150). By 1965, 9 percent of the Tunisian budget was devoted to public health expenditures and 23 percent to public education. Elementary school enrollment nearly doubled between 1955, a year prior to independence, and 1960. Despite this huge increase, a massive campaign of school building limited overcrowding. These gains were not limited to public education (Allman 1979, chapter 3). Despite losing a huge portion of European doctors at independence, the relative expansion of public education under colonialism meant that many more Tunisians were able to pursue medical training in France prior to independence. This enabled Tunisia to maintain relatively high levels of staffing after independence and gradually began the process of expanding its network of hospitals. Although the Neo-Destour did not eliminate regional inequalities in public infrastructure, the expansion of public facilities, particularly elementary schools, has justifiably been cited as one of the most impressive dimensions of the Neo-Destour's legacy in post-independence Tunisia (Micaud 1964).

Egypt

Egypt's broad elite coalition after independence pursued policies intended to extend public education and healthcare to all strata of the Egyptian population. After the Free Officers' successful coup in 1952, Presidents Naguib and Nasser pursued an expansive, populist approach to welfare reform, but the quality of these services was diminished by understaffing and overcrowding of public sector institutions. Consequently, although access to schooling and medical care became increasingly widespread, they were not entirely effective.

Colonial Education: The Primacy of Private Education in Khedival and Colonial Egypt

The modern Egyptian state dates to the early nineteenth century. Under Mohammad Ali Pasha and his dynasty, the Egyptian state was a pioneer in developing one of the region's most advanced public welfare systems. By the late nineteenth century, however, Khedival policies and those of the new British colonial administration curtailed the development of public services. Insufficient investment in public services and the explicit restriction of education to elites during British occupation (1882–1952) created deficits in human capital and physical infrastructure.

Under the British occupation, Egyptian education had three tiers. The first, a nongovernmental system supervised by Al-Azhar, consisted of religious *kutabs* that comprised the majority of schools. The national and foreign sectors comprised the second and third tiers, and were part of the "modern" system and based on European models of education. Foreign schools were privately run and catered to European and elite Egyptian families. After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Lord Cromer and the colonial government explicitly curbed the expansion of national (public) education (Cromer 1908), abolishing free primary education and reducing funds to the Ministry of Education. The education system became an arena of political contention between "nationalists who saw education as means for national improvement and colonial administrators who saw it as a privilege for those elites they wished to assimilate into the Egyptian bureaucracy" (Yousef 2012, 56). Distinctions between fee-paying elite education in national and foreign schools and mass education in *kutabs* were reinforced by linguistic rules and curriculum mismatches that prevented *kutab* students from pursuing further education.

The British maintained complete control over the education system until 1922, the first year the Ministry of Education returned to Egyptian control since the occupation began. The new administration responded to long-standing Egyptian demands for education expansion and reform. A law passed in 1923 made primary education free and mandatory although implementation lagged and primary school enrollment in 1950 only amounted to 36 percent of school-age children (Faksh 1976).

A similar pattern is visible in colonial effects on the Egyptian healthcare system. Prior to 1882, it was the norm for Egyptian doctors who graduated from the Qasr Al-Aini Medical School to enter into government service, while European graduates monopolized positions in private practice and private hospitals that served foreigners and the wealthy (Sonbol 1991, 136). The British protectorate marginalized Egyptian nationals in the Ministry of Health and subordinated the Egyptian medical system to colonial developmental goals. The number of Egyptian doctors dwindled when the British instituted high tuition fees and English-only instruction at Qasr Al-Aini (Sonbol 1991, 131). With fewer Egyptian doctors and negligible government support for public hospitals, foreign-oriented, private institutions became the dominant healthcare providers. The historian Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (1991) describes why: only three out of the twenty-one hospitals in Cairo and Alexandria in 1905 were government-run. Private care was too expensive for the majority of the native population, and even the medical fees charged for public hospital visits were too high for most Egyptians to afford. Before colonialism, these services were free. The ultimate effect of British health administration in Egypt was to create a privately run medical system oriented toward serving urban Europeans and to undo the foundations of the nascent, but expansive, public health network that was curtailed after the British occupation in 1882.

A Broad Post-Independence Elite Coalition

Egyptian independence from Britain progressed in stages. The British declared the protectorate dissolved in 1922, and although Egypt achieved de jure independence, the transition to sovereign rule began with the Free Officers' 1952 coup that overthrew the monarchy and traditional elite.[19] Although the regime was composed of "a charismatic leader and military cadre" (Hinnebusch 1981, 442), the Free Officers were both ideologically and socially diverse. Members espoused a range of nationalist and leftist views (Botman 1986, 350), and the Executive Committee drew its membership from multiple strata of Egyptian society, notably the rural lower-middle class (Abou-El-Fadl 2018, 104). The early years of the revolutionary transition were also characterized by an alliance between the ruling military officers and modernizing industrial elements from the old ruling class (Beinin and Goldberg 1982), and they were successful in mobilizing the middle classes around a modernizing, populist political agenda.

Independence and an Expansive but Struggling Public Sector

The Free Officer's inclusive coalition prioritized the expansion of government welfare sectors. The regime built on public education policies inaugurated in 1951 by Education Minister Taha Hussein, who incorporated *kutabs* into the public primary school sector (Saleh 2016). Tertiary education rapidly expanded and was tuition-free by presidential decree after 1962 (Faksh 1976). But as Saleh (2016) notes, these reforms had several deficiencies that effected the overall quality of schooling, including minimal improvements to physical education infrastructure, few changes to curriculum, and a surge in enrollment that led to immediate overcrowding. Egypt's student-to-school ratio remained high by regional standards (500 students per school), with only Morocco performing worse. Not surprisingly, private schooling remains the preference for the children of the political and economic elite in Egypt to the present day.

The health sector followed a pattern similar to that in education. The post-1952 regime built a network of government-run urban and rural medical facilities that provided free treatment (Carney 1984, 135). Even so, the pace of infrastructural expansion outstripped the sector's ability to provide quality care. The regime and professional doctors' associations agreed that newly trained doctors would be obliged to work in the public sector, but also be allowed to treat patients in private practice and hospitals. At the same time, the government nationalized foreign hospitals and restricted foreign doctors' practices (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016). In an attempt to increase provision, graduates were obliged to spend time in public rural clinics post-graduation, but this early stage of a new doctor's career typically lacked supervision by more senior physicians and featured low compensation rates. The draw of working in both the public and private sector led to doctors shirking public clinic hours (Carney 1984), contributing to both overcrowding and a lack of patients' confidence in public sector clinics. Even into the 2000s, patients reported a preference for the private sector if they could afford treatment (Rashad and Sharaf 2015, 1167).

The populist politics of Egypt's inclusive postcolonial elite coalition led to the expansion of public welfare sectors. The British protectorate undermined the development of public services, instead relying on private institutions to cater to wealthy and foreign elites. In attempting to quickly address these lingering inequities, the quality of Egyptian public services continued to suffer long after independence.

Jordan

Jordanian health and education sectors consistently rank among the best in the MENA region. The relatively high quality of Jordanian welfare does not stem from higher government expenditure, as these sectors only receive a modest proportion of the budget, but rather from a hybrid welfare regime that strategically targeted distinct constituencies. The political logic of government welfare provision historically prioritized East Bank Jordanians over the large population of Palestinian refugees and Jordanians of Palestinian descent. The narrow power elite that grew up around the Mandatory regime remained heavily entrenched after independence in 1946. Waves of Palestinian refugees after 1948 might have overwhelmed Jordanian capacities, if not for the large private sector and UNRWA health and education services for the displaced. This mixed welfare system freed the regime's hand to continue prioritizing public welfare for the East Bank population in the first decades post-independence.

Colonial Welfare: Private Institutions in Mandate Transjordan

Prior to the official establishment of the British Mandate in 1921, the East Bank had few education and medical services. Those that existed were primarily run by local religious communities or foreign missionaries. Limited, privately run health and education infrastructure, combined with British reluctance to overspend in Jordan, resulted in limited expansion of public services to rural villages and tribal areas. By 1925, only forty-six boys' schools and six girls' schools existed, and the country's only secondary school in Salt prepared male students for university study abroad (Anderson 2005). When John Glubb assumed command of the Arab Legion in 1939, the military undertook infrastructure projects like school and clinic building in sedentary and Bedouin tribal communities across Transjordan (Alon 2007; Massad 2001). By the time Jordan gained independence in 1946, private schools still outnumbered public, 100 to 73 (Salman 1986).[20]

As in the education sector, healthcare provision prior to the Mandate had been a mix of traditional, local providers and a limited missionary presence in Salt, Karak, Amman, and later Ajlun (Amadouny 1997). A push to control malaria in the 1930s reflects the limited state of public health in Transjordan. Amadouny (1997, 467) notes that health officials estimated a need for 200 kilograms of quinine to control endemic malaria, but that due to "financial stringency" only 20 kilograms could be used. Throughout the 1940s, the military continued to provide healthcare by building clinics and overseeing the Desert Medical Unit, which provided free treatment to the Bedouin population (Massad 2001).

An Exclusive Elite

Jordan's ruling elite emerged from its close connections to the colonial state. A foreign Arab bureaucratic elite, hailing mainly from Greater Syria and Palestine, formed the core of this narrow coalition. As transplants to Jordan via Ottoman and colonial bureaucratic roles, these men allied with the wealthiest tribal sheikhs and merchants to support the Hashemite regime. Tell (2013, 134) describes the evolution of a distributive alliance between this insular power elite and the East Bank steppe as the "Hashemite Compact." This narrow social pact extended entitlements (including public services) to East Bank Bedouins and *fallahin* (peasants) in exchange for political loyalty. In line with our theory's expectations, the historical dominance of the private sector and an explicit focus on targeted provision to the East Banker population produced restricted but effective social welfare services.

Independence and a Limited but Effective Public Sector

The exclusive elite coalition that developed during the Mandate remained in power after Jordan's independence in 1946. The military continued to expand public social welfare throughout the rural East Bank, with public health and education reaching most of the Transjordanian population by 1960 (Tell 2013).

The *Nakba* and resultant resettlement of Palestinian refugees on the East Bank constituted a serious challenge that might have overwhelmed Jordan's limited welfare capacities. After the declaration of Israeli statehood, the forced depopulation of Palestinian urban centers and villages resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. A large proportion of these refugees settled in the East Bank. The Jordanian state also formally annexed the Palestinian West Bank into its territory in 1950.

Although continuity of the Hashemite regime and narrow elite was by no means a certainty, the bedrock of the Hashemite compact held firm for several decades. Public sector welfare continued to target East Bank Jordanians. This singular focus was facilitated by a strong private sector and the support of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). UNRWA managed health and education provision for Palestinian refugees in Jordanian territory, meaning that the state did not have to allocate extra resources to provide for newcomers. Wealthy and upper-class Palestinians who relocated to Amman or other large towns were able to enroll their children in private schools or receive medical treatment at private hospitals. National statistics that show a dramatic increase in public schooling during the 1950s are inflated because they include West Bank public schools in their tallies. Our data illustrate the data between 1950 and 1965 are largely due the incorporation of Palestinian and UNRWA schools and hospitals into the Jordanian system. The visible drop in Jordan's national-level service indicators after 1967 is due to Israel's annexation of the West Bank during the Six-Day War (See Figure 33.1). These schools and services, no longer under Jordanian jurisdiction, were removed from the national accounts.

In sum, the trajectory of Jordanian welfare shows a long-term reliance on nonstate and private-sector service provision. The *Nakba* and the 1967 War shaped social welfare service provision in several ways. UNRWA's involvement in the education and health sectors alleviated some of the demographic pressure facing Jordan's welfare state. East and West Bank elites continued to rely on private schools and medical facilities, leaving the expansion of the government sector to cater to the core supporters of the Hashemite regime.

Morocco

Morocco provides an illustration of the "restrictive, ineffective" category. Private institutions were of limited importance in Morocco under colonialism, but, unlike Tunisia, access to public institutions for Moroccan subjects was limited throughout the protectorate period. The absence of a broadened political coalition at independence meant that there was little pressure or incentive to expand access to public facilities beyond the pace deemed acceptable to the palace. While access to public facilities nominally expanded at independence, glaring inequalities, particularly between urban areas and the countryside, characterize the provision of education and health services to the present day. As one observer noted in 2001, "60 percent of rural households have no access to paved roads; more than 87 percent have no access to health care; and 77 percent do not have electricity" (Maghraoui 2001, g. 77).

Colonial Education: A Stunted Public Sector

Morocco's first *Resident Generale*, Hubert Lyautey, who governed from 1912 to 1925, adopted a deliberately conservative approach to public education (Segalla 2009, chapter 1). While the sons and daughters of European citizens enjoyed access to primary and secondary schools that were generally equivalent to those in the metropole, access to basic education among subject populations was limited almost exclusively to urban boys, and access to secondary education was virtually nonexistent. The exception to this generalization was the *Ecoles des Fils Notables*, a small network of twelve secondary schools, designed to educate elite Moroccans who would go on to take key roles in the colonial government. Not only did these schools use an explicitly elitist criteria to determine eligibility for admission, but fees were charged to further dissuade the "wrong" kinds of students from being admitted (Knibiehler 1994).[21]

This conservative approach meant that while a network of public schools and hospitals was gradually developed, these institutions were overwhelmingly concentrated in the urban areas with the highest concentrations of Europeans. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Moroccan subject population was rural, public provision of basic health and schooling in these areas was extremely limited until independence (Bidwell 1973, 248–249).

Elite Continuity

While Morocco's main political party, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, was successful in agitating against the colonial government (Ashford 1961), it was effectively sidelined by the monarchy shortly after independence (Waterbury 1970). The marginalization of the Istiqlal ensured the dominance of a narrow coalition of elite families, known in Morocco collectively as the *makhzen* (Hermassi 1972, chapter 5), whose importance persists to the present day (Liddell 2010).[22] This narrow elite and the large state bureaucracy under its control meant that the elite coalition in Morocco was characterized by remarkable consistency post-independence, with a large number of families from the old imperial capital of Fez holding enormous influence, particularly in the first decades after independence.

Independence and a Limited Public Sector

The Moroccan government post-independence could avail itself of a relatively developed network of brick and mortar institutions, yet public infrastructure was generally limited to Morocco's largest cities. While spending levels were relatively high as a percentage of the annual budget, demand for public goods far exceeded the government's ability to provide them, especially in the countryside. The result was a stunted public system that failed to meet the needs of the inhabitants of Morocco's largest cities and towns, and marginalized entirely those born in rural areas for decades after independence (Wagner 1993).

Morocco's post-independence experience provides a mirror image to Tunisia's. Like Tunisia, Morocco lost the vast majority of its teachers and doctors at independence, as they returned to Europe. Unlike Tunisia, low levels of public education during the colonial period meant that it took significantly longer to train the white collar professionals who were essential for meeting the surging demand for social welfare services after independence. The combination of de jure expansion of access to social welfare services, surging population growth, and limited expansion of public facilities and staff resulted in a de facto decline in social welfare provision, as demand for public services far exceeded supply, even in urban areas.

Discussion

These cases provide descriptive evidence supporting our theory. The end of colonialism provided post-independence governments with the opportunity to expand the health and education sectors. Only in cases where the ruling social coalition was relatively inclusive (Egypt, Tunisia) do we see a broad expansion of public sector services;

in countries with narrow political elite coalitions (Jordan, Morocco) welfare provision was limited, particularly in the public sector. A second key insight is that, while the scope of government intervention in the decade after independence is "sticky," countries varied in their ability to provide and maintain public health and education services to match this scope, in part as a result of the public-private mix of inherited welfare infrastructure. In countries relying primarily on private schools prior to independence, but where elite coalitions broadened after independence, as in Egypt, the expansion of public institutions was dramatic but was almost totally overwhelmed three decades after independence, thanks to rapid population growth and rural to urban migration, which placed enormous strains on the public system.[23] While some of the burden was partially addressed by the expansion of the private sector, these countries have struggled to maintain standards and equity of access to services, given exponential growth in demand for these services. In other countries, like Tunisia, a broad social coalition and a large network of public infrastructure inherited at independence facilitated dramatic expansions at independence, while keeping pace with surging population growth and a huge increase in demand for public goods.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis seeks to understand why welfare provision varies across the MENA region. We argue that historical processes of state-building under colonial rule contributed to post-independence welfare expansion efforts in two ways. First, the breadth of the political elite in the post-independence period as well as colonial legacies of the public-private mix of health and education institutions impacted the ability and will of governments to implement broader welfare policies. Politically, the end of colonialism provided post-independence governments with the opportunity to expand or maintain colonial-era welfare policies.

Second, our findings suggest that colonial legacies appear to have differential effects when we disaggregate welfare policies by sector. The efficacy and expansiveness of healthcare provision remained "sticky" across the transition from the colonial to post-colonial eras, whereas education outcomes were more variable after independence. This variation in sectoral legacies clearly needs further exploration. One potential explanation, and an area of future research, could be that education expansion was a central component of ruling coalitions' political projects after independence. Education had mass appeal, was less costly to implement, and brought more citizens into regular contact with the state. Education also gave regimes the opportunity to promulgate new national narratives, and thus served the interests of ruling elites (Paglayan 2017).

This theory provides a schema for thinking about the political forces that shaped welfare promotion in the crucial decades after independence, but it leaves a number of key questions unaddressed. First among these is accounting for local variation in welfare promotion. A growing body of literature notes stark and persistent inequalities across the region (Abid, O'Donoghue and Sologon 2016; Belhaj Hassine 2012; Hassine 2015), particularly in terms of education (Krafft and Alawode 2016), even in "successful" cases of state-building like Tunisia (Trabelsi 2013). We test our theory's implications for this local variation in ongoing work that examines education outcomes in Jordan and Tunisia.

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NOTES

1 An important body of literature examines the relative decline of the region to Europe and traces this "reversal of fortune" to the Middle Ages (Blaydes and Chaney 2013; Kuran 2011; Kuru 2019; Rubin 2017). While this is an important argument for understanding differences in cross-regional variation in development, these arguments are less applicable to explaining variation within the MENA region, which is our focus.

2 The project focuses initially on the first several decades after most countries in the region achieved independence, when economic models and welfare regimes were institutionalized, and prior to the fiscal crises that most MENA countries faced in the 1980s and 1990s. We adopt this periodization because the politics of economic retrenchment are arguably distinct (Hacker 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2009; Pierson 2000), and because the response to these crises depended on the prior establishment of economic and social policies and institutions.

3 Major overviews of the economic history of the Middle East that cover the colonial period include: Batatu (1978); Beinin (2001); Hourani (1968); Inalcik (1978); İslamoğlu İnan (1987); Kazemi and Waterbury (1991); Keyder and Tabak (1991); Lewis (2014); Monroe (1981); Owen (1981, 1992); Owen and Pamuk (1999); Quataert (2005); Udovitch (1981).

4 An important but distinct literature examines the role of organized labor with respect to protests and demonstrations especially after 2010 (Beinin 2015; Berman 2020).

5 While the influence of the public sector has declined across the region in response to shifting economic fortunes, retrenchment, and the influence of the Washington Consensus, public institutions continue to play a huge role in the provision of social welfare across the region (Eibl 2020).

6 This reliance was not simply explained by the identity of the colonial power. As the anecdotes above suggest, the French relied much more heavily on private institutions in Syria and Lebanon than they did in North Africa.

7 See Saleh (2016) for an account of these institutions in Egypt post-independence.

[8] The same holds for missionary schools, which were often nominally regulated by the state but practically enjoyed significant leeway in their day-to-day operations and funding.

[9] Initial political settlements may create lock-in effects with longer-term consequences. Since the 1980s and 1990s, when many MENA first experienced fiscal crises, reform programs have faced serious opposition because popular constituencies for post-independence policies had become entrenched.

[10] Eibl's cross-national comparative study of MENA welfare spending is restricted to the postcolonial period. We build on his work by operationalizing the character of elite coalitions quantitatively and allow for historical contingencies by considering the nature of welfare sectors prior to independence.

[11] See Hammoudi (1997) for a classic account in this vein in Morocco.

[12] Includes all cabinets from 1956 to 1970.

[13] Includes all cabinets from 1955 to 1970.

[14] Includes all cabinets from 1952 to 1970. For United Arab Republic cabinets, only Egyptian ministers are considered.

[15] Includes all cabinets from 1946 to 1970. Foreign-born members of the colonial-era Hashemite elite who carry over into the post-independence period constitute the majority of ministers in most cabinets well into the 1950s and are coded as being from Amman. Post-independence Palestinian ministers who are not from this colonial elite are coded as being from Palestine.

[16] The MENAHDA website, which the co-authors are developing, will include the original scans of the statistical yearbooks, host data sets composed of transcribed MENAHDA data, highlight research that integrates these data, and will be publicly accessible.

[17] The post-independence period was a time of rapid population growth across all of our cases. However, our cases differed significantly both in terms of the overall size of the population and rates of growth. Egypt is by far the largest country among our cases. By 1960, Egypt's 26 million inhabitants were more than double Morocco's population, six times Tunisia's population, and more than twenty-six times Jordan's population. In order to compare across cases, we standardize our measures of expansiveness by the overall size of the population.

[18] While our focus in this chapter is on primary education, historians justifiably emphasize the important role played by higher education, like the famous Sadiqi College, which was established prior to the colonial period (Sraieb 1993). For a discussion of higher education post-independence see Micaud (1964, 150).

[19] The British did not completely exit from Egyptian affairs until 1956.

[20] The public schools served more students than did private schools, however: 9,874 students attended government-run schools, while 6,472 attended private schools.

[21] Lyautey vehemently opposed missionary schools (Bidwell 1973, 54–55), successfully limiting private religious schools to a handful of Catholic institutions in Morocco's largest cities.

[22] While general elections were held in 1963 and 1970, Morocco's monarch, Hassan II, dissolved parliament in 1965 and again in 1972, and it was not until the elections of 1984 that Morocco's elected representatives would actually complete their term in parliament, and not until 1996 that all members of Morocco's lower parliament would be directly elected (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1970, 1978; White 1997).

[23] An inability to meet demand for public goods is not just a challenge for populous countries like Egypt. Lebanon's population was comparable to Jordan's for most of the period under consideration, but lagged behind Jordan in terms of both health and education outcomes.

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CHAPTER 37

WELFARE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

FERDINAND EIBL

Social policies and welfare provision have been a cornerstone of government activity across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and have been the focus of a growing body of literature advanced by area specialists (e.g., Brooke 2017; Cammett and Issar 2010; Cammett 2014a; Loewe 2010).[1] Global social policy research, by contrast, has thus far largely bypassed the region. To cite just one example, there is no entry on the Middle East in the *Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* (Castles et al. 2010), while other regions, such as Asia and Latin America, are covered. This relative neglect is particularly surprising given the scope and fiscal weight of public welfare provision in the region. On average, social security systems cover six policy areas across the region, with the largest programs being health and old-age pensions, which puts the region roughly on par with Latin America and only behind one region, post-Communist Central Asia. And by committing about 8 percent of GDP annually to public welfare expenditures, the MENA region counts among the regional high spenders (see Figure 37.1).

One of the reasons why the global welfare state literature has often circumvented the region may be the tremendous diversity of welfare provision that underlies these regional averages in the Middle East, which defies easy categorizations in terms of regional trends and makes general statements on welfare provision in MENA analytically challenging. In a region that includes some of the world's most affluent (e.g., Qatar) and poorest (e.g., Sudan) countries, it is maybe unsurprising that social policies do not follow a uniform pattern. Indeed, just as Rauch and Kostyshak (2009) speak of "three Arab worlds" with regard to economic development, three distinct types of welfare states can be found across the region (Eibl 2020):[2] (1) *Broad and generous welfare states* are characterized by consistently high levels of social spending, providing welfare to a broad cross-section of the population. Arab Gulf States fall into this category of authoritarian welfare states, alongside Algeria, Tunisia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this category to make sense, generous spending needs to be considered in relation to income levels. In the mid-2000s, Tunisia and Kuwait spent about the same share



FIGURE 37.1: Areas of social security and social expenditures in regional comparison.
Note: CAC: Central Asia and Caucasus; EA: East Asia; LAC: Latin America and Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SA: South Asia; SEA: Southeast Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. Areas of social security refer to distinct risks covered by social security, such as health, old age, work accidents, etc.

Source: ILO 2014.

of goods and services on social welfare (15 percent of GDP), yet per capita spending in constant US dollars was more than double in Kuwait than in Tunisia ($2,900 and $1,400, respectively). Putting both countries in the same category only makes sense then if we understand generosity in relative, not in absolute, terms. (2) *Broad welfare states* provide social policies that are widely, often universally, accessible, but fail to underpin access with a sufficient stream of financial resources. Egypt and, to some extent, Syria fit into this pattern. (3) *Segmented and/or minimal welfare states* are characterized by public welfare provision targeted to core constituencies only, with historically low levels of social spending and an important role for private sector providers. Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon, among others, fall into this category. While there has been some convergence in welfare provision across the region, this division has on the whole been highly persistent.

This chapter seeks to give an overview of these different patterns of welfare provision and their political economy underpinnings. The next section fleshes out the three types empirically and highlights the importance of authoritarian coalitions and geostrategic context as the key drivers of social policies in MENA. The following section looks in greater detail at the effects of war and conflict on MENA welfare states and introduces the concept of "cheap social policies," using Egypt as an example. The conclusion sums up the main arguments and reflects on future research agendas.

WELFARE PROVISION IN MENA AND ITS COALITIONAL ORIGINS

Broadly speaking, the emergence of the three types of welfare states described above occurred from the early 1950s until the 1970s as a number of countries rapidly expanded social policies to a growing number of beneficiaries, while others were eager to restrict the scope of public policies to core constituencies of nascent regimes (e.g., military, bureaucracy), yielding more segmented welfare regimes.

Welfare expansion was underpinned by broad cross-class authoritarian coalitions, which were formed in the crucible of large-scale societal conflicts in postcolonial societies. With unions often being weak and fragmented, and left-wing political parties having limited mobilizational capacity compared to Asia or Latin America (Collier 1999; Slater and Smith 2016),[3] the virulent intra-elite conflicts that pitted rivaling elite actors against each other in the struggle for postcolonial political dominance were a major determinant for the formation of cross-class coalitions (Brownlee 2007; Waldner 1999). Whenever such episodes occurred at the critical juncture of regime formation, and when conflict among elites was not reconcilable or repressible (Eibl 2020), the formation of broader cross-class coalitions became viable strategies to ensure political victory over rivals. A good example is post-independence Tunisia, where Habib Bourguiba forged a lasting alliance with the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) to outcompete his rival within the Neo-Destour Party, Salah Ben Youssef. This alliance afforded the UGTT unprecedented influence over post-independence social policies (Eqbal 1967). Where ruling elites remained cohesive, such as in Jordan, bottom-up threats emanating from politically organized middle classes, often of the Arab nationalist ilk, were successfully fended off, with the result that welfare states remained fragmented. Where the repressive capacity of one elite group was dramatically higher than the other side, and the conflict could be ended by coercing elite rivals, such as in Morocco, coalitions remained small and welfare provision limited. Repression of such threats was also facilitated by cliency relationships with Western patrons (Yom 2016). Even in revolutionary moments, such as 1979 Iran, where bottom-up mass mobilization managed to unseat the incumbent Pahlavi regime, intra-elite conflicts significantly shaped the nature and scope of the post-revolutionary welfare state (Harris 2017). The effect of popular threats on welfare provision in the absence of intra-elite conflict was thus limited. Where bottom-up threats *did* have a lasting effect was the Arab Gulf States, where leftist subversive movements, such as the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, threatened conservative monarchical regimes in the Gulf in the context of an emerging Arab Cold War (Kerr 1965), pitting "progressive" against "reactionary" regimes in the region. These threats, albeit of varying intensity, provided a major incentive for the nascent oil exporters to share their resource wealth with their populations (Eibl and Hertog 2018; Bsheer 2018).

Communal cleavages that, whenever salient, worked against the building of coalitions based on social class were another major determinant of postcolonial political coalitions. The primary example here is certainly Lebanon, where post-independence sectarian leaders (*zuʿama*) enshrined their status as political patrons in the post-independence National Pact that divided power along sectarian lines. This seriously undermined state- and welfare state–building processes (Cammett 2014a). In Jordan, welfare provision predominantly targeted non-Palestinian East Bankers, who formed the backbone of Jordan's public sector and security apparatus (Baylouny 2010). Other cases where coalitions became lopsided in ethnic or sectarian terms were Baʿthist Iraq and Syria, where preferential distribution favoring the rulers' own communities became a prominent feature of public welfare provision (Balanche 2006; Blaydes 2018; Drysdale 1981). Intra-elite conflict, which had a generally broadening effect in the absence of salient communal cleavages, also tended to activate and reinforce communitarian rivalries in divided societies, which hampered but did not completely prevent the building of class-based coalitions. The mix of universalist welfare policies, coupled with elements of communal favoritism in Syria, represent the outcome of these conflicting incentives.

The formation of welfare states was importantly also intertwined with geopolitical dynamics affecting the region, which conditioned regimes' abilities for welfare provision. In the Gulf, the combination of relative peace and accelerating hydrocarbon exports, which by the time of the first oil boom had turned all Gulf States bar Yemen into rentier states (e.g., Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Hertog 2010), meant that fiscal constraints were not a major issue. In fact, resource abundance abetted the emergence of a specific Gulf variety of welfare states, in which welfare provision not only comprises generous social policies in traditional fields, such as health and education, but also the employment of the vast majority of the national labor force in the public sector. And while large public sectors have been described as a key feature of an Arab variety of capitalism (Hertog 2020), the extent of public employment sets these countries apart from other (welfare) states in the region. By contrast, non-Gulf regimes faced important budgetary trade-offs, and, in the absence of resource endowments, only those unaffected by violent interstate conflict—most notably the Arab-Israeli conflict—had the ability to provide welfare broadly *and* generously. For cross-class regimes at the epicenter of the conflict (e.g., Egypt, Syria), the ambition to build authoritarian welfare states was severely hampered as a result, yielding underfunded policies with low barriers to access. War and resource endowments thus represented the key conditioning variables for welfare state development in the Middle East. Having adumbrated the coalitional origins of MENA welfare states, I will now present trends in education, health, and social protection in greater detail.

Education

Education began to expand significantly across the region in the 1950s as nascent regimes (1) made education compulsory and tore down existing barriers to entry in primary, secondary, and, later, tertiary education; (2) invested in educational infrastructure in a hitherto unprecedented scale; and (3) either abolished or disempowered religious institutions as main providers of education. That educational attainment did not improve as rapidly in any other world region as it did in the Middle East is testimony to the scope of this process. Structurally, educational systems were built along a continental European model with a high level of tracking into academic and vocational streams at the secondary level. That said, differences between the three types of welfare states are visible regarding both the speed and the scope of educational expansion.

In Tunisia, for example, the flagship educational reform under Minister of Education Mahmoud Messadi virtually achieved universal primary enrolment in 1968, compared to 35 percent enrolment on the eve of independence. Algeria—which until the nationalization of oil in 1971 did not receive significant oil rents—tripled educational expenditures to nearly 30 percent of the budget in the first decade after independence in 1963, achieving universal primary enrolment in 1978. The share of educational spending similarly doubled in post-revolutionary Iran relative to Pahlavi-era levels, reaching a fifth of the budget. The post-1979 regime made a particular effort to bring education to the countryside, which had been hitherto neglected (Harris 2017; Messkoub 2006). As for the Gulf States, the expansion of education unfolded even more rapidly, since it occurred at primary and secondary levels at the same time. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, secondary enrolment was practically nonexistent in 1967 (0.33 percent), but ten years later it stood at 31 percent.

Broad (yet not generous) welfare states, such as Egypt and Syria, saw their educational ambitions seriously hampered by successive military conflicts with Israel, which tended to crowd out welfare spending (see next section). Primary enrolment, for instance, stagnated in Egypt between 1960 and 1970 and only increased by about 10 percent in Syria. Segmented-minimal welfare states, such as Morocco, Jordan, or Pahlavi Iran, exhibited a noticeable bias in their educational policies toward secondary and tertiary education, which played into the hands of key constituencies from which the bureaucratic and military elites were recruited, while undermining the large-scale expansion that occurred in authoritarian welfare states (Eilers 1978). By the mid-1970s, Morocco's primary enrolment barely exceeded 50 percent. Jordan, in turn, managed to outsource the education of Palestinian refugees to UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), sparing precious fiscal resources. And Lebanon historically developed an educational system with a significant share of private institutions, which reflects sectarian divides and affords political elites sources of patronage (Cammett 2011; Cammett 2014b).

Trends toward a limited convergence of educational policies have been observable since the mid-1970s, driven by fiscal difficulties in educational high spenders, a global trend to universalize secondary education, and a limited peace dividend in the wake of the Middle East peace process. The latter was particularly significant in Jordan, where a reduction in defense spending freed up more money for education. In Egypt, by contrast, any potential peace dividend was swallowed up by the mounting debt service, which at its height consumed about a quarter of public spending (Wahid 2009). Legacies of historical welfare state divergence remain clearly visible, though, in particular with regard to the role of private education, which remains either banned or seriously restricted in authoritarian welfare states outside the Gulf, whereas private tertiary institutions capture 17 and 25 percent of the student population in Egypt and Jordan, respectively (Kohstall 2012; World Bank 2008). In the Gulf, the implantation of private universities is not driven by a waning commitment to public education, but rather by expatriate demand and brand-seeking of aspiring Gulf citizens.

Legacies of welfare state development are also noticeable when it comes to educational inequalities. While data are only available for a limited number of countries, for children from the most vulnerable households, the probability of not entering school at all were 2.5 percent in Tunisia, 6 percent in Jordan, and 21 percent in Egypt (Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, and Hendy 2014).[4] Finally, across countries, educational systems suffer from a serious problem of mismatching between the skills taught and the demands of the labor market, as public education was historically geared toward recruiting future civil servants, and vocational degrees do not provide certified skills with a strong signaling effect on the job market (World Bank 2013).

Health

Postcolonial healthcare systems have differed significantly with regard to their accessibility, funding, and institutional structure. Regarding the latter, a number of countries in the region opted for a mixed healthcare system, combining a tax-funded public healthcare sector with an insurance-based system granting access to both public and, later, private facilities. This is the case in, among other countries, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Such mixed systems resulted from the requirement of having to take over insurance systems previously established for colonial civil servants while trying to expand access to healthcare to the wider population. Other countries, such as Syria or the oil-rich Gulf States, established purely tax-based healthcare systems. A third group of generally segmented-minimal welfare states built uniquely insurance-based systems, frequently with a significant role for private sector providers, as in the case of Lebanon (Cammett 2014a).

Regarding accessibility, it is clear that regimes based on cross-class coalitions sought to provide healthcare universally. Tunisia, for example, created health insurance funds for the public and private sectors—which were merged in 2004—while simultaneously granting uninsured patients virtually free access to healthcare through the publicly funded healthcare system (Camau, Zaïem, and Bahri 1990). In post-revolutionary Iran, the regime made a concerted effort to universalize healthcare by expanding the public health insurance scheme to the entire population in 1994 (Messkoub 2006). This had been preceded by significant hikes in health spending that particularly sought to enhance provision in rural areas (Harris 2010).

Similar efforts were visible in Egypt and Syria, which were, however, seriously undermined by the regimes' conflicting commitments to welfare and warfare. Egypt established a tax-financed pillar of its public healthcare system with free-of-charge access, yet due to notorious underfunding these facilities tend to be avoided even by the lowest income groups, as quality is considered wanting. Out-of-pocket expenditures of 72 percent are a negative side effect of this situation (World Bank 2015). Better-equipped facilities exist but cater uniquely to those covered by public health insurance. Throughout the 2000s, the Mubarak regime sought to universalize public health insurance but eventually balked at the prospect of having to subsidize the premiums of up to 40 percent of Egypt's population.[5] In Syria, the universalization of public healthcare occurred from the 1960s by gradually expanding access to public health cards, which granted free access to healthcare based on a means test. This method was later abandoned in favor of the introduction of a fully free-of-charge national health service. This process was lengthy and haphazard, though, leaving up to a third of Syria's population completely uncovered for a long period of time (Drysdale 1981).

Segmented-minimal welfare states made the least effort to expand healthcare coverage. A good example is Morocco, where public health insurance was for a long time limited to urban, white-collar middle classes in the public sector. Granted, to countervail negative distributive effects, the lowest income brackets have had, in theory, access to subsidized healthcare, subject to a means test. In reality, many poor Moroccans have been unable to afford even the reduced service charges (Loewe 2010). To address the lack of coverage, Morocco adopted a system of subsidized healthcare provision for low-income groups in 2009 (*régime d'assistance médicale*, or RAMED), which unfortunately still leaves about a third of the population uncovered. Jordan's healthcare system is truly fragmented, providing high-quality care to public sector workers and members of the armed forces—historical East Banker constituencies—while the rest of the population has had to pay a subsidized fee to access public healthcare (Knowles 2005). In Lebanon, healthcare provision has been predominantly private and represents a major playground for patronage politics along sectarian lines (Cammett and Şaşmaz 2017).

Social Protection

Social protection in MENA has consisted of two main pillars: (1) social security insurance in areas such as old age, maternity, and disability, funded through payroll taxes and, in some countries, voluntary contributions of self-employed; and (2) noncontributory social assistance, with the subsidization of basic commodities and energy being the dominant type of transfer (World Bank 2012). While differences across welfare state types are less pronounced in this area, they are visible nonetheless.

This is particularly the case in the area of social security, where the pattern of coverage across broad and generous, broad, and segmented-minimal welfare states has followed a very similar pattern as health insurance. On the eve of the Arab Spring, pension coverage outside the Gulf, for example, stood at 66–80 percent of the workforce in Tunisia, Algeria, and Iran; 35–55 percent in Egypt and Syria; and 22–50 percent in Morocco and Jordan (Eibl 2020). Jordan's relatively high level of coverage is concentrated among the East Banker population, which has historically benefited from employment in the public sector. While the rapid increase of informal employment after the Arab Spring (e.g., Gallien 2017) has leveled these differences to some extent, the social security system remains generally more accessible in historical cross-class regimes. Broad and generous welfare states, in particular, have made consistent efforts to enlarge their social security scheme to hitherto excluded segments of the population, such as the self-employed or agricultural workers (e.g., Chaabane 2002). These efforts notwithstanding, social security systems across the entire region have reinforced relatively sharp boundaries between labor market insiders and outsiders in the formal and informal sectors, while noncontributory social safety nets, such as cash grants known from the Latin American cases, are underdeveloped (World Bank 2012).

The only major noncontributory social assistance schemes are food and energy subsidies, which have been used to varying degrees by all countries in the region. With subsidies absorbing considerable fiscal resources and exposing MENA countries to adverse shocks as a result of fluctuating commodity prices—all MENA countries are net food importers—governments across the region have been under pressure by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to reduce subsidy spending for some time (IMF 2014). Reforms have had variable success, however, and been accompanied by backlashes from urban middle classes, which constitute the major beneficiaries of distributionally regressive subsidies (Sadiki 2000). As of 2019, energy subsidies for petrol have only been fully faded out in Morocco. Jordan and Egypt have established a managed price adjustment system, which is aligned to the world market price but subject to discretionary decisions. Tunisia is considering the introduction of similar systems. Liquefied petroleum gas, which is particularly important for lower-income households, remains widely subsidized, similar to basic commodities such as bread, sugar, or milk. In the Gulf countries, where excessive subsidies have led to widespread overconsumption by households, the drop of the oil price since 2014 has equally necessitated a reduction of subsidies (Boersma and Griffiths 2019).

WAR AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT

The analytical framework in this chapter emphasizes war-making and war preparation, as well as resource endowments, as crucial conditional variables of welfare state development. This section corroborates this claim by presenting evidence on the crowding-out effect of defense spending on welfare expenditures in MENA. Using the case of Egypt, I also highlight how regimes with a strong incentive but a lack of ability to distribute welfare have used what I call "cheap social policies" to square the circle.

MENA's "Butter or Guns" Trade-Off

Although the metaphor of a "butter versus guns" trade-off has intuitive appeal, empirical findings at the global level have actually been very mixed (Gupta et al. 2004; Hess and Mullan 1988; Narizny 2003; Rasler and Thompson 1985). Whitten and Williams (2011, p. 117) even claim that "governments do not face a trade-off between 'butter' or 'guns.'" Similar to European patterns (Tilly 1985), war-making has generally increased fiscal capacity in the Global South (Thies 2004), although this association seems absent in the MENA region (Lu and Thies 2012). That said, extant research (Cammett et al. 2015; see also Richards and Waterbury 2008, p. 350) has found little systematic evidence for a negative effect of defense spending on welfare.

To test the empirical association between war and welfare provision, I present the results of a fixed-effects, dynamic panel regression of defense expenditures on welfare expenditures, drawing on the Global State Revenues and Expenditures data set (Lucas and Richter 2016), supplemented with data from the IMF's *Government Financial Statistics* (IMF 2015a), as well as statistical yearbooks. Included countries all have long and consistent time-series data available between 1960 (or the earliest year after independence) and 2005. Welfare expenditures are measured as a percentage of the budget, although findings are substantively identical with other measures. The model includes standard controls from the welfare state literature, such as GDP per capita, trade, and the dependency ratio. The regression also includes a measure of resource rents per capita taken from the Ross (2019) data set. To test the countervailing effect of resources, this variable is interacted in a second model with defense expenditures. I refer the reader to Eibl (2020, chap. 4) for further details and regression tables, and instead would like to zoom in here on the main findings shown below.

Figures 37.2 and 37.3 display the simulated predicted effects of, respectively, a short-term and a permanent increase in defense spending. The short-term hike represents a change from the mean to the maximal value of defense spending found in the data (17.8 and 57.4 percent, respectively). Permanent changes are based on a scenario where defense remains at the maximum value indefinitely. Although these values seem drastic, they have historically been observed in times of war and in situations of severe external



FIGURE 37.2: Short-term defense shocks on welfare spending.

Note: Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence interval. Year refers to the number of years after the increase in defense spending. The left-hand axis indicate percentages.

Source: IMF 2015a; Lucas and Richter 2016; and various statistical yearbooks.



FIGURE 37.3: Long-term defense shocks on welfare spending.
Note: Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence interval. Year refers to the number of years after the increase in defense spending. The left-hand axis indicate percentages.

Source: IMF 2015a; Lucas and Richter 2016; and various statistical yearbooks.

threats without ongoing hostilities (e.g., Jordan in the early 1960s). The scenarios for the interaction models are identical, with the addition that the effect is shown for resource-poor and resource-abundant countries. The graphs yield two important take-away messages. First, there has been a significant trade-off between welfare and warfare in MENA. Second, large resource endowments allow regimes to eschew, or at least alleviate, the dilemma between "butter or guns" by allowing governments to shield social welfare from the negative impact of external conflict. While social spending eventually declines in both resource-rich and resource-poor countries in our, arguably, rather extreme scenario, social spending cuts are much more pronounced in resource-poor countries. Given that the MENA region to date has one of the highest levels of defense spending in the world, these findings suggest that war-making and war preparation continue to significantly undermine welfare provision across the region.

Cheap Social Policies

Regimes with the incentives but, due to external threats, lacking capacity to distribute welfare face a particular dilemma regarding how to honor coalitional commitments while avoiding fiscal collapse. Post-1952 Egypt under Nasser is a good example of such as regime. Strong intra-elite conflict within the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which came to a head in the wake of President Mohamed Naguib's ouster in 1954, prompted Gamal Abdel Nasser to reach out to working and middle-class constituencies to outcompete his rival (for a similar argument in the context of party regimes, see Brownlee 2007). In the words of Beattie (1994, p. 98), the events of 1954 "crystallized Nasser's thoughts regarding real and prospective sources of regime support." The events of 1954 thus stood at the origin of Egypt's broad-based regime coalition.

As the nascent regime soon came to realize, though, the ambition for large-scale welfare distribution needed to be reconciled with ensuring survival in the face of strong external threats. The Arab-Israeli conflict, and foreign policy more generally, did not feature prominently among the Free Officers' concerns when they seized power in 1952. In fact, wanting neither peace nor war, the Free Officers exhibited a certain ambivalence vis-à-vis Israel (Barnett 1992, 84). A key indicator of this low level of threat perception was the "heavy cuts in expenditure on defence" (IMF 1954, p. 15) carried out between 1952 and 1954. The Gaza raid of February 1955 carried out by Israel and the Suez War in late 1956 fundamentally changed the regime's risk perception, however, and shifted its spending commitments from socioeconomic development to defense. Defense expenditures increased by 116 percent between 1955 and 1960 in absolute terms, whereas social expenditure only rose by 39 percent in the same period. Putting these outlays into broader perspective, defense expenditures consumed yearly about two-thirds of what was spent in the first five-year plan altogether (Al-Jiritli 1974, p. 42). With Egypt lacking a natural resource endowment, social policies thus had to compete, from the beginning, with security-related expenditures, which greatly undermined the regime's distributive capacity.

Within this particular context of strong incentives to distribute, but little fiscal capacity to do so, Egypt resorted to what I have called "cheap social policies" (Eibl 2020), comprising at least one of the following features: (1) a heavy reliance on "free" social policies distributing rent-generating statutory rights to lower and middle classes; (2) the systematic use of windfalls to finance social expenditures; and (3) devising social policies that alleviate the regime's shortage of resources. In the following section, I will focus in particular on the latter feature and demonstrate how it has shaped Egyptian social policies.

Designing social policies to alleviate the shortage of resources arguably puts the logic of distributive social policies on its head, as social policies devised in such a way become a mechanism of resource generation instead of resource distribution. Given conditions of resource scarcity and the need to cater to a large support base, these social policies become extremely advantageous, since they enable the generation of additional revenue while bolstering domestic legitimacy. A main area where revenue-generating social policies has been implemented is social insurance. To illustrate the general logic behind revenue-generating cheap social policies, I rely on the correspondence between the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs and the Council of Ministers in the preparation of social security legislation in the early 1950s, which established the cornerstone of Egypt's current social security system.

When presenting the draft law to the Council of Ministers in November 1952, the minister of finance pointed to the "copious resources" that the funds would make available to the government, and the extent to which this would support the national economy (Egyptian National Archives 1953b). In fact, the explanatory note contains no reference to any social motives whatsoever. In a second note, dating from June 1953, the Ministry of Finance and Economics urged the Council of Ministers to extend social insurance to all new state employees (Egyptian National Archives 1953a). Underlining the "present conditions of austerity," the minister highlighted the "vast funding opportunities" (Egyptian National Archives 1953a) that would become available if social insurance were to be extended. In turn, this would help the government finance its development projects.

The same arguments for social legislation appear again in the context of the 1955 law, which extended social insurance to the private sector and thus considerably broadened its coverage. The archival notes strongly suggest that economic factors played a major role in the government's motivation to pass the law (Egyptian National Archives 1955). Particularly insightful is an explanatory note from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Council of Ministers from July 1955, laying out two key motives behind the draft law. First, social insurance was meant to "calm down" workers and to make them more productive, so social considerations, albeit in a rather paternalistic sense, did indeed motivate the adoption of the 1955 law. Second, and importantly, the generation of resources was again a primary argument presented in favor of the law: "Given the enormous amount of money that the social insurance system will accumulate after a while, the social insurance fund will become a powerful source of money that the government can rely on to finance social reforms and economic development projects" (Egyptian

National Archives 1955). Taken together, both notes demonstrate that the idea of implementing social policies to fund social policies was not something the regime "discovered" along the way. On the contrary, the generation of resources was a central motivation behind the social insurance legislation from the outset.

Ample borrowing from Egypt's social insurance funds by the state since 1952 demonstrates the importance of social policies as an income-generating mechanism. At the height of war preparation in 1971–1972, the government covered over two-thirds of all expenditures from the social security fund. The average between 1960 and 1976 was 42 percent. Borrowing continued through the 1980s and 1990s, when state-owned enterprises started to use the social insurance funds to access cheap loans. Since 1993, surpluses from the work accident insurance have been used to cover resulting deficits in Egypt's health insurance fund. Crucially, until the late 1990s, borrowing occurred at interest rates consistently below inflation, which effectively amounted to an expropriation of savings.

While it may seem that revenue-generating social policies are specific only to the period of welfare state formation in Egypt, there is evidence to suggest that cheap social policies of this nature matter until the present period—and could well be at play in other countries in the region. Specifically, by increasing domestic saving and curbing consumption, Egyptian governments have systematically used coverage extensions of the social security scheme to counterbalance current account problems. As Figure 37.4 demonstrates (for further details on the underlying regression model, see Eibl 2020, pp. 238–234), coverage extensions of the Egypt's social security system have been systematically associated with falling foreign currency reserves. The figure highlights the growing likelihood of coverage extension as reserves start to shrink, which is indicated by the increasing slope of the graph left of the zero line. It is interesting to note that the pursued extension of Egypt's health insurance by President Sisi occurs in a similar context.

Conversely, coverage extensions of social security that are not revenue-generating, at least in the short term, have been very difficult to implement. The primary example in this context is the failed introduction of a universal health insurance scheme under Mubarak in the late 2000s. As many lower-income groups would have been unable to pay their premiums, the Egyptian state would have had to shoulder an additional cost of at least 17 billion EGP, nearly twice the size of the country's health budget of 10 billion EGP in the late Mubarak period. According to former Health Minister Tag Eddin, "money was the key issue in the failure of the health insurance reform. [. . .] Our budget was never enough and our spending lower than needed. [. . .] In the drafting of the budget, the Ministry of Finance would only ever give us the 'leftovers'" (personal interview, Cairo 2013). Given these historical patterns, and the fact that the structural constraints weighing on President Sisi are essentially the same as those of his predecessors, the decision to introduce universal health insurance in 2018 should be viewed with caution. The envisaged implementation period of fifteen years, governorate by governorate, is extremely long, allowing for policy slippage and backtracking along the way.



FIGURE 37.4: Balance of payments crises and social security extension.
Note: Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence interval.

Source: IMF 2015b; own data on extensions.

In sum, the concept of cheap social policies offers a theoretical mechanism to understand how interstate war and external threats have shaped social policies in the Middle East and other regimes where the fiscal base for redistributive taxation cannot be easily extended due to institutional constraints and the durable "conscription of wealth" (Scheve and Stasavage 2010) has remained elusive. The concept could also be easily extended to take into account other forms of "cheap" social policies. For example, forbearance or non-enforcement (Holland 2017) in the context of social policies could be another mechanism through which social policies, albeit meaningful and beneficial for target groups, do not aggravate the fiscal burden on the state budget.

CONCLUSION

Since the late 1950s, social policies and welfare distribution have been major areas of government activity across the MENA region. Shaped by foundational political struggles at the moment of regime formation and conditioned by geopolitical context, MENA welfare states have appeared in three distinct forms: (1) broad and generous welfare states have been characterized by a high level of social expenditures and predominantly universal, open-access social policies (countries such as Tunisia or the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries fall into this category); (2) broad welfare states are similar in their ambition to guarantee, as much as possible, universal access but have been hampered in their scope by geopolitical challenges, mostly stemming from external threats undermining generous social outlays—this has led, as the example of Egypt above illustrates, to the emergence of "cheap social policies"; (iii) segmented and/or minimalist welfare states have not only spent much less on social welfare, but also put in place important barriers of access to social policies, limiting their scope to key political constituencies of the regime. They are generally characterized by a much greater importance of private sector providers.

While the political economy work on welfare provision in the MENA region has made great strides in recent years (e.g., Brooke 2017; Cammett and Issar 2010; Cammett 2014a; Loewe 2010), many important questions remain unsolved. First, the political economy of social policy reform has lagged behind the study of economic reforms in MENA. Key constituencies of reform, their dynamics of mobilization, and how they affect reform processes—such as the above-mentioned health insurance reform in Egypt—have so far been understudied. Second, more systematic attention should be given to the link between electoral politics—in autocratic and democratic contexts—and social policies. While important work has been done in the context of Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran (Brooke 2019; Cammett and Issar 2010; Harris 2017), we know very little about the electoral cycle of social policymaking in other parts of the region. Third, data related to social policies (e.g., expenditures, coverage) should be gathered more systematically across the region, including in the Gulf countries, where budgetary and labor market data are more spotty. Only by tracing spending patterns back to critical junctures can we better understand the political origins—and the likely future trajectory—of welfare states in the Middle East and North Africa.

NOTES

1. For the purpose of this analysis, MENA includes all Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa as defined by the World Bank. As a result, Turkey is not included in this analysis. See Eder (2010) and Buğra and Keyder (2006) for a comparative perspective on Turkey. To simplify diction, I use the terms "Middle East" and "Middle East and North Africa" interchangeably.
2. This typology is admittedly highly state-centric and analytically less ambitious than alternative typologies (e.g., Wood and Gough 2006), which are systematically anchored in a normative framework. My main aim is to evaluate the role of the state in providing welfare, rather than looking at the whole policy mix of private and public welfare provision. Welfare provision by nonstate actors is analyzed elsewhere in this volume.
3. The notable exception here is the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) (Bellin 2002; Hartshorn 2019).
4. The figures are based on the averages between boys and girls.
5. This project was resumed under President Sisi and a gradual expansion of the health insurance system to the entire population has in principle been agreed upon. That said, the roll-out period (into the 2030s) means that full implementation of the reform remains uncertain.

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CHAPTER 38

ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

STEVEN THOMAS BROOKE

MANY governments in the Islamic world struggle to extend social protections across their populations. Alongside these faltering public systems, a variety of nonstate providers, including Islamist organizations, have assumed a larger and larger role in furnishing schooling, healthcare, unemployment assistance, and financial aid to millions of people each year. Purely in terms its influence on the lived daily experience of ordinary people, Islamist groups' social service activism constitutes an important field for research. At the same time, recent scholarship has built an empirically rich and theoretically specified account of how this provision influences, and is influenced by, politics. This chapter focuses on this work, with an eye toward highlighting research advances for the field of comparative politics more broadly.

This chapter proceeds as follows: I first conceptualize Islamist social service provision, focusing on identifying precisely what distinguishes it from other types of nonstate provision, including by non-Islamist, and nonreligious, actors. The next section situates Islamist social service provision as an outcome to be explained: given the purported effectiveness of this provision in generating support for provider organizations, and the dominant status of Islamist groups as members of the political opposition, why has it flourished in regimes that devote extensive efforts to suppressing their opponents? Cross-national variation in the existence of these networks suggests the importance of structural factors, specifically the reaction of authoritarian regimes to economic crises. The final section probes the potential of Islamist social service provision to explain political mobilization. In contrast to classic, exchange-based theories of political support or ideological transformation, a major finding is that social service provision influences how recipients perceive the values of the provider organization. While this finding provides new insight into voting behavior in the Islamic world, it also requires better theorizing of the role of religion as a potential "recipient side" factor. Returning to the opening theme of the chapter, this fact in particular seems to distinguish Islamist social service provision from other types.

Islamist Social Service Provision

Among the multitude of social service providers are Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. As "Islamists," these actors seek not only to make Islam the basis of public and private life, but also to use the coercive power of the state—through legislation and enforcement—to do so. This chapter focuses largely on nonviolent Islamists, specifically those who have chosen to pursue this power through peaceful participation in electoral politics (although at times violent Islamist groups, as well as Islamic organizations in general, will be used to illustrate important comparisons). As discussed at greater length below, the fact that Islamist organizations often find themselves expressly at odds with ruling regimes marks out an important additional characteristic of this phenomenon.

There is a general assumption that Islamist groups' religious identity creates a special category of nonstate providers. In one popular argument, Islamist groups benefit from a dense and hierarchical organizational structure, which scholars often connect to their particular interpretation of Islam (al-Anani 2016; Kandil 2014). To the extent that Islamist groups can count on ideologically driven cadres to do the work of social service provision, it confers on these groups a notable advantage over their competitors in the realm of social service provision by reducing costs (Bano 2009; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014). Hamayotsu describes the development of the Islamist PKS in Indonesia, stating, "Given limitations on financial resources and on access to state bureaucracies and privileges, PKS relies heavily on cadres' service for extensive and effective operation of its welfare programs" (2015, 985). If Islamist parties draw on this reservoir of cheap organizational support, that may help account for the "Islamist Advantage" over non-Islamist providers (Cammett and Jones Luong 2014).

The evidence that this distinctly advantages Islamist parties is mixed, however. In other contexts, ethnic parties have similarly been able to convert the labor of movement activists into political gains (Anria 2018; Van Cott 2005). Other religious—but not Islamic—organizations have also shown the ability to capitalize on the ideological devotion of adherents to reduce the costs of social service provision (Thachil 2014a). And, of course, there seems little reason why leftist groups could not also draw on the "free labor" of an ideologically committed cadre just as Islamist groups can.

Returning to the specific case of Islamists further suggests that the advantage might not necessarily flow through infrastructure or organization. Other Islamist providers, such as the Salafi party Hizb al-Nour, managed to provide extensive social services *without* a Muslim Brotherhood–style formal organization. Even in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group's "brick and mortar" medical networks (Cammett and Issar 2010) did not run on free activist labor. Not only was every employee paid a competitive salary, but their attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood ranged from sympathetic to indifferent, and the movement went to great lengths to separate itself from the party (Brooke 2019). This brief examination suggests that doctrinal factors alone do not seem sufficient to explain Islamist proficiency, at least to the extent that they manifest in a particular type of organizational structure.

A second factor that may mark Islamist provision as a unique phenomenon is the extensive variation in type, style, and target of their social services. This is even the case within the same organization. For example, two authors describe how the Muslim Brotherhood operated "a massive, decentralized, society-wide network of clinics and hospitals, Islamic banks . . . textile factories, food banks, youth clubs, social welfare agencies, unemployment services, discount grocery stores, legal aid agencies, and much more" (Davis and Robinson 2012, 48). Empirically, however, much of the research on this provision is limited to health and, to a lesser extent, education (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007; Brooke 2017a, 2017b, 2019; Cammett 2011, 2014; Cammett and Issar 2010; Challand 2008; Clark 2004; Hefner 2008; Morsy 1988; Sciortino, Ridarineni, and Marjadi 2010). This web of interlinked, cradle-to-grave services—many of which have been operational for decades—seems to lack parallel in other providers.

This extensive array of services suggests the analytical utility of disaggregating the broader category of "nonstate services." As a starting point, Tugal (2013, 150) identifies a helpful four-part typology based on the method of delivery: (1) provision through quasi-independent organizations, (2) syndicates (effectively white-collar unions), (3) direct provision by individuals, and (4) through infiltration of independent organizations. One could plausibly add here a fifth dimension, particularly in weaker states, based around Islamists' ability to access state resources and redirect them toward their constituents (Cammett 2014). While this fifth approach resembles classic brokerage more than "nonstate" provision, to the extent that Islamists engage in "credit claiming" for state resources that they have redirected, it may approximate the effects of nonstate provision (Bueno 2018). For example, Masoud (2014, 90–92) notes how Muslim Brotherhood candidates seamlessly integrated into their list of campaign achievements the services for neighborhood residents that they successfully extracted from the state. And as Jenny White identified when studying the local service provision networks of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), "whether or not the activists provided services in the name of the party, it was known that they were party members and credit for their neighborly assistance was informally attributed to the party" (2012, 61). Other researchers have similarly noted the AKP's adeptness at using public goods to grow their own constituencies (Aytaç 2014; Marschall, Aydogan, and Bulut 2016).

An explanation for this variation potentially lies in the institutional context, and in particular in a given regime's ability to monitor and control these providers (Wiktorowicz 2000; Tadros 2011). Mubarak-era Egypt retained a significant level of control over the civic and social sectors, which meant that operating social services on an informal or below-the-radar capacity was not sustainable, and in fact was actively dangerous. Instead, the safer choice was to operate legally, generally by forming official service-providing NGOs that kept obvious partisan activism at arm's length. As

Hamid puts it, Islamists in Egypt made a calculation that "legal status, while offering no guarantees, at least offers some protection" (2014, 50). The Jamaʿat-i Islami in Pakistan seemingly made a similar judgement. As one member told Masooda Bano, formal separation granted the social activism some protection: "Whenever the military came into power, it put restrictions on our political work; this also restricted our welfare work. That is why we thought it is best to make our welfare wings completely separate" (2009, 90). This reinforces the importance of institutional context, and particularly regime-level relationships and constraints on how these organizations operate (Cammett and MacLean 2014).[1]

In addition to the institutional context, scholars also highlight how local-level dynamics of competition with other providers, the emergence of specific opportunity structures, and particular availability of resources influence the style and type of provision. For example, in a case study of the Indonesian Islamic movement Muhammadiyah, Mohamed Fuad (2002, 140–141) shows how the precise form the movement's social service provision takes is determined by opportunity, political dynamics, inter- and intra-religious rivalries, and an assessment of existing services. Similarly, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Islamist parties decide what social service to provide (and how to provide it) "mainly in response to the demands of the context" (Bano 2009, 25). Empirically assessing why certain types of services are delivered in certain ways will require systematically disaggregating to the local level of Islamist politics, which has rarely been systematically studied (Baker, et al. 2017). But doing so will likely help connect national-level variables such as economic crisis—see below—to subnational patterns of public goods provision and political competition. For example, based on a spatial analysis of mosque activism and infrastructure density across greater Cairo in the interwar period, Neil Ketchley and Steven Brooke (2018) find that activists affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood were more likely to appear in mosques in areas distal to government healthcare services. They then find that the Brotherhood went on to establish formal (physical) medical services in those areas.

While the above points reveal some ways that Islamist social service provision is a distinct type of nonstate activism, there are also important tie-ins to broader research agendas in comparative politics. For example, disaggregating Islamist social service provision by type is potentially useful in light of the recent interest in relaxing the "single good" assumptions of clientelism. Albertus (2012), for example, frames a provider's choice between durable goods (such as land transfers) and more contingent types of aid. He finds that providers target staunch supporters with contingent aid, while swing supporters are furnished with more permanent transfers. Dynamics related to the Muslim Brotherhood's provision of healthcare in Egypt suggest the reverse: the group disproportionately sited "brick and mortar" facilities (Cammett and Issar 2010) in neighborhoods where their middle-class core was predominant, while using intermittent "medical caravans" to extend provision to poorer voters living in swing districts (Brooke 2019). As this example implies, different types of social services—even coming from the same organization—may generate different types of "linkages" between the provider organization and the recipient (Kitschelt 2000), a point to which the final section of this chapter returns.

Institutional Origins of Islamist Social Service Provision

Islamist groups provide an extensive array of services that tangibly connect them to millions of citizens. Simultaneously, in many cases, Islamist groups are political opponents of extant authoritarian regimes. This frames an important research question: Why do regimes that restrict the political space allow opposition movements to engage in activism that reaches millions of citizens per year? Under what conditions does Islamist social service provision emerge?

Prior researchers have outlined a type of "democratic bargain" that emerges in times of economic stress, where political liberalization compensates citizens for economic hardship (Brumberg 1992). It is also the case that these economic cuts do not always occur evenly. For example, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008, 432) note how social spending is differentially exposed to political and economic pressures, with social security spending being fairly insulated while the health and education sectors are more exposed. These moments of state retrenchment and consequent reshuffling of bases of support appear to open the space for Islamists to expand social service networks, despite regimes that remain wary of their operations.

Egypt exemplifies this dynamic. Amid a dangerous series of economic reforms, highlighted by the eruption of nationwide "Bread Riots" in 1977, Anwar el-Sadat began to encourage nonstate actors to expand their social service operations, including both Christian and Muslim providers. The Muslim Brotherhood also benefitted from this policy, seizing on the opportunity to establish what would become their largest and oldest social service institution, the Islamic Medical Association. While this activism posed a risk to el-Sadat, such a broad-based expansion of nonstate providers did help to ease some of the social consequences of economic reform, and thus reduced the immediate risk of further regime-threatening uprisings (Brooke 2019).

While a full investigation is outside the scope of this chapter, other cases from the region similarly suggest that economic crises play in important role in the emergence of Islamic providers (Vandewalle 1992, 110). In Jordan, following a series of economic reforms that began in the late 1980s, Baylouny argues that "Islamic NGOs spread into new geographic areas and began to bridge the urban-rural divide, employing urban funds and mobilizing bases to do so. During this period Islamist charities increased their presence in social services, providing higher quality and less-expensive services that the private sector or other philanthropic charities" (2006, 112–113). The Algerian case also helps tentatively substantiate a linkage between financial crisis, political liberalization, and the expansion of Islamist social services. "Through an extensive network of mosques, the [Islamist] FIS dispensed religious and socialization programs as well as welfare and social services rarely provided by the government," Imad Shahin writes. "With more than three million followers, the party involved its members in voluntary activities, including collecting garbage, tutoring high school students, and offering medical care services for needy patients" (1998, 138). Even pre–Arab Spring Syria, despite a hegemonic single-party regime and repressive state apparatus historically hostile to Islamic activism, the restructuring of the "Ba'thist Social Contract" gave Islamic providers room to operate (Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2014). As Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik note in their study of the Zayd movement, "Starting in the late 1990s, the [Syrian] government progressively relaxed its restrictions on charitable associations, which have provided a useful—although still relatively modest—contribution through the growth of private-sector-funded welfare schemes . . . . the growth of the Islamic charitable sector speaks of a détente between the Ba'th regime and the Islamic trend that began in the mid-1990s" (2009, 596). There is, of course, a chasm between the emergence of such providers and the mobilization of political support, especially in the Syrian context, but it is telling that the pressures of economic reform incentivize initial steps toward liberalization of the nonstate sector even in highly repressive contexts.

The Gulf monarchies offer one relevant comparison set. In those cases, the existence of natural resource rents and the codification of a robust social safety net as part of the rentier bargain effectively foreclosed the emergence of nonstate Islamist service providers (Freer 2018).[2] However, to better trace mechanisms, it is helpful to expand the scope of the investigation beyond the Arab world. In addition to its sheer size and long period of developmental authoritarian rule, the Indonesian case is particularly relevant because of the presence of Islamic social movements that reasonably approximate those in the Arab countries. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah boast long histories, millions of members, and the type of local networks that could plausibly have mobilized electoral opposition to the New Order regime (Noer 1973). To the extent that these organizations *could* have used social service provision to generate opposition mobilization, but did not, they are important comparisons for theory building and testing.

As Thomas Pepinsky (2014a, 2014b) suggests, an important reason for the "failure" of these organizations to mount a social service–based challenge seems to be the relatively higher capacity that the New Order regime maintained throughout its lifecycle. Higher regime capacity seemingly forestalls the development of opposition providers through two mechanisms. First, it enables the regime to ensure that political mobilization is channeled through regime institutions and takes place purely on the regime's terms. In Indonesia the key instrument for this strategy was the capacious Golkar, which monopolized politics down to the local level and forced Islamic providers to accommodate to its rules or face severe sanctions (King and Rasjid 1988; Pepinsky 2014b). Muhammadiyah's relationship with the state exhibited similar dependencies, where social service provision was allowed, but was also depoliticized to avoid interference with potential opposition parties (Syamsuddin 1995; Fuad 2002). As Mitsuo Nakamura describes Muhammadiyah's relationship to the regime early in the New Order era, "so long as the Muhammadiyah kept its activities to religious propagation, education, and social welfare, the local government authorities did not intervene" (2012, 363).

Beyond policing the political arena, higher-capacity regimes can use access to funding streams and positions in the state bureaucracy to co-opt these providers.[3] As Porter describes the relationship for Indonesia's other large Islamic organization, "Nahdlatul Ulama's policies were accommodative to secular political authority in exchange for peripheral influence in the cabinet, control of the ministry of religion and the thousands of patronage positions within it, and economic advantages given to its leaders in their business ventures" (2004, 30–31).[4] Any movement toward opposition would risk access to these resources, which Nahdlatul Ulama discovered in the 1970s. At that time, amid increasing criticism of the New Order regime, Suharto took the Ministry of Religion out of their hands, which sapped revenue for their local social service networks. In the mid-1980s, however, a new generation of NU leaders revised their criticisms and returned to New Order's good graces (Bush 2009, 70–81).

By co-opting these challengers, the New Order regime was able prevent the emergence of the type of independent provision that could fuel an alternative electoral challenge. However, following the collapse of the New Order regime in the late 1990s, political constituencies became scrambled (Pepinsky 2009). This opened up an opportunity for service provision as a strategy of electoral mobilization, particularly because the financial crisis that ended the regime also damaged welfare provision and created space for new providers (Sciortino et al. 2010; Kusujiarti 2011). In particular, Islamic organizations became less tied to the state (for instance by reorienting around local fundraising), and thus more available as potential bases that political activists potentially could capitalize upon (Fuad 2002). Indeed, post-democratization, one Islamist political party, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS), used social service provision to break through strong social networks and expand its support, particularly in poorer and more remote areas (Hamayotsu 2011, 2015). These developments align the Indonesian case with other young and unconsolidated democracies, whereby social services provide a valuable tool for parties to use to extend their appeal beyond core ideological or programmatic supporters (Cammett 2014; Thachil 2014a; Brooke 2019).

While the Indonesian case helps to identify how regime capacity limits opposition social service activism, Malaysia suggests an alternative pathway. In some ways, it resembles the Middle Eastern cases rather than the Indonesian one, because an economic crisis punctuated, but did not end, the regime (Pepinsky 2009). This generates an expectation that Islamist parties would be able to exploit the loosening of constraints to expand their provision, and thus challenge the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party (Mueller 2014, 16–24). Yet this has generally not happened. Instead, Islamist parties, with the Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or PAS) as the most prominent example, have effectively remained regional parties with limited appeal. What, then, differentiates the Malaysian case from the Arab ones? Why did the Malaysian regime lose fiscal capacity yet not face more of a challenge from Islamist providers?

The likely reason lies in Malaysia's ethno-religious cleavages. In the early 1970s, the Malaysian regime began to devote increasing amounts of resources to the Malay (Muslim) population at the expense of non-Malays, including Chinese. One aspect of this policy change was Islamization of the state bureaucracy and, in general, a consolidation of the regime along religious lines (Liow 2009). This tightly linked UMNO to a Muslim core and created a dominant party that, in James C. Scott's words, was "a well-organized and well-financed political machine providing both individual and collective blandishments that reach into every Malay village" (1985, 57).[5] Beyond eliminating the opportunity for alternative providers (such as PAS), state-level Islamization became a source of considerable patronage for local Islamic service providers (Shamsul 1983; Hamayotsu 2004). Thus, even after the financial crisis, potential opposition providers in the Malay constituency remained tied in to the regime's largesse, rather than defecting toward the opposition (Hamayotsu 2015). As Hassan describes, "these Islamic NGOs therefore seldom if ever publicly express critical or evaluative opinions on government policies touching upon Islam and the Muslim Community" (2002, 102). Indeed, UMNO's material hegemony over the Malay population has caused the PAS, which might be expected to use social service provision to challenge the regime, to basically abandon the field of distributional politics and instead attempt to "outbid" the regime over questions of Islamic identity (Liow 2009).[6] To the extent that the Malaysian case offers a generally different set of cleavages than exist in the Arab world, it highlights important additional factors to consider.

Even in the most repressive regimes, religious social service providers can find the space to operate. But a brief investigation of majority-Muslim countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia suggests that the main constraint on these providers transforming their activism into political gains is the capacity of the regime. In the Arab world, the onset of financial crisis in the 1970s and 1980s forced nondemocracies to cede space to Islamist providers, while, in contrast, Indonesia's fiscal health allowed it to co-opt potential challengers until the collapse of the New Order. Yet, as the Malaysian case suggests, an ethno-religious cleavage that overlaps with regime constituencies also influences how social service provision unfolds.

ISLAMIST SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION AND PARTY-VOTER LINKAGES

Social service provision attracts considerable scholarly attention for how it can influence the various beliefs and behaviors of recipients, up to and including generating political support for the provider organization. This is perhaps the area where the recent study of Islamist social service provision has made the strongest contributions, both in terms of empirically documenting how receipt of Islamist-provided services influences behavior, but also using these cases to build theories relevant to scholars of comparative political behavior more broadly.

One prominent argument is that Islamic identity functions as a more-or-less rational mechanism that helps citizens learn more about the policies political parties stand for (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). Tarek Masoud (2014) extends this to Islamists' social service provision, showing how individuals embedded in Islamic institutions, including social service ones, are more convinced that Islamist parties are economically redistributive. Other authors deemphasize these information-based arguments to identify how social service provision leads to ideological, and often religious, attitudinal change. For instance, Carrie Wickham, in her study of Islamic social organizing in Egypt, suggests that continual exposure to a "parallel Islamic sector" of businesses, mosques, and social service organizations can "change the preferences of educated youth" (2002, 148). A third mechanism centers on how provision conveys broadly desirable traits about providers separate from programmatic stances. Bano hypothesizes about the Jamaʿat-i Islami, stating that "if an individual builds credibility through good social service work and gradually becomes known to be engaged with a specific party, it is expected that he can lend that party credibility" (2009, 33). For Szekely (2015), Hamas's social service activism is a form of "political advertising" that communicates information about bureaucratic competence to constituents. Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones Luong (2014) suggest similar emotional and sentiment-based roles for social service provision. And through a survey experiment, I show that individuals indeed use their experiences with Islamist social service providers to form impressions about the traits of Islamist candidates, including their honesty, competence, and modesty (2017a).

Regardless of the mechanisms connecting social service provision to political outcomes, the ways in which these outcomes are conditional on various individual-level characteristics of the recipient are not well understood. For example, many of the abovementioned studies are built on a general assumption that experience with or exposure to these types of social service providers is more or less randomly distributed across the population. Because the citizens who opt in to these providers are not systematically different from those who opt out, the subsequent effects of this provision are produced in some way by exposure to the provision itself. This can be better substantiated (or challenged) by more careful empirical work. Fully accounting for the ways that various effects are jointly produced by exposure to social service networks and individual recipient characteristics is an important task for future research.[7]

Among potential differential effects, social class and religiosity are worth considering in more depth. There is a general assumption that Islamist social service networks extend among the poor, often with the assumption that these efforts exist as a subtype of charity. Mishal and Sela, for example, discuss the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas's social service network, arguing that "the Brotherhood's traditional practice of applying the Islamic duty of charity to the poor" is a reason why that sector tends to support the group (2006, 20). Yet the empirical record on this count is mixed. Whatever impulse may drive providers to focus on a particular segment of the population, many have found that pressures for sustainability force provision mainly toward a class of customers who can afford to pay for what they receive (Brooke 2019). In her pioneering study of Islamic NGOs, Janine Clark (2004) found that quotidian needs to receive permits, hire staff, obtain materials, and ensure funding meant that Islamic providers operated by and for the middle class. Indeed, she refers to these as "Islamic Commercial Institutions." One World Bank study found that, in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah has increasingly oriented its services toward a middle-class audience to cope with limited financial resources. As the authors put it, "Aware that ... it cannot compete with high-ranking, for profit hospitals for upper class clientele, [Muhammadiyah] has identified as its "market segment" people with lower-middle and middle incomes" (Sciortino et al. 2010, 29). The Jamaʿat-i Islami's initiatives in Pakistan were not free, but "less than the market rate and the respondents considered that there was a better guarantee of the quality of the services than available from other providers, especially the public sector, where the quality of services is doubtful.... The same was the case in Bangladesh, where most services are provided at twenty-five percent below the market price ... the Jamaʿat prefers to provide subsidized rather than free services because ... it is conscious of the need to ensure sustainability" (Bano 2009, 20). While in some cases a robust social movement affiliate, or access to outside resources, can sustain provision targeted at an indigent population, most religious providers seem forced to accommodate doctrinal mandates with mundane material considerations.

While the ability of structural (class-based) factors to condition the effect of Islamist provision on political outcomes is relatively more developed in the literature, the potential influence of religion is far less so. For example, much of the literature on party-voter linkages outside the Islamic world emphasizes monitoring (Stokes 2005). In parallel, however, scholars have theorized how norms, such as reciprocity and fair play, likely also ensure provision translates into political support (Auyero 1999; Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014). This research agenda can likely benefit from a closer engagement with the specific case of Islamist social service providers, specifically considering how their religious identity may trigger such informal mechanisms. For example, Hamayotsu (2015, 162) identifies how the Islamist PKS's social service provision is embedded in a larger web of religious solidarity and activities, which in turn influences a sense of reciprocity and feeling of community. By extension, because nonreligious providers cannot rely on the webs of social and physical infrastructure available to religious groups, they may be forced to make the exchange more explicit.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2014) shows how, among certain audiences, clientelism produces both a moral revulsion and a suspicion of administrative incompetence. Islamist groups may have an advantage in escaping these connotations because their social service provision simultaneously exists as a manifestation of religious activism as well as political ambition. As one scholar of Hizbullah puts it, "the activities of Hizbullah's Social Unit emanate from a strong ideological commitment because social service is a fundamental tenet of the faith" (Hamzeh 2004, 53). Another scholar describes the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's social service provision as "one of the basic principles of the Muhammadan mission ... a product of this Islamic culture and the values and ethics that are derived from the Islamic Sharia and the Arab-Islamic heritage" (Hammad 1997, 187). Bano found similar motivations for the Jamaʿat-i Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh: "it was clear that spiritual rewards were the main incentives motivating many members to volunteer to manage the Jamaʿat welfare organization" (2012, 89). And members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood describe their social service activism similarly. Amr Darrag, a former minister in Mohammed Morsi's government, explains that the group's interests in social service provision "are not traditionally the most expedient or the most utilitarian, but rather are principled and faith-based" (2017, 222).

On precisely this point, Marie Vannetzel (2016) identifies a "symbolic economy of disinterestedness" that shapes social service provision by Islamist actors in Egypt. As she shows, the public (and to some extent performative) disavowal of political motives for service provision in favor of reference to religious motivations is, paradoxically, part of the reason why it is effective at generating political support for the organization. Put differently, because Islamist actors are expected to provide services *because of their religious identity*, it simultaneously helps them to escape the taint of clientelism (and potentially help their recipients cognitively disassociate from the exchange as well). The implication is that because non-Islamist providers cannot do this, they similarly struggle to distance themselves from the negative connotations of traditional exchange.

Provider religiosity likely also functions subtly, conditioning the set of expectations that individuals bring to specific interactions (Pepinsky et al. 2012, 587). In this construct, customers may *perceive* the service offered by Islamists to be better, or believe that it says something about Islamists that it does not say about non-Islamists, thus generating a unique political effect for Islamist providers despite technical similarities (or differences) across different provider organizations. As Asef Bayat concludes, "many private schools and clinics chose Islamic tags even though they differed little from non-Islamic institutions of the same type" (2007a, 149). Suheir Morsy calls this "the placebo effect provided by religious symbolism" (1988, 366). Latief hints at this in his study of health providers in Indonesia, noting how, "despite the preservation of Islamic identity, there is no particular distinction between Islamic clinics and other 'secular' private or government clinics" (2010, 508). One implication of this argument is the need to isolate the particular characteristics of the social service provision that is responsible for generating the effect of interest, separating technical quality from atmosphere by comparing religious and nonreligious providers (Cammett and Şaşmaz 2017).

To extend this argument, when recipients form judgments about particular services received, and are thus motivated toward some behavioral or attitudinal outcome, they are almost certainly doing so based on an implicit comparison with another provider. In many cases, this provider is the struggling public sector. As Soliman quips, "the word *public* in Egypt today is synonymous with *mediocrity*" (2011, xiv).[8] Or, in his aforementioned study of the Indian BJP, Tariq Thachil finds that the "very basic standard of services offered by the VKA [the BJP's movement affiliate] is that such services are appealing only in areas where even basic public provisioning is absent, and even then only to those voters who cannot pay to obtain these services privately" (2011, 446). Given that a decline in state capacity is an important factor in the emergence of opposition providers, this is a natural comparison set. However, it also raises the possibility that an opposition organization's ineffectiveness at converting social service provision to political capital is not only due to the high-capacity regime's ability to depoliticize and co-opt that provider, but also because the provider's efforts simply do not stand out when set against a well-functioning public sector.

Given the importance of declining state capacity and the consequent decay in public services, in many cases a plausible alternative provider could be the state itself. Yet this raises an additional question: If public services are so poor, why is it that Islamist social services seem to stand out? In Indonesia, for instance, Hamayotsu suggests that providers tied to the PKS benefit because "their reputation and impact are in stark contrast with some of the other similar institutions and programs that are almost bankrupt or known for corruption and inefficient management" (2015, 163). But if multiple provider organizations exist, why are religious providers able to offer services that seemingly stand out for their high quality, lack of corruption, or efficient operation? One way to find out, presumably, would be to not only establish more rigorous comparisons against the state, but against alternative nonstate providers as well.

The emphasis on comparisons and, in particular, individual-level factors provides important insight into the question that motivated the outset of this chapter—what makes social service provision by Islamist organizations unique? The evidence presented implies that Islamist provision is different perhaps because recipients come to it with different perceptions and assumptions than they do with non-Islamist organizations. To move beyond anecdotal evidence, and toward systematic theorization, will require rigorous comparison against competitors across both organizational and individual level factors.

Conclusion

Across the Islamic world a variety of religious organizations, from political parties to social movements, provide an array of social services to millions of citizens per year. This chapter reviews this growing literature and makes three major arguments. First, it attempts to define Islamist social service provision and identify what makes it a unique case of nonstate provision. While religious factors do not seem to be the source of Islamists' purported advantage, the variation in type and method of social service delivery is notable. Islamist providers are also somewhat unique in that they exist under authoritarian regimes that deliberately constrict the political space for the opposition. The second contribution of this chapter is to theorize why this is so, in the process making a broader contribution to the study of the political economy of authoritarian durability. Finally, the chapter identifies how and why the receipt of Islamist social services shifts the beliefs and behaviors of recipients. While this provides new insights into the role of perceptions and expectations as part of a broader research agenda in comparative political behavior, it also suggests that the demand side—in terms of the assumptions ordinary people hold about Islamist providers—is likely a key factor distinguishing Islamist provision from that engaged in by non-Islamist actors.

Two areas emerge as particularly relevant for additional theoretical development and empirical documentation. First, the conditions under which Islamists provide one type of social service, and deliver it in a particular way, are likely relevant for better understanding the political effects of such provision, but are themselves poorly understood. Increasing focus on the local dynamics of Islamist activism will likely yield relevant explanations, including spatial and temporal variation inside the same provider. Second, provision is not only filtered through recipients' perceptions about the service they receive (and the provider itself), but also based on an implicit comparison between the Islamic provider and the plausible alternative. To the extent that there is a considerable role for subjectivity in the political manifestations of Islamic groups' provision of social services, it stands out as a considerable gap in our knowledge.

Notes

1. For example, in the realm of health, the Brotherhood's Islamic Medical Association was a formally registered, independent organization with dozens of brick-and-mortar facilities around the country (Brooke 2019). And while they too were "brick and mortar" institutions, the Brotherhood's schools operated on a mostly different basis than the medical facilities: instead of being registered under the umbrella of a formal, legal NGO, the Brotherhood's schools were mostly operated as private businesses of specific individuals. Interestingly, these divergent modes of legal operation complicated the state's crackdown on the group after 2013 (Brooke 2017a).
2. Although, in some cases, Islamists still managed to influence social service delivery inside the state itself, particularly in the realm of education.
3. State capacity is one variable that influences the extent to which alternative providers can use their provision to generate mobilization. But it is not fully satisfying; despite declining fiscal capacity, the Egyptian regime remained able to co-opt a prominent Islamic provider, the sprawling Islamic organization al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya. As with the NU in Indonesia, successive Egyptian regimes enlisted al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya to help operate the country's religious sector, including the administration of mosques and oversight of charity funds (*zakat*). In return, al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya enrolled their networks of mostly poor beneficiaries on behalf of the regime. As Sarah Ben Nefissa, puts it, the group provided "a base of support for the political regime and, especially, the party in power, the NDP" (2002, 149).
4. NU leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid, recognized this lack of financial independence as a key constraint on their ability to operate their network of religious schools (Porter 2004, 112).
5. As he goes on to note, the Islamist PAS "cannot offer any of the material incentives that UMNO's control of the government provides" (Scott 1985, 58).
6. The Malaysian case is also interesting in light of Corstange's (2016) work on ethnicity and clientelism. As he argues, ethnic groups dominated by a single provider generally receive lower levels of goods provision than those that are internally competitive. To the extent that UMNO dominates the Muslim community, it would suggest that alternative providers may have the opportunity to mobilize support among UMNO's dissatisfied base. This, apparently, has not happened.

7. Better identifying these interactions is also highly important given potential issues of endogeneity whereby receipt of social services is an effect, rather than cause, of political allegiance. Cammett, for example, finds that in Lebanon, political partisans are more likely to receive services than nonpartisans, and also that the baskets of benefits that they receive are comparatively greater. As she summarizes, "access to diverse packages of social assistance entail distinct outlays of political activism" (2011, 73).
8. The historic Egyptian case suggests that the relationship may in fact be endogenous, in that when opposition candidates win, the Mubarak government was known to withhold services from those districts (El-Borai 1996, 36–43; Blaydes 2011, chap. 4).

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CHAPTER 39

EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN MALI

Service Provision, Citizenship, and Governance

JAIMIE BLECK AND ALEX THURSTON

Why would clerics who demonstrate an explicit interest in politics, sit atop formidable infrastructures of alternative service provision, and repeatedly mobilize followers around political demands refrain from directly seeking elected office or other means of capturing the state? In this chapter, we examine clerics' roles in politics and governance in Mali, where the country's leading clerics have pursued both competition and complementarity with the state. We argue that even at the height of contention between mainstream Muslim clerics and the state, both clerics and elected politicians share an underlying understanding about the limits of clerics' ambitions. For clerics, refraining from office-seeking allows them to influence policy and gain personal power without sacrificing their reputational advantage (Cammett and Jones Luong 2014) and popular appeal by risking a total immersion into politics. However, the arrival of jihadist groups, whose repertoires of service provision explicitly challenge the state, is a strong departure from these existing patterns of political engagement. We conclude with a discussion speculating on the ways that jihadist presence could challenge patterns of accommodation between religious leaders and the state.

In many other Muslim-majority contexts in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, Islamic service provision has been used to fuel electoral support for Islamic parties or Islamic candidates running as independents. If governments underperform in vital sectors such as public health or education, religious providers can fill the void and demonstrate their comparative ability to reach the population with essential goods and services (Brooke 2019, 2021; Cammett and Jones Luong, 2014; Cammett and MacLean 2011; Cammett and Issar 2010; Harrigan and el-Said 2009). Quality service provision can build groups' reputational advantage at the ballot box, offering insight into the compassionate way that these groups would govern (Brooke 2017; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014); some groups leverage this advantage to reinforce a perception that Islamists will perform better on economic and welfare policy in a context where voters are uncertain about party platforms or performance (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). Often Islamist organizations draw on alternative funding, including diasporas, donor countries, or illicit networks that balance against government-funded clientelist networks (Wickham 2002), thus enhancing Islamists' power and ability to act as opposition players independent from the state (Arriola 2013). Service provision has also proved effective for insurgent and jihadist groups seeking popular support (Cammett and Issar 2010; Flanigan 2008) and/or information about the territory that they control (Wagstaff and Jung 2020).

In both settings, service provision can help nonstate actors to outperform states, but also affords an opportunity to reshape political imagination about the spheres of authority and legitimacy in society. For example, schools provide venues for indoctrination into religious ideology, but also forums to connect with parents and enlist their allegiance in alternative forms of political authority. Similarly, Islamic courts, if they perform well, offer the promise of more equitable provision of justice in contrast to perceived corruption within bureaucratic states (Kendhammer 2013).

In much of West Africa, Islamic service providers play key roles in providing education, justice provision and mediation, and alternative clientelist welfare networks to the channels afforded by the state (Kang 2015; Kendhammer 2013, 2016; Villalón 2010; Wing 2009; Schulz 2008, Kuenzi 2006).[1] However, this vast network of service provision has not translated into many Islamist parties in the region. Part of the explanation is the structure of West African political systems. Like several other Muslim-majority countries in Francophone West Africa, such as Senegal and Niger, Mali has a constitutionally *laïc* state, following the French model of secularism that seeks to protect the state and public life from religious influence, rather than the American model that protects the church from the state. Successive constitutions have forbidden the establishment of religious parties (Bogaards et al. 2010).

Since the overthrow of a long-running authoritarian regime in 1991, Mali has held regular multiparty elections. Yet Mali, despite being over 90 percent Muslim, lacks a mass-based, bureaucratically organized Islamist movement comparable to the Muslim Brotherhood. This absence reflects not just the formal prohibitions on Islamist party formation, but also several other factors, including the enduring power of Sufism, the relatively small size of the kind of middle-class base that has populated Islamist movements elsewhere, and the particular histories of the democratization era (Thurston 2020b). Under these conditions, Mali's foremost Muslim religious leaders have not, so far, competed directly in elections, even as independents or under the banner of established secular parties—as Islamists did in neighboring Mauritania prior to the legalization of Islamist parties there in 2007, or as Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood candidates did at various points prior to the Arab Spring.

However, the absence of Islamic parties from the electoral terrain understates the tremendous role that religious leaders and their followers play in politics. In Mali, religious authority and religio-political activism largely emanate from individual clerics and their associated followings. Malian clerics as well as peers in neighboring countries back candidates, mobilize followers to engage in protests, and/or lobby government (Bleck and Patel 2021; Villalón 2010). As such, clerics' forays into service provision and the "parallel sector" tend to complement rather than challenge state authority. Islamic actors have become an enduring informal institution of governance.

In contrast to these patterns of accommodation, complementarity, and competition between clerical networks and the state, the emergence of jihadist actors in Mali and their repertoires of service provision poses a challenge to these older patterns of accommodation between religious constituencies and the state. Insurgent actors use service provision strategies to outperform, delegitimize, and displace the secular state. We conclude by speculating how their emergence in the country's periphery might challenge the existing status quo relationship between the most powerful clerics and politics in the capital.

CLERICS AND THE STATE

Malian religious leaders jockey for power and influence over elected leaders, while also asserting their own independence from government to maintain credibility with their constituencies. Less formally, religious authorities shape policy, mediate state-society relations, and even, in some senses and especially in the country's peripheries, govern in tandem with bureaucratic and elected officials. For many citizens with limited contact with the bureaucratic state, religious and traditional leaders continue to be the de facto authority. Mali, following Senegal, boasts the second-highest rating of traditional authorities on the continent. Malians put trust in traditional leaders higher than the president, members of the national assembly, municipal government or the courts (Logan 2009, 119). Seventy-six percent of Malians favor increasing the power of traditional authority (Logan 2013, 364). The elected elite routinely show deference to and consult the Muslim elite in this *laïc* state, which lifts Islam to the status of state religion in practice (Amselle 2018). In the eyes of much of the population, clerics serve as a moralizing "check" on secular power—almost as a branch of government, or at least a counterweight to the executive office (Bleck 2021). Focus groups with over 330[2] members of informal, tea-drinking clubs ages 18–45 in Bamako, Sevare, and Mopti revealed that most respondents value religious pluralism, and they also favor religious leaders' involvement in governance (Bleck 2021).

In independent Mali, clerics' visibility in politics has grown over time. Under the socialist regime of Modibo Keïta (in power 1960–1968) and the military-turned-civilian regime of Moussa Traoré (in power 1968–1991), authoritarianism discouraged overt expressions of politicized religiosity, especially religious-based dissent. Although *laïc*, the state attempted to control clerics. Starting in 1980, the year after Traoré formally transitioned his regime from a military to a civilian one, religious leaders were technically grouped under the state-sponsored Association malienne pour l'unité et le progrès de l'Islam (Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam, AMUPI), which "was meant to parallel, in the religious domain, the ideological functions of Mali's single political party" (Brenner 1993, 73). Some religious actors created independent movements, notably Ousmane Madani Haïdara's Ançar Dine (Supporters of the Religion),[3] which is now one of the most popular religious networks in the country (Holder 2012; Schulz 2012). Yet such movements remained partly underground until Traoré was overthrown. His fall accelerated liberalization and enabled a transition to multiparty democracy. These changes created greater space for Islamic organizations, media outlets, and NGOs. The early 1990s saw some incipient, would-be Islamist parties, but they proved short-lived (Brenner 2001; Soares 2006).

In 2002, Malian president Alpha Oumar Konaré created a new state-backed Muslim umbrella body, the Haut Conseil Islamique (High Islamic Council, HCI), which partly supplanted and partly absorbed AMUPI. Via the HCI, Konaré sought to domesticate and control Mali's proliferating Islamic associations in the new, post-9/11 era (Idrissa 2017, 179). The HCI has greater independence from the government than AMUPI had, and the HCI has been a platform that helps clerics mobilize supporters in order to check government policies, personnel, and legislation that they view unfavorably. Not all HCI leaders and members support greater Islamization of Malian society—nor do they agree on what such Islamization should look like—but the HCI has at times been one vehicle for a more assertive Islamic politics in Mali.

Amid the rise of new Islamic associations, prominent new clerics have emerged, while some of the country's established religious lineages have maintained their influence (Lebovich 2019). The most prominent of the new clerics include Haïdara, a populist preacher who borrows from Sufi styles without belonging to a Sufi order (Soares 2006, 86), and who took over as head of the HCI in 2019. Another major figure is Mahmoud Dicko, the foremost Malian Salafi. Dicko's blend of traditionalist learning in the Sahara and studies in Saudi Arabia helped bring him to prominence as an imam in Bamako in the 1980s and 1990s. Dicko served two terms as president of the HCI from 2008 to 2019, having been initially denied that position when the HCI was created (Idrissa 2017, 179–180). In 2019 Dicko stepped down as HCI president and decided not to put forth a clear, Salafi successor, bowing to pressure from Sufis and other non-Salafis within the organization, as well as pressure from President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (in office 2013–2020), who all demanded new, non-Salafi leadership for the HCI in the person of Haïdara.

Some Sufis and traditionalists have remained influential on the religious scene. The most important Sufi leader is Mohamed Ould Cheickna Hamaullah, better known as the Chérif of Nioro du Sahel. The Chérif is the son of Ahmad Hamaullah (d. 1943), who led a popular and controversial branch of the Tijaniyya Sufi order, the Hamawiyya, and had repeated conflicts with the French colonial authorities, culminating in his deportation to France (Soares 2005). The Tijaniyya is one of the most widespread Sufi organizations across Africa, and the Tijaniyya Hamawiyya has a substantial following within Mali and in other parts of West Africa.

Despite the diversity of their religious orientations and their differences on politics, particularly in the era of President Keïta, these leaders and their peers adopt a common foundational strategy of working within the framework of the existing Malian state. Of the three clerics mentioned above, Dicko is the most politically outspoken and the most willing to challenge presidential authority, while Haïdara has been the most quietist—although still willing to participate in organizing mass demonstrations on social issues when he chooses to. The Chérif, although not often physically present at mass rallies in Bamako, also intervenes directly in politics by endorsing candidates, making political statements, and, in recent years, publicly backing some of Dicko's political maneuvers.

All of these clerics supply a range of services to citizens. This role in turn positions clerics as power brokers and the heads of patronage networks. For example, as Dorothea Schulz (2012, 104–105) writes, "Villagers use their ties to [Haïdara] in Bamako whenever they need support in local conflicts over business transactions or with representatives of the administration. Ties of religious and commercial-entrepreneurial patronage that link rural followers to Haïdara and his followers in Bamako are facilitated by intermediaries, most of them merchants and teachers at local medersas." Such networks give the clerics social and political weight that elected politicians cannot ignore.

Meanwhile, the weakness of the Malian state expands the space available to clerics as political entrepreneurs and alternative service providers. To cite a harsh but well-argued assessment, Mali "never quite met the prerequisites for functional statehood" (Craven-Matthews and Englebert 2018). In multiple domains, vacuums left by state weakness have created opportunities for alternative service providers to fill gaps. Independence-era socialism fell short of its ambitions to remake state and society, and since the 1970s, NGOs have had a major role in governance across the Sahel (Mann 2015), including in remote areas of northern Mali (Gutelius 2007; Lecocq and Schrijver 2007). More informal religious networks have also filled gaps in governance, or, in some cases, never surrendered the roles that they had long played.

Weak state capacity, as well as the limited strength of political parties, leaves ample opportunity for religious leaders to demonstrate their comparative ability to influence policy and mobilize their constituencies. Unlike in more restrictive authoritarian contexts, contentious politics, including engagement in wide-scale protests, has proven very effective in achieving policy objectives. For instance, Haïdara and Dicko criticized the adoption of a Family Code in 2009, which they claimed contradicted Islamic values. Articles in the code proposed raising the legal age of marriage, but also required that couples have a civil ceremony—drawing power and resources away from religious elites who conducted marriages. Religious leaders organized nationwide protests with tens of thousands of participants, which led to a significant revision of the contested provisions (Soares 2011). More recently, Dicko was the face of mass protests in Bamako in summer 2020, with tens of thousands of demonstrators, which eventually culminated a coup that removed President Keïta from office. At the time of writing in December 2020, Mali has passed from a short-lived military junta to a roughly eighteen-month, transitional government, with religious leaders continuing to jockey for influence over rapidly changing government structures. Presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for spring 2022.

The political roles of religious leaders have expanded not just because of liberalization and because of many Malians' perceptions that elected politicians have failed, but also because of the country's long-running security crisis. In 2012, Mali suffered a multifaceted rupture that involved a separatist rebellion in the North, a junior officers' coup in the South, a jihadist force that wrested control of the North from the separatists, and a humanitarian emergency. A French-led military intervention in January 2013 and presidential elections in summer 2013 ended the immediate crisis, but international security deployments and a resumption of electoral politics have not prevented the continuation and even escalation of multidirectional violence in northern and central Mali.

As Mali attempted to transition out of the crisis in 2013, the presidential election saw religious figures openly backing presidential candidates. Dicko helped to create an explicitly "Islamic" movement called *Sabati 2012* to back Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who won the election; Sabati followed an earlier, pro-Keïta effort organized by Dicko in the 2002 election (Elischer 2019, 211). The Chérif openly encouraged followers to vote for Keïta in 2013 (Bleck 2021). Dicko and the Chérif fell out with Keïta during his first term in office. In the lead-up to the 2018 elections, the Chérif joined Dicko in opposing Keïta, although the president and his surrogates continue to court the Chérif's support (Coulibaly 2019). Meanwhile, Keïta made lavish gestures of patronage to Haïdara, notably by gifting him 150 hectares of land in 2017 and ensuring that a paved road reached the cleric's hometown of Tamani, in the Segou region. This did not elicit a formal endorsement from Haïdara for Keïta (Koné 2018). Yet amid Dicko and the Chérif's antagonism, Haïdara's tacit support for Keïta appears to have earned him material rewards, access to the presidency, and the presidency's own tacit support, as Haïdara became head of the HCI in 2019. Amid these leading clerics and the president, numerous alignments and realignments occur; any actor who comes to be seen by the others as too powerful will elicit a counter-reaction and various realignments.

JUSTICE AND SCHOOLING AS KEY SECTORS OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

The judicial and education sectors exemplify two areas where the state has clear shortcomings and where religious actors provide influential alternatives. These two domains are characterized by compartmentalization, coordination, and competition in service provision

Malians trust the judiciary less than any other state institution (Little and Logan 2009). A 2014 poll found that 14 percent of Malians living in Bamako reported paying a bribe to a police officer, judge, or civil servant in the previous month (Bleck, Dembele, and Guindo 2016). And in this predominately rural country, many courts sit in regional centers—far from villages—making courts inaccessible and unaccountable to many rural inhabitants (Doungon and Sangaré 2016).

In the face of corrupt or unresponsive bureaucratic legal apparatus, many Malians turn to religious authorities to settle conflicts (Soares 2005, 83). This type of Islamic justice, as well as arbitrage by village elders, has gained ground, or in some cases maintained its hegemony, in a context where many rural citizens view government courts with skepticism, believing that judgments will reflect the interest of those with the most money (Doungon and Sangaré 2016). The state justice system can also be opaque for some citizens because the language of the courts is French, which a small minority of the Malian population speaks fluently (Remane 2010). Religious or traditional justice provisions can offer local communities more legible, transparent, and predictable alternatives.

Schooling is another important arena of service provision, not just because of the multifaceted impacts that education has on citizens' economic prospects and overall quality of life, but also because of its ability to draw people into engagement with the state. Bleck (2015) finds that parents with children enrolled in public schools are more likely to vote, campaign, and hold voter identification cards than citizens without children enrolled. In contrast, Bleck finds that parents who have their children in modern, Islamic schools were less likely to vote in the 2009 communal elections or to claim having voted in 2007, as compared to Malians without a child enrolled in school. This research suggests that, even amid skepticism about government performance, access to state services might foster participation in formal politics. Meanwhile, engagement with nonstate services or membership in related communities might discourage formal participation or orient claims-making toward other venues.

The strong history of Islamic education in what is now Mali, as well as the association of post-independence education with the French colonial state, contributes to enduring tension around schooling. In Mali and the surrounding region, Islamic schooling provision precedes "Western education" by centuries (Hall and Stewart 2010; Nyanchoga 2014; Sanankoua 1985; Ware 2014). When French colonial authorities encountered a substantial Muslim educational presence in the north of the country, they sought to co-opt schools for the colonial mission, recruit students to forced labor, or delimit schools' curricula (Brenner 2007; Saidou 2012). Malian Muslims often feared that French schools would turn their children into unbelievers (Brenner 2007; Gérard 1997). This belief continues to be held by segments of the Malian population. Meanwhile, despite French intentions to contain Islam, the colonial era saw widespread conversions to Islam in southern Mali, where French policies and their impacts (emancipation, labor migration, conscription, etc.) created conditions that prompted conversions, often due to new or strengthened linkages between Islam and different forms of economic and social belonging (Peterson 2011). The wave of conversions not only made Mali a Muslim-majority society, but also bound new converts into networks of patronage and belonging that existed outside of the state (Launay and Soares 1999; Soares 2005). As of the early 1950s, meanwhile, only 4 percent of the school-aged population was attending French schools (Bolibaugh 1972, 139).

The Malian state inherited the weak colonial education legacy, and the independent state continued the colonial state's contentious relationship with Islamic schools. The regime maintained a relatively antagonistic relationship with Islamic schools, which did not receive comparable government subsidies that Catholic Schools received (Lange and

Diarra 1999). Yet madrasas—"modernized" Islamic schools with a broader curriculum than Qurʾanic schools—have become popular. As the public education system struggled in the 1970s and 1980s, enrollment in madrasas likely increased at a rate greater than enrollment in public schools (Brenner 2001, 171–172). With democratization, the Malian state embarked on an educational expansion, which included an attempt to integrate madrasas as part of the broader educational infrastructure. By counting students enrolled in madrasas toward the total number of children enrolled in school, the government moved closer to goals of universal primary enrollment, while simultaneously appealing to Malian constituencies that preferred Islamic schooling (Bleck 2015, 89–90).

Most madrasas are private schools, making this one area where religious leaders and networks have a substantial role in service provision. Educational entrepreneurs can draw on substantial resources: if they studied abroad in North Africa or the Arab world, personal networks can help fund projects back home in Mali. Roy (2012, 154) argues that these personal connections are far more powerful than any state-sponsored financing of madrasas. This creates a diverse, and often fragmented, Islamic landscape in Bamako, whereas each association has ties to different foreign funders. Many madrasas offer subsidized fees for the poorest learners as well as scholarship opportunities abroad. While these opportunities are dwindling, there remain channels for this type of educational trajectory (137). Madrasas represent another sphere of power, education, and influence linked to North Africa and the Middle East. Roy argues that graduates of madrasas gained a "madrasa consciousness"—a specific type of Muslim identity (101). She stresses that many parents saw this as an alternative, rather than competing, network to state channels; by enrolling some of their children in Islamic schools—families could diversify their clientelistic networks. Similarly, Sanankoua and Brenner (1991) discuss the social prestige associated with a madrasa education. By some metrics, madrasas offer higher-quality education than contemporary public schools. In 2005–2006, for example, more than eighty-one teachers in madrasas held a four-year diploma—more than three times the number of comparable degree holders in public schools (Bleck 2015, 81–82).

Islamic schools form key parts of different clerics' and associations' webs of service provision. Although sometimes stereotyped as a Salafi project, madrasas are run by all of the clerical networks (Roy 2012, 177–118; Roy 2012 86–88). Schooling represents one ingredient in religious networks' ability to channel funding from abroad, particularly from the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, there is interplay between clerical bodies and service provision networks; some of the foremost service providers also hold senior positions within bodies such as the HCI (Watling and Raymond 2015).

Qurʾanic schools, in contrast, have remained isolated from the formal education system. Qurʾanic schools have more limited curricula than madrasas, as students focus on memorizing the Qurʾan and, at higher levels, pursuing esoteric knowledge. Since students beg for their own school fees and, in some instances, lodge with their religious instructor, these schools are affordable options for many Malian parents. Qurʾanic teachers feel as though they are providing welfare—including housing and food—for some of the most vulnerable children in Mali, yet do not receive any financial support from the state (Bleck 2015, 75). Qurʾanic schools play powerful roles, especially throughout rural Mali—particularly in the Kayes, Mopti, and Timbuktu regions (*Autoportrait du Mali*, 2015). Many of these schools are decentralized and linked to specific religious leaders, including adherents of Sufi orders.

Islamic schools continue to offer a complement or alternative to state schooling and have varying degrees of engagement with the Malian state. Given a high degree of dissatisfaction with the quality of secular education or the job prospects it creates, madrasas offer an acceptable alternative to many parents, who can diversify their portfolio or choose a type of schooling that reaffirms a Muslim identity and inserts their children in a new network of power and resources.

In sum, religious leaders and networks have a powerful role in the judicial and education sectors specifically, and in service provision more broadly. This has not, however, translated into Islamist mobilization in the style of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or other well-known Islamist movements from the Arab world. In all cases, these religious leaders have maintained their position as formidable welfare providers and key political actors without formally entering the "dirty" realm of electoral politics.[4] By inserting themselves as central actors in elite political negotiations, but keeping enough distance to preserve autonomy and independence, they are able to maintain "reputational" credibility,[5] which could be damaged with an explicit entry into electoral politics. Instead their repertoire of contentious politics and backroom negotiation proves lucrative for their own personal power and serves an effective policymaking instrument without needing to engage in campaigning or partisan politics that many Malians hold in disdain.

Jihadist Service Provision: A Challenge to Patterns of Accommodation

The current conflict between jihadists and the state—wherein the former, although they are not usually portrayed this way, could be considered armed, coercive religious service providers—raises questions about the limits of Islamic service provision as complementary to the Malian state. In many ways, the state's inability to respond to citizens in their direst time of need has reinforced state impotence in the minds of many rural citizens (Bleck and Michelitch 2015). When presented with a better-performing alternative (e.g., jihadists, whose governance styles do appeal to some segments of the population even as jihadists kill, intimidate, and marginalize others), this competition may force reflection on the state performance, making citizens question their allegiance to the state. Jihadist service provision can proceed alongside and interact with jihadist service restriction. When they exercise sway in a given locale, jihadists often shut down some public institutions; allow other services, such as health provision, to function under surveillance; and create new structures of their own.

Since the early 2000s, jihadist groups have had a presence in Mali, beginning in the far north. It is important to note that al-Qaʿida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) used welfare provision during its initial entry into northern Mali in the late 1990s. They distributed money, medicine, phone credit, and healthcare to local populations and married women from less-powerful families to demonstrate solidarity with "poor local lineage" (Bøås and Torheim 2013, 1287). Jihadists controlled northern Mali's major cities for much of 2012–2013, before a French-led military intervention expelled them. During the occupation, they continued to use security provision—including a hotline for those experiencing harassment or extortion by bandits or other insurgent groups, as well as other service provision tactics in Timbuktu.

Since 2017, the most important jihadist formation in Mali has been Jamaʿat Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, JNIM). Formed as a coalition of local jihadist actors and the Mali-based units of AQIM, JNIM's area of operations extends from Mali's northern border with Algeria south to the Mopti and Ségou regions in the center of Mali. JNIM also conducts attacks in Burkina Faso, while AQIM units have struck as far south as Cote d'Ivoire. In addition to JNIM/AQIM, since 2015 Mali has also been troubled by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). This outfit operates in the borderlands of eastern Mali, western Niger, and northern and eastern Burkina Faso.

Part of JNIM's challenge involves thinking through the lessons of 2012–2013, including the ways that jihadists' uncompromising rule alienated potential allies. AQIM's own leader criticized the manner in which his field commanders behaved in Mali during that period. Although JNIM's leaders have rarely acknowledged any past mistakes, they do now invoke concepts such as "the popular embrace" (*al-hadina al-shaʿbiyya*) to describe their search for support (Al-Masra 2017). Throughout the areas where they are present, JNIM's field commanders are enmeshed in hyper-local politics (Thurston 2019). Jihadists have relationships not just with young male fighters, but also with various politicians, clan leaders, businesspersons, religious leaders, and other power brokers (Sandor and Campana, 2020). Such relationships allow some figures to occupy a gray area between overt jihadism and mainstream life; by 2018, for example, the former jihadist judge Houka Houka ag Alhousseini had allied himself with Timbuktu-based militias and based himself in Zoura, a town "well known in the Timbuktu region for its weekly market days (*foire*), frequently used by AQIM as a platform to intimidate the population by displaying decapitated heads and distributing threatening leaflets" (United Nations Panel of Experts 2018, 5). In this type of shadow governance by AQIM/JNIM, however, threats and coercion are accompanied by forms of outreach that take advantage of the very insecurity that jihadists help produce. If in 2012 cutting off hands seemed largely calculated to demonstrate jihadists' power and produce a media spectacle, by 2019 jihadists were presenting such acts as public safety measures. For example, a jihadist flier posted in 2019 in Acharane, a village in the Timbuktu region, called upon thieves to repent and return stolen goods; "if not," the flier continued, "he exposes himself to prosecution and accountability in accordance with the Law of God, Glorious and Exalted be He."[6]

Since 2013, two important trends in jihadist governance and service provision have occurred in Mali. First, jihadists have moved away from their bid for urban control, which in retrospect appears anomalous, to a mode of rural-based shadow governance and political influence (Jezequel and Foucher 2017). Second, jihadists have partly shifted from the shock-and-awe tactics of stoning accused adulterers and destroying Sufi shrines to a more encompassing effort to present shariʿa as an alternative moral order and a mode of equitable justice that meets community needs. Established clerics, in this context, have often remained relatively quiet, reflecting both the fear of retaliation by jihadists (numerous imams have been assassinated in central Mali) and the fact that, in certain areas, established clerics' prestige had been challenged even before the current wave of conflict began (Thurston, 2020a).

As context for why some citizens would welcome the changes that jihadists bring, recall that many Malians distrust the judiciary. Further, Malian communities' interactions with the police or the army are often predatory. This pushes certain populations toward armed actors, including jihadist groups, if they do not feel protected by the state (Nievas and Sangaré 2016). For instance, rent-seeking by the state has pushed some pastoralists into the arms of jihadists who promise more equitable treatment (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019). In the context of the current conflict, most Malians living in the North and center of the country feel exposed to criminal and insurgent actors, and many have formed self-defense groups and militias in the vacuum left by the state (Bleck, Boisvert, and Sangaré 2018). In some areas, jihadist groups have stepped in to offer protection from criminal actors and championed fair treatment for all members of the population as a way to distinguish themselves from the state, but also from other insurgent actors. The current wave of conflict has, moreover, in many cases weakened the power of traditional and religious elites, especially in the North. A 2019 study by the Clingendael Institute found that "the increased fragmentation of conflict has limited traditional authorities' scope of authority and their legitimacy. As communities become divided along ethnic, resource-based and clan-based fault lines, so do their traditional authority structures" (Molenaar et al., 2019: 6). Armed groups have in some cases supplanted the historical roles of hereditary authorities in terms of conflict mediation and service provision.

Much of what jihadists offer, in terms of governance and services, comes back to the notion of equitable justice. Jihadists present the shariʿa as an alternative moral order, an ideal of justice that they contrast with the allegedly corrupt, Francophile state. In a widely discussed August 2017 recording, for example, the central Malian jihadist leader Amadou Kouffa said, "Our only 'fault' is that we defend Islam; if not for that, one couldn't reproach us for anything. We haven't stolen anyone's goat . . . . We the jihadists only attack our known adversaries, the allies of France" (Kouffa 2017). In central Mali, Kouffa's forces have reconfigured the management of pastures, placed restrictions on the dowries expected of bridegrooms, instituted the collection of what they term *zakat* (obligatory alms in Islam), and expelled many state agents (Sangaré 2016; Thiam 2017). Such maneuvers have won jihadists some support, however grudging, among locals who had suffered for years under corrupt judges and gendarmes as well as under the "rackets" practiced by village-level oligarchies.

Consistent with other insurgent strategies that focus on less capital-intensive sectors (Wagstaff and Jung 2020), since 2016 jihadists have intervened dramatically in the domain of schooling, one of the foremost sectors where religious actors and the Malian state compete and sometimes collaborate. Yet in contrast to patterns of accommodation involving nonviolent religious actors, jihadist strategies to close government schools and remove bureaucratic officials have generated a zero-sum struggle between the Malian state and new forms of religious provision. By the spring of 2017, 23 percent of schools in Mali and 100 percent of schools in eight communes were closed; in areas with the most concentrated jihadist activity, teachers, decentralized state administrators, and health officials were all targeted by threats and harassment (Bleck, Boisvert, and Sangaré 2021, 16). A wider set of schools face a jihadist assault against schooling as a symbol of the secular state, including threats against administrators, calls for schools to turn into Qurʾanic teaching centers, or burning of material and closures. Parallel to the closing of government schools has been the expansion of Qurʾanic schools in Mopti and Segou (Adam, Golovko, and Sangaré 2017).

These campaigns take place in the broader context of the Ministry of Education's inability to manage its own schools. In December 2019, 895 schools were close and, as a result, 333,900 children were out of school (UNICEF 2019). These school closures over the past few years are due to insecurity and targeting, but also to teacher strikes. The current educational crisis in Mali—the perceived decline of educational quality over the last twenty years (Ba 2009; Diakité 2000), as well as the impact of the recent political crisis on the education sector (Bleck, Boisvert, and Sangaré 2021)—may force a more explicit reevaluation of political allegiance as some actors seek to differentiate themselves as being in opposition the secular state. The jihadist efforts to generate services and the state's incapacity in the face of threat is likely to inform other rural citizens' own strategies to cope with the ongoing insecurity.

Conclusion

This paper has described the complementarities and competition between religious service provision and state-directed governance in Mali. We have described clerics as key political actors who primarily rely on contentious politics, endorsement (or denouncements) of existing candidates, and elite lobbying to heighten their personal power and achieve their policy goals. We argue that these strategies, rather than overt electoral participation, prove very effective in achieving policy goals and fueling their personal power, while allowing them to maintain reputational advantage (Brooke 2017; Cammett and Jones 2014) and keep the moral high ground as compared to other political elites.

These relationships are shaped by Malian history, the nature of its *laïc* political system, and the way that popular attitudes appear to condition clerics' engagement in politics and government. The preceding section, however, described the severe challenge that jihadist activity—including zero-sum competition in service provision between jihadists and the state—represents to this model of collaboration and nonviolent competition. What, then, might come next for Mali, particularly in terms of Islam's role in governance?

Theoretically, religious leaders are supposed to be part of the solution to the conflicts in northern and central Mali. The 2015 Algiers Accord, meant to bring peace to the North, includes among its provisions a call for "revalorizing the role of Qadis [Islamic judges] in the administration of justice, notably in terms of civil mediation in a manner that takes into account cultural, religious, and customary specificities" (Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation au Mali 2015, 13). The scope that Islamic law will have in the postconflict North, however, has been a point of debate between northern military-actors and the government in Bamako. In early 2019 the ex-rebel bloc the Coordination of Azawad Movements (French acronym CMA) unilaterally declared the application of a version of shariʿa in the northern region of Kidal—but their decision was swiftly criticized by the national government and by the monitoring committee for the Algiers Accord, and the CMA formally backed down while nevertheless retaining de facto control over Kidal and, indeed, many areas of northern Mali continue to apply aspects of shariʿa. If Malians want a greater role for traditional and religious authorities in the justice sector, politicians have not yet agreed on the exact modalities of that role.

One question is how the explicit competition between jihadist and the state could change or inform religious leaders' strategies in the capital. On one hand, the three most influential religious leaders are highly networked to state power. While they challenge the state at times, they largely operate in a complementary sphere. While the government often appeals to them, the president is not entirely dependent on religious leaders. President Keïta was able to win re-election without heavy religious backing in 2018, which demonstrates the electoral resilience of the incumbent president. On the other hand, the jihadist strategies in the center as well as efforts to adopt shariʿa in the North, may open a political opportunity for some leaders to challenge to laicité and might buoy the reputational advantage (Cammett and Jones Luong 2014) of religious leaders associated with the secular state into question.

The question of religion, service provision, and the state is largely subordinate to questions of Malian state presence in the geographic periphery. Given the recent education crisis (more than 800 schools closed last year), as well as the state's inability to thwart expanding interethnic violence, many Malians in peripheral areas may look for other forms of protection or service provision. If jihadists can execute justice more equitably, they can likely win adherents independent of broader ideology. Greater questions remain about how religious leaders in the periphery will respond to jihadist rule in the longer term. Those who are incorporated into the networks of Haïdara, Dicko, and the Chérif have incentives to keep the status quo relationship to the state. However, others who operate without the protection or even any visible signs of state presence will likely cede to the most powerful brokers in their areas or flee as a matter of pragmatism.

Lastly, there are broader questions about the role of religion and the state in the long term. Many religious leaders have adopted a populist rhetoric that critiques the state and offers better governance through Islam. As jihadists have a chance to rule over a longer period of time, citizens will have more evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of these new models. They may also grow unsatisfied if a regime is unable to generate jobs or economic growth, or if it shows vulnerability to corruption (Kendhammer 2016), and they might seek other forms of governance. In contrast, better long-term performance by these actors may raise questions about the applicability of this alternative governance scheme in other parts of the country.

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Notes

1. As Platas writes in this volume, in many of Muslim-majority states, independent governments inherited particularly weak bureaucratic and public goods infrastructure, and as a result, many Islamic providers preceded the state or operated in its void.
2. The vast majority of respondents were male. We note that respondents were much more divided about the role of religion in electoral politics and direct governance by religious leaders.
3. Not to be confused with the more recently created, Northern-based jihadist movement Ansar al-Din.
4. This is consistent with the strategies Brooke describes, which underscore the importance of groups distancing themselves from the "dirty river of politics," which can help to "capture diffuse (reputational) benefits of the provision . . . but retain the image of being above the fray of politics" (2017, 45).
5. Cammett and Jones Luong (2014) argue that Islamist advantage largely comes from this reputational advantage, thus a central concern of Islamic leaders should be maintaining the relative reputational credibility—especially vis-à-vis the other political elite.
6. This flier is available at https://mobile.twitter.com/walid6519/status/1142368408341766145.

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CHAPTER 40

ISLAMIST PARTIES AND WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN MOROCCO

Taking One for the Team

LINDSAY J. BENSTEAD

When it comes to political representation, women face major obstacles in Arab and Muslim countries. Female candidates encounter biases at the polls and in many countries, and ordinary women are less likely to enjoy clientelistic networks with politicians, who are often men (Bauer and Burnet 2013; Beck 2003; Benstead 2016; Bjarnegård 2013; Tripp 2001). Even when women win elections, they may not be able—or even inclined—to promote liberal gender laws in weak and co-opted legislatures.

The electoral success of Islamist parties and its implication for women has received substantial attention and spanned fears that the electoral success of Islamist parties in places like Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia will threaten women's rights. Islamist parties may incorporate women's rights into their platforms, some argue, but they may not genuinely promote gender equality (Clark and Schwedler 2003).[1]

Yet the relationship between gender and political representation in authoritarian regimes is not straightforward. A growing number of studies of Islam, gender, and governance suggest that women may be better represented in districts with Islamist governments due to Islamist parties' efforts to create effective social service institutions. For instance, Meyersson (2014) finds that the Refah (Welfare) Party in Turkey, which won several mayoral elections, improved poor women's access to education. Henderson and Kuncoro (2011) found that Islamist parties decreased corruption, while Blaydes (2014) showed that women living in Egyptian localities controlled by radical Islamists experienced better healthcare. Abdel-Samad and Benstead (2016) find that in Tunisia, women living in districts with Islamist and female legislators are more likely to interact with elected officials than those living in electoral districts without female legislators, due to female legislators' access to sex-segregated spaces, which increases ordinary women's interaction with deputies (especially with female deputies), and Islamist parties' desire to serve marginalized populations including women.[2]

The suggestion that Islamist parties' institutionalization has positive consequences for female citizens is compelling. Yet it has been tested in only a few cases. This chapter draws on original data to test the Islamic mandate effect in Morocco, where women gained 35 of 325 seats (11%) due to a reserved seat quota in the 2002 elections when the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) won 42 of 325 (13%) of all seats in parliament. Using data from a survey of 112 parliamentarians and qualitative interviews in parliamentary offices in Tangiers, a city in northern Morocco, this chapter tests the impact of electing Islamist parties and women on female citizens' access to networks with politicians, which they use to seek help with constituency service requests.[3] Expanding the Islamic mandate effect (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016), it makes a singular claim: the PJD's more internally democratic party candidate recruitment fosters incentives to cultivate the party reputation over personal reputation and fosters an organizational culture of teamwork, resulting in more responsive constituency service to women.

The findings are striking. Islamist deputies receive more requests from women, as do female deputies of any party. Secular male MPs interacted least with female citizens, while Islamist male, Islamist female, and non-Islamist female deputies had similar, high levels of service-oriented interactions with women.[4]

By highlighting the gendered impacts of Islamist governance, this study builds on an already growing literature theorizing about the role that party institutionalization plays in supporting Islamist parties' electoral success (Cammett and Jones Luong 2014). It also builds on gender and politics research on Islamist females' work in sex-segregated environments by showing that the gender gap in interactions between parliamentarians and citizens is also narrowed mixed-sex teamwork in the context of constituency offices.

CONCEPTUALIZING CLIENTELISTIC RESPONSIVENESS

This chapter focuses on state-citizen interactions in clientelistic settings—authoritarian regimes with weak rule of law in which personal connections are needed to resolve social challenges that citizens face. Clientelism is an "informal relationship between two actors of asymmetrical socioeconomic power where the patron . . . controls . . . resources . . . clients pursue but often cannot receive otherwise" (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 953). Citizens frequently contact intermediaries, including elected officials, for help with personal problems such as accessing healthcare, education, or jobs, which functions as a form of constituency service when leaders are willing and able to assist them, a form of service responsiveness.[5] Because access to it is based on preferential networks, not on fair treatment of citizens under the law, service responsiveness should be referred to as "clientelistic responsiveness" (Benstead 2016). Yet although service responsiveness takes place in clientelistic settings, it nevertheless serves as a vital link to the state that helps citizens navigate the myriad bottlenecks of corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. Interactions between legislators and citizens may promote different forms of responsiveness,[6] including by bringing women's concerns into the policymaking sphere (Arat 2005, 113; Kudva 2003), an outcome akin to policy responsiveness. When citizens come in contact with legislators and other representatives of the state, they may also ask for other non-exclusionary goods such as a road or other service for a whole community (i.e., allocation responsiveness). Moreover, these interactions also promote citizens' trust in their representatives, which is a form of symbolic responsiveness. In reality, the dimensions of responsiveness overlap (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), forming a seamless process of responsiveness to citizens' needs (Celis et al. 2008).

The Case of Morocco

Morocco is a useful case for examining the effect of Islamist party orientation and gender on women's access to networks with elected officials. As shown in Table 40.1, Morocco's population is 99% Muslim. While many Moroccans identify as Arab, the indigenous Amazigh population accounts for 40% of its population. Social norms in many rural areas are strongly traditional, with patrilineal tribes playing a strong role (Charrad 2001).[7] Recent family code reform in 2003 (Waltz and Benstead 2006) and the implementation of a parliamentary gender quota in 2002 contributed to the improvements in gender equality. However, women from lower socioeconomic classes and those in rural areas can face particularly severe social and political discrimination in addition to experiencing poverty.

Gender Inequality Index scores of .44 illustrate a high level of gender discrimination in politics, healthcare, and economic life. Women's low workforce participation (26%) suggests that they could be relatively more excluded from formal political networks (Ross 2008). Morocco has low historical levels of women's representation. The first woman was elected to the Moroccan parliament in 1993 (Gribaa 2008). At the time of the study, thirty-five (11%) of the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives were women; thirty were elected to the national list as a result of a reserved seat quota negotiated by the political parties in 2002, and five, including two from the PJD, were elected in regular constituencies (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013).

With a gross domestic product (per capita PPP) of $4,600, Morocco is also a developing country in which citizens encounter many social and economic challenges that require them to seek help from friends, the government, and other sources. Due to unemployment, unresponsive government, and corruption, Moroccans' needs for housing, jobs, and public services abound. According to the Arab Barometer (2015), many citizens find services difficult to obtain: 34% found getting an identity document difficult, 75% stated that obtaining medical services is difficult, and 26% found getting help from police difficult. While women did not have less access to these services, according to the

Table 40.1: Moroccan Case

Social	Population (millions)[i]	32.0
	Percent Muslim (official)[ii]	99%
	Percent Amazigh[iii]	40–50%
	Family law[iv]	Conservative until 2004
	Gender Inequality Index[v]	.444
	Proportion women, House of Representatives (2002)[vi]	35 (10.7%)
Political	Regime type[vii]	Lynchpin monarchy
	Parliamentary Powers Index[viii]	.31
	Freedom House (2012)[ix]	Partly free
	Electoral system (2002)[x]	Closed-List PR, 325-member Chamber of Representatives, upper house
	District magnitude	2–5 seats, 95 geographical constituencies/ 30-seat national constituency for women
	Gender quota	Reserved seat
Economic	GDP per capita (US$)[xi]	$4,600
	Oil dependency[xii]	Low
	Percent women in workforce[xiii]	26%

Source:

[i] World Bank (2014);

[ii] CIA, *World Factbook*;

[iii] Ennaji (2005); Benstead and Reif (2013);

[iv] Charrad (2001);

[v] UNDP (2013);

[vi] Darhour and Dahlerup (2013), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU);

[vii] Jamal and Lust-Okar (2002);

[viii] Fish and Kroenig (2009);

[ix] Freedom House (2012);

[x] Benstead (2008);

[xi] World Bank (2014);

[xii] Proportion export earnings from oil/natural gas: 0–33% (low)/34–65% (moderate)/66–100% (high), Cammett (2011, 101);

[xiii] World Bank (2014).

Arab Barometer, females were significantly more likely to have never tried, suggesting patriarchal norms limit women's access to public spaces (Benstead 2016; Sadiqi 2008).

Politically, Morocco is an authoritarian regime that is considered partly free by Freedom House (Freedom House 2012), a result of decades of political liberalization under the country's linchpin monarchy, headed by King Mohammed VI, who ascended the throne in 1999. As in other Arab countries, when the regime faced pressure to liberalize politically in the 1980s, it feared that its grip on power might be challenged by rising Islamist parties. The Moroccan PJD emerged several decades earlier, but it was not until the 1990s that it made significant strides in the parliamentary elections. In the 1960s, Abdelkrim al-Khatib founded the National Popular Movement, a royalist party with significant support in the rural south. His party would later split, leading to the emergence of the Islamist movement, the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), from which he later founded the Party of Justice and Development (PJD).

After al-Khatib's initial experience in the 1977 parliamentary elections, the MUR participated in elections in 1997 and was named the PJD in 1998. By 2002 the PJD was still considered an opposition party, winning 13% of the seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Yet the PJD achieved 13% of the seats after fielding candidates only in some districts. Based on interviews that I conducted with journalists and civil society actors in Morocco in 2007, I found two narratives explaining why the PJD did not run nationwide. One view held that the PJD did not field candidates in all of the districts to avoid being "too successful" and facing state repression, such as that meted out to Islamist parties in Algeria and Egypt (Masoud 2014). Another view was that the PJD was not able to break into the regime's solid grasp on patronage networks in rural areas, which traditionally benefited from electoral gerrymandering and ties with the palace. As a party with a base among middle-class, educated Moroccans, the PJD may have avoided fielding candidates in rural areas where it did not expect to succeed electorally. It was from this position in the opposition that the PJD deputies answered the survey.

The Islamist PJD has become a major political force in the country, rising from a small opposition party in parliament in the 1990s to a party that enjoyed a plurality in parliament and the prime minister's office in 2011. The regime tried to weaken the PJD between 2007 and 2010, only to see it become a major winner after the Arab uprisings. By 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the PJD won a plurality (26%) of seats in the legislature and its leader was for the first time named as the country's prime minister, though a shadow cabinet still ran important government affairs (Buehler 2015).

Although the founders of the PJD were men, women joined in large numbers, and within a generation they constituted one-fourth of the party's membership. As early as 1999, the PJD's General Secretariat enacted a quota of 15% female delegates at the party congress (Wegner 2011, 54). In addition, like the Ennahda movement in Tunisia, the PJD also never practiced gender segregation within its party structures (Wegner 2011), and it took steps early on to increase women in its internal party structures and as candidates. In 2000, King Mohammed VI made several high-level female political appointments, and in 2002 political parties signed a "gentleman's agreement," reserving thirty seats in the Chamber of Representatives for women (Sadiqi 2008). But the PJD is not the only party in Morocco to do so. The socialist USFP, for instance, also has a strong showing of female parliamentarians (Benstead 2021). This raises questions about how and why electing women generally, and Islamist parties in particular, shapes women's representation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXISTING LITERATURE

Applied to political life, network homosociality helps explain why electing women supports greater gender balance in political life, whether at the elite or citizen levels. Examining Thailand, Bjarnegård (2013) argues that women face barriers to elected office because they lack ties to powerful individuals, who are usually male, which are needed to access resources and succeed in elections. A network-based approach suggests that it is not gender stereotypes that reproduce women's marginalization from politics—though stereotypes may contribute to the problem—but men's numerical dominance in the political sphere. Bjarnegård argues that men have advantages accruing homosocial capital—that is, resources in same-sex friendships and working relationships such as political ties—which is made up of two components. Homosocial capital consists of instrumental resources that flow through political networks ("instrumental resources") and relational similarities ("expressive resources"). Expressive resources are relational similarities (e.g., ease relating, fewer conflicts), which stem from traditional norms defining public space as male and private space as female (Sadiqi 2008) and encourage sex segregation, while instrumental resources are resources needed to reach goals, such as winning office or attracting patronage. Since males are numerically dominant, instrumental and expressive resources are not in opposition to one another for men, helping to explain why men are more likely to be recruited for and succeed in elections.

The concept of homosocial capital is also useful for understanding why women's access to linkages with politicians differs from that of men (Benstead 2016). Male leaders have more men in their networks and thus are more likely to serve male citizens. Electing female legislators increases women's access to networks with elected officials because women tend to have more heterosocial networks. Women have more females in their network than men, but female legislators must engage with males to gain the resources (i.e., instrumental resources) they need to be electorally successful.

Benstead (2016) offers evidence from several countries that women are marginalized from linkages with elected officials. She finds in Morocco and Algeria that electing women, especially through quotas, improves women's access to national legislators. In a nationally representative survey of 1,200 Libyans,[8] Benstead (2015) found that women were significantly less likely to contact parliamentarians than men. But electing women reduced the gender gap in access to political networks because female constituents were more likely than male citizens to contact female representatives. Female constituents reported that the gender of the MP they contact was female 17% of the time, while male citizens stated that the gender of the MP they contacted was never female. When male constituents contacted an MP, it was never a female member.[9] The same was true for Tunisia, where citizens more often contacted same-gendered local councilors, particularly when making large requests for club goods, which require a close relationship (Benstead 2019).

The Islamic Mandate Effect

The Islamic mandate theory is helpful for explaining why electing Islamist parties promote female citizens' access to networks with legislators. Abdel-Samad and Benstead (2016) argue that this is due to the Islamic mandate effect, which has both a "party" and a "gendered" mechanism, leading to improved service responsiveness toward women when Islamist parties are elected.[10] They argue that Islamist parties strive to serve marginalized populations, including women, through the institutionalization of constituency service and levering female members to reach out to women in private and public spaces (party component). This results in more interaction with women and members of other marginalized groups.

Islamic Mandate Effect: Party Component

First, Islamists engage in more interactions with female citizens because they institutionalize service provision by establishing direct contact with citizens through a network of party and local offices, mosques, social service institutions, and schools (Aldrich 1995; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Roháč 2013, 256). Moreover, they emphasize support from the needy in their communities (Bayat 2002; Catusse and Zaki 2009; Esposito 1999; Hamzeh 2001; Harik 1994; Ismail 2001; Milton-Edwards 2007; Troudi 2011; Walsh 2006; Wiktorowicz 2002), which also support greater access to networks with legislators by female citizens.[11] Because Islamist parties use service provision to promote party reputation for fairness and social responsibility (Cammett and Jones Luong 2014), they are different from other non-Islamist parties in authoritarian regimes, which, while they may not all be corrupt, tend to operate in a highly clientelistic way (Abdel-Samad 2009; Benstead 2008; Brumberg 2002; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014; Esposito 1999; Wickham 2002), in which individual members seek to foster their own reputation over that of the party. Brooke (2019) argues that in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was successful not through proselytizing or electoral mobilization or reaching out to the poor, but by providing high-quality, paid medical services to the middle classes, which improved the group's reputation. As such, the Brotherhood sought to build a good reputation more than to engage in proselytizing or electoral mobilization.[12] Because of this approach, Islamist parties stand out from others in different ways, including by serving more female citizens than other more clientelistic parties (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016).

Islamic Mandate Effect: Gendered Component

Second, Islamists engage in more interactions with female citizens because they involve female members in reaching out to women citizens in sex-segregated environments, leading to an increase in women's access to networks with parliamentarians. This is the second, "gendered" component of their theory of Islamist representation of women. Female members not only mobilize voters, but they also establish new social networks (Clark 2004b) by meeting women who are not engaged in political networks through social functions like homes, weddings, and social teas (Arat 2005; Blaydes and Tarouty 2009). By emphasizing piety, Islamist parties foster "sacred" spaces that ensure that women can safely enter political offices and participate in meetings while being free from harassment and negative impacts on their reputation. Islamist parties in several countries utilize quotas to increase the number of women not only on party lists but also within their organization (Clark and Schweder 2003), and often have women's sections in their party offices and women's committees (White 2002; Yadav 2010). Direct contact with constituents allows Islamist women to access female citizens who are practicing Muslims and may be reluctant to approach male legislators, and to talk to someone who understands the obstacles they face.

Extending the Islamic Mandate Effect: The Role of Mixed-Sex Teamwork

Abdel-Samad and Benstead (2016) theorized that female deputies' promoted women's representation through fostering interactions with women in sex-segregated spaces and by creating spaces that allow gender mixing while respecting piety. Yet neither the MUR nor the PJD practiced sex segregation within their party structures. Rather, teamwork as a party involving party members and legislators at all levels has characterized their work. This does not mean that sex segregation does not occur within the PJD or any other party. Indeed, homosociality is a feature of human interactions in many settings (Bjarnegård 2013). Rather, an extension of the Islamic mandate theory holds that mixed-sex teamwork, in addition to interactions with citizens in sex-segregated settings, contributes to the PJD's ability to establish networks with female citizens. I argue that the PJD's stronger party institutionalization enhances legislators' electoral incentives to work in *mixed-sex* teams and build their party's reputation, leading to Islamist parliamentarians' more frequent service interactions with female citizens.

Measuring Incentives to Promote the Party Reputation

Islamist MPs do in fact perceive greater incentives to cultivate their party's reputation over their personal reputation than do members of other parties (Benstead 2016). I asked MPs to tell me about their electoral strategy by responding to the following survey question: "In your opinion, what is the best strategy for seeking reelection to the Chamber of Representatives? Build a strong party image (=1); build a strong party and personal image, but focus on the party image (=2); build a strong party and personal image equally (=3); build a strong party and personal image, but focus on the personal image (=4); and, build a strong personal image (=5)." I found in Morocco that the PJD was the most party-focused, scoring 1.6 on average compared to 3.2 for all other parties ($p<.001$).[13] That is, PJD deputies were more likely than other MPs to believe that the pathway to re-election depending on what they did for their party as a unit, rather than their efforts to establish their personal reputation in the district.

Incentives to Promote the Party Reputation and Teamwork

I also found evidence for a link between these incentives and the tendency toward teamwork involving party members and legislators of both sexes. I conducted field research throughout Morocco, including in the northern city of Tangiers (Benstead 2008). During my visit to Tangiers, I visited the offices of the four parliamentarians who represented one of the city's electoral districts. The type of office that each deputy had and its organizational culture differed markedly, with profound implications for citizens' access.

Office 1

The first office that I visited belonged to a socialist deputy—a lawyer—with whom I had arranged a meeting. His parliamentary office doubled as his legal practice and was located on an upper floor of a commercial building with a doorbell and receptionist. The MP was friendly and approachable. He detailed the types of requests that he received from constituents. Yet no constituents were present at the time of the visit. This deputy, while working conscientiously as a lawyer and member of the House of Representatives, did not have a constituency office that was set up to foster direct contact with citizens.

Office 2

The second office that I visited was that of a pro-regime party MP who utilized his home as his office. Although I rang the bell, there was no answer. A young girl was sitting beside the deputy's gate in a wheelchair asking passersby for money. This deputy, if he had a constituency office at all, utilized his home and was not on this occasion available to visitors, although he may have been at other times.

Office 3

The third office I visited was that of two Islamist deputies from the district—a man and a woman—working together in a party office. Upon reaching the neighborhood, I asked a man standing beside his truck for help locating the office. He said, "I know them. They are the only MPs around here who work hard. I'll take you there."[14] Then he took me to an office where a female receptionist welcomed me and took me into the reception area, where the two parliamentarians were seated with two other party members. Together, the male and female MPs were engaged in talking with their constituents about an issue that concerned them. Anyone in the constituency could directly enter the office without making a prior appointment.

In this example, the PJD was the only party that had elected two representatives in the district, and thus it was more natural that they would work together. Yet this teamwork and direct contact with citizens was aided by the presence of a constituency office with a staff that was dedicated to constituent relations rather than to another function, as was the case with the lawyer's office. While I visited other non-Islamist offices in which many citizens were present, this PJD office from Tangiers was the only one in which multiple members were present working together with citizens.

This team orientation and institutionalization of constituency services was also evident in the qualitative interviews. When I asked parliamentarians to tell me the average number of requests that they receive per month, many Islamist deputies clarified this, stating, "It is the party that takes care of citizens who ask for help."[15] The PJD, in contrast to other parties, indicated that the party works together as a unit to resolve citizens' needs and build the party's reputation.

The PJD's candidate recruitment practices also contrast with those of non-Islamist parties, creating a strong incentive for teamwork, based upon my field research in Morocco. The PJD was the only party that noted in interviews that they conduct internal votes among party members to select candidates. When I asked parliamentarians whether they planned to run again, all MPs could respond, but PJD MPs' response was often, "That's not up to me. It's the party that decides."[16] No other socialist or pro-regime party members stated that it was the party that decides who would be a candidate in the future, and party-switching is common. One female deputy from a socialist party shared the internal power struggles regarding who would be selected to head the party's list for the female seats.[17] She stated that party members traded favors in an effort to jockey to be a candidate on the party's electoral list. Other MPs noted that they had changed parties when they were not able to be successful.

Thus, to sum up, expanding on the Islamic mandate effect (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016), I argue that the PJD's more internally democratic candidate recruitment practices foster incentives to cultivate the party over candidates' personal reputation and an organizational culture of mixed-sex teamwork in addition to women's work in sex-segregated settings, resulting in more responsive constituency service to women.

HYPOTHESES

Accordingly, I propose several hypotheses. First, I expect that, due to network homosociality, female parliamentarians from any party will provide more constituency services to female constituents than male parliamentarians, helping to reduce the gender gap in access to connections with parliamentarians (H1).

Homosociality Hypothesis

> *H1: Female parliamentarians will engage in more constituency contacts with female constituents than male parliamentarians.*

Second, because Islamist parties more than others use voting by party members to foster more internally democratic candidate selection and foster incentives to promote the party image than do other parties, Islamist male parliamentarians will work in mixed-sex teams and provide more constituency services to female constituents and other marginalized citizens than non-Islamist male parliamentarians (H2).

Islamic Mandate Hypotheses: Party Mechanism

> *H2: Islamist male parliamentarians will engage in more constituency contacts with female constituents than non-Islamist male parliamentarians.*

Finally, I hypothesize that Islamist female parliamentarians will provide more constituency services to female constituents than non-Islamist female parliamentarians (H3). I argue that this occurs because female Islamists meet female constituents in sex-segregated environments more than non-Islamist females to adhere to Islamic values of piety. In addition I argue that Islamist parties' use of teamwork in mixed-sex teams also promotes female citizens' interactions with parliamentarians.

The Islamic Mandate Hypotheses: Gendered Mechanism

> *H3: Islamist female parliamentarians will engage in more constituency interactions with female constituents than non-Islamist female parliamentarians.*

DATA AND METHODS

The data used to test the homosociality (H1) and Islamic mandate hypotheses (H2–H3) are from an original paper-and-pencil survey of 112 Moroccan Chamber of Representatives members conducted between September 2006 and May 2007. I used two-stage probabilistic sampling to draw a representative sample of deputies to whom I administered the questionnaire, either at the parliament or in their district.[18] The survey focused on constituency activities and had forty questions in French and Arabic. When possible, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with deputies when I administered the paper-and-pencil survey.[19] While many interviews were conducted at the national parliament, others took place in the electoral constituency itself, including in Tangiers, a city in northern Morocco that is the particular focus of this paper. Through the survey and qualitative interview, I learned more about the constituency service practices of the legislators. I conducted these interviews in district offices and the parliament. The survey had a response rate of 57%.[20]

Measurement of Dependent and Independent Variables

To measure the dependent variable, interactions with female constituents, I use this item: "What percent of these requests come directly from women? Less than 10% (=1),

Table 40.2: Moroccan House of Representatives (2002–2007)

Parliamentary group	Total seats	Number of females elected	Percent seats held by female
Parliamentary groups[a]			
Movement Group (MP)	72	5	6.9
Independence Group of Unity and Equality (*Istiqlal*)	60	6	10.0
Group of the National Rally of Independents (RNI)	39	4	10.3
Group of the Constitutional Democrat Union (CD)	28	2	7.1
Socialist Group (USFP)	48	5	10.4
Group of the Socialist Alliance	21	2	9.5
Justice and Development Group (PJD)	42	6	14.3
Small Parties and Independents			
Deputies of the Democratic Forces Front (FFD)	8	2	25.0
Deputies of the Unified Socialist Left (GSU)	3	0	0
Deputies of the Alliance of Freedoms	1	0	0
Deputies without Party Affiliation	3	0	0
Total	325	32	9.8

[a] Parliamentary group composition at the survey, 2006–2007.

10–19% (=2), 20–29% (=3), 30–39% (=4), 40–49% (=5), 50–59% (=6), 60–69% (=7), 70% or more (=8)." The mean response in the full sample of MPs is 3.87.

To measure the key independent variables, deputy gender, and party affiliation, I used the gender and party affiliation reported on the survey. As shown in Table 40.2, twenty-six parties contested the elections in 2002 in ninety-five districts with two to five seats each, as well as the national list, for a total of 325 seats. The Socialist Union of Socialist and Popular Forces (USFP) won 50 seats; the country's oldest party, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, received 48 seats; the Islamist PJD gained 42 seats; the conservative party of the *makhzen*, the National Rally of Independents (RNI), took 41 seats; the People's Movement and the National People's Movement, which subsequently formed a single Popular Movement (MP), received 27 and 18 seats, respectively; and, the Constitutional Union (UC) had 16 seats. The remaining fifteen parties received 83 seats. These parties formed parliamentary groups to establish offices in the parliament. Nearly all parties elected female members, most to the 30 reserved seats for women. Five women were elected in geographical constituencies as well. A few small parties elected no women, while most parties elected between 7 and 25 percent women. The PJD elected 14% women, which was greater than any other party except the Democratic Forces Front (FFD).

The key explanatory variable is MP gender and party affiliation. The Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is the only Islamist party, while other parties are coded as non-Islamist: the Koutla (governing coalition)—Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Istiqlal, Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), and the Unified Socialist Party (GSU)—were moderately oppositional and may not differ from members of pro-palace parties, including the National Rally of Independents (RNI). In the sample as a whole, 74% are male non-Islamist deputies, 9% are female non-Islamist deputies, 13% are male Islamist deputies, and 3% are female Islamist deputies. Thus, the conclusions that can be drawn from comparing Islamist female and non-Islamist female deputies is limited by the small n.

Descriptive Statistics

In support of H2, the PJD interacts with women more than any other party. As shown in Figure 40.1, the PJD was the only party that achieved gender parity (5.7) in its constituency service provision. All other parties scored 4.0 or lower on the scale of interaction with female constituents, and the difference across the parties is statistically significant ($p < .01$).

To be sure, this effect could partially be driven by the relatively high number of women in the PJD party, at 14% (Table 40.2). However, one other party, the FFD, had more women, at 25% of its MPs. As shown in Figure 40.2 and in support of the homosociality hypothesis (H1), female members interact with female citizens more than male members. Male members serve nearly 30–39% women (3.68 on an 8-point scale), while female members serve 50–59% on average (5.57 on an 8-point scale).



FIGURE 40.1: Percentage of requests received from female constituents, by party.



FIGURE 40.2: Percentage of requests received from female constituents, by MP identity. Question wording: "What percent of these requests come directly from women? Less than 10% (=1), 10-19% (=2), 20-29% (=3), 30-39% (=4), 40-49% (=5), 50-59% (=6), 60-69% (=7), 70% or more (=8)." The average among all MPs is 3.87.

Yet the comparisons between male and female deputies from Islamist and non-Islamist tendencies also support the Islamic mandate hypothesis (H2). Female deputies serve more citizens than male deputies, but male Islamist deputies are as responsive to females as their female colleagues from any party. The average non-Islamist male deputy reported a score of 3.27 on a scale of 1–8 (about 20–29% of requests from women), while an average Islamist male deputy has a score of 5.67 (almost 50–59% on an 8-point scale). This suggests that Islamists generally institutionalize constituency service in a way that helps them reach out to citizens from different backgrounds, especially those who are more marginalized from formal networks.

Yet unlike in the Tunisian case (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016), there is no evidence for the Islamic mandate hypothesis's gendered component, which expects that Islamist female MPs are more prone to serving citizens in sex-segregated environments than are non-Islamist female MPs. Inconsistent with H3, female parliamentarians do not differ from one another in their responsiveness to female constituents. Non-Islamist female MPs and Islamist female MPs receive about 50–60% requests from women. This could be due to the small sample size. Only 3% of MPs who responded were Islamist females, due to their small number within the Chamber of Representatives.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the impact of the deputy party identification and gender on responsiveness to female citizens. The overall n is low, but the regressions are significant and robust to multiple specifications. Model 1, which includes only parliamentarian gender, explains 30% of the variation in responsiveness to female constituents, while Model 2, which includes the intersection of parliamentarians' gender and Islamist orientation, explains 35% of the variation in the dependent variable in Morocco. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity tests indicate the constant variance assumption is not violated.

Measurement of Control Variables

In the regressions, I include three measures of electoral incentives: a proxy for district population, perceived incentives to provide clientelism, and political ambition (Table 40.3). Women elected in larger districts may be more responsive to females, due to weaker incentives to cultivate a personal vote and greater freedom to serve less politically influential constituencies; a high density of civil society organizations; and urban, employed female constituents. Women elected in small districts—such as Moroccan districts, with 2–5 seats—may have strong incentives to cultivate a personal vote among female and male constituents and lower responsiveness to women. District population, measured with five levels, is included as a control variable.[21]

Because numerous factors, including electoral competitiveness, can affect how inclusive legislators' networks are of women, I control for perceived importance of providing services, measured as agreement on a four-point Likert scale: "Serving citizens is important for maintaining electoral support." Political ambition could affect inclusiveness. Thus, a measure of whether the respondent plans to seek higher office is included. Deputies who plan to run again or perceive electoral benefits of service provision may be less likely to serve females because patriarchally organized constituencies, such as tribes or Sufi brotherhoods, are more advantageous to serve.

Second, I control for the extent to which deputies have networks helpful for solving requests: education, tapping workforce participation, and political experience. Education has six levels, ranging from high school or less to doctorate. In Morocco, members may hold concurrent functions, such as mayor. Previous political experience is measured as a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent indicated a past public role, such as local councilor. The models also include a dummy variable equal to one if the member served at least one previous parliamentary term. Those with experience should have denser networks and be more likely to serve a broad constituency, including men and women.

Table 40.3: Measurement of Control Variables

District population:
Morocco: "What is the best description of your electoral zone? Large city, more than 200,000=4/100,000–200,000=3/less than 100–000=2/rural and small villages=1/national list=5."

Electoral incentives:
Electoral basis: "Serving citizens is important for maintaining electoral support: Strongly agree=4/agree=3/disagree=2/strongly disagree=1."
Political ambition: "Will you try to attain a higher political position in the future? Definitely=2/probably=1/no=0."

Network density:
Education: "Please indicate your highest level of education: High school or less=1/baccalaureat=2/short cycle university diploma=3/long cycle university diploma=4/master's=5/doctorate=6."
Previous political experience, 1 for any of the following: "What was your occupation prior to being elected?"/"How many years have you served as an elected official a local council?"/"How many years have you served as an elected official in a regional council?"/"Which of the following positions do you hold or have you held?"/"Do you have a second public function?"
Previous mandate: "How many mandates have you served as a deputy? Current only=0/two, including current=1/three or more, including current=1."

Controls:
Age: Less than 35 years=1/35–39=2/40–44=3/45–49=4/50–54=5/55–60=6/61 or more=7.

Third, I control for age and district socioeconomic level. Age has six levels, from 35–39 years to 61 or more. In rural and less developed areas, women should be less likely to approach members, leading to less inclusiveness. Development level is measured as the log of hospital beds/100,000 people.

Homosociality Hypothesis (H1)

As hypothesized (H1) and consistent with existing research (Benstead 2016), female members are more responsive to women than are males, but the model is significant only at the $p<.10$ level (Model 1). Responsiveness is 2.69 higher ($p<.05$), on average, on an 8-point scale for female than male deputies, suggesting that electing women decreases the gender gap. But given the small number of observations, this difference does not reach conventional significance levels.

Islamic Mandate Effect: Party Component (H2a and H2b)

Responsiveness is also higher among Islamist male deputies than non-Islamist male deputies (Model 2), as hypothesized by the Islamic mandate effect party component (H2). Islamist male deputies are 1.80 units more responsive than non-Islamist male deputies, all else being equal ($p<.05$). In Model 2, female non-Islamist deputies are 3.68 units more responsive than non-Islamist male deputies ($p<.05$). But due to the small size of the sample, female non-Islamist deputies are not significantly more responsive to female constituents than Islamist male deputies or Islamist female deputies.

Islamic Mandate Effect: Gendered Component (H3)

Contrary to the Islamic mandate effect's gendered component (H3), the evidence does not support the claim that, in Morocco, Islamist female deputies are more likely to respond to women than non-Islamist female deputies due to the possibility of greater constituency service in sex-segregated environments. This is somewhat surprising, given female Islamist deputies were particularly likely to serve women in Tunisia. The lack of evidence in support of H3 could be due to the small number of Islamist females.

Control Variables

Responsiveness to women is higher in urban districts with populations greater than 200,000. In Model 1 (Table 40.4), the average responsiveness is 1.63 units higher, on average, than in rural areas ($p<.05$), while in Model 2 it is 1.29 units higher ($p<.05$). Perceptions of the importance of providing services or the desire to run again in the future do not predict responsiveness for female citizens. Neither deputy political experience, age, and education, nor the development level of the district were significant.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Theories of homosocial capital offer fertile ground for examining the impact of Islamist parties on women's access to constituency service. In the study, nearly 30–39% of requests to legislators in Morocco come from women. Yet, consistent with previous work, electing women improves the potential for their service and symbolic representation by increasing women's interaction with elected officials. Contrary to conventional wisdom, electing Islamist parties also contributes markedly to closing the gender gap. Islamist males were as likely as women from any party to serve female citizens. This supports the claim that Islamist parties foster women's representation by working in mixed-sex teams in order to support their party's reputation over their own.

Yet the results did not support the hypothesis that electing female Islamists has a particularly strong impact on improving responsiveness to women. This may be due to the small number of female Islamists in the study. The number of women elected—thirty-five—is too small to speak definitely about how partisan differences across these women may impact their representative styles. It may also mean that the improvements in

Table 40.4: Determinants of Service Responsiveness to Women

	Model 1	Model 2
	OLS coefficients	
Electoral incentives		
Urban (Less than 100,000)[1]	.89(.79)	.96(.77)
Urban (100,000-200,000)[1]	1.26(.88)	1.09(.87)
Urban (More than 200,000)[1]	1.63(.63)*	1.29(.64)*
National list	.80(1.47)	.37(1.49)
Electoral basis (Agree)[2]	-.47(1.02)	-.81(1.07)
Electoral basis (Strongly agree)[2]	-1.15(1.02)	-.95(1.02)
Political ambition (Probably)[3]	-.11(.69)	-.36(.71)
Political ambition (Certainly)[3]	-.31(.69)	-.47(.73)
Network density		
Higher education	.03(.16)	.06(.16)
Previous/current political experience	.45(.55)	.66(.56)
Previous parliamentary mandate	.10(.51)	.25(.50)
Controls		
Higher age	-.16(.19)	-.22(.20)
Higher socioeconomic level (hospital beds)	-.43(.36)	-.50(.35)
Parliamentary traits		
Female MPs	2.69(1.38)†	
Female non-Islamist MPs[4]	-	3.68(1.52)*
Male Islamist MPs[4]	-	1.80(.89)*
Female Islamist MPs[4]	-	2.56(1.91)
Constant	7.27(3.10)*	7.85(3.05)*
Test of linear hypothesis:		
$H_0 = b_{\text{(Female non-Islamist)}} - b_{\text{(Male Islamist)}} = 0$	-	F(1, 65)=1.27
$H_0 = b_{\text{(Female non-Islamist)}} - b_{\text{(Female Islamist)}} = 0$	-	F(1, 65)=.33
$H_0 = b_{\text{(Male slamist)}} - b_{\text{(Female Islamist)}} = 0$	-	F(1, 65)=.16
N	82	82
F	2.03	2.16
Prob.>F	.1513	.0156
R^2	.2980	.3468

† *$p < .10$*

* *$p < .05$* ** *$p < .01$* *** *$p < .001$* two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Comparison categories:

[1] Rural/villages.

[2] 2=Disagree.

[3] No.

[4] Male non-Islamist MP.

women's access to Islamist MPs are due more to party institutionalization and mixed-gender teamwork than to female Islamists' efforts in sex-segregated environments like women's organizations or mosques. I contend that both of these processes contribute to Islamist parties' unique engagement with female citizens.

To be sure, interaction and the ability to make a request is not the same thing as that request being favorably addressed or citizens developing feelings of trust toward their representatives. Yet women's access to members is the first step in a potential chain of responsiveness that can lead to symbolic responsiveness (trust, political engagement) and substantive outcomes, including receiving help with a personal or community problem.

The findings have important implications for gender and governance research by showing that parties that institutionalize and become less clientelistic are more responsive to women. Islamist parties do not completely reject clientelistic practices, but when it comes to service provision, they are more internally democratic than other parties. This positively impacts marginalized groups, including women. This is consistent with the argument that clientelism and informality, rather than Islam or something else, inhibits women's equality in political life (Sung 2003).

Existing literature on Islamist parties illustrates the integral role that party reputation plays in supporting Islamist parties electoral success (Brooke 2019; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014). This chapter extends this work by providing new evidence that Islamists MPs believe that promoting their party's reputation is central to their electoral success. And it also shows the implications of this orientation for mixed-sex teamwork and female citizens' access to networks with legislators.

The findings also extend work on Islam, gender, and politics by suggesting that party institutionalization and the creation of mixed-sex constituency service environments is as important as engagement in sex-segregated environments for ensuring that elected officials engage with citizens from more diverse social backgrounds.

The findings concerning Islamist parties are likely to be broadly applicable to clientelistic societies in the Arab and Muslim world, where Islamist parties have the opportunity to mobilize supporters through the openness to engage with them about their basic needs that are unmet by the state.[22] The impact of electing women is likely to shape women's representation in a broader swath of countries, given male advantages in accessing patronage networks in Africa (Tripp 2001), Asia (Bjarnegård 2013), and the Middle East (Benstead 2016). Because Morocco has achieved some expansion of women's rights in the form of the 2003 reform of the Moudawana, the effects of electing women and Islamists are likely to have a greater impact than in more conservative nations such as Yemen.

Nevertheless, this must be tested. A comparative framework should take into account not only how conservative a society is, but also the number of women engaged in the Islamist party as elected officials and as party members. New research should also directly test the role of mixed-sex teamwork and gender segregation in improving women's access to elected leaders. More specifically, this research must focus on institutional differences in how women are engaged in Islamist parties, whether in a more gender-segregated way, as in the case of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan (Clark and Schwedler 2003), or without segregation, as has been the case for the Moroccan PJD and the Tunisian Ennahda.

Other citizen and member identities must also be considered in future research. When parliamentarians and citizens share a family or tribe, they are more likely to have a network with an MP (Benstead 2015). For instance, I find in Jordan that men and women are equally likely to enjoy a network with an MP. This may be due to tribes' political influence, which improves women's service responsiveness, because women can leverage an intersecting identity (i.e., co-ethnicity) to access services (Benstead 2015). Co-ethnicity has also been found to be an important factor facilitating women's political engagement and electoral success (Kao and Benstead 2021).

Future surveys should include questions on citizens' interactions with parliamentarians, and, if possible, surveys of parliamentarians should also be conducted in other countries. In critical cases like Egypt, this is impossible, due to the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood parliament. New research should also consider different types of Islamist parties, including those that are more authoritarian and seek to establish a theocratic state. Future studies should also assess other intersectional aspects of parliamentarian and citizen identity, such as ethnicity and class, and look more closely at the extent to which women and men who are helped by Islamist and other parties turn out to vote for them. Through these extensions, scholars will have a better understanding of how electoral politics impact responsiveness to women and other marginalized citizens.

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NOTES

1 The PJD is not a militant wing but a political party that always focused on electoral participation. Nor did it have social service institutions or directly participate in *da'wa* (proselytizing). Instead, it participated in elections and pushed for social and economic concerns more than religious ones (Brown and Hamzawy 2010).

2 In this chapter, marginalized citizens are those who have been excluded from traditional political networks. Studies from the Middle East indicate that in many countries, women are less able to access political networks than men. See Benstead 2016.

3 The measure of service responsiveness taps whether citizens have asked for help, not whether the service was actually received. This is an important avenue of citizen engagement in clientelistic settings. The survey is based on self-reported data from parliamentarians. Yet there is no reason to believe that male Islamists would be more likely due to social desirability to report interacting with females.

4 Unlike my previous work in Tunisia with Abdel-Samad, I found that Islamist female deputies in Morocco are no more likely to interact with female citizens in their districts than women from socialist or other parties. This may be due to the small number of

observations or it may suggest that all female parliamentarians tend to interact equally often with female constituents in different types of settings (e.g., constituency offices, civil society organizations).

5 According to my research, the most common requests made to Moroccan parliamentarians involve "social problems such as medicine, hospital beds," "work," "local development, security, parks"; "job transfers for teachers, family reunification," and "education" (Benstead 2016).

6 Building on Pitkin's (1967) conceptualization of representation as responsiveness rather than policy congruence, Eulau and Karps (1977) identified four dimensions of responsiveness: symbolic, service, policy, and allocation (i.e., district projects) responsiveness. Symbolic responsiveness refers to interactions with constituents (Eulau and Karps 1977), which create conditions for service, allocation (i.e., club goods), and policy (i.e., legislative) responsiveness.

7 Tribes in Morocco are strong and supportive of the monarchy; patronage flows to rural notables, strengthening tribes (Charrad 2001).

8 2013 National Democratic Institute poll of 1,200 Libyans. Diwan Research. Benstead, Lust, and JMW Consulting. Transitional Governance Project (2021).

9 In Jordan, men and women are equally likely to ask a female for help. This may be due to tribes' political influence, which improves women's service responsiveness because women can leverage an intersecting identity (i.e., co-ethnicity) to access services (Benstead 2015).

10 Abdel-Samad and Benstead (2016) adapt this term from Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), who argued that quota-elected women's perceive a mandate, or "obligation to act on behalf of women," due to their underrepresentation (394–395). Along similar lines, research on race in the United States finds black state legislators were more likely to respond to letters from black constituents, even those living outside their district, suggesting an intrinsic motivation to serve members of one's own, marginalized group (Broockman 2013).

11 Some theorists claim this constitutes an exchange of favors for votes (Alterman 2000; Flanigan 2008; Hamzeh 2001). Others argue that these activities are different from traditional clientelistic networks because they are based on "horizontal networks" between group members working to provide services to citizens to promote the party's goals (Clark 2004a; Roháč 2013, 267). Islamist parties focus on fairness and responsiveness, but may also utilize some traditional patronage networks or establish new ones. The concept of clientelistic responsiveness (Benstead 2016) suggests that these exchanges and interactions are inherently clientelistic. This is due to the context in which they are embedded, but this does not diminish their importance for citizens needing support for their needs or their consequences for improving trust their representatives.

12 Yet, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the PJD does not have a service network. It is also not the only political party in Morocco with a history of electing women.

13 The Socialist Alliance (3.6) Istiqlal (3.3), RNI (3.3), USFP (3.1), Popular Movement (MP) (3.1), GSU (3.0), CD (2.9), and FFD (2.7).

14 Interview with male citizen, 25–40 years old, Tangiers, Morocco (2008).

15 Interview with male MP, 41–55 years old, Rabat, Morocco (2008).

16 Interview with male MP, 41–55 years old, Rabat, Morocco (2008).

17 Interview with female MP, 41–55 years old, Casablanca, Morocco (2008).

18 First, random stratified sample with parliamentary group as strata; females and members of parliamentary groups with fewer than 8% of seats over-sampled. Second, random stratified sample of electoral districts with region and population as strata.

19 I also conducted qualitative interviews with 10% of the MPs who responded to the survey and agreed to a secondary qualitative interview. No differences in item response rates were noted.

20 American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), Response Rate 3 (RR3).

21 Electoral districts in Morocco do not correspond to administrative areas. Gerrymandering increases the importance of rural areas, where palace support is strong. District population is difficult to obtain and estimates rendered regressions insignificant. MP age was not statistically significant and not included in the regressions.

22 Effects may not generalize where Islamist parties establish an authoritarian, theocratic government, or when few women are engaged in the party, whether as elected officials or party militants.

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CHAPTER 41

THE ISLAMIC STATE AS A REVOLUTIONARY REBEL GROUP

IS's Governance and Violence in Historical Context

MEGAN A. STEWART

At the Islamic State's (IS) height, the rebel group controlled over 100,000 square kilometers of territory in Iraq and Syria (Jones et al. 2017, 20), captivating both adherents and adversaries worldwide. In the process of taking control of a territorial space that spanned the sovereign borders of two nation-states, the IS unleashed spectacular and gruesome violence. At the same time, it began to co-opt, construct, and consolidate an interconnected web of institutions that not only governed millions of people (Jones et al. 2017, 20), but frequently did so in ways that some Iraqis perceived to be superior to the Iraqi state itself (Revkin 2020a). Throughout the process, the Islamic State's specific religious perspective appeared to undergird a number of its behavioral choices. What then explains the Islamic State's warmaking and governance strategies?

In this essay, I argue that the Islamic State's overarching strategy with respect to warmaking and governance is not derived from its religious ideology, but rather represents a jihadist adaptation of a strategy for revolutionary warfare first coherently articulated, and then especially propagated, by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Civil War. This strategy includes a military doctrine that integrates both conventional and guerrilla warfare alongside other violent tactics, simultaneously coupled with intensive sociopolitical restructuring through governance. Not only is the Islamic State's strategy not new, it is also not the only other jihadist organization to adopt the dual-front revolutionary warfare approach. Instead, religious ideology tends to influence the nature of governing institutions (e.g., religious taxes and shariʿa courts), the primary beneficiaries of governance and the targets of violence. The strategic template for the construction of a specific portfolio of governance institutions alongside specifically patterned violence, however, is unrelated to religious ideology.

Importantly, I am not the first to argue that the Islamic State is a revolutionary organization and that its military behaviors reflect its revolutionary character (Whiteside 2016a, 2016b; Kalyvas 2018). Rather, my contribution is to first articulate the nature and origins of a single strategy for rebel groups that combines military and governance elements, to explain that this strategy is most frequently adopted by rebel groups with revolutionary goals, to show how this strategy transcends beyond discrete ideologies, to illustrate that this strategy appears to shape both the Islamic State's military and governing behaviors in practice, and to identify the role religious ideology plays, if any, in the Islamic State's governance and violence. By approaching the Islamic State through a framework embedded within a broader historical context, the Islamic State is correctly understood as not fundamentally unique compared to other rebel groups—jihadist or otherwise—and presents the organization's strategy and behaviors as akin to any other rebel group with similar ambitions (revolution), regardless of ideology. In so doing, by distinguishing the aspects of the Islamic State's behavior attributable to religious ideology and those that are not, we are better able to understand the conditions under which religious ideology plays a role in conflict, and in what ways, thereby avoiding essentialist arguments that root the Islamic State's behaviors in Islam. Finally, one of the primary contributions is to illustrate how ideas and practices are learned by rebel groups, and the conditions under which these ideas spread, even across ideologically opposed organizations.

This essay is structured as follows. First, I explain a strategy for the conduct of civil war implemented, but especially propagated, by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This strategy consciously combines political (meaning governance) and military elements to realize social and political transformation during civil war. Then, I explain how the CCP's strategy has diffused across ideological lines such that it has been adapted and incorporated into jihadist rebel groups with similarly revolutionary ambitions. Third, I review how the IS puts into practice both the violence and governance components of revolutionary war. Finally, I conclude with a discussion about how the IS's violent and governing behaviors are directly linked to, and an echo of, communist rebel groups of the mid-twentieth century and are neither new nor particularly Islamic, but I illustrate how and when an Islamic ideology affects rebel organizational behavior with respect to governance.

The Origins of the Islamic State's Strategies

The Islamic State's behaviors with respect to governance and violence are not new or original emanations of the IS's religious ideology. Rather, the strategic origins begin with Mao Zedong and the CCP during the Chinese Civil War that began in the 1920s.

Prior to the Chinese Civil War, many revolutions and civil wars unfolded as periods of state contestation, followed by social and political restructuring and consolidation after this period (Skocpol 1979, 163–4; Mondlane 1983, 163; Huntington 2006, 266). For instance, the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Jacobins in France first seized the reins of state power *before* undertaking massive socioeconomic and political restructuring. Likewise, this step-wise trajectory was similar for many rebel groups: although some rebel groups governed during war, many preferred to save technically complex reforms not directly related to the military struggle until the end of conflict.

Unlike many other previous revolutionaries and rebel groups, the Chinese Communist Party undertook a concerted effort to integrate the typically sequential processes of contestation and consolidation. Rather than pursue military victory followed by socioeconomic and political restructuring, the CCP pursued social transformation alongside and simultaneous with military confrontations against the state or other rebel organizations (Chen 1986; Selden 1995; Pepper 1999; Opper 2018; Mao 2011, [1937] 1989). To Mao, the political and the military aspects of civil war are inherently intertwined (Mao [1937] 1989, 42–44).

On the military side, although the CCP is best known for its use of guerrilla warfare—defined as relatively mobile bands of combatants that use the element of surprise to attack much more powerful enemies (Mao [1937] 1989, 96–98)—this was not the sole element with which the CCP pursued military victory. Instead, the CCP understood civil war as a dynamic process characterized by three phases. In the first phase, frequently covert and cellular rebel elements would lay the groundwork for more overt operations. In the second phase, these cells would eventually become mobile guerrilla bands, which would eventually transition to, in the third phase, conventional military forces that would encircle major cities and finally seize power through conventional forces (21–22). The dynamic process was not expected to proceed in a linear and step-wise fashion: Mao envisioned regression, progression, and combination across different military stages in pursuit of final victory (see, e.g., Mao 2011, loc. 43-75).

At the same time, the CCP also undertook a set of political behaviors intended to accelerate the transformation of societies and individuals during conflict. This basket of political activities formed a concerted propaganda (psychological) campaign (Mao [1937] 1989, 85, 103), with appeals to certain constituencies (see, e.g., Snow 1968; Larkin 1973; Friedman 2015; Lovell 2019) within the international system and the creation of an elaborate system of governance (Seybolt 1971; Minden 1979; Yung-Fa 1986; Huang 1995; Pepper 1999; Griffin 2015; Opper 2018). The governance apparatus the CCP constructed included new educational (Seybolt 1971) and healthcare systems (Minden 1979, 302), utilities and electricity response teams (Pepper 1999, 392), land redistribution (Pepper 1999, 307) and regulatory economic policies (Huang 1995, 119), the "liberation" of women (Seybolt 1971, 646), the introduction of elections (Selden 1995, 103–109), and a new judicial structure (Griffin 2015, 97–100).

Most critically, however, was that the CCP packaged together these behaviors as part of a coherent and unified strategy, and then propagated this strategy globally. Indeed, the CCP even understood its experience—the multidimensional approach to conflict—as a "model" to be emulated by other rebel groups the world over (Larkin 1973, 148). Lu Dingyi, one of the CCP's chief theorists, argued that the Chinese Civil War provided a "model for the 'colonial and semi-colonial countries'" in pursuing their own revolution (Friedman 2015, 27). For instance, during the civil war, the CCP was keen to highlight its electoral institutions to British and American missionaries in China, who were quick to praise the communist rebels for adopting these governance forms upon witnessing the CCP's elections take place (Selden 1995, 103). Mao and the CCP cadres also composed and disseminated numerous texts relating to the civil war and Maoist thought that were published globally (e.g., Mao [1937] 1989, 2011). In what was perhaps most important to the propaganda campaign, the CCP also carefully orchestrated a visit from a Western journalist, Edward Snow, to tour its liberated areas (Lovell 2019, 61–62). Snow then published his favorable account of life in the CCP's liberated areas, titled *Red Star over China*, a text that captured the attention of people and partisans around the world. Even anti-Nazi partisans in Europe read these highly favorable accounts of the CCP (Lovell 2019, 62, 470).

Beyond just spreading information during the Chinese Civil War, the CCP also trained many would-be rebels, none of whom were more famous than Ho Chi Minh, who would lead the Viet Minh against the French in the First Indochinese War (Wilson Center, n.d.). Although Ho's training took place in the heat of battle during the Chinese Civil War itself, once the CCP secured victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, the CCP was able to institutionalize a training course for rebel groups. For rebellions already underway, the CCP offered political and material aid (Van Ness 1970, 82, 87), and even offered to provide military support if cadres of rebel groups agreed to complete a training course in China (Crosby 1968).

Over time, more and more rebel groups with similar long-term objectives of revolution—meaning goals for the creation of a new state and society, (and not goals for autonomy, reform, or the preservation of culture)—but not necessarily the same ideologies as the CCP, learned from and decided to imitate the CCP's template for how to execute revolution during their own civil wars. As an increasing number of rebel groups with revolutionary goals adopted the CCP's strategy, the CCP's template became delinked from the CCP's experience specifically (Stewart 2021). Instead, it ultimately became a general framework for the pursuit of *revolutionary warfare*—a specific portfolio of governance institutions alongside a strategy for how to contest the state and civilian enemies with violence. Importantly, as I discuss more in the next section, this institutional and warmaking framework was ideologically flexible and adaptable to local conditions. For instance, the revolutionary warfare template included the construction of schools, but the nature of the schools, the content of the curriculum, and the beneficiaries of such education were left to the interpretation and adaptation of later rebel groups. Likewise, although discriminate violence is a feature of nearly all civil wars to varying degrees, the targets of discriminate violence may vary from location to location and depend upon ideology. In other words, the strategy of revolutionary warfare provided a general framework for rebels, which could then be adapted to local conditions and ideologies as necessary.

Furthermore, this revolutionary warfare approach came to dominate over alternative strategies for pursuing revolution during civil war. For instance, although the Russian Revolution preceded the Chinese Civil War by about a decade, the Bolsheviks achieved their revolution through a putsch, not civil war. As a result, even the Chinese Communist Party came to cast the Russian Revolution as a model for revolution in industrial countries, but not in colonial or semi-colonial countries (Friedman 2015, 27). Likewise, because the CCP had begun propagating its experience as a template during its civil war in the early half of the twentieth century, it had a several-decades head start before the innovation of other models. Even if one considers Che Guevara's approach to guerrilla warfare to fully constitute an alternative and nonderivative strategy,[1] Guevara only published his seminal text for guerrilla fighters in 1961, years after other rebel leaders were trained or had their cadres trained in China. Ultimately, the subsequent adaptation of the CCP's strategy by later revolutionary rebel groups limited the space for innovation for alternative approaches and strategies for the conduct of revolution during civil war.

To summarize, the CCP integrated sociopolitical transformation alongside warfare during civil conflict, packaged this strategy together, and propagated it globally. Other rebel groups with goals similar to the CCP increasingly adopted this strategy, such that it became delinked from the CCP's experience specifically, and generally became known as *revolutionary warfare*. Furthermore, the commonplace implementation of this strategy among rebels meant that there was limited space for innovation or alternative strategic models for pursuing revolution during civil war. In the next section, I illustrate the flexibility of revolutionary warfare with respect to ideological backgrounds.

Revolutionary Warfare Spreads to Jihadist Rebel Groups

The adaptation and implementation of non-Islamic strategic approaches and texts by jihadist organizations is not unusual (see, e.g., Lia and Hegghammer 2004; Brooke 2008) and the CCP's revolutionary warfare strategy is not immune to cross-ideological adaptation. For instance, in its infancy, Hezbollah leaders learned from the CCP's revolutionary warfare model and even explicitly referenced Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh as paragon examples worthy of emulation (al-Hassan 2012; Daana 2013; Al Sayegh 2014). Hezbollah's mimicry of leftist groups was not simply a function of its leaders' lack of knowledge about other organizational forms or strategies: Hezbollah's leaders consciously determined to avoid organizational models such as that of the fellow Shiʿa Daʿwa party in Iraq (AbuKhalil 1991, 392), and instead decided to learn from and emulate leftist revolutionary rebel groups that achieved success just a decade or two earlier (Kahveci 1998; Khashan and Mousawi 2007, 5–7; Daana 2013; Qassim 2017). In addition, Hezbollah's organizational structure closely mirrors the organizational structure of leftist revolutionary rebels (AbuKhalil 1991, 397), and commentators on Hezbollah's own website even note that Hezbollah implements a strategy of revolutionary warfare that contains asymmetric violence alongside governance, that this strategy was created by the CCP, and that the organization should be understood and considered within the tradition of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara (Kahveci 1998; Qassim 2017).

Hezbollah is far from the only jihadist organization to learn from the CCP's revolutionary warfare strategy. In fact, several al-Qaʿida strategists have learned directly from the Chinese model. One such example is Abu Musab al-Suri, a jihadist writer who is acutely aware of his intellectual tradition among leftist revolutionary warfare thinkers, including Mao (Ryan 2013, 231), and even explicitly cites these communist thinkers and practitioners to justify his own claims (Ryan 2013, 233–234). Al-Suri's revolutionary war strategy, like Mao's, includes three phases of war—exhaustion, balance, and decision or liberation (Ryan 2013, 230)—and culminates in establishing a political entity with a basis in shariʿa law during war itself (Ryan 2013, 234).

A second al-Qaʿida strategist, Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, is similarly explicit in his advocacy for jihadist rebels adopting the Chinese Communist Party's model of revolutionary war as a template for the relatively "weak against the strong" (Ryan 2013, 86). He repeatedly and blatantly cites the CCP as a model of "Revolutionary War" to emulate, specifically emphasizing Mao's classic three-phased military campaign, as well as the CCP's governing and propaganda components. According to al-Qurashi, "[m]ost revolutionary movements spend some time to set up not only the local administration but also parallel governmental institutions. . . . Thus the Chinese 'people's war' (for example) witnessed the establishment of a state within a state in regions controlled by the communist forces in China" (Ryan 2013, 88–89). Al-Qurashi's acknowledgement of the influence of the CCP's experience on his own work is clear, and, like the CCP, Qurashi advocates for the implementation of both the military and political aspects of revolutionary warfare.

Al-Qurashi's work would go on to inspire other al-Qaʿida strategists, including Abu Bakr Naji, author of the influential jihadist text *The Management of Savagery* (Naji 2006; see also Ryan 2013, 199). Although Naji does not explicitly reference Mao in *The Management of Savagery*, he nevertheless encourages his readers to turn to al-Qurashi, who does reference Mao (Naji 2006, 30),[2] tells readers to review "[g]eneral books on the art of war, especially guerrilla wars, as long as the student is able to correct the Sharia mistakes that are in them" (30), and specifically references other rebel groups that adopted and implemented the revolutionary warfare strategy, including describing leftist organizations, as examples to emulate (14).

Though not explicitly stated, the similarities between Naji and Mao are unmistakable. For instance, both outline a three-phased, multidimensional military approach: Naji advocates for a period of violence that forces state or enemy forces to withdraw, followed by the control of territory whereby the initial institutions of an Islamic state administration are created, leading to a final decisive victory whereby an Islamic state is established (Ryan 2013, 168–169). Like Mao, Naji also describes the importance of small and mobile guerrilla warfare tactics that surprise the enemy through waves of consistent attacks, thereby militarily and economically draining him, and, like Mao, Naji advocates for initiating attacks in depopulated areas before contesting spaces where the state has greater control (Naji 2006, 29–30).

In pursuit of achieving the political, governance aspects of revolutionary warfare, Naji also left clear guidance as well. To facilitate this transformation from violent chaos to administered order, Naji lists twelve basic steps of governance procedures that ought to be completed during the course of war. This guidance includes:

- Spreading internal security and preserving it in every region that is managed
- Providing food and medical treatment
- Securing the region of savagery from the invasions of enemies by setting up defensive fortifications and developing fighting capacities
- Establishing Sharia justice among the people who live in the regions of savagery
- Raising the level of faith and combat efficiency during the training of the youth of the region of savagery and establishing a fighting society at all levels and among all individuals by means of making them aware of its importance. But it must be made clear that it is an obligatory duty . . . which does not mean that every individual member of society must practice fighting; rather, only a part or portion of the fighting ranks (must practice it) in the form which the society knows best and needs.
- Working for the spread of legal, Sharia science (putting the most important aspects before those of lesser importance) and worldly science (putting the most important aspects before those of lesser importance).
- Disseminating spies and seeking to complete the construction of a minimal intelligence agency.
- Uniting the hearts of the people by means of money and uniting the world by Sharia governance and (compliance with) rules which are at least exemplified by individuals in the administration.
- . . .
- To these we add a future goal, which is the advancement of managerial groups toward the attainment of the power of establishment and readiness for plucking the fruit (of their efforts) and establishing the state. (Naji 2006, 15–18)

Like Mao, the political element of revolutionary warfare, meaning governance to construct an ideal state during war, was an essential component of Naji's vision for executing jihad.

In the same way that Mao propagated his military and governance achievements, Naji is explicit about the use of propaganda through military and governance actions to attract a broad (if not global) coalition of followers. For instance, Naji notes that the "rate of operations escalates in order to send a living, practical message to the people, the masses, and the enemy's low-ranking troops that the power of the mujahids is on the rise . . . . This encourages the masses and revives hope within them and facilitates permanent support for the movement and the automatic escalation of the movement" (Naji 2006, 29). At the same time, Naji insists on developing a media plan for the "masses" that focuses on governance and administration so that "the masses fly to the regions which we manage, particularly the youth after news of (our) transparency and truthfulness reaches them so that they may be fully aware of the loss of money, people, and worldly gains" (21). Like Mao, Naji emphasizes the importance of propagating both the governance and military behaviors of jihadist groups, even beyond the theater of conflict.

To summarize, revolutionary warfare is not simply a leftist or communist strategy, and many jihadist rebels—ostensibly ideologically opposed to communism—adopted the package of military and political behaviors that make up revolutionary warfare. For instance, in the 1980s, Hezbollah adopted revolutionary warfare to the context of the Shiʿa in Lebanon. Likewise, al-Qaʿida strategists adapted and spread Mao's framework to other jihadist rebel groups globally.

THE ISLAMIC STATE AS A REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION

Although the Islamic State's ideology diverges from the communist, leftist, and national liberation rebel movements that preceded it decades earlier, the IS shares these rebel groups' goals of fundamentally transforming state and social institutions, a key determinant of revolutionary goals (Ryan 2014; Salih 2015; Whiteside 2016a, 2016b; Kalyvas 2018; Stewart 2021). Like rebel groups with revolutionary ambitions before them, the Islamic State implemented a template for pursuing revolution during civil war that closely mirrors the Chinese model, but the implementation thereof represents a jihadist interpretation of revolutionary warfare. This revolutionary warfare strategy is articulated throughout several jihadist texts, but especially in *The Management of Savagery*, which has in turn become one of the touchstone strategic works for the Islamic State's pursuit of its goals (Ryan 2014; Salih 2015; Al-Arab 2016; Whiteside 2016a, 2016b).

In this section, I summarize the Islamic State's strategic foundation in revolutionary warfare. I then detail how elements of IS's revolutionary warfare strategy, both violent and political, has shaped the group's behaviors in practice. As a result, because of the IS's ties to revolutionary warfare, its behaviors can be understood as neither particularly new nor inherently Islamic. I conclude with a discussion of what the Islamic State's adaptation of revolutionary warfare means for both the organization's future, as well as future jihadist movements.

The Islamic State's Strategic Foundation

As already noted, *The Management of Savagery* represents the evolution of revolutionary warfare, and is a jihadist interpretation of what is, at its heart, a relic of leftist revolutionaries of the Cold War. Despite its non-jihadist (even atheist) origins, most experts agree that the IS relies on the guidance contained in its pages (Ryan 2014; Hassan 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2016; Whiteside 2016b). According to Hassan (2015) and Weiss and Hassan (2016, 41–6, 218) the IS uses the text as a central part of its training curriculum. Additionally, because of the strict ideological interpretation and worldview of the IS, the organization has banned many texts that its cadres can read and consume. One of the few nonreligious texts that its leaders can read, however, is *The Management of Savagery* (see Weiss and Hassan 2016, 218), underscoring its importance among the leadership class and intellectual underpinnings of the Islamic State.

Even when the Islamic State itself is cautious not to overemphasize the roll of *The Management of Savagery* in the strategic guidance it issues to its cadres, the group admitted that "[a]s for the concise but beneficial 100 page book titled [*The Management of Savagery*] by an unknown author who only went by the penname Abu Bakr Naji, then when Shaykh al Zarqawi read this book he commented, 'it is as if the author knows what I am planning.' Note: Although Naji's book describes very precisely the overall strategy of the mujahidin, Naji fell into some errors in his discussions on issues related to the takfir of parties who forcefully resist the Shariah and its laws" (Islamic State 2015b, 39, fn. 2; see also Whiteside 2016b, 10). Thus, the IS admits to using the text in its curriculum, allows leaders to read it, and claims that it reflects the overall strategic choices that the group makes.[3]

Violence

From an operational level, the Islamic State's pattern of violence closely mirrors Naji's three-phase strategy of revolutionary war, and thus, in turn, Mao's three phases of revolutionary war. In its incipient stage (around the early 2000s), the IS launched a relatively anemic campaign of urban suicide terrorism combined with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that left the organization almost totally defeated (Hashim 2019, 26). By 2011, however, the organization had regrouped and began to diversify the types of violence the organization used. The IS used truck bombs to free imprisoned jihadist and to destroy soft targets, while also assassinating key opposition figures (Hashim 2019, 27). Around the time the IS entered into Syria, the group had, "conduct[ed] robberies, assassinations, acts of terror, sabotage, and other attacks termed 'war out of the dark'" (Whiteside 2016a, 745). Importantly, IS members explicitly pointed to certain passages as influential in justifying some of the violent tactics they have used. For instance, the group rationalizes public beheading through appeals to *The Management of Savagery* (Hassan 2015).

When the Islamic State entered the Syrian war and the second phase of the revolutionary warfare struggle, it relied on mobile guerrilla tactics to push out existing state forces or rival rebel organizations (Hashim 2019, 27). As the organization captured and controlled territory, it was able to seize and repurpose heavy artillery and weapons left by the fleeing forces. The IS amassed a large battalion of tanks, trucks, and anti-tank missiles used in both offensive and defensive campaigns. It even developed an elite conventional combat unit and had cultivated a relatively high degree of command and control (Maurer 2018, 232). The result was that by its height, the IS relied on an array of violent behaviors that included conventional military attacks (Maurer 2018; Hashim 2019, 27–28). The use of this form of violence coincides with Mao's and Naji's second phase of civil war and approached its third phase—guerrilla warfare to realize the construction of administrative structures, culminating in the final decisive blow to achieve victory with conventional warfare.

As an international coalition against the rebel movement coalesced and the Islamic State's territorial grasp slipped from its hands, the group's ability to conduct conventional attacks dwindled and disappeared. Increasingly, the IS resembles the organization it once was before it captured vast swaths of territory throughout Iraq and the Levant (Hashim 2019, 28). This regression away from conventional warfare—though certainly undesirable by the Islamic State—is completely consistent with Mao's own writing, which notes that progress in war is not linear, and a rebel group could move through and away from multiple phases of the guerrilla war campaign (Mao [1937] 1989, 21–22). Even Mao and the CCP progressed and regressed through the three stages of civil war, facing severe and almost insurmountable setbacks as well as realizing successes, before finally securing victory after nearly two decades of fighting (see, e.g., Mao 2011; Opper 2018).

Governance

As I and other scholars have explained, the Islamic State's violent behaviors closely mirror the revolutionary warfare that once characterized leftist and anticolonial rebel groups of the Cold War (Whiteside 2016a; Kalyvas 2018). But revolutionary warfare itself is not simply a military strategy; indeed, what makes revolutionary warfare revolutionary is that politics are central and indistinguishable from the military struggle (Mao [1937] 1989, 42–44). For the IS, the political aspects of revolutionary warfare entailed the creation of an Islamic state and a set of administrative structures that would underscore a wholly new Islamist society.

This portfolio of IS institutions mirrored many of the same institutional forms that the CCP created during war, although of course these institutions clearly differed along ideological grounds. For instance, while both the CCP and the Islamic State set up court systems, a central institutional form in the construction of a state, the CCP's included People's Tribunals and trials for counter-revolutionaries (Griffin 2015, 98–100), while the Islamic State's were premised on shariʿa law (Robinson et al. 2017, 167).

The similarities in the Islamic State's and the CCP's institutional forms do not simply end with the creation of a new judicial structure. Both organizations opened and transformed schools and hospitals (Robinson et al. 2017, xxi, xiv) under their control, albeit in different ways. Both organizations "nationalized" certain institutions (Robinson et al. 2017, 167), made land more easily available for its central constituency (Rukmini 2018),[4] and regulated the marketplace (Robinson et al. 2017, xxvi). Both focused their efforts to rehabilitate infrastructure and utilities (Robinson et al. 2017, xiv), and both changed the political institutions within the places they controlled (Reuter 2015). Both organizations sought to restructure the lives of women to better comport with ideological ideals (Islamic State 2015a, see, for example, specimens M, 1F, 1G, 1I, 1Y). As a whole, the Islamic State and the CCP created almost the same set of institutional forms, though the content and nature of these institutions varied in accordance with their divergent ideologies (see also Robinson et al. 2017, 80; Revkin 2020b).

In the same way that the Islamic State used violence to propagate itself and its deeds, the organization also propagated itself through the governance institutions that it created, just as the CCP had done. In its magazine, the IS called on all educated persons with technical expertise to serve as administrators within the caliphate (Islamic State 2014, 11). The magazine also featured a full page filled with quotes *from its enemies*, describing the IS as a "de facto state," in order to attract the backing and attention of potential supporters (Islamic State 2014, 32–33). Finally, a study of the Islamic State's propaganda found that over half of the material it produced covered its governance operations and the daily life of civilians living in its territory (Osborne 2015), again conforming to Naji's guidance while mirroring Mao's behaviors by propagating the governance institutions created within the territories the rebel group controlled.

Discussion and Role of Religious Ideology

In the previous section, I discussed how the Islamic State's violence and governance originate from a single strategy of revolutionary warfare. This strategy has its roots in the communist insurgencies of the Cold War that date back almost a century. Not only has the revolutionary warfare strategy been adapted by jihadist organizations and strategic thinkers, but the Islamic State learned from these jihadist thinkers, and in practice it unmistakably realizes almost the same governance portfolio and violence profile as the CCP and other revolutionary rebel groups. At the same time, like the CCP, the Islamic State has gone to great pains to highlight globally its violent and governing behaviors, highlighting both its violence alongside its simultaneous realization of its socioeconomic and political goals. Given the historical origins of the Islamic State's strategic behaviors, it would be incorrect to understand the Islamic State or its behaviors as something that is fundamentally new.

If the Islamic State's strategic framework is neither strictly jihadist nor an emanation of Islam, what role does religious ideology play in its behavior? Although a religious ideology did not appear to influence the decision to provide the portfolio of governance institutions the Islamic State has or the Islamic State's conduct of violence heretofore, religious ideology still influences some aspects of the Islamic State's behavior in ways that represent a point of departure from previous leftist and some jihadist organizations. Specifically, the Islamic State's religious ideology influences the nature, content, and beneficiaries of governance institutions, while also influencing the targets of violence and the primary recruits for the organization.

In terms of governance, religious ideology and cultural history have played a role in shaping the nature of the Islamic State's institutions, though not necessarily the decision to build institutions in the first place, or which specific institutions to build during war. For instance, although the Islamic State organized schools, just like the CCP, the schools' curriculum is devoid of secular topics and is instead closely tied to its religious ideologies (Khalil 2014). Likewise, where the CCP held elections for positions to administrate certain CCP programs (Selden 1995, 103–109), the Islamic State appoints an emir (Reuter 2015). The Islamic State's courts are also rooted in shariʿa law, while the CCP's courts were not. Finally, while both the CCP and IS sought to alter the roles of women (Spencer 2016), they held different expectations for what the role of women ought to be.

Similarly, Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014, 215) note that central to any ideology is a referent group around which grievances are articulated, as well as a plan of action to address these grievances. For the Islamic State, Sunni Muslims are the referent group, whereas for leftist rebel groups these referent classes are typically peasants or colonized persons. Thus, in the distribution of governance, the Islamic State prioritizes Sunni Muslims, whereas communists typically prioritized peasants. For instance, Christians are charged a religious tax that Sunni Muslims do not have to pay (Revkin 2020b), thereby implementing policies that favor Sunni Muslims over other religious and ethnic groups.

Likewise, while the specific forms of violence the Islamic State uses are not new (e.g., guerrilla warfare, discriminate lethal violence), the targets of this violence could be shaped by its religious ideology. For instance, the Islamic State's violence against certain religious or minority sects is a reflection of the group's ethno-sectarian referent group of Sunni Muslims. Likewise, the CCP's violence against members of a certain class (see, e.g., Opper 2018) is again partially a reflection of its ideological priorities. In other words, the Islamic State and the CCP might rely on the same forms of violence, but the targets of this violence are often shaped by their differing ideologies.

Because the revolutionary warfare strategy is not wedded to a particular ideology, the Islamic State's religious ideology does not make the group inherently unable to adapt the revolutionary warfare strategy. However, whereas members of other revolutionary rebel groups, including organizations like Hezbollah, were quick to explicitly compare themselves to the CCP, the Viet Minh, or other adapters of the Chinese model (Al Sayegh 2014), the strict religiosity of the Islamic State's ideology may prevent members from making direct comparisons between the two organizations. For instance, even though *The Management of Savagery* encourages readers to examine leftist revolutionary rebel groups in South America, it warns readers to correct for their un-Islamic tendencies (Naji 2006, 14). Thus, the Islamic State might be careful to distance itself from leftist rebel groups.

Alternatively, the consistent application of the CCP's strategy meant that the model became delinked from the CCP's experience specifically. Over time, it became a general strategic framework for pursuing revolution that could be learned from any other organization that adopted the CCP's approach. As a result, the Islamic State could be unaware of its communist roots and could have learned its strategies from a study of Hezbollah or some other jihadist rebel group that adopted the revolutionary warfare framework. Either way, the Islamic State need not know about the CCP specifically to adopt the strategy of revolutionary warfare that the CCP propagated.

Conclusion

Ultimately, in this essay, I argued that the Islamic State's strategy is not a unique product of its religious ideology. Rather, its strategy has its origins in the Chinese Communist Party's approach first propagated by the CCP almost a century ago. This strategy is ideologically flexible, however, allowing for local and non-leftist adaptations of the approach. As a result, although the Islamic State's strategic approach is not a product of religion or Islam, its interpretation and application of the approach does reflect its particular worldview and the ideas and practices that constitute this worldview.

Today, the Islamic State is but a shadow of its once formidable self. Reduced to almost no territorial control and holdings, the organization appears to be all but defeated. Although the Islamic State pales in comparison to itself just a few years ago, rebel regression from once great heights of power and control is built into the genetic makeup of the revolutionary warfare strategy. Not only did Mao, the initial propagator of revolutionary warfare, assume that rebel groups would face ebbs and flows in the pursuit of victory, he experienced them too. In the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party introduced governance initiatives that were so radical and extreme that it ended up triggering waves of civilian defections in support of its rival, the Kuomintang. With the help of civilian forces, the Kuomintang forced the CCP out of its foothold in southern China, precipitating a debilitating retreat to the CCP's northern base. Despite, these setbacks, Mao was nevertheless able to return and succeed a little more than a decade later. Because the CCP and the Islamic State rely on similar strategies, perhaps the Islamic State's current military regression and near defeat are more closely akin to Mao's Long March, meaning that total defeat is far from certain, and the Islamic State could survive to fight another day.

Even if the Islamic State never recovers and is duly defeated, the Islamic State's ability to capture global attention through its use of a revolutionary warfare strategy may serve to perpetuate the strategy, now nearly a century old. Furthermore, the application of the revolutionary warfare strategy by the Islamic State may serve as another template for how jihadist groups could integrate the CCP's strategies into a non-leftist framework that might be used by jihadist organizations at a later time.

NOTES

1. According to Wickham-Crowley (1987, 483–489) the Cuban revolutionaries engaged in some forms of governance and similarly undertook guerrilla warfare, so the degree of substantial difference between the CCP's approach and Guevara's remains unclear.
2. The translation of *The Management of Savagery* contains page numbers for the translation and notes, but also keeps the original page numbers of the untranslated work in brackets. I cite the original page numbers of the text reported in brackets.
3. Although the work of al-Qaʿida strategist al-Suri was highly influential, the Islamic State's leadership does not recommend this work (Islamic State 2015b, 39, fn. 2; Whiteside 2016b, 10). As a result, I primarily focus on the Islamic State's imitation and implementation of *The Management of Savagery*.
4. For instance, the CCP redistributed land after a class analysis of peasants, whereas the Islamic State confiscated land often owned by Christians and then rented it back to poorer Muslims.

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